In Re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership

119 B.R. 809, 1990 WL 155529
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedOctober 11, 1990
Docket19-10307
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 119 B.R. 809 (In Re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership, 119 B.R. 809, 1990 WL 155529 (N.M. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARK B. McFEELEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came before the Court on September 17, 1990, for final hearing on the Resolution Trust Corporation’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. Having considered the arguments of counsel, case law, exhibits, and memoranda of law submitted by the parties, and being otherwise fully informed and advised, the Court finds the motion is not well taken and should be denied.

FACTS

Reddington/Sun Arrow Limited Partnership, a Texas limited partnership (“debt- or”), filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 1, 1989. The debtor’s primary asset is an apartment complex located in El Paso, Texas, known as the Desert Arrow Apartments (“property”). At the time of the filing, Victoria Savings Association (“Victoria”) held a first lien on the property and a lien on all rents from the property.

On June 14, 1989, this Court entered an Agreed Order Regarding Interim Use of Cash Collateral and Providing Adequate Protection (“cash collateral order”). The cash collateral order provided that the debt- or was authorized to use the rents from the property and Victoria was to be provided a portion of the rents as adequate protection of its security interest therein. Pursuant *811 to the order, Victoria has received payments of approximately $600,000.

On June 28, 1989, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“Bank Board”) appointed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) as receiver of Victoria. The Bank Board chartered Victoria Savings Association, F.S.A. (“Federal Association”), and authorized the transfer of substantially all of the assets, deposits and certain other liabilities to the newly chartered Federal Association. The Bank Board appointed FSLIC as conservator of the newly chartered Federal Association. The Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) has succeeded to the rights of the FSLIC. The debtor is indebted to RTC in the approximate amount of $5,400,000.

The indebtedness to RTC is secured by a first lien upon the real property and upon all rents, issues, profits, and management and services fees from the property pursuant to a Collateral Assignment of Leases, Rentals and Management Fees as well as the Deed of Trust.

On July 3, 1990, the debtor filed its Second Amended Plan of Reorganization of Debtor-in-Possession (“Plan”) and Second Amended Disclosure Statement. The Second Amended Disclosure Statement was approved on August 23, 1990, subject to the requirement that the debtor make certain modifications. In its plan, the debtor proposes to execute a promissory note in favor of the RTC secured by the property in the approximate principal amount of $4,000,000. The parties have stipulated that the property has a fair market value of $4,600,000. The debtor proposes to reduce RTC’s secured claim by the amount received by RTC pursuant to the cash collateral order. The debtor admits that if the claim is not reduced, a plan may not be feasible.

RTC has stipulated that there has been no decrease in the value of the collateral.

DISCUSSION

At issue is approximately $600,000 which the debtor has paid to RTC pursuant to the cash collateral order. The debtor has admitted there is no equity in the property; therefore, RTC’s argument on the stay motion focused on the question of whether the property is necessary for an effective reorganization. 1 RTC contends that the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization because its claim cannot be reduced as the debtor proposes, and therefore the debtor cannot reorganize.

RTC argues that the payments made by the debtor should not go to reduce the principal on the debt because the payments were made solely to protect its interest under 11 U.S.C. § 361. 2 The cash collateral order does not furnish any guidance to the Court. The order only states that “the Debtor ... shall pay to Victoria the ‘net cash flow’ which for the purposes of this Order shall be all rental income and other cash collateral received by the Debtor....” *812 The order further provides that Victoria shall have continuing postpetition liens on all rents from the property. The parties did not specify in the cash collateral order how to treat the payments. Therefore, the Court must look to the Bankruptcy Code and case law to decide if the payments will reduce the principal on the debt owed to RTC.

RTC argues that it is entitled to have the payments made pursuant to the cash collateral order as adequate protection not because the value of the collateral is decreasing but rather because the allowed secured claim is not increasing. RTC’s argument centers on a change in amount of the allowed secured claim between the date of filing the petition and the date of plan confirmation. At the date of filing the petition, the value of the collateral was $4.6 million and therefore the allowed secured claim was $4.6 million. 3 The parties agree that the value of the collateral is not depreciating and thus on the date of confirmation the value remains $4.6 million. RTC argues that if the rents had been sequestered, the value of the collateral would have increased and the amount of the allowed secured claim would increase commensurately. RTC therefore contends that its position has eroded over time due to the stay and urges the Court to determine its allowed secured claim as of the date of plan confirmation.

I. Determination of Allowed Secured Claim

The threshold question before the Court is: What date should be used for the court’s determination of the value of an allowed secured claim for purposes of determining adequate protection under § 362? Should it be the date of filing the petition or the date of plan confirmation?

As an undersecured creditor, RTC would benefit from any increase in the value of the collateral in the period between the date of filing and the date of confirmation. “Value,” as set out in § 506(a), is an amorphous term. It “shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.” In re Caraway, 95 B.R. 466, 467 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1988). In In re Marion Street Partnership, 108 B.R. 218 (Bankr.Minn.1989), for purposes of determining adequate protection under § 362, the court valued the collateral as of the date of filing the petition. The court held that under § 361, the creditor was entitled to be compensated for potential declines in the value of the collateral measured from that date.

In the context of automatic stay litigation, other courts have also decided that determination of value as of the date of filing of the petition is appropriate under § 506(a). In re Barkley-Cupit Enter., Inc., 13 B.R. 86 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1981), aff'd, Barkley-Cupit Enter, v. Equitable, 677 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1982); In re Smithfield Estates, Inc., 48 B.R. 910 (Bankr.R.1.1985);

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
119 B.R. 809, 1990 WL 155529, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-reddingtonsunarrow-ltd-partnership-nmb-1990.