Maxwell v. State of New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 4, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-03563
StatusUnknown

This text of Maxwell v. State of New York (Maxwell v. State of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maxwell v. State of New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X : DAVID MAXWELL, : : Plaintiff, : : 23 Civ. 3563 (JPC) -v- : : ORDER OF SERVICE STATE OF NEW YORK et al., : : Defendants. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and denial of medical treatment. By Order dated May 1, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. Dkt. 4. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the State of New York and Bronx County District Attorney Darcel Clark, directs service on Sergeant Howard Moth and Officer Fatmir Vucetovic, and directs the New York City Fire Department to identify the John Doe Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) worker that Plaintiff seeks to sue. I. Background The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). II. Discussion A. The State of New York “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have

waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the State of New York are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.

B. Bronx County District Attorney Darcel Clark Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that Assistant District Attorneys’ direction as to where criminal defendant would be arraigned was made in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as advocates, and therefore that the

Assistant District Attorneys were shielded by absolute immunity). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Bronx County District Attorney Darcel Clark, which in essence assert that Clark prosecuted Plaintiff on “fabricated charge[s]” Dkt. 1 at 6-7, are based on actions within the scope of Clark’s official duties and associated with the conduct of a trial. Therefore, these claims are dismissed because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and because they are frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F. 3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that claim against prosecutor is frivolous if it is brought for “initiating a prosecution [or for] presenting the State’s case” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). C. Service on Sergeant Moth and Officer Vucetovic Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the

Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.1 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP).

1 Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within ninety days of the date a complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the Complaint until the Court reviewed the Complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Sergeant Howard Moth and Officer Fatmir Vucetovic through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service

all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. If the Complaint is not served within ninety days after the date the summonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein
555 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Collazo v. Pagano
656 F.3d 131 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Giraldo v. Kessler
694 F.3d 161 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Ogunkoya v. Monaghan
913 F.3d 64 (Second Circuit, 2019)

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Maxwell v. State of New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maxwell-v-state-of-new-york-nysd-2023.