Opinion
COLEMAN, J.
The sole issue presented in this criminal case is whether the trial court was required on the facts to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. Joseph Bryant McCoy was indicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The jury convicted him of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, but as an accommodation to another individual. Code § 18.2-248. The trial court sentenced him to ten years in the penitentiary in conformity with the jury verdict. On appeal McCoy contends that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the theory of entrapment was sufficient to raise a jury question whether a police agent entrapped him into purchasing cocaine for resale.
Because the evidence established that McCoy was predisposed to purchase and possess cocaine and to distribute or give it to another as an accommodation, the evidence was insufficient to raise a question for the jury’s determination whether a police agent entrapped McCoy into committing the crime for which he was charged. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.
A jury must be instructed on any theory or affirmative defense supported by the evidence. See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 322 (1896). Thus, we must decide whether the evidence when viewed most favorably to that theory could have supported a finding of entrapment. Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 19, 197 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1973).
McCoy, a forty year old licensed pharmacist, moved to Pulaski County in February 1986, to accept a job at People’s Drug store. McCoy became close friends with Clyde R. “Wink” McMillian and the two used cocaine together on a number of occasions. In June 1986, McMillian and his wife were charged with grand larceny in Franklin County. Concerned about these charges, [230]*230McMillian told Officer Ralph Dobbins of Pulaski County that he could supply information about “major sized” drug dealers. Dobbins told McMillian that if he supplied accurate information and cases were made, Dobbins would tell the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Franklin County the source of the information.
In August 1986, McMillian and McCoy discussed purchasing cocaine for their personal use. McMillian suggested that they purchase enough for resale because he needed funds for his legal defense of the Franklin County prosecution. Because cocaine previously purchased from McMillian’s source had been of poor quality and too expensive, they agreed that McCoy would purchase an ounce from a source whom he knew in Blacksburg. Totally independent of McMillian and without McMillian’s knowledge, McCoy contacted a drug supplier whom he knew in Blacksburg to arrange the cocaine purchase. McCoy paid the supplier $200 solely from his funds as a downpayment.
On August 13, 1986, McCoy telephoned McMillian to inform him that he was leaving for Blacksburg to complete the buy. McMillian called Officer Dobbins and informed him that McCoy was involved in “an ongoing drug transaction.” McMillian provided Officer Dobbins detailed, reliable information that the drug transaction had transpired at McCoy’s apartment in the early morning on August 14, 1986. Officer Dobbins requested that McMillian call McCoy and in the course of the conversation, which Dobbins monitored, McCoy acknowledged purchasing the drugs which he said were hidden at his apartment. McCoy had paid the balance of the $1,800 for the cocaine solely from his funds. Based on the information, Dobbins obtained a search warrant which led to seizure of the cocaine from a suitcase hidden in McCoy’s bedroom. McCoy was arrested. Although McCoy initially denied knowledge of the cocaine, he soon admitted that he had purchased it. In all material essentials, McCoy acknowledged what had occurred. He admitted that he had purchased the cocaine for his and McMillian’s personal use and for McMillian to resell, but argued that McMillian entrapped him into committing the more serious offense of possession for resale. Based upon these facts, he contends that the jury should have been told that he could be acquitted of possession of the cocaine if the jury found that a police agent provided the intent for him to obtain the drugs for resale.
[231]*231At trial, McCoy testified that he had no intention to purchase cocaine to resell for personal financial gain. He said the quantity for resale was going to McMillian and he intended to retain some for personal use only. McCoy testified that he would not have purchased the ounce of cocaine except for McMillian’s insistence that he needed the money. McCoy admitted that he had purchased smaller amounts of cocaine in Pulaski for his personal use. McCoy was convicted of possession with an intent to distribute as an accommodation, and not with the intent to profit thereby. Under the evidence presented, there were, in fact, two levels of distribution contemplated by this scheme. McCoy purchased the cocaine with the intent to distribute the cocaine as an accommodation to his friend, McMillian who, in turn, intended to redistribute at least a portion of the cocaine for profit. There were, thus, two theories under which the case could be proved. Under the facts, however, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the defense of entrapment was not available under either theory.
“Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.” Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 715, 324 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (quoting Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 555-56, 189 S.E. 329, 332 (1937)). See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932). Entrapment occurs when the defendant’s criminal conduct was the product of “ ‘creative activity’ [by the police] that implants in the mind of an otherwise innocent person the disposition to commit an offense and induce its commission in order to prosecute.” Stamper, 228 Va. at 715, 324 S.E.2d at 687. If the criminal design originated in the mind of the defendant and the police did no more than “afford an opportunity for the commission of a crime” by a willing participant, then no entrapment occurred. Huffman v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 823, 828, 284 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1981) (quoting Cogdill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 279, 247 S.E.2d 392, 396 (1978)). See also Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).
Assuming that Clyde R. “Wink” McMillian was a police agent for determining whether the government entrapped McCoy into committing a crime, see Keener v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 208, 214, 380 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989), the police merely af[232]*232forded McCoy an opportunity to commit a crime which he had committed on other occasions and was predisposed and willing to commit.
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Opinion
COLEMAN, J.
