Mazgaj v. Anthony

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00776
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MILDRED MAZGAJ; MARIAN Case No.: 3:24-cv-00776-JAH-AHG ANTHONY, 12 ORDER: 13 Plaintiffs, GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 14 v. MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT 15 PREJUDICE.

16 CORINA GALVEZ; ISSAC GALVEZ; [ECF No. 4] 17 CECEILA LEON; GABRIELLA GALVEZ-REYNA; et al., 18

19 Defendants. 20 21

22 INTRODUCTION 23 Pending before the Court is Defendant Corina Anthony’s (“Defendant Anthony”)1 24 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). 25

26 27 1 Defendant’s true name does not appear in the Order’s heading because she was erroneously sued under the name, “Corina Galvez,” when in fact her name is Corina 28 1 ECF No. 4 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Plaintiffs Mildred Mazgaj and Marian Anthony 2 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion 3 on May 31, 2024. ECF No. 5 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”). Defendant’s Motion is decided 4 on the Parties’ briefs and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. After 5 a thorough review of the Parties’ submissions, and for the reasons discussed below, the 6 Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs’ Complaint is 7 DISMISSED with leave to amend. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Plaintiff Mazgaj is the 78-year-old mother of Plaintiff Anthony. ECF No. 1 10 (“Compl.”) at 4.2 Defendant Anthony is or was at one time married to Plaintiff Anthony, 11 with whom she is “currently engaged in an ongoing family dissolution matter” in state 12 court. Mot. at 5. In fact, Plaintiff Anthony has also sued Judge Daniel Segura (who 13 presided over their family law proceeding) in the Southern District of California, case 14 number 3:24-cv-00458-BAS-SBC. Id. That case has since been dismissed with prejudice 15 based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and judicial 16 immunity. Anthony v. Segura, 2024 WL 3315996, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2024).3 17

18 19 2 Unless otherwise stated, page numbers referenced herein refer to page numbers generated by the CM/ECF system. 20 3 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of a copy of the Memorandum of 21 Points and Authorities filed by Judge Segura in support of his Motion to Dismiss. Mot. at 5. A district court may take judicial notice of facts that are generally known within its 22 jurisdiction, or that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 23 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 201(b)(2). While the existence of briefing from another case may be judicially noticeable, the content is not judicially 24 noticeable for its factual accuracy. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 25 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within the document is judicially noticeable for 26 its truth”); see also M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Const. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 27 1491 (9th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, Defendant’s request for judicial notice is DENIED as moot because Judge Segura’s motion was granted, and that opinion is referenced herein. 28 1 On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the instant case against 2 Defendant Anthony and her siblings. Compl. at 1, 4. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is forty-six 3 pages in length and contains seventy-three pages of exhibits. See Compl. In the Complaint, 4 Plaintiffs do not separate the causes of action alleged, creating a challenge for the Court to 5 determine what facts support what claims. As best as the Court can determine from the 6 pleadings, the underlying factual bases for Plaintiffs’ claims derive from an alleged scheme 7 by Defendants to illegally gain the rights to the Anthony Family Revocable Living Trust 8 (the “Living Trust”), (id. at 11), and affect the ongoing custody dispute over Plaintiff 9 Anthony’s and Defendant Anthony’s minor children, (id. at 29.) 10 It is unclear when the Living Trust was formed. However, Defendant Anthony was 11 named the Successor Trustee on November 18, 2019. Id. at 11. According to Plaintiffs, 12 the Living Trust’s assets are valued at more than $2,000,000. Id. at 9. Plaintiffs contend 13 that, at some point in August of 2022, Defendant Anthony reported Plaintiffs to law 14 enforcement officials for “multiple allegations.” Id. at 11. Plaintiffs describe the 15 “allegations” Defendant Anthony made to law enforcement throughout the Complaint, 16 making it unclear to the Court whether the allegations were made contemporaneously or at 17 different times. As far as the Court can gather, Plaintiffs claim—while they were at the 18 movies with Plaintiff Anthony’s minor children—Defendant Anthony called 911 and 19 reported Plaintiff Anthony was “hiding and waiting in the bushes … waiting to ambush 20 and kill us[.]” Id. at 19. Plaintiffs also claim Defendant Anthony reported Plaintiff 21 Anthony was displaying a weapon in a threatening manner. Id. at 19. Plaintiffs suggest 22 Defendant Anthony’s purpose for calling law enforcement was to create a situation 23 whereby Plaintiff Anthony may have “reached for his wallet … [and] most likely would 24 have been shot” and killed, allowing Defendant Anthony to take over the Living Trust as 25 the Successor Trustee. Id. at 11. 