OPINION
FOLEY, Judge.
These appeals were combined for purposes of oral argument. They present constitutional challenges to the criminal refusal statute and the implied consent advisory. Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. la, § 169.123, subd. 2(b) (Supp.1989). The trial courts in the individual cases found the statutes unconstitutional, on differing grounds and either dismissed the criminal prosecutions or rescinded the driver’s license revocations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in each case.
FACTS
The facts of each of these individual cases are of limited relevance to the constitutional and statutory issues presented. There is, for example, no issue as to the legality of the investigative stops, or the officers’ compliance with the statute in reading the implied consent advisory. We state the facts only briefly to describe the trial court decisions and to frame the discussion which follows.
State v. McCauley
Michael Joseph McCauley was stopped after allegedly being clocked driving at over 80 mph. The police report states McCauley admitted having had three beers. [366]*366He refused to take the portable breath test, and after being read the advisory, he refused testing.
McCauley was charged with gross misdemeanor DWI, gross misdemeanor refusal, misdemeanor DWI and speeding. He moved to dismiss the refusal charge on constitutional grounds. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the implied consent advisory and the criminal refusal statute were unconstitutionally vague, but rejecting McCauley’s other constitutional arguments. The state appeals.
State v. Driver
Keith Arnold Driver was allegedly stopped for speeding. After allegedly failing the field sobriety tests and the portable breath test, Driver was read the implied consent advisory in the squad car and refused to take a breath test.
Driver was charged with two counts of gross misdemeanor DWI and one count of gross misdemeanor refusal. He moved to dismiss for lack of probable cause, and moved to dismiss the refusal charge based on the unconstitutionality of the statute. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, but granted the motion to dismiss the refusal charge. The state appeals.
McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety
Lisa Kay McDonnell was stopped by an officer who observed her driving erratically. The officer observed indicia of intoxication and arrested McDonnell for DWI. He transported her to the police department, and read her the implied consent advisory. McDonnell refused to submit to testing and her driver’s license was revoked. She petitioned for judicial review.
After a hearing, the trial court found McDonnell understood the advisory and made a knowing refusal. The court held, however, that the officer should have determined whether McDonnell had a prior revocation that would subject her to the criminal refusal law. If she did not, ruled the trial court, there was no need to advise her that refusal may subject her to criminal penalties. If she did, the officer should have advised her of the potential penalty and the right to counsel. The trial court held that failure to do so violated McDonnell’s fifth amendment rights and found that the new law added more confusion to the advisory. It rescinded the revocation. The Commissioner of Public Safety appeals.
Moser v. Commissioner of Public Safety
An officer stopped Cindy Jean Moser in her vehicle when he saw it swerving within the traffic lane. After observing indicia of intoxication, he arrested her for DWI. The implied consent advisory was read to Mos-er. She testified she was confused by the language of the advisory and asked the officer to re-read certain paragraphs to her. Moser and the officer spent approximately 11 minutes discussing the advisory, after which she agreed to take a test. She testified that had she not thought she was subject to criminal prosecution, she would have refused to take the test. The test showed an alcohol concentration of .13, and Moser’s license was revoked pursuant to the implied consent law. She petitioned for judicial review.
The trial court found that Moser, who had no prior revocations, was confused by the language of the advisory. It held that the implied consent advisory was a misstatement of law as applied to Moser, which prevented her from voluntarily consenting to the test and rendered the advisory ineffective. The trial court rescinded the revocation. The Commissioner of Public Safety appeals.
Weeding v. Commissioner of Public Safety
An officer stopped Troy Eugene Weeding after noticing erratic driving. He then observed Weeding exhibit indicia of intoxication, and arrested him for DWI. The officer read the implied consent advisory to Weeding and asked him if he understood. Weeding replied “sure,” but refused to take a test. Weeding had a prior license revocation.
[367]*367Weeding’s driver’s license was revoked for refusing testing, and he petitioned for judicial review. The trial court, in an extensive memorandum, ruled that Weeding’s fifth amendment rights, sixth amendment rights, and fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection rights were not violated. However, it rescinded the revocation on the grounds that the advisory was a misstatement of law and misleading because it did not fully inform Weeding of his rights and the consequences of refusing testing. The Commissioner of Public Safety appeals.
