McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.

72 S.E.2d 860, 236 N.C. 396, 1952 N.C. LEXIS 565

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedNovember 5, 1952

Docket391

StatusPublished

Cited by39 cases

This text of 72 S.E.2d 860 (McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co., 72 S.E.2d 860, 236 N.C. 396, 1952 N.C. LEXIS 565 (N.C. 1952).

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Opinion

EbviN, J.

Tbe appeal presents tbe single question whether tbe presiding judge erred in overruling tbe demurrer interposed by tbe defendant on tbe ground tbat tbe complaint discloses upon its face tbat there is another action pending between tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant for tbe same cause within tbe purview of tbe statute codified as G.S. 1-127.

Tbe pendency of a prior action between tbe same parties for tbe same cause in a State court of competent jurisdiction works an abatement of a subsequent action either in tbe same court or in another court of tbe State having like jurisdiction. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E. 2d 796; Seawell v. Purvis, 232 N.C. 194, 59 S.E. 2d 572; Brothers v. Bakeries, 231 N.C. 428, 57 S.E. 2d 317; Whitehurst v. Hinton, 230 N.C. 16, 51 S.E. 2d 899; Taylor v. Schaub, 225 N.C. 134, 33 S.E. 2d 658; Moore v. Moore, 224 N.C. 552, 31 S.E. 2d 690; O'Briant v. Bennett, 213 N.C. 400, 196 S.E. 336; Bowling v. Bank, 209 N.C. 463, 184 S.E. 13; Brown v. Polk, 201 N.C. 375, 160 S.E. 357; Bank v. Broadhurst, 197 N.C. 365, 148 S.E. 452; Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686, 64 A.L.R. 656; Morrison v. Lewis, 197 N.C. 79, 147 S.E. 729; Grouse v. York, 192 N.C. 824, 135 S.E. 451; Bradshaw v. Bank, 175 N.C. 21, 94 S.E. 674; Carpenter v. Hanes, 162 N.C. 46, 77 S.E. 1101; Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 62 S.E. 411; Ridley v. Railroad, 118 N.C. 996, 24 S.E. 730; McNeill v. Currie, 117 N.C. 341, 23 S.E. 216; Long v. Jarratt, 94 N.C. 443; Redfearn v. Austin, 88 N.C. 413; Smith v. Moore, 79 N.C. 82; Gray v. A. & N. C. R. R. Co., 77 N.C. 299; Claywell v. Sudderth, 77 N.C. 287; Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 29; Woody v. Jordan, 69 N.C. 189; Harris v. Johnson, 65 N.C. 478; Casey v. Harrison, 13 N.C. 244. Tbe law decrees tbat tbe second action is abated by tbe action which is first in point of time because tbe court can dispose of tbe entire controversy in tbe prior action and in consequence tbe subsequent action is wholly unnecessary. Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79; 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, section 33. An action is pending for tbe purpose of abating a subsequent action between tbe same parties for *399 tbe same cause from tbe time of tbe issuance of tbe summons until its final determination by judgment. McFetters v. McFetters, 219 N.C. 731, 14 S.E. 2d 833; Atkinson v. Greene, 197 N.C. 118, 147 S.E. 811; Morrison v. Lewis, supra; Construction Co. v. Ice Co., 190 N.C. 580, 130 S.E. 165; Pettigrew v. McCoin, 165 N.C. 472, 81 S.E. 701, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 79.

Under tbe statute codified as G.S. 1-127, tbe defendant must take advantage of tbe pendency of a prior suit between tbe same parties for tbe same cause by demurrer when tbe fact of sucb pendency appears on tbe face of tbe complaint; and under tbe statute embodied in G.S. 1-133, tbe defendant must take advantage of tbe pendency of a prior suit between tbe same parties for tbe same cause by answer when tbe fact of sucb pendency does not appear on tbe face of tbe complaint. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E. 2d 641; Dwiggins v. Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E. 2d 892; Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 222 N.C. 87, 21 S.E. 2d 893; Thompson v. R. R., 216 N.C. 554, 6 S.E. 2d 38; Johnson v. Smith, 215 N.C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834; Reed v. Mortgage Co., 207 N.C. 27, 175 S.E. 834; Allen v. Salley, 179 N.C. 147, 101 S.E. 545; Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 83, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1137; Emry v. Chappell, supra; Alexander v. Norwood, 118 N.C. 381, 24 S.E. 119; Curtis v. Piedmont Co., 109 N.C. 401, 13 S.E. 944; Hawkins v. Hughes, 87 N.C. 115; Smith v. Moore, supra; Harris v. Johnson, supra; Rogers v. Holt, 62 N.C. 108. Tbe objection tbat a prior action is pending between tbe same parties for tbe same cause is waived unless it is raised in tbe mode appointed by law. G.S. 1-134; Reece v. Reece, supra; S. v. Gant, 201 N.C. 211, 159 S.E. 427; Montague v. Brown, 104 N.C. 161, 10 S.E. 186; Blackwell v. Dibbrell, 103 N.C. 270, 9 S.E. 192.

