KERN, Associate Judge:
D.C.App.Bar R. XI, § 7(3) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.
That the respondent attorney here engaged in professional misconduct is not in dispute and hence there is no challenge to factual findings by the Board on Professional Responsibility. We accept the Board’s findings of fact as being supported by substantial evidence of record and incorporate herein as an Appendix those findings. We conclude, however, that the Board’s recommended disposition of disbarment is unwarranted on the facts of the case. We conclude that a suspension for two years is the appropriate sanction. We deem suspension rather than disbarment as being more consistent with other dispositions in disciplinary cases involving comparable conduct and as otherwise warranted under the circumstances.
Respondent’s professional misconduct consisted of neglecting the legal matter entrusted to him by his client in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and making serious misrepresentations to both his client and Bar Counsel in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). The Board, noting respondent’s prior record of a private reprimand for neglecting a client and misrepresenting to that client the status of his matter and of an informal admonition from Bar Counsel for neglecting to investigate and pursue a traffic accident claim, concluded that “respondent has shown ... he ... will not apply the standards of ethical conduct and of fiduciary responsibility that are sine qua non to public confidence in the legal profession.”
The Board relies heavily on two unreported decisions, i.e., In re Duesterdick (D-9-75) Order of Disbarment dated August 15,1975, and In re Spencer (D-36-80) Order of Disbarment dated February 13, 1980.1 In re Spencer was based upon the reciprocal discipline rule and, hence, this court did not independently review findings and the disposition in that matter. In re Duesterdick dealt with an attorney who not only allowed the Statute of Limitations to run in a negligence case he was handling but also falsely testified before an Inquiry Committee.
As we have said before there are no easy equations in these matters. While we strive to observe the mandate of Rule XI § 7(3) to achieve consistency in the disposition of disciplinary cases, each case must be decided on its own particular facts. In re Knox, D.C.App., 441 A.2d 265 (1982), quoting In re Russell, D.C.App., 424 A.2d 1087, 1088 (1980).
The reported disciplinary case that seems most closely on point is In re Fogel, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 966 (1980). In that case, respondent neglected an appeal and then lied to his client, the Hearing Committee and the court. Fogel also had a record of prior discipline. He was suspended for one year and a day.
In In re Russell, supra, we suspended the respondent for six months after he neglected a personal injury suit for three years, failed to return his client’s file, and failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel.
In In re Smith, D.C.App., 403 A.2d 296 (1979), we suspended the respondent for eighteen months for neglect of two civil matters and for misrepresentation to his clients concerning the cases. He had no prior discipline.
In In re Haupt, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 768 (1980), respondent was suspended for three years for two instances of misconduct: (1) [1362]*1362neglect and misrepresentation in a divorce proceeding, and (2) misrepresentation in telling a Maryland sheriff that the defendant’s fiancee was his assistant so that she could enter the cellblock. Haupt had been previously suspended for 30 days and received a formal admonition.
In In re Willcher, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 185 (1979), respondent was suspended for five years for conduct involving twelve separate matters including serious neglect.
In reaching our conclusion that respondent be suspended for two years is more appropriate, we also note the various factors taken into account by the Committee: that respondent “did fully disclose all the pertinent facts in this matter after receiving the follow-up letter from [Bar Counsel]” and respondent’s client did receive an amount of money representing an estimate of what she might have received on her accident claim.
We are satisfied that suspension for two years is proper under our Rule.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Respondent, Donald J. Sheehy, be and he hereby is, suspended from the practice of law for two years, effective 30 days from entry of this opinion.
So ordered.
APPENDIX
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Bar Docket Number: 507-78
In The Matter op Donald J. Sheehy
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The respondent attorney has admitted serious neglect and incompetent handling of a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). He has also admitted making written statements both to his client and to Bar Counsel which involved serious misrepresentations and deceit, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). The only real issue before this Board is the scope of the sanction which we are called upon to recommend to the Court.