ISSUES
1. What is the effect of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. la (Supp.1989) on the supreme court’s interpretation of a driver’s fifth and sixth amendment rights in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 586, 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)?
2. Is the language of the implied consent advisory or the criminal refusal statute void for vagueness or so misleading as to compel rescission of a driver’s license revocation?
3. Does either the advisory or the criminal statute violate equal protection?
ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court very recently spoke on the issue of drunk driving: “No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunk driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.” Michigan Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, — U.S.-, -, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). The Minnesota Supreme Court and this court also have recognized that “drunken drivers pose a severe threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota.” Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 63 (Minn.1983); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Minn. App.1985). In response to this serious problem the legislature has enacted strict laws. Szczech v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 343 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn.App.1984). The courts have repeatedly recognized these are remedial statutes that must be liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interest of the drivers involved. State, Dep’t of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1981). It is in light of these problems and principles that we analyze the issues presented today.
Many challenges to the criminal refusal statute and the corresponding amendment to the implied consent advisory have come to this court. See Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. la, § 169.123, subd. 2(b). In order to address the statutes in an expedient manner, five cases were selected that raised various challenges to the statutes. Though not consolidated, these cases were orally argued together, and we decide them today.
I.
A. Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only to a critical stage of a criminal prosecution, beginning at the point when formal judicial proceedings commence. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has identified the starting point of criminal proceedings as the complaint, preliminary hearing, or arraignment. Id. In Nyflot, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach at the time a driver is given the implied consent advisory because formal judicial proceedings have not, at that point, begun. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516. The criminal refusal statute does nothing to hasten the stage of formal charging.
In Nyflot, the supreme court noted Justice Rehnquist’s statement in United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984), indicating that custodial interrogation was the
only arguable deviation from the usual rule that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not triggered until the com[368]*368mencement of adversary judicial proceedings.
Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516. The United States Supreme Court has consistently followed this position in later decisions. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431-32, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (no sixth amendment right to counsel when attorney attempted to contact uncharged suspect undergoing custodial interrogation); see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S.Ct. 477, 484, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (right attaches after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings).
A driver arrested and read the implied consent advisory has neither been charged nor arraigned. The addition of the criminal sanction for refusal does not make the advisory stage itself an “adversary judicial criminal proceeding[ ].” Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189, 104 S.Ct. at 2298. The implied consent advisory previously warned the driver of possible criminal liability if he failed the test. See Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(3) (1988). The attachment of criminal sanctions to the other choice, refusal, does not make the advisory an adversarial proceeding.
A state court may interpret its own constitutional provision more expansively than a similar or identical provision in the United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn.1988). However, the supreme court has recognized a broader right to counsel than required by the federal constitution only under the supreme court’s supervisory power and not under a broader state constitutional analysis. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Minn.1983); Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn.1979). This court will not extend the state constitutional right to counsel beyond the bounds recognized by the supreme court.
B. Fifth Amendment
1. Federal Constitution
The fifth amendment to the federal constitution provides that: “No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The procedural safeguards under the fifth amendment, including the right to an attorney, are meant to secure the privilege against self-incrimination when custodial interrogation occurs. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602,1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The fifth amendment right to counsel is distinct from the sixth amendment right to counsel; the latter is triggered by the commencement of adverse judicial proceedings. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. at 2297 n. 5.
The fifth amendment privilege has both “testimonial” and “compulsion” components. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, — U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2644, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990). It only protects an accused “from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).
The fifth amendment does not protect a suspect from being compelled to produce a blood sample, because a blood sample is “real or physical” evidence. Id. at 764-65, 86 S.Ct. at 1832. Nor does introduction into evidence of a person’s refusal to submit to a test violate a person’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, because when an officer lawfully requests a test, refusal is not an act “coerced” by the officer. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 922, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983).
