Matter of Seip

116 B.R. 709, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 123, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1563, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1206, 1990 WL 107864
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedJune 25, 1990
Docket15-41919
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 116 B.R. 709 (Matter of Seip) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Seip, 116 B.R. 709, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 123, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1563, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1206, 1990 WL 107864 (Neb. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDA

JOHN C. MINAHAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This Chapter 11 case presents the issue of whether the amount of a secured claim for purposes of the plan of reorganization is determined by the value of collateral on the date the case was commenced or, alternatively, on a date in close proximity to the date of confirmation of the plan. Also before the court is a dispute regarding the application of adequate protection payments made to a secured creditor during the case. The issues are raised in the context of an Objection to Confirmation (Fil. # 161) filed by Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. I conclude that collateral must be valued in close proximity to the date of confirmation. The objection to confirmation should therefore be granted.

FACTS

Debtors, Gerald and Lillian Seip, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 11, 1986. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Connecticut Mutual”) holds a mortgage on debtors’ real estate and certain equipment. Connecticut Mutual’s claim was $596,669.79 on December 11, 1986, the date this case was filed. The claim consisted of unpaid principal of $435,-734.53 and prepetition interest of $160,-935.26. On the date this bankruptcy case was filed the value of the real estate and equipment securing Connecticut Mutual’s claim was $520,000.00. The parties have stipulated that the current value of the real estate and equipment is $650,000.00.

Prior to filing bankruptcy, debtors defaulted on payments under the mortgage with Connecticut Mutual. Connecticut Mutual commenced foreclosure proceedings in state court and a consent decree of foreclosure between debtors and Connecticut Mutual, together with an order granting Connecticut Mutual immediate possession of the property and equipment, were entered.

Under the state court orders, the debtor, Mr. Seip, and Connecticut Mutual entered into a lease agreement providing for a lease of the real estate and equipment to Mr. Seip. A foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 12, 1986, but debtors filed this bankruptcy case on December 11, 1986 before the sale occurred.

Debtors’ plan proposes to treat the secured claim of Connecticut Mutual by valuing Connecticut Mutual’s collateral as of the date debtors’ bankruptcy petition was filed, rather than on or about the date of confirmation. Further, debtors’ plan reduces the claim of Connecticut Mutual by an amount equal to payments made to Connecticut Mutual during this case. During the pendency of this case, debtors made two $25,000.00 lump sum adequate protection payments and payments on account of accruing interest on pre-petition real estate taxes to Connecticut Mutual.

In the objection to confirmation, Connecticut Mutual asserts that the collateral securing its claim should be valued at or about the time of confirmation rather than at the date of commencement of this case. Connecticut Mutual also asserts that its allowed secured claim should not be reduced by the amount of the adequate protection payments it received during this case.

Conversely, debtors assert that the collateral securing the claim of Connecticut Mutual should be valued as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed. In support of their arguments for valuing property at the date of filing, the debtors rely upon the recent decision of In re Beard, 108 B.R. 322 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ala.1989). In addition, debtors assert that the adequate protection payments made to Connecticut Mutual should be deducted from the allowed secured claim of Connecticut Mutual.

DISCUSSION

I conclude that the collateral securing the claim of Connecticut Mutual should be valued at or about the time of confirma *711 tion. Accordingly, I conclude that the objection to confirmation should be granted.

Although logical arguments can be made in support of valuing collateral at the date of filing, see In re Beard, 108 B.R. at 324-27, I conclude that for purposes of confirmation, collateral should be valued in close proximity to the date of confirmation. First, I conclude that precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is controlling on this issue and should be followed. The eighth circuit has clearly held that “[f]or purposes of the reorganization plan, the value of the collateral is to be determined at the time for confirmation of that plan.” See Ahlers v. Norwest Bank Worthington (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 399 (8th Cir.1986) (citing 11 U.S.C. Section 506(a)), rev’d on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988). The eighth circuit reasoned that under Section 506(a):

valuation is to be determined in light of the purposes of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property. This determination shall be made in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use of property or on a plan affecting the creditor’s interest. To illustrate, a valuation early in the case ... would not be binding upon the debtor or creditor at the time of confirmation of the plan. Throughout the [Bankruptcy Code], references to secured claims are only to the claim determined to be secured under this subsection, and not to the full amount of the creditor’s claim.

Id. at 399-400 (quoting S.Rep. No. 989 at 68, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787 at 5854). See also Lend Lease v. Briggs Transportation Co. (In re Briggs Transportation Co.), 780 F.2d 1339, 1349 (8th Cir.1985) (“[A] value determination for automatic stay purposes is not necessarily the same as value determined for another purpose, such as confirming a plan.”) (citing Section 506(a)). Although the eighth circuit’s decision in Ahlers was reversed in part by the United States Supreme Court, the decision was reversed solely on a separate ground respecting the absolute priority rule. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988). Thus, the reversal does not lessen the precedential effect of the eighth , circuit’s holding in Ahlers that for purposes of confirmation, collateral should be valued in close proximity to the date of confirmation.

Second, I conclude that collateral should be valued as of the time of confirmation as a matter of statutory construction. Under Section 506(a), the amount of a creditor’s allowed secured claim “shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest”. Section 506(a) clearly contemplates, and in fact directs, that determination of value be made in light of the circumstances.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Hales
493 B.R. 861 (D. Utah, 2013)
Wood v. La Bank (In Re Wood)
190 B.R. 788 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1996)
In Re Stanley
185 B.R. 417 (D. Connecticut, 1995)
In Re Union Meeting Partners
178 B.R. 664 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1995)
In Re Kennedy
177 B.R. 967 (S.D. Alabama, 1995)
Matter of Atlanta Southern Business Park, Ltd.
173 B.R. 444 (N.D. Georgia, 1994)
In Re Melgar Enterprises, Inc.
151 B.R. 34 (E.D. New York, 1993)
In Re Woolley's Parkway Center, Inc.
147 B.R. 996 (M.D. Florida, 1992)
In Re Robertson
135 B.R. 350 (E.D. Arkansas, 1992)
In Re Broomall Printing Corp.
131 B.R. 32 (D. Maryland, 1991)
In Re Landing Associates, Ltd.
122 B.R. 288 (W.D. Texas, 1990)
In Re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership
119 B.R. 809 (D. New Mexico, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
116 B.R. 709, 24 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 123, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1563, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1206, 1990 WL 107864, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-seip-nebraskab-1990.