All of the essential facts in these proceedings are found in a written stipulation between the parties, court records, and letters written by the respondent. While there are some variances between the verbal testimony given by the complaining witness and that given by respondent they do not affect the crucial admissions which are found in the documents referred to.
We turn now to a recital of the significant events. On March 8,1974, Ms. Beverly A. Telfaire was involved in a minor automobile accident in the District of Columbia. The driver of the other vehicle was one Raymond Chavis; the owner was Darling Delaware Co., Inc. Ms. Telfaire was treated by her physician, Dr. Thomas Dent, for back injuries and she claims that she missed at least twelve days of work.
Shortly afterwards, Ms. Telfaire called the respondent to discuss the accident. Respondent told her that he would send her an authorization form and retainer agreement and he claims he did so. There is confusion in the testimony as to whether Ms. Telfaire received the retainer agreement and, if so, whether she mailed it back to the respondent. He testified he did not receive it, but both parties agree nevertheless that an attorney/client relationship was established in 1974. There was some shifting of addresses on the part of both parties during the next year. Claiming that she was unable to reach respondent by telephone, Ms.
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KERN, Associate Judge:
D.C.App.Bar R. XI, § 7(3) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.
That the respondent attorney here engaged in professional misconduct is not in dispute and hence there is no challenge to factual findings by the Board on Professional Responsibility. We accept the Board’s findings of fact as being supported by substantial evidence of record and incorporate herein as an Appendix those findings. We conclude, however, that the Board’s recommended disposition of disbarment is unwarranted on the facts of the case. We conclude that a suspension for two years is the appropriate sanction. We deem suspension rather than disbarment as being more consistent with other dispositions in disciplinary cases involving comparable conduct and as otherwise warranted under the circumstances.
Respondent’s professional misconduct consisted of neglecting the legal matter entrusted to him by his client in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3) and making serious misrepresentations to both his client and Bar Counsel in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). The Board, noting respondent’s prior record of a private reprimand for neglecting a client and misrepresenting to that client the status of his matter and of an informal admonition from Bar Counsel for neglecting to investigate and pursue a traffic accident claim, concluded that “respondent has shown ... he ... will not apply the standards of ethical conduct and of fiduciary responsibility that are sine qua non to public confidence in the legal profession.”
The Board relies heavily on two unreported decisions, i.e., In re Duesterdick (D-9-75) Order of Disbarment dated August 15,1975, and In re Spencer (D-36-80) Order of Disbarment dated February 13, 1980.1 In re Spencer was based upon the reciprocal discipline rule and, hence, this court did not independently review findings and the disposition in that matter. In re Duesterdick dealt with an attorney who not only allowed the Statute of Limitations to run in a negligence case he was handling but also falsely testified before an Inquiry Committee.
As we have said before there are no easy equations in these matters. While we strive to observe the mandate of Rule XI § 7(3) to achieve consistency in the disposition of disciplinary cases, each case must be decided on its own particular facts. In re Knox, D.C.App., 441 A.2d 265 (1982), quoting In re Russell, D.C.App., 424 A.2d 1087, 1088 (1980).
The reported disciplinary case that seems most closely on point is In re Fogel, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 966 (1980). In that case, respondent neglected an appeal and then lied to his client, the Hearing Committee and the court. Fogel also had a record of prior discipline. He was suspended for one year and a day.
In In re Russell, supra, we suspended the respondent for six months after he neglected a personal injury suit for three years, failed to return his client’s file, and failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel.
In In re Smith, D.C.App., 403 A.2d 296 (1979), we suspended the respondent for eighteen months for neglect of two civil matters and for misrepresentation to his clients concerning the cases. He had no prior discipline.