In Nyflot, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the right to counsel recognized in Miranda does not apply to the limited questioning of a driver to determine if he or she will consent to a chemical test, because the inquiry of whether a suspect will take a test is not “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516; see also State v. Whitehead, 458 N.W.2d 145, 148 (Minn.App.1990).
One aspect of the issue before this court, therefore, is whether, because a criminal penalty now attaches when certain repeat offenders refuse testing, questioning them to determine if they will take a chemical test is compelled interrogation [369]*369subject to fifth amendment protections. If so, this court must determine whether the refusal is testimonial. While the Commissioner of Public Safety argues that the fifth amendment right to counsel is not applicable to the civil implied consent proceedings, we decline to decide the implied consent cases on that basis, in light of the supreme court’s consideration of similar issues in Nyflot. Id. at 516.
A testing request in the context of a DWI arrest is not interrogation; the request is “highly regulated by state law,” section 169.123, subd. 2(b), and “presented in virtually the same words to all suspects.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15; see Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516. The type of coercive police techniques used to compel a confession and against which Miranda rights protect are not involved in the test request. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446, 86 S.Ct. at 1613; State v. Herem, 384 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn.1986). The only change in the current advisory is that drivers are now told refusal “may” subject them to criminal penalties, which does not make the manner of the request more coercive.
The question also arises as to whether making refusal a crime “compels” the drivers to incriminate themselves because the drivers with the requisite revocations may commit a crime by responding to the inquiry. In Neville, the Court reasoned that the state gives the person the choice of taking the test, which the state could legitimately compel under Schmerber, or refusing. Since the test request is legitimate, it becomes no less legitimate when the state offers the second option of refusing with the attendant penalties of license revocation and the use of evidence of refusal at trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, 103 S.Ct. at 922.
In a case before it, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Alaska’s statute making refusal to submit to testing a crime “compelled” the driver to incriminate himself. While recognizing the choice in Alaska was arguably more coercive than in Neville, the court concluded the Supreme Court’s analysis was controlling. It found the choice not to be any more “impermissi-bly coercive than any order to produce physical evidence * * * backed with the sanction of criminal contempt.” Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 543 (9th Cir.1988). It noted as equally important the Ñeville analysis weighted it heavily that refusal was not directly compelled by the state. Instead, the state wants suspects to take the test.
In fact, a criminal penalty for refusal arguably compels a refusal less than the civil penalty present in Neville did. Although the imposition of a criminal penalty for refusal may create an inherently more coercive situation than imposition of a civil penalty for the same behavior, the compulsion it increases is the compulsion to submit to the breathalyzer test, not the compulsion to refuse, and refusal is the conduct made criminal in the statute. Because increasing the penalty attendant upon refusal only reduces the likelihood of refusal, of Neville, 459 U.S. at 560, 103 S.Ct. at 920-21 (allowing use of refusal at trial discourages choice of refusal), Deering’s refusal was even less “compelled” than the refusal in Neville.
Id. at 543 (emphasis in original). We agree with the reasoning in Deering, and hold that attaching a criminal penalty does not make the test request impermissibly coercive.
2. Minnesota Constitution
Article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Several drivers in the cases argued here contend that this court should interpret the state constitutional provisions more broadly than the parallel federal constitutional provisions.
The Commissioner argues the issue of rights under the Minnesota Constitution were raised for the first time on appeal in McDonnell, and therefore are not properly before this court. State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn.1989). Issues not first addressed by the trial court usually will not be decided for the first time on appeal, even if they involve constitutional questions concerning criminal procedure. [370]*370In Driver, although the issue was raised both below and in Driver’s brief, the trial court did not rule on state constitutional grounds. However, in order to comprehensively address the challenges to the statutes, we consider the issue here.