The sole issue presented in this criminal case is whether the trial court was required on the facts to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. Joseph Bryant McCoy was indicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. The jury convicted him of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, but as an accommodation to another individual. Code § 18.2-248. The trial court sentenced him to ten years in the penitentiary in conformity with the jury verdict. On appeal McCoy contends that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the theory of entrapment was sufficient to raise a jury question whether a police agent entrapped him into purchasing cocaine for resale.
Because the evidence established that McCoy was predisposed to purchase and possess cocaine and to distribute or give it to another as an accommodation, the evidence was insufficient to raise a question for the jury’s determination whether a police agent entrapped McCoy into committing the crime for which he was charged. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment.
A jury must be instructed on any theory or affirmative defense supported by the evidence. See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 322 (1896). Thus, we must decide whether the evidence when viewed most favorably to that theory could have supported a finding of entrapment. Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 19, 197 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1973).
McCoy, a forty year old licensed pharmacist, moved to Pulaski County in February 1986, to accept a job at People’s Drug store. McCoy became close friends with Clyde R. “Wink” McMillian and the two used cocaine together on a number of occasions. In June 1986, McMillian and his wife were charged with grand larceny in Franklin County. Concerned about these charges, [230]*230McMillian told Officer Ralph Dobbins of Pulaski County that he could supply information about “major sized” drug dealers. Dobbins told McMillian that if he supplied accurate information and cases were made, Dobbins would tell the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Franklin County the source of the information.
In August 1986, McMillian and McCoy discussed purchasing cocaine for their personal use. McMillian suggested that they purchase enough for resale because he needed funds for his legal defense of the Franklin County prosecution. Because cocaine previously purchased from McMillian’s source had been of poor quality and too expensive, they agreed that McCoy would purchase an ounce from a source whom he knew in Blacksburg. Totally independent of McMillian and without McMillian’s knowledge, McCoy contacted a drug supplier whom he knew in Blacksburg to arrange the cocaine purchase. McCoy paid the supplier $200 solely from his funds as a downpayment.
On August 13, 1986, McCoy telephoned McMillian to inform him that he was leaving for Blacksburg to complete the buy. McMillian called Officer Dobbins and informed him that McCoy was involved in “an ongoing drug transaction.” McMillian provided Officer Dobbins detailed, reliable information that the drug transaction had transpired at McCoy’s apartment in the early morning on August 14, 1986. Officer Dobbins requested that McMillian call McCoy and in the course of the conversation, which Dobbins monitored, McCoy acknowledged purchasing the drugs which he said were hidden at his apartment. McCoy had paid the balance of the $1,800 for the cocaine solely from his funds. Based on the information, Dobbins obtained a search warrant which led to seizure of the cocaine from a suitcase hidden in McCoy’s bedroom. McCoy was arrested. Although McCoy initially denied knowledge of the cocaine, he soon admitted that he had purchased it. In all material essentials, McCoy acknowledged what had occurred. He admitted that he had purchased the cocaine for his and McMillian’s personal use and for McMillian to resell, but argued that McMillian entrapped him into committing the more serious offense of possession for resale. Based upon these facts, he contends that the jury should have been told that he could be acquitted of possession of the cocaine if the jury found that a police agent provided the intent for him to obtain the drugs for resale.
[231]*231At trial, McCoy testified that he had no intention to purchase cocaine to resell for personal financial gain. He said the quantity for resale was going to McMillian and he intended to retain some for personal use only. McCoy testified that he would not have purchased the ounce of cocaine except for McMillian’s insistence that he needed the money. McCoy admitted that he had purchased smaller amounts of cocaine in Pulaski for his personal use. McCoy was convicted of possession with an intent to distribute as an accommodation, and not with the intent to profit thereby. Under the evidence presented, there were, in fact, two levels of distribution contemplated by this scheme. McCoy purchased the cocaine with the intent to distribute the cocaine as an accommodation to his friend, McMillian who, in turn, intended to redistribute at least a portion of the cocaine for profit. There were, thus, two theories under which the case could be proved. Under the facts, however, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the defense of entrapment was not available under either theory.
“Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.” Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 715, 324 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (quoting Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 555-56, 189 S.E. 329, 332 (1937)). See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932). Entrapment occurs when the defendant’s criminal conduct was the product of “ ‘creative activity’ [by the police] that implants in the mind of an otherwise innocent person the disposition to commit an offense and induce its commission in order to prosecute.” Stamper, 228 Va. at 715, 324 S.E.2d at 687. If the criminal design originated in the mind of the defendant and the police did no more than “afford an opportunity for the commission of a crime” by a willing participant, then no entrapment occurred. Huffman v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 823, 828, 284 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1981) (quoting Cogdill v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 272, 279, 247 S.E.2d 392, 396 (1978)). See also Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988).
