ORDER
W. HOMER DRAKE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Now before the Court in this proceeding is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Industrial Tractor Company, Inc. (hereinafter “the Creditor”). Through this Motion, the Creditor seeks review of an Order whereby the Court granted the “Motion to Reopen Case and Add Omitted Creditor” filed by Kenneth A. McDaniel (hereinafter “the Debtor”). This Motion gives rise to a core proceeding,
see
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) & (O), and as such, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the reasoning that follows.
Background
The Debtor commenced his present bankruptcy case by filing a Chapter 7 Petition on May 22, 1995. Since the bankruptcy estate contained no assets beyond the Debtor’s ex
emptions, no bar date was set for filing proofs of claim against the Debtor’s estate, as proscribed by Bankruptcy Rule.
Apart from this distinguishing characteristic, however, the case proceeded in due course, and on October 16, 1995, the Debtor received a discharge from his prepetition debt obligations. Thereafter, his ease was closed.
Throughout the foregoing process, however, the Debtor failed to include as part of his bankruptcy schedules a certain claim owed to the Creditor, which indebtedness arose from the Debtor’s status as guarantor of loans made to River Landings, Inc. and KM Trucking, Inc. The Creditor had sent the Debtor no direct notice of its intent to proceed against the guaranty obligation prior to the date of his petition, instead sending correspondence to agents of the corporate obligors in Hilo, Hawaii.
. Thus, circumstances suggest that the Debtor did not realize his impending liability until the Creditor filed a garnishment on debtor’s joint bank account with his wife on or about May 8,1997.
Upon commencement of such garnishment proceedings, the Debtor filed a Motion to Reopen Case and Add Omitted Creditor. A hearing thereafter was conducted, at which time the Creditor appeared and vigorously contested any amendment of the Debtor’s schedules to include that obligation owed to it. Notwithstanding the Creditor’s contentions, however, the Court found that the Debtor had a right both in law and in equity to-amend his bankruptcy schedules as requested. The Creditor now characterizes that decision as inapposite with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in
Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher),
781 F.2d 1529 (1986), and thus, seeks reconsideration of its terms.
1. The Standard for Reconsideration and The Creditor’s Failure to Present New Evidence or Case Law Justifying the Relief Sought.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) grants bankruptcy courts license to reconsider orders and judgments after their entry.
See
fed.r.civ.p. 59(e) (made applicable in bankruptcy by fed.r.bankr.p. 9023);
see also
fed.r.bankr.p. 9002 (references, like that of FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e), to the alteration or amendment of a “judgment” shall be read to include reconsideration of any order appealable to an appellate court);
see also NationsBank v. Blier (In re Creative Goldsmiths),
178 B.R. 87, 90-91 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (applying Rule 59(e) in bankruptcy). Understandably, however, the goal of this provision is limited to the correction of any manifest errors of law or misapprehension of fact.
See Hutchinson v. Staton,
994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir.1993);
Lux v. Spotswood Constr. Loans,
176 B.R. 416, 420 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1467 (4th Cir.1994). “[This Rule is] not designed to furnish a vehicle by which a disappointed party may reargue matters already argued and disposed of, nor [is it] aimed at providing a mechanism by which new arguments or legal theories, which could and should have been raised
prior to the issuance of judgment, can be later advanced.”
See In re DEF Inn, Inc.,
186 B.R. 671, 680-81 (Bankr.D.Minn.1995) (citing
Bannister v. Armontrout,
4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir.1993));.
see also Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace,
999 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.1993),
cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1093, 114 S.Ct. 926, 127 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994);
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World Univ., Inc.,
978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992);
Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. Dep’t of Agric.,
838 F.Supp. 1346, 1348 (D.Minn.1993);
DeGidio v. Pung,
125 F.R.D. 503, 505 (D.Minn.1989). Attempts to take a “second bite at the apple,” to introduce new legal theories, or to pad the record for an appeal, constitute an abuse of the Rule 59(e) motion which the Court normally will not condone.
See id.
Thus, the Court will grant a Rule 59(e) motion only under extraordinary circumstances, such as a change in the law or the facts upon which it based its decision.
