Matter of Mayor, Etc., of New York

75 N.E. 156, 182 N.Y. 361, 1905 N.Y. LEXIS 933
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 3, 1905
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 75 N.E. 156 (Matter of Mayor, Etc., of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Mayor, Etc., of New York, 75 N.E. 156, 182 N.Y. 361, 1905 N.Y. LEXIS 933 (N.Y. 1905).

Opinion

Haight, J.

These proceedings were instituted on behalf of the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York to acquire the title and interest of all persons interested in the lands and premises, including upland and land under water or rights therein, not then owned by or vested in the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York, abutting upon the Riverside drive between 72d street and 129th street.

The lands in question were part of a tract of land which was granted to the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York by Thomas Dongan, then lieutenant-governor Under bis majesty the king of England, by his charter, bear *364 ing date the 22d of April, 1686, which grant included the^ tideway of the lands upon the eastern side of the Hudson '■ river to low-water mark. On the 21st of July, 1701, the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York conveyed to one Jacob De Iiay a tract of upland abutting upon the lands under water, in dispute, and bounded by the Hudson river, which conveyance was subsequently confirmed by Lord Cornbury, the captain-general of the province,under Queen Anne. In 1839 one William Whitlock became thp., owner of the lands in question, claiming title through several mesne conveyances to the lands acquired by De Kay from the city in 1701. The claimants derived their title through Whit-lock. On November 9th, 1847, Whitlock conveyed to the Hudson River Railroad Company a strip of land sixty-six feet wide across his premises upon the river front for a right of way, a small portion thereof being above high-water mark and the remainder thereof below high-water mark, leaving, however, a narrow strip of the tideway on the lower side thereof unconveyed. Subsequently, the city of New York acquired the lands between the railroad’s right of way and the- Riverside drive for park purposes and the same is now known as Riverside park.

The rights of claimants depend ujion the construction that is to be given to the deed of 1701, by which the city conveyed the uplands abutting upon the premises in question to De Kay. It is contended on behalf of the claimants that under the provisions of that deed De Kay acquired the tideway in front of the uplands described in the deed, and that it was the intention on the part of the city to convey to him all the title that it had to the lands under water, while on behalf of the city it is contended that the lands conveyed were, by the terms of the deed, bounded west by the Hudson river, and that being a navigable river in which the tide ebbs and flows, the presumption arises that high-water mark was intended tc be the boundary line. We shall assume for the purposes of this case that, if the conveyance was by an individual who owned the tideway and who had bounded his *365 deed upon the river, the presumption would he that he intended to include in the conveyance the tideway. (Smith v. Bartlett, 180 N. Y. 360, and Archibald v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 157 N. Y. 574) But the conveyance in this case, as we have seen, was by a municipal government, the city of New York, and the question arises as to whether a different presumption arises with reference to its deed.

The rights of the sovereign, whether crown or state, to land under water in navigable streams and arms of the sea are doubtless twofold, proprietary and governmental. As proprietor, the sovereign may sell or convey to others, but as to the power to govern, the sovereign holds as trustee for the use of the public, under such laws, rules and regulations as may from time to time be adopted and which shall be deemed to best serve the interests of commerce and the state. These powers may be transferred by the sovereign to local subordinate governments which have been established, constitutir g such governments the trustees of the public and the.guardians of the rights and privileges of the people. The king of England, therefore, during our colonial period had the power to grant a charter to the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York, constituting it a body corporate and politic with powers of local government, and to convey to it the lands under water surrounding Manhattan island, on which the city is located. This power the king exercised through his colonial governors, who from time to time have enlarged the powers and jurisdiction of the city. While the king had the power to convey the tideway on the shores of the high seas and navigable rivers, he will not be presumed to have done so by merely bounding the conveyance upon the sea or the river; such conveyance will carry title only to high-water mark. Other words must be employed in the conveyance which would clearly indicate his purpose and intent to convey the lands under water in order to pass the title thereto. (Trustees of Broohhaven v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56; Sage v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 154 N. Y. 61; Mayor etc. of N. Y. v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443.)

*366 The charter issued to the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of thé city of Mew York in 1686 by Governor Dongan recites that the city of Mew York is an ancient city, and that the citizens have anciently been a body politic .and corporate, and have held, used and enjoyed divers and sundry rights, liberties, privileges, franchises, free customs, pre-eminences, advantages, jurisdictions, emoluments and immunities, as well by prescription as by charter, letters patent, grants and'confirmations, not only of divers governors and commanders-in-chief in the said province, but also of several governors, directors, generals and comtnanders-in-chief of the Mether Dutch nation, whilst the same was under their power and jurisdiction; and the citizens and inhabitants of said city have erected and built at their own costs several public buildings, including a city hall or stadt house, and have constructed a bridge into the dock or wharves and established a ferry between the city and Long Island for the convenience of travelers. He then, on behalf of the king, grants, ratifies and confirms to the mayor, aider-men and commonalty of the city all and every such and the same liberties, privileges, franchises, rights, royalties, free customs, jurisdictions and immunities which they have anciently held, used or enjoyed ; provided, always, that none of the paid liberties, privileges, franchises, rights, free customs, jurisdictions or immunities be inconsistent with or "repugnant to the laws of his majesty’s kingdom of England, or any of the laws of the general assembly of the province; the public buildings, with the ground there.unto belonging, two market houses, the bridge into the dock, the wharves or dock, and the aforementioned ferry, with their rights and appurtenances:, together with all the profits, benefits and advantages which shall or may accrue and arise at all. times hereafter, for dockage or wharfage, within the said dock, with all and singular the rents, issues, profits, gains and advantages, which shall or may arise, grow or accrue by the said city hall, or stadt house, and ground thereunto belonging, market houses, bridge, dock, burying place, ferry; together with full power, license and authority to the said mayor, *367 aldermen and commonalty, and their successors forever, to establish, appoint, order and.

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Bluebook (online)
75 N.E. 156, 182 N.Y. 361, 1905 N.Y. LEXIS 933, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-mayor-etc-of-new-york-ny-1905.