26 Plaintiffs claim, in response to Defendant Anthony’s reports, law enforcement 27 deployed “helicopters, dozens of emergency response units, including Police, fire, 28 ambulance, CPS, [and] K9(s), essentially barricading the surrounding areas[.]” Id. at 19. 1 Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim Defendant Leon—the wife of a “LASD Law enforcement 2 officer, a Captain with over 25-years’ experience”—waited outside Plaintiffs’ home for 3 two hours without a warrant. Id. at 35-36. According to Plaintiffs, when they arrived home 4 from the movies, they were met with “extreme police force” organized by the Defendants, 5 resulting in Plaintiff Anthony being hospitalized overnight for injuries “sustain[ed] during 6 the event.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Leon stood and observed the law 7 enforcement incident, capturing a video of the scene and “smiling and laughing” while the 8 children “suffer[ed] the immediate trauma of the ‘domestic terrorism’ [of] having six 9 officers, and K-9 units with firearms drawn – pointing at [them] … with hostile deadly 10 force intent[.]” Id. at 35-36. Plaintiffs claim the law enforcement encounter caused 11 “extreme emotional and psychological harm” to the children. Id. at 37. 12 The Court notes the above claim is not the only allegation Plaintiffs make involving 13 Defendants attempting to take their lives. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants collectively 14 hired a “hit-man” at some undisclosed time to “effect [sic] harm on the Plaintiffs,” though 15 no more information is provided about this event. Id. at 21. 16 Plaintiffs also describe actions taken on behalf of Defendant Anthony and her 17 siblings to interfere with Plaintiff Anthony’s custody of their children. First, Plaintiffs 18 claim Defendant Anthony placed the children in the “exclusive” physical custody of 19 Defendant Issac Galvez (her brother, as far as the Court can determine from the Complaint). 20 Id. at 29. Plaintiffs go on to explain the siblings would launch attempts to “encourage a 21 physical reaction” by Plaintiff Anthony, (id.), presumably to affect the child custody 22 proceedings. Second, Plaintiffs describe a scheme by which Defendants Anthony and 23 Galvez-Reyna conspired to secure a steady job for Defendant Anthony to affect the custody 24 proceedings. Id. at 34-35. Plaintiffs explain Defendant Galvez-Reyna is the principal at 25 “Norwalk K-LA Mirada Unified School District of Los Angeles,” and hired Defendant 26 Anthony as an educator over “other qualified” candidates. Id. at 32. According to 27 Plaintiffs, Defendant Galvez-Reyna’s decision to hire Defendant Anthony constitutes a 28 “collaborative act[]” to deprive Plaintiff of his children. Id. at 34. 1 Further related to this alleged conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff Anthony of his 2 children, Plaintiffs refer to one Defendant’s mental health records and history, alleging that 3 this same Defendant has threatened to kidnap Plaintiff Anthony’s children “over the period 4 of years.” Compl. at 7. It is later alleged that this same Defendant has, at some time, 5 engaged in destruction of property and destruction of evidence by tampering with Plaintiff 6 Anthony’s home security system and “ensuring lack of ability to capture any possible 7 evidence of his misconduct.” Id. at 8, 10. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Anthony “had 8 access to the home security system. . .” and used this access to “intentionally delet[e] videos 9 to disguise their misconduct.” Id. at 23. Plaintiffs claim these acts illustrate Defendants’ 10 furtherance of a conspiracy, because “why would a person destroy evidence unless they 11 needed to hide something[?]” Id. Plaintiffs also make repeated references to violations of 12 Plaintiff Anthony’s constitutional rights, specifically through Defendant Anthony’s alleged 13 attempts to strip him of custody of his children through means of various illegal acts, 14 including perjury. Id. at 31. 15 Throughout different sections of the Complaint, Plaintiffs raise various causes of 16 action. The caption of the complaint alleges violations of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (Federal 17 Question Jurisdiction); 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights); 18 18 U.S.C. Section 371 (Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud United States); 18 19 U.S.C. Section 1001 (Making False Statements); 18 U.S.C. Section 1341 (Fraud by wire, 20 radio, or television);4 18 U.S.C. Section 1503 (Influencing or injuring officer or juror); 18 21 U.S.C. Section 1512 (Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant); 18 U.S.C. 22 Section 1519 (Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in federal investigations); 23 18 U.S.C. Section 1621 (Perjury); 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 (Defining racketeering); and 47 24 25 26 4 The Court notes that the allegations of fraud pled by the Plaintiff are subject to FRCP 27 9(b)’s pleading with particularity standard. However, because the issue raised by the Defendant is limited to Dismissal under Rule 8, the Court need not assess Plaintiff’s 28 1 U.S.C. Section 231 (Restricting access to materials harmful to minors on the internet). 