DOOLIN, Justice.
To what extent may this sovereign state regulate the presidential election process by its election laws ?
The petitioners in this matter, who seek mandamus directed to the Secretary of the State Election Board to place them on the [776]*776general election ballot of November 1976, suggest that no regulation is permissible. They submit that the power to regulate and legislate as to rules concerning presidential electors has been reserved in the people under the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. V, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.
They also argue the 1st and the 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States guarantee to petitioners free speech and the right to associate and to equal protection of the laws, thus rendering Oklahoma’s statutes unconstitutional when they attempt the regulation of the election of presidential electors.
We disagree with both of petitioners’ contentions.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
“Each State shall appoint in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: * * * ” (Emphasis supplied).
This article is the source of the state’s power, if any, to regulate presidential elections. Art. II cannot and does not enumerate a limitation, lowering in rank or disparagement of the rights of the people guaranteed or retained under the 9th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) acknowledges this constitutional provision grants extensive power to the state to pass laws regulating the selection of electors.1
Indeed it has been said, speaking of the power conferred to the states by Art. II of the United States Constitution, in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1908):
“The clause of the Constitution does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint, but that ‘each state shall’ . . . in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct . . . ” (Quotation theirs).
It is fundamental that each state and its Legislature, under a Republican form of government possess all power to protect and promote the peace, welfare and safety of its citizens. The only restraints placed thereon are those withdrawn by the United States Constitution and the state’s fundamental law. Art. V, §§ 1 and 2 express that these reservations or withdrawals in the people under the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma are two in nature and as explicitly set out in Art. V, § 2 to be the “initiative” and the “referendum” processes. For our purpose, no other withdrawal or restraint is placed upon the broad fundamental powers of this state’s Legislature by Art. V of the State Constitution.
Prior to 1960 and from the time of statehood Art. Ill § 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution mandated a primary election system for all candidates including presidential electors. At the primary election on July 5, 1960, state question 388 amending Art. Ill § 5 was approved by the people and provided a system of nomination for presidential electors by certification to the Secretary of the State Election Board. In both constitutional provisions the right of the people to place on the ballot by petition any non partisan candidate was specifically recognized. 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 10-1012 [777]*777as thereafter enacted has not in our opinion restricted or narrowed the constitutional provisions of the 1960 amendment.
We hold that 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 10-101 is a proper exercise of the power granted by Art. II of the United States Constitution to the State Legislature, is not restrictive but is definitive and a reasonable regulation of the method of selection of the electors of a recognized political party and not in conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution.
We would affirm our statement in Lillard v. Cordell, 200 Okl. 577, 198 P.2d 417 (1948) that the Legislature has the duty to direct the manner of choosing presidential electors.
This is not to say that there are no limitations upon the power of the state to regulate the selection of presidential electors. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Supreme Court spoke to these matters. That case establishes these criteria for such legislation.
The legislative power is subject to the limitation that it may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.
While the power of the states, under Article II § 1, of the Federal Constitution, to pass laws regulating the selection of presidential and vice-presidential electors is extensive, it cannot be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands that specifically bar states from passing certain kinds of laws.
The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are intended to bar the Federal Government and the states from denying the right to vote on grounds of race and sex in presidential elections.
No state can pass a law regulating elections that violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but this does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of the Federal Constitution. However, invidious distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the clause.
Legislation may not infringe on freedom of association, including the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs. This right is protected by the First Amendment against federal encroachment, and by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by the states.
We do ndt find Oklahoma’s recently enacted election code 3 to be invidiously discriminatory nor unduly burdensome under the criteria demanded by Williams v. Rhodes.
We believe this state has the duty to regulate all election processes and that the State of Oklahoma has exercised its “compelling interest” reasonably and properly through the election code and under [778]*778the Constitutions of the United States and Oklahoma. We have insured the “most precious right” 'guaranteed to all citizens, the right of franchise.
Petitioners argue that our decision in McCarthy v. Slater et al., 553 P.2d 489 decided July 23, 1976, has insured them a place on the November 1976 presidential ballot. We do not agree.
McCarthy stands for the proposition that persons who are registered as independents are entitled to a place on the presidential ballot as independent electors pledged to a serious independent candidate with no party affiliation.
In the case before us the petitioners scrupulously followed the filing procedures outlined in the State Election Code for candidates of political parties. Respondent does not contest the affidavit of any elector petitioner to the effect he is a nominee of the American Party for presidential elector and if elected will cast his vote for that party’s Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees.
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DOOLIN, Justice.
To what extent may this sovereign state regulate the presidential election process by its election laws ?
The petitioners in this matter, who seek mandamus directed to the Secretary of the State Election Board to place them on the [776]*776general election ballot of November 1976, suggest that no regulation is permissible. They submit that the power to regulate and legislate as to rules concerning presidential electors has been reserved in the people under the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. V, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.
They also argue the 1st and the 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States guarantee to petitioners free speech and the right to associate and to equal protection of the laws, thus rendering Oklahoma’s statutes unconstitutional when they attempt the regulation of the election of presidential electors.
We disagree with both of petitioners’ contentions.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
“Each State shall appoint in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: * * * ” (Emphasis supplied).
This article is the source of the state’s power, if any, to regulate presidential elections. Art. II cannot and does not enumerate a limitation, lowering in rank or disparagement of the rights of the people guaranteed or retained under the 9th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) acknowledges this constitutional provision grants extensive power to the state to pass laws regulating the selection of electors.1
Indeed it has been said, speaking of the power conferred to the states by Art. II of the United States Constitution, in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1908):
“The clause of the Constitution does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint, but that ‘each state shall’ . . . in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct . . . ” (Quotation theirs).