See Wilson v. Runyon,
981 F.2d 987, 989 (8th Cir.1992),
cert. denied,
508 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 2968, 125 L.Ed.2d 668 (1993);
Dale & Selby,
838 F.Supp. at 1347-48.
In the instant case, the Creditor has not produced any previously unavailable case law or evidence which might warrant reconsideration from the Court.
Rather, having failed in opposing the Debtor’s efforts at schedule amendment to begin with, the Creditor appears to call upon Rule 59(e) as a vehicle for rehashing those same contentions.
Rule 59(e), however, is not to be used for the advancement of arguments that should and could have been made prior to an Order’s entry.
Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
999 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.1993) (litigants may “not use a Rule 59(e) motion to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced [earlier, or] as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time”);
California Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
930 F.Supp. 317, 317-18 (N.D.Ill.1996);
DeWit v. Firstar Corp.,
904 F.Supp. 1476, 1495 (N.D.Iowa 1995). The Court’s decisions are “not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.”
Lester v. Brown,
1995 WL 447764, No. 93-C-7481 at *1 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 1995). Nor should Rule 59(e) be viewed as a means for overcoming one’s failure to litigate matters fully.
All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill’s Pet Prods. Div., Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
847 F.Supp.
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ORDER
W. HOMER DRAKE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Now before the Court in this proceeding is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Industrial Tractor Company, Inc. (hereinafter “the Creditor”). Through this Motion, the Creditor seeks review of an Order whereby the Court granted the “Motion to Reopen Case and Add Omitted Creditor” filed by Kenneth A. McDaniel (hereinafter “the Debtor”). This Motion gives rise to a core proceeding,
see
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) & (O), and as such, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the reasoning that follows.
Background
The Debtor commenced his present bankruptcy case by filing a Chapter 7 Petition on May 22, 1995. Since the bankruptcy estate contained no assets beyond the Debtor’s ex
emptions, no bar date was set for filing proofs of claim against the Debtor’s estate, as proscribed by Bankruptcy Rule.
Apart from this distinguishing characteristic, however, the case proceeded in due course, and on October 16, 1995, the Debtor received a discharge from his prepetition debt obligations. Thereafter, his ease was closed.
Throughout the foregoing process, however, the Debtor failed to include as part of his bankruptcy schedules a certain claim owed to the Creditor, which indebtedness arose from the Debtor’s status as guarantor of loans made to River Landings, Inc. and KM Trucking, Inc. The Creditor had sent the Debtor no direct notice of its intent to proceed against the guaranty obligation prior to the date of his petition, instead sending correspondence to agents of the corporate obligors in Hilo, Hawaii.
. Thus, circumstances suggest that the Debtor did not realize his impending liability until the Creditor filed a garnishment on debtor’s joint bank account with his wife on or about May 8,1997.
Upon commencement of such garnishment proceedings, the Debtor filed a Motion to Reopen Case and Add Omitted Creditor. A hearing thereafter was conducted, at which time the Creditor appeared and vigorously contested any amendment of the Debtor’s schedules to include that obligation owed to it. Notwithstanding the Creditor’s contentions, however, the Court found that the Debtor had a right both in law and in equity to-amend his bankruptcy schedules as requested. The Creditor now characterizes that decision as inapposite with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in
Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher),
781 F.2d 1529 (1986), and thus, seeks reconsideration of its terms.
1. The Standard for Reconsideration and The Creditor’s Failure to Present New Evidence or Case Law Justifying the Relief Sought.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) grants bankruptcy courts license to reconsider orders and judgments after their entry.
See
fed.r.civ.p. 59(e) (made applicable in bankruptcy by fed.r.bankr.p. 9023);
see also
fed.r.bankr.p. 9002 (references, like that of FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e), to the alteration or amendment of a “judgment” shall be read to include reconsideration of any order appealable to an appellate court);
see also NationsBank v. Blier (In re Creative Goldsmiths),
178 B.R. 87, 90-91 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (applying Rule 59(e) in bankruptcy). Understandably, however, the goal of this provision is limited to the correction of any manifest errors of law or misapprehension of fact.
See Hutchinson v. Staton,
994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir.1993);
Lux v. Spotswood Constr. Loans,
176 B.R. 416, 420 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1467 (4th Cir.1994). “[This Rule is] not designed to furnish a vehicle by which a disappointed party may reargue matters already argued and disposed of, nor [is it] aimed at providing a mechanism by which new arguments or legal theories, which could and should have been raised
prior to the issuance of judgment, can be later advanced.”