In In re Haupt, D.C.App., 422 A.2d 768 (1980), respondent was suspended for three years for two instances of misconduct: (1) [1362]*1362neglect and misrepresentation in a divorce proceeding, and (2) misrepresentation in telling a Maryland sheriff that the defendant’s fiancee was his assistant so that she could enter the cellblock. Haupt had been previously suspended for 30 days and received a formal admonition.
In In re Willcher, D.C.App., 404 A.2d 185 (1979), respondent was suspended for five years for conduct involving twelve separate matters including serious neglect.
In reaching our conclusion that respondent be suspended for two years is more appropriate, we also note the various factors taken into account by the Committee: that respondent “did fully disclose all the pertinent facts in this matter after receiving the follow-up letter from [Bar Counsel]” and respondent’s client did receive an amount of money representing an estimate of what she might have received on her accident claim.
We are satisfied that suspension for two years is proper under our Rule.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Respondent, Donald J. Sheehy, be and he hereby is, suspended from the practice of law for two years, effective 30 days from entry of this opinion.
So ordered.
APPENDIX
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Bar Docket Number: 507-78
In The Matter op Donald J. Sheehy
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The respondent attorney has admitted serious neglect and incompetent handling of a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). He has also admitted making written statements both to his client and to Bar Counsel which involved serious misrepresentations and deceit, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5). The only real issue before this Board is the scope of the sanction which we are called upon to recommend to the Court.
All of the essential facts in these proceedings are found in a written stipulation between the parties, court records, and letters written by the respondent. While there are some variances between the verbal testimony given by the complaining witness and that given by respondent they do not affect the crucial admissions which are found in the documents referred to.
We turn now to a recital of the significant events. On March 8,1974, Ms. Beverly A. Telfaire was involved in a minor automobile accident in the District of Columbia. The driver of the other vehicle was one Raymond Chavis; the owner was Darling Delaware Co., Inc. Ms. Telfaire was treated by her physician, Dr. Thomas Dent, for back injuries and she claims that she missed at least twelve days of work.
Shortly afterwards, Ms. Telfaire called the respondent to discuss the accident. Respondent told her that he would send her an authorization form and retainer agreement and he claims he did so. There is confusion in the testimony as to whether Ms. Telfaire received the retainer agreement and, if so, whether she mailed it back to the respondent. He testified he did not receive it, but both parties agree nevertheless that an attorney/client relationship was established in 1974. There was some shifting of addresses on the part of both parties during the next year. Claiming that she was unable to reach respondent by telephone, Ms. Telfaire on March 8, 1976, filed a complaint with Bar Counsel which was formally docketed. Bar Counsel thereupon found a new address for respondent and advised him of Ms. Tel-faire’s complaint, and on April 7 Ms. Tel-faire met with respondent in his office and executed another retainer agreement and an authorization form permitting respondent to get information from Ms. Telfaire’s doctor. At respondent’s urging she then asked Bar Counsel to terminate his investigation stating that she and respondent had reached an understanding.
The problems with communications between Ms. Telfaire and respondent contin[1363]*1363ued. In a January 26,1977, letter, however, respondent stated to Ms. Telfaire that “[a]t the present time I am trying to move Mr. Dent toward a settlement so we can avoid filing suit.”1 This was, of necessity, a mis* representation as Mr. Dent was in fact Dr. Dent, the physician who treated Ms. Tel-faire and not a proper party defendant.
On March 7, 1977, one day before the statute of limitations on Ms. Telfaire’s claim would expire, the respondent filed a personal injury and property damage action on her behalf in Superior Court, naming Thomas M. Dent as the sole defendant, and alleging that he was the driver of the vehicle that struck Ms. Telfaire. On the same day respondent obtained a summons to be served on Thomas M. Dent. Respondent throughout this period was fully aware that Thomas M. Dent was Ms. Telfaire’s doctor and not the driver of the automobile, and the police accident report which was readily available showed the owner of the other automobile involved to be the Darling Delaware Co., Inc. and the driver to be Raymond Chavis.