2 Compl. at 1. The body of Plaintiffs’ Complaint raises conspiracy to defraud, (id. at 1); 3 criminal mischief, (id.); fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud, (id.); domestic terrorism, 4 (id. at 5); extorsion, (id. at 6); conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 5 1961 (R.I.C.O. Act), (id.); criminal threats, (id. at 7); destruction of property, (id. at 8); 6 unjust enrichment, (id.); witness tampering, (id. at 9); destruction of evidence, (id.); 7 “depriving Plaintiffs of their civil rights”, (id. at 13); conspiring to kill Plaintiff Anthony, 8 (id. at 19); conspiring to cause harm to Plaintiff Anthony, (id. at 21); coercion, (id. at 26); 9 violations of Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 10 (id. at 27); and defamation, (id. at 4). Further, in the “Jurisdiction” section of the 11 Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to more sections of the United States Code. Id. at 2. (alleging 12 violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001, 1343, 1344, 1349, 1503, 1512, 1519, 1521, 1621, 13 1622; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 230, 2331). 14 Plaintiffs include requests for relief both throughout the body and at the end of the 15 Complaint. Compl. at 10, 22, 25, 38, 44. These requests for relief include preliminary 16 injunctive relief, (id. at 10), criminal charges against the Defendants, (id. at 22, 44), 17 $10,000,000 in damages, (id. at 38), and Attorney’s Fees. Id. at 44. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include: 20 (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and 21 plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief 22 sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Rule 8(d) further requires each allegation to be “simple, 23 concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). When, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro 24 se, the “liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)” are even less stringent because 25 “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed[.]’” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 26 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The purpose of Rule 8 is to provide a defendant with fair notice of the 27 claims alleged and the grounds on which those claims rest. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 28 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Twombly”). Pleadings that do not comply with Rule 8’s 1 “simple, concise, and direct” requirements impose unfair burdens on litigants because they 2 fail to put a defendant on notice as to what claims are being brought against them. See 3 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179-1180 (9th Cir. 1996); and see Twombly, 550 U.S. 4 at 555. 5 “The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8 does not depend on 6 whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. The standards 7 set by Rule 8, requiring that each allegation be pled simply, concisely, and directly, 8 “applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 9 12(b)(6).” Id. (citations omitted). While dismissal under Rule 8 is often not justified for 10 excess length alone, Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 11 2008), dismissal is proper where a complaint is confusing, redundant, prolix, and largely 12 irrelevant. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985); but see Hearns 13 v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d at 1127-1132 (holding that plaintiff’s eighty- 14 one-page complaint comprised of extensive factual detail did not warrant dismissal under 15 Rule 8 because the complaint was well organized, coherent, separated claims into distinct 16 sections and coherently stated viable claims that defendants would have little difficulty 17 responding to). When considering dismissal in these circumstances, the court should first 18 consider “less drastic alternatives” such as permitting amendments to the complaint or 19 granting additional time. Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 651, 674. However, 20 the Court is not required to exhaust all possible options before dismissing a case. Id. 21 Moreover, “a district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 22 unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 23 amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015).5 24 25 26 5 Whereas, here, the motion is only brought by one defendant, the Court may dismiss 27 the Complaint as to all Defendants where “. . .such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related.” 28 1 DISCUSSION 2 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply 3 with Rule 8 on several grounds. Mot. at 2-4. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to 4 provide a “short and plain statement of the claim” that is “simple, concise, and direct,” and 5 instead presents a “rambling and unfocused tome” of facts giving rise to their claims. Id. 6 at 3-4. Because of this, Defendant claims the Complaint fails to “present a succinct and 7 straightforward statement alleging the wrongdoings of each Defendant.” Id. at 4. 8 Defendant also asserts the Complaint is “replete with repetition.” Id. As a result of these 9 deficiencies, Defendant argues, the Complaint presents an “unreasonably onerous burden” 10 on each Defendant to prepare an Answer that addresses each allegation independently. Id. 11 Plaintiffs respond, insisting their Complaint is simple, concise, and direct. Opp’n at 12 4. In support of their Opposition, Plaintiffs cite twenty-one cases. Id. at 15-20. Among 13 the cases cited, the Court can only locate eight, as the remaining cases are either fictional 14 or improperly cited. Interestingly, four of these undiscoverable cases have citation 15 numbers that are sequential. For example, one case is cited as “123 F.3d 456.” Id. at 15. 