In 1973, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that admission of evidence that a defendant refused to submit to testing violated the privilege against compelled self-incrimination pursuant to the federal fifth amendment, article 1, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution, and Minn.Stat. § 169.121. State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 261, 212 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 881, 95 S.Ct. 146, 42 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974). Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Neville, holding that evidence of refusal is not protected by the fifth amendment. Neville, 459 U.S. at 554,103 S.Ct. at 917. The Minnesota Supreme Court has followed Neville as to the interpretation of the federal constitutional provisions. Ny-flot, 369 N.W.2d at 516. The ruling in Andrews as to the interpretation of the state constitutional provision was not explicitly overruled. See State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 183 n. 1 (Minn.1983).
In 1990, our court held the driver’s privilege against self-incrimination was not violated under the Minnesota Constitution, noting that Andrews was of questionable precedential value in light of Nyflot. Friedman v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 455 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. July 6, 1990). We decline to interpret section 7 more broadly than the federal constitution as to the issue presented here as well. See Chock v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn.App.1990) (choosing to follow Supreme Court interpretation of federal constitution in challenge to constitutionality of DWI roadblock); Whitehead, 458 N.W.2d at 148 n. 2 (declining to interpret state constitution more broadly than federal constitution in determining whether videotape of implied consent advisory was inadmissible).
II.
In 1989, the legislature amended the DWI law to make refusal to submit to testing a gross misdemeanor if the person has certain prior license revocations. Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subds. la, 3(c) (Supp. 1989). At that time, it also amended the implied consent advisory. The advisory now provides, in relevant part:
At the time a test is requested, the person shall be informed:
(1) that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test to determine if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance * * *;
(2) that if testing is refused, the person may be subject to criminal penalties, and the person’s right to drive will be revoked for a minimum period of one year * * *;
(3) that if a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, the person will be subject to criminal penalties and the person’s right to drive may be revoked for a minimum period of 90 days * * *;
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to consult with an attorney and to have additional tests made by someone of the person’s own choosing; and
(5) that if the person refuses to take a test, the refusal will be offered into evidence against the person at trial.
Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b) (Supp.1989) (new portion emphasized). In the implied consent cases before the court, the trial courts found that the advisory was so confusing and misleading or such a misstatement of law that the license revocations should be rescinded. The trial court in State v. McCauley found the statute unconstitutionally vague and dismissed the count charging a refusal.
A driver of a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to the implied consent testing procedures. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(a) (Supp.1989); State, Dep’t of Public Safety v. Wiehle, 287 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn.1979). The driver may nonetheless refuse testing. Nyflot, [371]*371369 N.W.2d at 517. The purpose of the advisory is not to persuade a driver to refuse testing, but to let a driver know the serious consequences of refusal. Tyler v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn.1985). We reaffirm here that the rights of a person in implied consent proceedings must be considered within the framework of reasonableness. Wiehle, 287 N.W.2d at 419.
The supreme court has not required officers to give advice other than that which the legislature mandates. State v. Abe, 289 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Minn.1980). This court has recommended that officers read the exact words of the statute to avoid confusion or improper deviation. Hallock v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 372 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Minn.App.1985). The drivers here do not contend that the officers incorrectly read the advisory or conducted themselves in any way to confuse the drivers but, instead, challenge the statutory language itself.
A. Void for vagueness
A criminal statute is void for vagueness if it fails to
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The state need not give any warning other than the criminal statute itself. See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 697-98 (Minn. 1977) (every person is presumed to know the law). The legislature has chosen to give a fuller warning through the advisory, and we conclude the advisory is reasonable. The criminal refusal statute provides:
It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine under section 169.123 if the person’s license has been revoked once with the past five years, or two or more times within the past ten years [for enumerated alcohol-related driving offenses].
Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. la (Supp.1989). The implied consent advisory informs the driver
that if testing is refused, the person may be subject to criminal penalties, and the person’s right to drive will be revoked for a minimum period of one year;
Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(2) (Supp. 1989).