See In re DEF Inn, Inc.,
186 B.R. 671, 680-81 (Bankr.D.Minn.1995) (citing
Bannister v. Armontrout,
4 F.3d 1434, 1440 (8th Cir.1993));.
see also Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace,
999 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.1993),
cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1093, 114 S.Ct. 926, 127 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994);
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. World Univ., Inc.,
978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992);
Dale & Selby Superette & Deli v. Dep’t of Agric.,
838 F.Supp. 1346, 1348 (D.Minn.1993);
DeGidio v. Pung,
125 F.R.D. 503, 505 (D.Minn.1989). Attempts to take a “second bite at the apple,” to introduce new legal theories, or to pad the record for an appeal, constitute an abuse of the Rule 59(e) motion which the Court normally will not condone.
See id.
Thus, the Court will grant a Rule 59(e) motion only under extraordinary circumstances, such as a change in the law or the facts upon which it based its decision.
See Wilson v. Runyon,
981 F.2d 987, 989 (8th Cir.1992),
cert. denied,
508 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 2968, 125 L.Ed.2d 668 (1993);
Dale & Selby,
838 F.Supp. at 1347-48.
In the instant case, the Creditor has not produced any previously unavailable case law or evidence which might warrant reconsideration from the Court.
Rather, having failed in opposing the Debtor’s efforts at schedule amendment to begin with, the Creditor appears to call upon Rule 59(e) as a vehicle for rehashing those same contentions.
Rule 59(e), however, is not to be used for the advancement of arguments that should and could have been made prior to an Order’s entry.
Concordia College Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
999 F.2d 326, 330 (8th Cir.1993) (litigants may “not use a Rule 59(e) motion to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced [earlier, or] as the occasion to tender new legal theories for the first time”);
California Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
930 F.Supp. 317, 317-18 (N.D.Ill.1996);
DeWit v. Firstar Corp.,
904 F.Supp. 1476, 1495 (N.D.Iowa 1995). The Court’s decisions are “not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.”
Lester v. Brown,
1995 WL 447764, No. 93-C-7481 at *1 (N.D.Ill. July 26, 1995). Nor should Rule 59(e) be viewed as a means for overcoming one’s failure to litigate matters fully.
All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill’s Pet Prods. Div., Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
847 F.Supp. 858, 860 (D.Kan.1994) (“[a] party’s failure to present his strongest case in the first instance does not entitle him to a second chance in the form' of a motion to amend”);
Yorke v. Citibank; N.A. (In re BNT Terminals, Inc.),
125 B.R. 963, 977 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) (second bites are not the function of Rule 59(e)). To the extent that it harbors such an effort, calculated from hindsight without the benefit of any new case law or evidence that could not have been presented earlier, the Creditor’s Motion for Reconsideration falls outside the permissible scope of a Rule 59(e) Motion, and it must be denied as such.
II. The Standards for Reopening No-Asset Cases for the Purpose of Schedule Amendment,
As
Defined By Code Sections 350(b) and 523(a)(3).
A. Sections 350(b) and 523(a)(3) in Overview.
To the extent, however, that the Creditor’s present Motion reflects a misun
derstanding of its prior ruling, the Court shall herein memorandize the principles of law behind that decision in substantial detail. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) permits a bankruptcy case to be reopened “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”
See generally
fed.r.bankr.p. 5010 (“[a] case may be reopened on motion of the debtor or other party in interest pursuant to section 350(b) of the Code.”). By its reference to “cause,” section 350(b) casts a broad net, and a decision in this respect thus necessarily falls within the “sound discretion of a bankruptcy court.”
See In re Sheerin,
21 B.R. 438, 439-40 (1st Cir. BAP 1982);
see also In re Figlio,
193 B.R. 420, 424 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996) (“[t]he decision to reopen the case is within the broad discretion of the bankruptcy court”);
In re Winebrenner,
170 B.R. 878, 881 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1994) (quoting
In re Carter,
156 B.R. 768, 770 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1993) (“[t]he right to reopen the case depends upon the circumstances of the individual ease and the decision whether to reopen is committed to the court’s discretion”)).