Since a demurrer is itself a critic, it ought to be free from imperfections. Williams v. Seaboard Air Line By. Go., 165 Ga. 655, 141 S.E. 80S. The only office of a demurrer is to test tbe legal sufficiency of the facts stated in tbe pleading of an adversary. In consequence, it is not permissible for a demurrant to incorporate in bis demurrer facts not shown by tbe pleading challenged by tbe demurrer. Where a demurrer to a complaint invokes tbe aid of a supposed fact which does not appear in tbe complaint, it is a “speaking demurrer,” and offends both tbe common law and code systems of pleading. Tbe court will not consider tbe supposed fact introduced by tbe “speaking demurrer” in passing on tbe legal sufficiency of tbe facts alleged in tbe complaint. Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E. 2d 371; Nall v. McConnell, 211 N.C. 258, 190 S.E. 210; Morrow v. Cline, 211 N.C. 254, 190 S.E. 207; Ball v. Hendersonville, 205 N.C. 414, 171 S.E. 622; Southerland v. Harrell, 204 N.C. 675, 169 S.E. 423; Ellis v. Perley, 200 N.C. 403, 157 S.E. 29; Hamilton v. Rocky Mount, 199 N.C. 504, 154 S.E. 844; Reel v. Boyd, 195 N.C. *400 273, 141 S.E. 891; Brick Co. v. Gentry, 191 N.C. 636, 132 S.E. 800; Latham v. Highway Commission, 185 N.C. 134, 116 S.E. 85; Moody v. Wike, 170 N.C. 541, 87 S.E. 350; Wood v. Kincaid, 144 N.C. 393, 57 S.E. 4; Davison v. Gregory, 132 N.C. 389, 43 S.E. 916; Van Glahn v. De Rossett, 76 N.C. 292; 71 C.J.S., Pleading, section 256.

The task of applying the relevant rules to the case at bar must now be performed. The demurrer under scrutiny is a “speaking demurrer,” for it invokes the aid of supposed facts which, do not appear in the complaint. When these supposed facts are disregarded and recourse is had to the complaint itself, it is plain that the only facts properly before the court having any pertinency to the legal question raised by the demurrer are those set out in the extraneous allegation “that the defendant, in order to harass the plaintiff, instituted a suit in Mecklenburg County after this suit had been instituted about the identical matters and things in this complaint.”

While this allegation does state that this action and the Mecklenburg suit are between the same parties for the same cause, it does not aver that the Mecklenburg suit is the prior action.

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EbviN, J.

Tbe appeal presents tbe single question whether tbe presiding judge erred in overruling tbe demurrer interposed by tbe defendant on tbe ground tbat tbe complaint discloses upon its face tbat there is another action pending between tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant for tbe same cause within tbe purview of tbe statute codified as G.S. 1-127.

Tbe pendency of a prior action between tbe same parties for tbe same cause in a State court of competent jurisdiction works an abatement of a subsequent action either in tbe same court or in another court of tbe State having like jurisdiction. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E. 2d 796; Seawell v. Purvis, 232 N.C. 194, 59 S.E. 2d 572; Brothers v. Bakeries, 231 N.C. 428, 57 S.E. 2d 317; Whitehurst v. Hinton, 230 N.C. 16, 51 S.E. 2d 899; Taylor v. Schaub, 225 N.C. 134, 33 S.E. 2d 658; Moore v. Moore, 224 N.C. 552, 31 S.E. 2d 690; O'Briant v. Bennett, 213 N.C. 400, 196 S.E. 336; Bowling v. Bank, 209 N.C. 463, 184 S.E. 13; Brown v. Polk, 201 N.C. 375, 160 S.E. 357; Bank v. Broadhurst, 197 N.C. 365, 148 S.E. 452; Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686, 64 A.L.R. 656; Morrison v. Lewis, 197 N.C. 79, 147 S.E. 729; Grouse v. York, 192 N.C. 824, 135 S.E. 451; Bradshaw v. Bank, 175 N.C. 21, 94 S.E. 674; Carpenter v. Hanes, 162 N.C. 46, 77 S.E. 1101; Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 62 S.E. 411; Ridley v. Railroad, 118 N.C. 996, 24 S.E. 730; McNeill v. Currie, 117 N.C. 341, 23 S.E. 216; Long v. Jarratt, 94 N.C. 443; Redfearn v. Austin, 88 N.C. 413; Smith v. Moore, 79 N.C. 82; Gray v. A. & N. C. R. R. Co., 77 N.C. 299; Claywell v. Sudderth, 77 N.C. 287; Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 29; Woody v. Jordan, 69 N.C. 189; Harris v. Johnson, 65 N.C. 478; Casey v. Harrison, 13 N.C. 244. Tbe law decrees tbat tbe second action is abated by tbe action which is first in point of time because tbe court can dispose of tbe entire controversy in tbe prior action and in consequence tbe subsequent action is wholly unnecessary. Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79; 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, section 33. An action is pending for tbe purpose of abating a subsequent action between tbe same parties for *399 tbe same cause from tbe time of tbe issuance of tbe summons until its final determination by judgment. McFetters v. McFetters, 219 N.C. 731, 14 S.E. 2d 833; Atkinson v. Greene, 197 N.C. 118, 147 S.E. 811; Morrison v. Lewis, supra; Construction Co. v. Ice Co., 190 N.C. 580, 130 S.E. 165; Pettigrew v. McCoin, 165 N.C. 472, 81 S.E. 701, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 79.