The use of the word “may” in describing the potential of criminal refusal liability does not render the advisory vague or misleading. See State v. Andersen, 370 N.W.2d 653, 663 (Minn.App.1985) (general terms used in a statute are not unconstitutional due to vagueness when greater specificity is impractical). This court has rejected a due process challenge to the implied consent advisory because it warned the driver that his license “will” be revoked for a refusal but “may” be revoked for taking and failing a chemical test. State v. Frank, 365 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn.App.1985). The Frank court noted a number of contingencies, including the legality of the arrest and the outcome of administrative and judicial review proceedings, affected whether a license would actually be revoked. Id. Due process does not require a driver be given a warning of all possible consequences of his decision whether to refuse testing. Abe, 289 N.W.2d at 160-61 (failure to warn driver of civil revocation for test failure did not offend due process).
The implied consent advisory informs the driver that the law requires him to take the test. The driver is told that if he refuses testing his license will be revoked for a minimum of one year. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(2). The severity of such a revocation was recognized by the supreme court when the revocation minimum was half its current length. Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 409, 247 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1976) (noting that the mandatory revocation for refusal, then only six months, might be a greater burden than the criminal conviction).
The civil consequences of license revocation make it clear that the advisory is intended to induce the driver to take the test. [372]*372With a license revocation of a minimum of one year for refusal, refusal is plainly “not a ‘safe harbor,’ free of adverse consequences.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924. Comparing the one-year refusal minimum with the 90-day minimum revocation for failing the test, the civil consequences weigh heavily in favor of taking the test.
The information given the driver in the implied consent advisory is “accurate and relevant.” Abe, 289 N.W.2d at 161. The refusal statute and the advisory are not unconstitutionally vague and do not “entrap” the driver into refusing testing.
B. Confusion as a grounds for rescission of revocation
In the implied consent cases, the drivers argue that, as to those with the requisite prior revocations, the advice that “if testing is refused, the person may be subject to criminal penalties,” does not sufficiently advise them that it is a crime for persons with such prior revocations to refuse testing. Therefore, they contend the advisory is misleading and a misstatement of law.
As noted above in Abe, the supreme court addressed a challenge to the statutorily mandated advisory language. Under the then applicable law, the driver was advised only that he could be subject to revocation for refusal. While he could also be subject to revocation for test failure under a separate statutory provision, there was no requirement that he be so advised. Abe contended that due process required he be given all relevant information about the consequences of consenting to the test. The court noted the implied consent law established his continuing consent, and he could prevent the test only by withdrawing consent:
[H]e received the information which the legislature required to be given concerning the withdrawal of consent. The information was accurate and relevant. It also promoted peaceable submission to the blood test. Abe did not withdraw his consent. There is nothing in the statutory procedures which were followed in this case that involved any violation of due process.
Abe, 289 N.W.2d at 161. See also State v. DeGier, 387 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. App.1986). Likewise, the statutory language here sufficiently informs these drivers of the law, and no due process violation occurred.
The drivers also argue that it is confusing and inaccurate to be advised that they “may” be subject to criminal penalties for refusing, while being informed their license to drive “will” be revoked for refusal. This court addressed a similar argument in Frank. The court recognized that it may be preferable to use parallel language. However, because the happening of the actual event is contingent on a number of events, this court held the use of the word “may” is accurate and does not violate due process rights. Frank, 365 N.W.2d at 314.
The advisory is not the charging document, but is the statement set out by the legislature to generally alert the driver of possible legal consequences, and should be judged by a reasonableness standard. See Wiehle, 287 N.W.2d at 419. To set aside the advisory because of the use of the word “may” is to place a hyper-technical emphasis on it, rather than the liberal construction contemplated to effectuate its purpose. See Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d at 319.
Some would impose upon the arresting officer the burden of ascertaining whether the individual is subject to the criminal refusal law. If so, it is argued, the officer should advise the driver of the refusal law and read the Miranda warning, and if not, the advisory should be given without mention of the refusal law. We decline to place this additional task upon officers who have many other duties to fulfill while at the scene of a possible DWI arrest. The statute does not require the officers to make this determination, and we decline to enforce a statutory scheme which the legislature did not require. Abe, 289 N.W.2d at 160.