Generally speaking, a debtor’s desire to amend his bankruptcy schedules “to include an additional creditor and, thus, accurately reflect all debts owed ... constitutes sufficient cause to reopen.”
See In re Jensen,
46 B.R. 578, 581 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1985);
accord In re Daniels,
51 B.R. 142, 143 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1985) (“[a] classic cause for invoking the cure of reopening is to add an omitted creditor to the schedules”);
see also In re Godley,
62 B.R. 258, 261-62 n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1986) (noting that such cause exists because “[t]he Bankruptcy Code places a premium on scheduling all creditors”). Indeed, in the vast majority of eases, it is a debtor’s wish to discharge the omitted debt which forms the impetus behind his Motion to Reopen. Notwithstanding such self-interest, however, this motive shall be validated by the Court’s approving the Motion to Reopen, absent some harm or prejudice to the omitted creditor.
See, e.g., In re Candelaria,
121 B.R. 140, 142 (E.D.N.Y.1990);
Matter of Davidson,
36 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1983). “Harm or prejudice” arises when Creditor’s omission from bankruptcy schedules has precluded it from participating in the case’s distribution, or made it unable to challenge the dischargeability of the debtor’s obligation to it.
So as to guard against these dual prejudices to the rights of omitted creditors, Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(3) makes the following provision:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit—
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of dischargeability of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request;
* * *
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). By virtue of this section, a debtor’s motion to reopen, and thereby, to obtain a discharge from previously unscheduled debts substantially is defeated in two circumstances.
First, if the debt is one which otherwise would be excepted from discharge under sections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), but upon which the Creditor could not obtain a timely determination of nondischargeability by virtue of her lack of notice or actual knowledge of the case,
section 523(a)(3) precludes the Debtor from capitalizing on that inequity.
See
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B). Second, as to all other debts, the Debtor may not amend his schedules and obtain a discharge from an obligation upon which the creditor’s lack of notice or actual knowledge prevented the timely filing of a proof of claim
and consequent participation in distributton.
See
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A);
see also In re Shaheen,
174 B.R. 424 (E.D.Va.1994);
Matter of Johnson,
208 B.R. 746 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1996);
In re Hicks,
184 B.R. 954 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1995).
B. Application of Section 523(a)(3)(A) in the Context of No-Asset Cases.
Since, in tbe context of debts not subject to section 523(a)(2), (4), (6), all adverse consequences of non-scheduling hinge upon a creditor’s lost opportunity to “timely file a proof of claim,” application of section 523(a)(3)(A) becomes quite complicated in no-asset liquidation cases. Specifically, in such cases, no deadline for filing proofs of claim ever arises, and as such, it never can be said that an unscheduled creditor of a case with no assets was prevented from “timely filing” proof of
its interest,
as contemplated by section 523(a)(3)(A).
Beezley v. Calif. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley),
994 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir.1993);
In re Gardner,
194 B.R. 576, 578 (Bankr.D.S.C.1996);
In re Gates,
183 B.R. 723, 725-26 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.1995);
In re Carberry,
186 B.R. 401, 403 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995);
In re Woolard,
190 B.R. 70, 73-74 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995);
In re Stecklow,
144 B.R. 314, 315-17 (Bankr.D.Md.1992). In other words, the terms of section 523(a)(3)
a fortiori
do not apply to no-asset cases.
Id.
Most recently, the Third Circuit underscored the validity of such considerations in
Judd v. Wolfe,
78 F.3d 110, 114 (1996). There, the debtor and creditor were divorced prior to filing, with the debtor taking responsibility for the marital home under the terms of their Settlement Agreement.
Id
at 112. The debtor thereafter filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy, wherein she listed the residence’s mortgagee as a creditor, but failed to scheduled the creditor as holder of a potential claim for indemnification.
Id.
Since there were no assets in the liquidation case, no deadline for filing claims was set, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e); rather, creditors were notified that it would be unnecessary to file claims in view of the lack of distributable assets.
Id.
Ultimately, the trustee abandoned his interest in the marital home, the debtor received a discharge, and the case was closed.
Id.
In March, 1994, after the debtor’s bankruptcy case was closed, the first mortgagee, Mortgage Access Corporation, filed a complaint in foreclosure listing both the debtor and the creditor as defendants. Subsequently, the creditor sought indemnification from the debtor pursuant to their property settlement, and on August 15, 1994, the debtor filed a motion to reopen her Chapter 7 proceedings so that she could list the creditor and discharge her obligation to him.