Under tbe statute codified as G.S. 1-127, tbe defendant must take advantage of tbe pendency of a prior suit between tbe same parties for tbe same cause by demurrer when tbe fact of sucb pendency appears on tbe face of tbe complaint; and under tbe statute embodied in G.S. 1-133, tbe defendant must take advantage of tbe pendency of a prior suit between tbe same parties for tbe same cause by answer when tbe fact of sucb pendency does not appear on tbe face of tbe complaint. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E. 2d 641; Dwiggins v. Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E. 2d 892; Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 222 N.C. 87, 21 S.E. 2d 893; Thompson v. R. R., 216 N.C. 554, 6 S.E. 2d 38; Johnson v. Smith, 215 N.C. 322, 1 S.E. 2d 834; Reed v. Mortgage Co., 207 N.C. 27, 175 S.E. 834; Allen v. Salley, 179 N.C. 147, 101 S.E. 545; Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 83, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1137; Emry v. Chappell, supra; Alexander v. Norwood, 118 N.C. 381, 24 S.E. 119; Curtis v. Piedmont Co., 109 N.C. 401, 13 S.E. 944; Hawkins v. Hughes, 87 N.C. 115; Smith v. Moore, supra; Harris v. Johnson, supra; Rogers v. Holt, 62 N.C. 108. Tbe objection tbat a prior action is pending between tbe same parties for tbe same cause is waived unless it is raised in tbe mode appointed by law. G.S. 1-134; Reece v. Reece, supra; S. v. Gant, 201 N.C. 211, 159 S.E. 427; Montague v. Brown, 104 N.C. 161, 10 S.E. 186; Blackwell v. Dibbrell, 103 N.C. 270, 9 S.E. 192.

Since a demurrer is itself a critic, it ought to be free from imperfections. Williams v. Seaboard Air Line By. Go., 165 Ga. 655, 141 S.E. 80S. The only office of a demurrer is to test tbe legal sufficiency of the facts stated in tbe pleading of an adversary. In consequence, it is not permissible for a demurrant to incorporate in bis demurrer facts not shown by tbe pleading challenged by tbe demurrer. Where a demurrer to a complaint invokes tbe aid of a supposed fact which does not appear in tbe complaint, it is a “speaking demurrer,” and offends both tbe common law and code systems of pleading. Tbe court will not consider tbe supposed fact introduced by tbe “speaking demurrer” in passing on tbe legal sufficiency of tbe facts alleged in tbe complaint. Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E. 2d 371; Nall v. McConnell, 211 N.C. 258, 190 S.E. 210; Morrow v. Cline, 211 N.C. 254, 190 S.E. 207; Ball v. Hendersonville, 205 N.C. 414, 171 S.E. 622; Southerland v. Harrell, 204 N.C. 675, 169 S.E. 423; Ellis v. Perley, 200 N.C. 403, 157 S.E. 29; Hamilton v. Rocky Mount, 199 N.C. 504, 154 S.E. 844; Reel v. Boyd, 195 N.C. *400 273, 141 S.E. 891; Brick Co. v. Gentry, 191 N.C. 636, 132 S.E. 800; Latham v. Highway Commission, 185 N.C. 134, 116 S.E. 85; Moody v. Wike, 170 N.C. 541, 87 S.E. 350; Wood v. Kincaid, 144 N.C. 393, 57 S.E. 4; Davison v. Gregory, 132 N.C. 389, 43 S.E. 916; Van Glahn v. De Rossett, 76 N.C. 292; 71 C.J.S., Pleading, section 256.

The task of applying the relevant rules to the case at bar must now be performed. The demurrer under scrutiny is a “speaking demurrer,” for it invokes the aid of supposed facts which, do not appear in the complaint. When these supposed facts are disregarded and recourse is had to the complaint itself, it is plain that the only facts properly before the court having any pertinency to the legal question raised by the demurrer are those set out in the extraneous allegation “that the defendant, in order to harass the plaintiff, instituted a suit in Mecklenburg County after this suit had been instituted about the identical matters and things in this complaint.”

While this allegation does state that this action and the Mecklenburg suit are between the same parties for the same cause, it does not aver that the Mecklenburg suit is the prior action. Indeed, it makes the diametrically opposite assertion that this action is the first one in point of time and that the Mecklenburg suit was brought “after this suit had been instituted.” This being true, the judgment overruling the demurrer must be

Affirmed.

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