Finally, we address the advisory as applied to one to whom the criminal refusal statute does not apply. In Moser v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the driver, [373]*373who had no prior revocations, took the test. She testified she did not understand the advisory and that her decision to take the test would have been different if she had not believed she could be subject to criminal penalties for refusing. The Moser court held that because Moser could not be subject to criminal penalties, the advisory was a misstatement of law, and prevented her from voluntarily consenting to testing. It found she was confused by the language read to her and that the language of the advisory was so confusing and incorrect as to render the advisory ineffective.
We first note that Moser does not raise constitutional claims. Moser’s consent is deemed continuing under subdivision 2(a) of section 169.123, and she does not have any “right” to withdraw her consent. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517. The right to refuse is “simply a matter of grace” bestowed by the legislature, unlike the constitutional right to silence underlying Miranda warnings. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565, 103 S.Ct. at 923. The advisory is intended to give drivers general notice of the law, and cannot be and need not be precise as to each driver’s individual situation. The legislature determined that the advisory, which is already lengthy, need only generally advise drivers that they “may” be subject to criminal penalties upon refusal. We must liberally interpret the language of the statute in favor of the public interest. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d at 319. “When the meaning of a statute is doubtful, courts should give great weight to a construction placed upon it by the department charged with its administration.” Krumm v. R.A. Nadeau Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn.1979). We agree with the Commissioner that the language of the advisory as applied to drivers not subject to the criminal refusal law is reasonable.
We next address the Moser court’s finding that the language of the advisory prevented her from voluntarily consenting to the test. The supreme court has said that
where the driver’s physical or mental condition as a result of alcohol consumption or the effects of injury or treatment for injury precludes him from knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently exercising his statutory choice to refuse submission to such test, his statutorily implied consent remains continuous.
State, Dep’t of Public Safety v. Hauge, 286 N.W.2d 727, 728 (Minn.1979). Likewise, where we have held the language of the advisory is sufficient, no question arises as to “voluntary” consent. The trial court also found Moser was confused by the language of the advisory, and that the language was both confusing and incorrect.
In light of our decision that the language is sufficient, we also hold that the trial court is incorrect as a matter of law. The officer gave Moser the advice required, as well as discussing the matter with her, and nothing more is required. Abe, 289 N.W.2d at 161. Moser does not contend that any conduct of the officer, except for the reading of the mandated statutory language, caused her confusion, and we find none.
With respect to the first-time offender, the implied consent advisory’s warning on the consequences of refusal must be less strictly scrutinized. See, e.g., Horn v. Burns & Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 254-55 (8th Cir.1976) (due process requires less literal exactitude in a statute providing no criminal sanctions). Procedural due process does apply to driver’s license revocations. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). Nonetheless, the driver is fully advised as to the only means by which he may avoid revocation: take the test and pass it. Some additional advice as to relative consequences is given, but the same warning must serve for all drivers, and
there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.
United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 [374]*374U.S. 548, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973).
The warning specifically informs drivers they are required to take the test and their licenses will be revoked if they refuse. If the advisory gives first-time offenders more incentive to submit to testing than they otherwise would have, that result is in their own best interest, as well as being in the public interest. As the Supreme Court has stated with regard to criminal statutes:
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness. It is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1957, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).
III.
In Weeding v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the trial court rejected the driver’s argument that his right to equal protection under the law had been violated. The driver did not file a notice of review, but argues the issue in his brief. A respondent must file a notice of review to raise an issue adversely decided by the trial court. Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 106. Failure to file a notice of review can bar a respondent from presenting issues. Arndt v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 394 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn.1986). Under the unusual circumstances of these combined cases, we exercise our discretion to nonetheless address the issue. Id. at 794.
Weeding contends that because only individuals with the requisite prior license revocations are denied their right to remain silent when asked whether to submit to a test, this classification is a violation of their right to equal protection. The legislature has broad discretion to define criminal acts, and may select those acts which it believes pose the most significant societal problems. State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 215, 217, 245 N.W.2d 612, 615, 617 (1976).
The sole limitation which the equal protection clause imposes upon the legislature in the exercise of this power is that criminal statutes must not prescribe different punishments “for the same acts committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situations.”
Id. at 215, 245 N.W.2d at 616 (citation omitted).
