McAulton v. Goldstrin

656 P.2d 96, 66 Haw. 14, 1982 Haw. LEXIS 261

• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Decided: December 30, 1982
• Docket: NO. 8071
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT BY

PADGETT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment for personal injuries and property damages arising out of an automobile accident. The judgment was entered pursuant to a jury verdict and appellant, by proper motions, has preserved his claims of error. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The accident occurred on May 3, 1978 and the case was tried in June of 1980. Appellee’s vehicle was uninsured and he was thus ineligible for no-fault benefits under Chapter 294, HRS. The verdict awarded appellee $500 for medical and hospital care, $800 for pain and suffering, $200 for loss of wages and $3,500 in property damage.

As to the award of damages of personal injuries, appellant argues that since appellee admittedly did not suffer sufficient losses to equal the threshold amount under § 294-10(b) to qualify him to sue under § 294-6(a) (2), HRS,¹ appellant’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment non obstante veredicto should have been granted. In the light of our holding in Joshua v. MTL, Inc., 65 Haw. 623, 656 P.2d 736 (1982), that § 294-6(a) (2) is unconstitutional as applied to persons ineligible for no-fault benefits, that point cannot be upheld.

Michael D. Tom ( Randall K. Steverson with him on the briefs, Goodsill Anderson & Quinn of counsel) for appellant. Earle A. Partington (Schweigert & Associates of counsel) for appellee.

We have examined appellant’s other points with respect to the personal injury award and find no reversible error.

However, as to the property damage award, we agree with appellant’s contention that it was error to permit the introduction, over objection, of appellee’s testimony that he had received offers of $5,000 and $8,000 for his car prior to the accident. Such testimony, particularly in the light of the absence of any details indicating the bona fides of the alleged offers, lacked any probative value and was properly objected to as irrelevant. We add that it was also likely to be highly prejudicial.

Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for a new trial upon the issue of property damages only.

1 Appellee, at trial, testified that one reason he did not visit his doctor more often was that he could not afford to pay his medical bills. He also testified that he was still receiving therapy at the time of trial.