McConnell v. McConnell, No. Fa-99-0722859 (Jan. 10, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 442
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 10, 2000
DocketNo. FA-99-0722859
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 442 (McConnell v. McConnell, No. Fa-99-0722859 (Jan. 10, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McConnell v. McConnell, No. Fa-99-0722859 (Jan. 10, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 442 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The non-resident defendant husband has filed a motion to dismiss in this dissolution action commenced by the plaintiff wife seeking a dissolution of marriage, custody, child support, alimony and other financial relief dated November 3, 1999. The defendant filed an appearance through counsel and a motion to dismiss dated November 24, 1999 contending that the pending case should be dismissed on the basis of the plaintiff's lack of residency and due process grounds. The parties presented oral testimony and exhibits at a contested hearing on December 6, 1999.

FACTS
The parties were married in the State of Connecticut on May 1, 1993. The parties lived in Connecticut for approximately one month subsequent to the date of the marriage. The parties then moved to the State of New York. The parties also lived in the State of Maine and Florida for a period of time and the State of Connecticut. The parties returned to the State of New York and on November 3, 1998 they purchased a home together in Wilton, New York. Both parties resided with their minor child, Samantha, born December 25, 1996, at the Wilton, New York home. The parties, (including the minor child) resided in the State of New York until October 29, 1999, when the plaintiff wife moved to her parent's residence in Enfield, Connecticut with an intent to permanently remain in Connecticut with the parties minor child, Samantha. The plaintiff advised the defendant that she was leaving him to return to the State of Connecticut on a permanent basis. The defendant has remained in the marital home in the State of New York with an intent to continue to reside at said CT Page 443 residence.

The defendant, husband, commenced the dissolution of marriage action against the wife in New York Superior Court, County of Saratoga, on the morning of November 4, 1999. The plaintiff commenced her own separate action in Hartford Superior Court and served the defendant on November 4, 1999 with return of the action filed on November 8, 1999. The minor child has resided in the State of New York with the parties from at least November, 1998 through October 29, 1999 in the State of New York.

DISCUSSION OF LAW
A motion to dismiss is the proper method of raising in personam and subject matter jurisdiction in family matters. Labow v.Labow, 171 Conn. 433, 436-37, 370 A.2d 990 (1976). The defendant's motion to dismiss raises lack of jurisdiction over the person. P.B. 25-13(2) (formerly P.B. § 1213).

The defendant's motion to dismiss was filed within thirty days of the filing on his appearance. P.B. § 25-12(a). Pursuant to P.B. § 25-12(a), the defendant filed a memorandum of law with the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed a supporting affidavit as to facts not apparent on the record. The plaintiff's affidavit states that she established residency in the State of Connecticut effective February, 1999. The plaintiff wife claimed jurisdiction over the nonresident husband for the purpose of entering a decree dissolving the marriage and determining financial orders as well as orders of custody and visitation over the minor child. The longarm statute of the State of Connecticut is C.G.S. § 46b-46 (b) concerning financial matters. The court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident party as to all matters concerning temporary or permanent alimony or support of children, only if: (1) the nonresident party has received actual notice under subsection (a) of this section; and (2) the party requesting alimony or support of children meets the residency requirement of § 46b-44.

Based upon the testimony of the parties are witnesses, the exhibits and plaintiff's supporting affidavit, the court finds that the plaintiff has met the two Longarm requirements of C.G.S. § 46b-46 (b) to wit: (1) The nonresident party has received actual notice under subsection (a) of C.G.S. § 46b-46; and (2) The party requesting alimony or support of children meets the residency requirements of § 46b-44. CT Page 444

The issue raised by the defendant in his motion to dismiss requires the Court to determine whether or not compliance with these two requirements of the Longarm Statute meets the jurisdictional requirements of Connecticut. The defendant claims the plaintiff's commencement of this action in Connecticut violates his federal due process rights and this violation deprives Connecticut of jurisdiction. The record is clear that the defendant has received actual notice of the pendency of the action. The first prong of the test has been met. Shaffer v.Hatner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977). Pennoyer v. Neff,95 U.S. 714, 732, 33 (1878).

The second prong of the test requires the Court to find whether there is a sufficient connection between the defendant and Connecticut to make it fair to require the defense of the action by the defendant in Connecticut. Milliken v. Meyer, supra,311 U.S. 464, 61 S.Ct. 336, 85 L.Ed. 284. Even though there may be adequate notice to a party, the lack of sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state is sufficient to establish a due process violation. Without satisfaction of this second requirement, the matter must be dismissed. "A defendant to be bound by a judgment against him must have certain minimal contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945). The defendant makes this claim seeking dismissal by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person. P.B. § 25-13(2). These due process requirements are applicable to dissolution cases. Estin v. Estin,334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948);Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 417, 77 S.Ct. 1360,1 L.Ed. 1456 (1957); Kulko v. Superior Court of California,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pennoyer v. Neff
95 U.S. 714 (Supreme Court, 1878)
Stoner v. New York Life Insurance
311 U.S. 464 (Supreme Court, 1941)
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Estin v. Estin
334 U.S. 541 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt
354 U.S. 416 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Shaffer v. Heitner
433 U.S. 186 (Supreme Court, 1977)
LaBow v. LaBow
370 A.2d 990 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1976)
Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd.
674 A.2d 426 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)
Carchrae v. Carchrae
524 A.2d 672 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1987)
Cugini v. Cugini
538 A.2d 1060 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1988)
Jaser v. Jaser
655 A.2d 790 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1995)
Pinder v. Pinder
679 A.2d 973 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 442, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcconnell-v-mcconnell-no-fa-99-0722859-jan-10-2000-connsuperct-2000.