When respondent filed his complaint, he hand-lettered “and John Doe” next to the typed name of the defendant in the caption of the pleading. This hand lettering apparently was written after the complaint had been accepted for filing, for it does not appear on the caption of the court jacket.
One month after the complaint was filed, on April 7,1977, Judge Johnson granted an oral motion of the respondent for leave to file an amended complaint naming the proper parties defendants, i.e., Raymond Chavis and Darling Delaware Co., Inc. Respondent says he gave copies to employees of Alarm Masters Security Systems, Inc. (which company was also a client of respondent) for service on the defendants. No service was effected, and the respondent had a falling out with Alarm Masters Security Systems, Inc. (on another matter) and apparently forgot all about pursuing Ms. Telfaire’s claim.
In October, 1978 respondent was offered a position with the District of Columbia government as Deputy Chief of the Office of Judicial Affairs to draft legislative and legal opinions and to act as liaison to the offices of the Corporation Counsel and the U.S. Attorney. He accepted the position and began to wind up his private law practice.
Ms. Telfaire again had problems getting in touch with respondent, and on February 26,1979, almost two years after the statute of limitations on her claim had expired she filed a second complaint against respondent. With it she incorporated a copy of the amended complaint, a copy of the letter from respondent to her dated January 26, 1977, (which has been previously referred to) in which respondent falsely mentioned his alleged settlement negotiation with “Mr. Dent,” and a letter which Ms. Telfaire had mailed to respondent under date of January 9, 1979, but which had been returned undelivered.
Upon receiving Ms. Telfaire’s new complaint, Deputy Bar Counsel, Edwin Your-man, obtained respondent’s current office address and telephone number and called on February 27 and 28, and March 1, 2 and 5, 1979, leaving messages asking respondent to return his call. These messages spurred respondent to seek an immediate accommodation with Ms. Telfaire by means of deceit. On March 1 he sent a letter to Ms. Telfaire in which he made the following statement:
“Please be advised that I now have a settlement offer of $1,200 in cash. I would recommend acceptance for the various reasons I have previously discussed.” 2
Ms. Telfaire agreed in a telephone conversation with respondent to accept the $1,200 “offer.” Several weeks later, since she had not yet received her money, Ms. Telfaire again called the respondent. During this conversation respondent said “as soon as the people would send him the money, that he would send it to [her]”.3
[1364]*1364As a matter of fact respondent had received no offer for settlement from anyone. The case against Mr. Chavis and Darling Delaware Co., Inc. had not gone forward and was barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent was attempting to grossly deceive his client as to the true status of affairs.
Communications between Ms. Telfaire and respondent again lapsed until May 21, 1979, when respondent told Ms. Telfaire that he would mail her a check for $760.00 that day. The figure was arrived at by respondent stating that after he deducted his one-third fee of $400.00 and “costs” of $40.00 that $760.00 would be the balance due Ms. Telfaire under the purported settlement. Respondent received a tax refund which was the actual source of the funds for the $760.00 check to Ms. Telfaire which she did receive in due course and which was drawn on an account labeled “Donald J. Sheehy, Attorney At Law.”
At no time did respondent ever disclose to Ms. Telfaire the truth.
In late May or early June of 1979, Ms. Telfaire brought the situation to the attention of the Bar Counsel. She explained her efforts to obtain what she thought were the proceeds of the settlement from respondent, she described his check to her, and pointed out that she had never authorized the respondent to endorse the settlement check.
In a letter dated June 4, 1979, Bar Counsel advised respondent of the pending investigation, and asked him to address several issues concerning the purported settlement. The letter accurately reflected the information available at that time.
After respondent received Bar Counsel’s letter he wrote the following reply:
“Dear Mr. Grabowsky:
In response to your inquiry regarding the above, please be' advised that on March 1, 1979, I wrote to Miss Telfaire advising her of a settlement offer of $1,200.00, of my change of address, and at the same time suggested that she accept the offer.
