Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co.

9 N.W. 410, 46 Mich. 278, 1881 Mich. LEXIS 567
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided June 22, 1881·Published·Cited by 19 cases

Opinion

Marston, C. J.

This case has been before in this court, and is found reported in 41 Mich. 453, to which reference is made for a statement of the facts and a diagram, showing the location of the bridge, swing, property of the plaintiff, etc.

[281] Two questions of primary importance have, with others, been argued and submitted in tbe present case, and these were not passed upon on the former hearing;

First, Did the evidence introduced tend to prove an estoppel as against the plaintiff' or his grantor Hart, so that damages could not now be recovered against the company % and,

Seoondk/, Did the action of the supervisors in 1874, in fixing rates of toll for the bridge company to charge and collect, and of the Legislature in 1875 legalizing the rates so fixed, legalize the bridge, and make it a lawful‘structure not only from the date when such act took effect, but from the time the bridge was established by the board of supervisors in May, 1864, as claimed by counsel for the bridge company ?

• The testimony of Mr. Glasby, who built the bridge, was •one of the principal stockholders, and who testifies fully as to what Mr. Hart the plaintiff’s grantor said and did in reference to the location and construction of the bridge and swing is given in a note herewith,* and there is no other [282] testimony in. tbe case tending, more strongly tban tbis, to sbow acts or conduct of Hart, or reliance tbereon by tbe company, tbat would estop tbe plaintiff in tbis case.

In speaking of an estoppel, wben tbis case was before considered it was said tbe doctrine of estoppel rests upon a party having directly or indirectly made assertions, promises or assurances upon wbicb another has acted, under such circumstances tbat be woirld- be seriously prejudiced if tbe assertions were suffered to be disproved or tbe promises or assurances to be withdrawn; and as tbe doctrine wben applied operates to take away legal rights it is no more tban common justice to require tbat tbe facts wbicb are supposed to call for its application shall be unquestionable, and tbe wrong which is to be prevented be undoubted. Tbe correctness and indeed tbe justice of tbe rule as thus laid down will be unquestioned, sustained as it is by an almost unbroken line of authorities. "What is there in tbe evidence to bring tbis case within tbe rule thus laid down ?

Tbe testimony of Mr. G-lasby, wben taken together, and tbis is tbe only way to test it, shows conclusively, tbat in no[283] way was bis conduct — and be tben and for tbis purpose was tbe company — influenced or affected by tbe acts, conduct or language of Mr. Hart, different from wliat it would bave been bad Mr. Hart not been an actor or interested in tbe question at all, Mr. Grlasby says clearly and distinctly that it was to tbe board of supervisors be looked and depended for bis authority in tbe premises, in all that be did; tbat if bis actions and doings pleased Hart, be' (G-lasby) was glad, but beyond tbis Hart’s acts and conduct bad no influence with bim. It is’ clear beyond dispute from tbe evidence, [284] that aside from Hart’s signature to tlie petition presented the board of supervisors asking that the bridge be located at the foot of Third street, he neither did any act nor said anything, which changed or influenced the conduct of the company, or upon which action was taken by it different from what it otherwise would have been, so that we are unable to see how it can now be said that the company relying upon what he said or did, expended any money or did anything, which justice and equity requires them to be protected in the full enjoyment of, as against Hart or his grantees. The [285] essential elements required by the doctrine of estoppel in-order to apply it are wholly wanting in tlie present ease* Were this simply a question as to the weight of the testimony, within the rule laid down in Conely v. McDonald 40 Mich. 150, and since adhered to, we should not interfere, hut in our opinion the evidence failed in essential particulars to establish an estoppel, or facts which would warrant a jury in so finding.

Upon the second question we are of opinion that the acts-of the supervisors and of the Legislature in fixing and legal[286] izing the rates of toll upon this bridge were sucb that the public could not thereafter question the legality of the structure or the right of the company to maintain it under its charter. "We are also however of opinion that such action would not cure or cut off any claim which np to that time the plaintiff may have had, because of its illegal character and the injury he may have sustained in consequence thereof. The Legislature did not attempt to legalize the action of the board of supervisors in granting authority to construct the bridge in 1864, even if such an [287] act iu 1875 would cut off tlie right of the plaintiff to recover damages which he had sustained between those dates. The act of the supervisors in 1871 in fixing tolls thereafter to be collected and the Legislature in making legal such proceedings of the board, was but a recognition of the legality of the company and its rights after that date. Statutes are not to be given a retrospective construction unless the language thereof shows clearly such to have been the intention of the Legislature, and in this case it clearly appears that no such intention existed, but that other and far different reasons [288] existed for tbe action of tbe Legislature. We need not therefore discuss at length in this case, what the effect of an act legalizing the structure from 186é would have been or how the plaintiff might have been affected thereby. This case calls for no such investigation.

But conceding that the effect of the legislation of 1875 in legalizing the previous action of the board of supervisors was to make the bridge and pier a lawful structure, it does not follow that the plaintiff may not maintain an action for the consequential injury to his dock. Neither the super[289] visors nor the State can directly or indirectly appropriate the plaintiffs use of the shore to public uses without compensation ; and if even a lawful bridge and pier is constructed so near it as to preclude its profitable use he is entitled to compensation. If the bridge and pier is far enough from the dock so that it may be used but only with inconvenience, the same principle applies, and the .question is merely of the extent of the injury.

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Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 9 N.W. 410, 46 Mich. 278, 1881 Mich. LEXIS 567 (Mich. 1881).

9 N.W. 410 (Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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