16 In McHenry, the Ninth Circuit upheld a dismissal of a similar complaint under Rule 17 8. 84 F.3d at 1180. There, the complaint was fifty-three pages long (only seven more 18 pages than the Complaint here), it mixed factual allegations, included information and 19 argument that was not directly relevant to the claims alleged, and the legal argument itself 20 was confusingly structured. Id. at 1174. Similar to the instant case, the plaintiff alleged a 21 conspiracy by numerous defendants to assault and imprison him. Id. In reviewing the 22 complaint, the Ninth Circuit found the factual allegations were set forth in “narrative 23 ramblings” and storytelling that were not a short and plain statement of the facts. Id. at 24 1176. Therefore, the McHenry court found that “one cannot determine from the complaint 25 who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide 26 discovery,” and dismissed the Complaint. Id. at 1178, 1180. 27 Similarly, here, Plaintiffs present their claims in a lengthy and fractured narrative. 28 For example, at page four of the Complaint, Plaintiffs address the conspiracy to defraud 1 but do not begin discussing the factual basis for this claim until page nine. Rather, the next 2 five pages of the Complaint make vague references to other causes of action, (id. at 4-8), 3 and one Defendant’s mental health records, (id. at 7). As another example, Defendant Isaac 4 Galvez’s alleged destruction of property and alleged destruction of evidence is mentioned 5 on pages eight, ten, twenty-two, and twenty-eight of the Complaint. 6 As in McHenry, Plaintiffs fail to make it clear which claims are asserted against 7 which Defendants. Interspersed throughout the Complaint are narrative recitations often 8 involving multiple defendants, references to multiple legal causes of action, and conclusory 9 statements of liability that make it unclear whether the author is providing background 10 information for a claim or making one. See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 9, 14-16, 17-18. Plaintiffs 11 further lengthen their Complaint and distract from their core allegations by including pages 12 of superfluous information that do not serve to inform Defendants of the claims brought 13 against them. See, e.g., id. at 17, 23. While Plaintiffs do attempt to specify in some 14 paragraphs which Defendants are connected to which allegations, the narrative, 15 interruptive, and repetitive structure does not simply, concisely, and directly put defendants 16 on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims. 17 And in Shakespeare v. Wilson, a pro se plaintiff alleged a broad conspiracy against 18 numerous defendants. 40 F.R.D. 500, 503 (S.D. Cal. 1966). There, the plaintiff attempted 19 to characterize her allegations as constitutional deprivations by including references to 20 “equal protection,” and “due process,” but did not set forth with specificity what acts gave 21 rise to these constitutional violations. Id. at 504. The district court dismissed her 22 complaint, finding that such conclusory, vague and imprecisely pled allegations did not 23 give defendants fair notice of her claims. Id. at 503. 24 Lastly, as in Shakespeare, Plaintiffs here make repeated references to Defendants’ 25 violations of Plaintiff Anthony’s constitutional rights. These allegations are largely 26 conclusory, stating Defendants’ actions somehow violated Plaintiffs’ Second, Fourth, 27 Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. at 27, 28. In the Court’s view—like 28 in Shakespeare—this is a case of a disappointed state court litigant who has brought 1 || multiple lawsuits in federal court “‘as an expression of hurt feelings and dissatisfaction with 2 ||the results in the state tribunals,” and whose Complaint falls short of Rule 8’s pleading 3 standard. Shakespeare, 40 F.R.D. at 504. 4 As written, the Complaint impermissibly asks the Court and Defendants to piece 5 together the claims alleged and speculate as to which of these claims pertain to which 6 ||Defendant. This structure and form of pleading is forbidden by Rule 8. See Gauvin v. 7 || Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion 8 ||to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to 9 amend. 10 CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 12 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend; 13 2. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to cure the 14 deficiencies noted herein no later than forty-five days from the date of this 15 order. Plaintiffs are cautioned, however, that should they choose to file an 16 amended complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with the Federal Rules 17 of Civil Procedure, and any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See 18 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 19 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the 20 original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting 21 that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 22 pleading may be considered “waived if not repled”’). A failure to do so will result 23 in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. 24 DATED: February 27, 2025 29 OHN A. HOUSTON 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28