It is fundamental that each state and its Legislature, under a Republican form of government possess all power to protect and promote the peace, welfare and safety of its citizens. The only restraints placed thereon are those withdrawn by the United States Constitution and the state’s fundamental law. Art. V, §§ 1 and 2 express that these reservations or withdrawals in the people under the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma are two in nature and as explicitly set out in Art. V, § 2 to be the “initiative” and the “referendum” processes. For our purpose, no other withdrawal or restraint is placed upon the broad fundamental powers of this state’s Legislature by Art. V of the State Constitution.
Prior to 1960 and from the time of statehood Art. Ill § 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution mandated a primary election system for all candidates including presidential electors. At the primary election on July 5, 1960, state question 388 amending Art. Ill § 5 was approved by the people and provided a system of nomination for presidential electors by certification to the Secretary of the State Election Board. In both constitutional provisions the right of the people to place on the ballot by petition any non partisan candidate was specifically recognized. 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 10-1012 [777]*777as thereafter enacted has not in our opinion restricted or narrowed the constitutional provisions of the 1960 amendment.
We hold that 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 10-101 is a proper exercise of the power granted by Art. II of the United States Constitution to the State Legislature, is not restrictive but is definitive and a reasonable regulation of the method of selection of the electors of a recognized political party and not in conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution.
We would affirm our statement in Lillard v. Cordell, 200 Okl. 577, 198 P.2d 417 (1948) that the Legislature has the duty to direct the manner of choosing presidential electors.
This is not to say that there are no limitations upon the power of the state to regulate the selection of presidential electors. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Supreme Court spoke to these matters. That case establishes these criteria for such legislation.
The legislative power is subject to the limitation that it may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.
While the power of the states, under Article II § 1, of the Federal Constitution, to pass laws regulating the selection of presidential and vice-presidential electors is extensive, it cannot be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands that specifically bar states from passing certain kinds of laws.
The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments are intended to bar the Federal Government and the states from denying the right to vote on grounds of race and sex in presidential elections.
No state can pass a law regulating elections that violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but this does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a violation of the Federal Constitution. However, invidious distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the clause.
Legislation may not infringe on freedom of association, including the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs. This right is protected by the First Amendment against federal encroachment, and by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by the states.
We do ndt find Oklahoma’s recently enacted election code 3 to be invidiously discriminatory nor unduly burdensome under the criteria demanded by Williams v. Rhodes.
We believe this state has the duty to regulate all election processes and that the State of Oklahoma has exercised its “compelling interest” reasonably and properly through the election code and under [778]*778the Constitutions of the United States and Oklahoma. We have insured the “most precious right” 'guaranteed to all citizens, the right of franchise.
Petitioners argue that our decision in McCarthy v. Slater et al., 553 P.2d 489 decided July 23, 1976, has insured them a place on the November 1976 presidential ballot. We do not agree.
McCarthy stands for the proposition that persons who are registered as independents are entitled to a place on the presidential ballot as independent electors pledged to a serious independent candidate with no party affiliation.
In the case before us the petitioners scrupulously followed the filing procedures outlined in the State Election Code for candidates of political parties. Respondent does not contest the affidavit of any elector petitioner to the effect he is a nominee of the American Party for presidential elector and if elected will cast his vote for that party’s Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees.
Neither does respondent challenge the timeliness of filing affidavits or notification by the American Party to the Secretary of the State Election Board under 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 10-101. Petitioners do not claim to have filed a declaration of candidacy as required by 26 O.S.Supp.1975 § 5-112 4 with a supporting petition or alternative cash deposit, as found necessary and proper for “independents” in the McCarthy case.
Even if it can be successfully argued that members of the American Party are not registered as independent voters by virtue of 26 O.S.1975 Supp. § 1-110,5 this does not alter or efface their admitted and undisputed allegiance to and membership in the American Party. Petitioners tender the Constitution of the American Party and unequivocally state: “We are in fact a party.” In McCarthy the petitioner electors are pledged to an independent candidate. Petitioners in this case are pledged to avowed candidates of the American Party. Herein lies the distinction.
We find the petitioners filed for a place on the ballot as electors as members and nominees of the American Party. They do not seek to be placed on the ballot pledged to independent candidates but rather to candidates who are standard bearers of the American Party. This position is borne out by the uncontested statements presented by each petitioner to the State Election Board and by the statements and arguments made at the hearing on this application. Petitioners totally fail to act as independents.
We are not unmindful of petitioners’ argument that because they sought no candidate for state office or to put up no slate of candidates for the various county, state or municipal races in the November election, they are not a political party but nomi-i nees of a “special character” for “presidential electors.” Such argument is without merit if the Constitution of the United [779]*779States, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 gives to the states, reasonable regulatory powers over presidential elections.
The American Party ceased to be recognized when it failed to receive 10% of the total vote cast6 under 26 O.S.Supp. 1975 § 1-109.7 Neither did it comply with requirements of 26 O.S.Supp.1975 §§ 1-107, 1-1088 to form a new political party.
McCarthy does not overrule or destroy the reasonable regulatory power vested in this state. Williams v. Rhodes, supra.
WRIT DENIED.
WILLIAMS, C. J., and DAVISON, IRWIN, BERRY, LAVENDER and SIMMS, JJ., concurs.
BARNES, J., concurs in result.
HODGES, V. C. J., dissents.