The legislature has previously taken steps to encourage drivers to take the test. Drivers who refuse are subject to a one-year license revocation, while those who take and fail the test receive a 90-day revocation. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4. In addition, evidence of refusal to take a test is admissible into evidence in a prosecution under Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1, § 169.121, subd. 2.
The 1989 legislature wanted to address the specific problem of repeat offenders who refuse to provide a test. These individuals, who may well be aware from past experience the effect a test result has on a jury in a DWI trial, pose a special problem. Hearing on S.F. No. 851 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 29, 1989); Hearing on S.F. No. 851 Before the House Judiciary Committee (Apr. 24, 1989). Still choosing not to force the drivers to take a test against their will, see Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517, the legislature instead criminalized refusal for those with the requisite number of prior license revocations. We note the prior license revocations which can cause a person to be subject to the refusal law, one in the past five years or two or more in the past ten years, track the gross misdemeanor DWI law, Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(b). The classification reasonably addresses the serious problem of repeat offenders who refuse to take the test and prevent the use of such evidence in their subsequent DWI trials. The law does not treat similarly situated persons differently, and does not violate equal protection rights of repeat offenders.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the constitutional challenges to the implied consent advisory and the criminal refusal statute, in each of the [375]*375five cases before the court, must fail. The trial court’s order in State v. McCauley finding the implied consent advisory void for vagueness is erroneous, and the criminal charge of gross misdismeanor refusal should not have been dismissed. Similarly, the order in State v. Driver, which did not specify a specific constitutional violation in dismissing the criminal charge, must be reversed. The trial court order in McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, finding a fifth amendment violation, and the court order in Weeding v. Commissioner of Public Safety, finding the advisory misleading and a misstatement of law, are each erroneous. Finally, the trial court erred in Moser v. Commissioner of Public Safety in concluding the advisory is misleading as to the driver with no prior revocations.
The statute sets out what the police officer must read to the suspected drunk driver. See Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b). In the most recent United States Supreme Court case, Justice Brennan spoke to the issue of implied consent and what was said regarding legal consequences having lawfully stopped a vehicle:
[The officer] read Muniz a prepared script explaining how the test worked, the nature of Pennsylvania’s Implied Consent Law, and the legal consequences that would ensue should he refuse.
* * * [the officer] carefully limited her role to providing Muniz with relevant information about the breathalyzer test and the implied consent law. She questioned Muniz only as to whether he understood her instructions and wished to submit to the test. These limited and focused inquiries were necessarily “attendant to” the legitimate police procedure, see Neville, supra, at 564, n. 15 [103 S.Ct. at 923, n. 15], and were not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response.
Muniz, — U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2652 (footnote omitted).
Law enforcement officials in the performance of their duties begin their inquiry of the driver with the firm knowledge that the statute already imposes upon the driver consent to testing. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(a). It is within the power of the legislature to lay down reasonable conditions for the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on our highways, and the implied consent advisory comes within the umbrella of reasonableness. By using the public streets and highways, drivers are not only deemed to have consented to testing but are charged with the knowledge that to drive under the influence is against the law and they can be prosecuted and/or their driver’s licenses revoked if they drive under the influence.
The philosophy of our own court toward the whole matter of public safety is pointedly brought together in Szczech:
The right of the public to be free from the unwarranted dangers posed by drinking drivers far outweighs any interest any individual may have in the continued unrestricted operation of motor vehicles. This public interest mandates a nonrestrictive application of the statute to give effect to the clear legislative intent to have the statute made as effective a remedy as possible for the removal of drinking drivers from our streets and highways.
Szczech, 343 N.W.2d at 307. See Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d at 319; State v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 363, 227 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1975) (caselaw restricting application of implied consent law should be narrowly construed).
DECISION
The trial court orders dismissing criminal charges for refusing testing or rescinding driver’s license revocations in each of these separate cases are reversed. We remand for trial or other proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
LANSING, FORSBERG, CRIPPEN, KALITOWSKI, SCHUMACHER, SHORT and GARDEBRING, JJ., concur in the result reached by the majority.