Assuming that Clyde R. “Wink” McMillian was a police agent for determining whether the government entrapped McCoy into committing a crime, see Keener v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 208, 214, 380 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989), the police merely af[232]*232forded McCoy an opportunity to commit a crime which he had committed on other occasions and was predisposed and willing to commit. “There is nothing improper in the use, by police, of decoys, undercover agents and informers to invite the exposure of willing criminals and to present an opportunity to one willing to commit a crime.” Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 381, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1985) (quoting Stamper, 228 Va. at 715, 324 S.E.2d at 687). McCoy admitted to participation in the previous purchases of drugs and in the accommodation distribution of those drugs between himself and McMillian. Reluctance to engage in crime is not transformed into entrapment whenever a person hesitantly, but willingly, acquiesces in the request of a close ally to commit a crime. See People v. Perry, 75 Mich. App. 121, 254 N.W.2d 810 (1977). Encouragement or. solicitation of the commission of a crime by one who is willing and predisposed to commit the crime does not constitute entrapment. See United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1986). The fact that McMillian, acting as an agent for the police, may have encouraged or suggested to his friend that he purchase cocaine simply provided McCoy, who was predisposed to the crime, an opportunity to do so. Absent “procurement of ... [a crime] by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer . . .” no entrapment has occurred. Schneider, 230 Va. at 381, 337 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Stamper, 228 Va. at 715, 324 S.E.2d at 687). When viewed in the light most favorable to McCoy, the evidence proved that he was predisposed to purchase cocaine to distribute to his friend McMillian, albeit as an accommodation, and for his personal use.
We find that this case is controlled by Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 197 S.E.2d 207 (1973). In Neighbors, the informant, while still in jail, agreed to cooperate with the police in apprehending drug pushers if he was released from jail. Upon his release, the informant repeatedly begged the defendant to sell him drugs. The defendant asserted that he was not predisposed to sell drugs as shown by his repeated refusal to do so on several occasions and that the informant’s urging entrapped him into committing an offense that he would not have otherwise committed. When Neighbors finally sold the informant morphine sulphate tablets, he was arrested and convicted of the drug sale. In rejecting Neighbors’ contention that he was entitled to an entrap[233]*233ment instruction, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that all the police informant “did was afford an opportunity for the commission of the offense, an opportunity the defendant willingly accepted. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to create a jury issue on entrapment.” Id. at 19, 197 S.E.2d at 208.
McCoy attempts to distinguish his case from Neighbors by pointing out that Neighbors admitted that he had previously sold drugs to the informant and, therefore, the evidence showed that Neighbors was predisposed to sell drugs. McCoy argues that he merely admitted to having purchased cocaine in the past for personal use but never for resale. It is not necessary, however, that the evidence prove that an accused has previously committed the same offense with which he is charged in order to establish that he was predisposed to commit an offense. “Otherwise, a first offender, disposed to commit the crime for which he is charged, would find sanctuary in the entrapment defense merely because the government would be unable to prove prior nonexistent activities. The entrapment defense does not require such a result.” United States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760, 762 (1st Cir. 1970). Instead, the evidence need only show that the defendant’s state of mind was such that once his attention was drawn to the criminal activity he readily accepted it. Neighbors, 214 Va. at 19, 197 S.E.2d at 208.
The presence or absence of a predisposition to commit a crime is merely one circumstance to be considered in determining whether the intent to commit a crime is solely the product of police activity. Where one is predisposed to commit a criminal act and involvement by a police informant influences the nature or degree of the crime, it cannot be said that the state provided an innocent person with the intent to commit a crime. We construe the defense of entrapment as defined by the Virginia Supreme Court to be more limited than the broad application which McCoy urges. A person ready and willing to engage in certain criminal activity cannot avail himself of an entrapment defense by claiming he was only willing to commit one type of crime but the Commonwealth entrapped him by encouraging him to commit a more serious crime of the same nature. See United States v. Ewbank, 483 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1973).
[234]*234While the legislature has seen fit to make distribution of cocaine as an accommodation punishable with less severity than distribution for profit, the gravamen of the offense is possession of the drug with the intent to distribute it to another. Code § 18.2-248. The evidence fails to support the theory that McCoy was entrapped into committing that offense. In fact, he admits that on this occasion, and on other occasions, he purchased the cocaine with the intent to distribute part of it to McMillian. No evidence in the record shows that McCoy, when provided with an opportunity, was reluctant or unprepared to purchase cocaine to distribute a portion of it to McMillian. See Coady, 809 F.2d at 122. While the evidence may well require, as it did, that the jury be instructed that McCoy could be found guilty of distribution as an accommodation, the evidence could not be construed to conclude that McCoy was not predisposed to purchase and distribute cocaine to McMillian, albeit as an accommodation.
These prior drug purchases, together with McCoy’s personal planning, arranging, and completing the drug purchase without McMillian’s assistance, established as a matter of law ' that McCoy was predisposed and willing to commit the offense for which he was charged and convicted. Thus, he was not entitled to an entrapment instruction.
The jury instruction offered by McCoy embodied a correct statement of the affirmative defense of entrapment. However, it is error to give an instruction which correctly states an abstract legal principle unless evidence exists to support giving of the instruction. Swift v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 420, 424, 100 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1957). Based on the record before us we find that McCoy failed to present evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that he was not predisposed to purchase cocaine for distribution to McMillian as an accommodation.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
Duff, J., concurred.