Subsequent to my conversation with Mr. Yourman of your office, I spoke with Miss Telfaire and she indicated to me on the phone that the offer of $1,200.00 was acceptable. At the same time she inquired as to the amount she would receive. I advised her of the one-third attorney fee as per the retainer agreement of April 7, 1976, which would be $400.00 and that I had incurred a filing fee cost of $40.00 which funds I advanced (Check # 7292, dated March 7, 1977 made payable to Clerk of Superior Court, D.C.). Any other costs which have been incurred would be waived. Therefore, she would receive $760.00.
After that time I always returned Miss Telfaire’s telephone calls within a few days. However, I could not always reach her. Therefore, I would leave a message at either her residence or her place of employment that I had ‘returned her call’.
Somewhere in the vicinity of Easter week (April 22, 1979) I talked with Miss Telfaire when returning one of her calls. She stated that she was broke and needed the money badly. I advised her that as of that time I still did not have the money and that I would send her a cheek just as soon as I received it since I could sympathize with her financial condition.
In the month of May, she called several times and each time I returned her calls either to her home or her place qf employment, leaving the message whenever I did not talk with her directly that I was ‘returning her call’.
On May 21, 1979 I called Miss Telfaire and advised her that I had received the settlement money. Again we discussed the breakdown of funds and the fact that she would be receiving $760.00. She wanted to know when she would be receiving the money since she needed it and I replied that hopefully I would be putting it in the mail that day or the next so that she would have it for the long Memorial Day weekend which was coming up. I mailed a check to her dated May 23, 1979 in the amount of $760.00 drawn on the account of Donald Joseph Sheehy — Attorney at Law together with [1365]*1365a handwritten account, so that she would have the money for the Memorial Day weekend. Miss Telfaire never gave me a power of attorney to endorse her name, however, all our discussions were about ‘send me the money because I need it’.
At no time was there any questioning or disagreement about the amount of money received, the division of funds or the amount of money to be sent Miss Telfaire. Frankly I was most anxious to close Miss Telfaire’s case and get her $760.00 for the long weekend coming up, particularly because of her conversation regarding her financial need.
Very truly yours,
[Signed] Donald Joseph Sheehy”4
Upon receipt of the above letter Mr. Yourman wrote respondent again, repeating his previous request for details regarding the alleged settlement and the disbursement of funds. Soon afterwards respondent sought a conference with Mr. Your-man at which he confessed to his acts of neglect and attempt at deception heretofore described. He supplemented this with a detailed letter to Bar Counsel which was introduced as evidence before the Hearing Committee.5
The Board concurs fully in the Hearing Committee’s own summary of respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
“Mr. Sheehy has violated DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3). His neglect of, and failure to prepare Ms. Telfaire’s suit is clear. It is undisputed that as of Ms. Telfaire’s telephone call in 1974, the attorney-client relationship was established. Nonetheless, in the course of his representation, he filed suit against the wrong defendant, amended suit after the statute of limitation had expired and failed to serve the correct defendants. As a result of his inattention, negligence and neglect, Ms. Telfaire’s cause of action lapsed.
Mr. Sheehy also violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation. At all times up until the commencement of these proceedings, Mr. Sheehy maintained the deception to Ms. Telfaire that her case had been actively pursued, and that he had obtained from the defendants a legitimate settlement offer. In fact, Mr. Sheehy was aware that he had done little to pursue the case and his negligence and neglect had resulted in the expiration of the statute of limitations. His so-called ‘settlement’ was a disguised payment designed to finish the matter and placate Ms. Telfaire. Such deceit strikes to the heart of the relationship between attorney and client, and is a clear violation of the Code.
Mr. Sheehy’s acts of deception were compounded when he responded to the first letter from Bar Counsel. Realizing that this conduct was under examination, he made an intentional and calculated attempt to mislead Bar Counsel. That conduct, in and of itself, establishes a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).”