Id.
Noting that no claims bar date had ever been set for the ease, the
Judd
panel concluded that not having been scheduled, the creditor could not have been prevented from “timely filing” a proof of claim.
Id.
at 114-15. Thus, since the unlisted debt was not an intentional tort debt to which section 523(a)(B) might apply, reopening of the case was deemed unnecessary to discharge the obligation at issue.
Id.
at 115 (citing
In re Thibodeau,
136 B.R. 7 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992);
In re Peacock,
139 B.R. 421 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992);
In re Guzman,
130 B.R. 489 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1991)) (scheduling or not scheduling a creditor has no impact on whether the creditor’s claim is discharged; section 727 extends discharge to all prepetition debts and applies without regard to whether the debt is listed in the schedules);
In re Mendiola,
99 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989) (reopening the case to amend schedules would not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties, but would be an exercise in futility);
In re Karamitsos,
88 B.R. 122 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1988) (the filing of an amended creditor schedule after discharge has been granted in a no-asset Chapter 7 case has absolutely no effect on the dischargeability of the debt);
In re Anderson,
72 B.R. 495 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987) (holding similarly).
C. Impact of the Eleventh Circuit’s Baitcher Holding on Section 523(a) (3)’s Application.
Notwithstanding arguments by the Creditor to the contrary, the foregoing line of precedent may easily be reconciled with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in
Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher),
781 F.2d 1529 (1986). In
Baitcher,
the Court found itself faced with a debtor who had omitted the claim of her injured employee, despite being an active participant in the litigation over that debt at the time of filing.
Noting that the involved case was one of no assets, and as such the debtor might have a statutory right to discharge under section 523(a)(3)(A), the
Baitcher
panel nonetheless concluded that equity would compel a different outcome, if evidence demonstrated that the creditor’s omission had arisen from intentional design or fraud on the debtor’s part.
Id.
at 1533 (quoting
In re International Horizons, Inc.,
751 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.1985) (“[i]t is well accepted that the, bankruptcy court is guided by the principles of equity, and that the court will act to assure that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done”)) (internal quotations omitted).
This holding, of course, found its roots in basic principles of equity, and not in any specific language of the Bankruptcy Code.
Indeed, in enunciating its terms, the Eleventh Circuit fashioned a rule speaking to those concerns to which section 523(a)(3) does not extend,
i.e., while sections
523(a)(3)(A) and (B) merely seek to remedy various prejudices befalling unscheduled creditors, the
Baitcher
doctrine insures that no fraud shall be committed upon the Court, even in the absence of creditor prejudice. Thus, in mandating the nondischargeability of debts unscheduled by fraud or intentional design,
Baitcher
effectively poses a judicially created supplement to the rule of section 523(a)(3).
II. Application to the Instant Case.
As noted in the October 24th and July 25th hearings on these matters, this Court finds the reasoning of
Judd
decision and its progeny directly to govern the instant case. No suggestion has been raised that the debts at issue come within the terms of Bankruptcy Code sections 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), and as such, section 523(a)(3)(B) presents no bar to the Debtor’s amending his schedules as requested. Furthermore, to the extent that an assetless liquidation case is involved, the lack of any claims bar date in these proceedings makes Code section 523(a)(3)(A) likewise inapplicable. In short, the claim’s having heretofore been unscheduled will have no impact upon its susceptibility to discharge.
Likewise, the Court finds nothing in the circumstances of this case which would warrant invocation of
Baitcher’s
equitable rule of nondischargeability. The Debtor’s explanation of his failure to list this debt seems wholly believable, and the evidence clearly suggests an innocent mistake on his part.
Moreover, the Creditor has produced no evidence undercutting this suggestion of mere inadvertence by the Debtor.
As a
consequence, the Court can only conclude that the Debtor’s failure to list his obligation to the Creditor did not arise from fraud or intentional design, such that the debt should be declared nondischargeable under the reasoning of
Baitcher.
Conclusion
This matter having come before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Industrial Tractor Company, Inc., and the Court having found no justification for the relief sought therein, it hereby is ORDERED that the foregoing Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.