SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
The question is whether the parents of a patient in a persistent vegetative state may authorize the withdrawal of artificially provided nutrition and hydration from their never-compagent daughter. We hold that they may. ~~
Case History
When this litigation began, Sue Ann Lawrance was a forty-two year old woman who was "completely nonverbal, nonambu-latory, requir[ing] total care and ... only sustained by artificially delivered nutrition and hydration." Amended Order on Peti[35]*35tion for Authority at 8. She died during the course of this appeal. Sue Ann had been healthy until the age of nine, when she displayed symptoms of intracranial pressure and underwent a craniotomy. She suffered permanent brain damage and attended special schools and camps for the mentally handicapped. From at least 1966 to 1979, Sue Ann suffered balancing problems and seizures which became more frequent over time. In 1987, she fell while attending camp and underwent a second craniotomy. On July 24, 1987, she was admitted to the Manor House nursing home in Noblesville. She remained in a persist ent vegetative state from approximately that time until her death.
On March 4, 1991, Sue Ann Lawrance's parents petitioned the Hamilton Superior Court for authority to withdraw their daughter's artificially provided nutrition and hydration. In their amended petition, the parents asked that the court make ten findings, which we condense as follows: (1) that Sue Ann Lawrance has been in a persistent vegetative state since June 1987, that she is never expected to recover, and that continued treatment is futile; (2) that Sue Ann cannot make her own health care decisions and that she has no appointed health care representative; (8) that the Indiana Health Care Consent Act (HCCA) includes in its definition of "health care" the administration of artificially provided nutrition and hydration; (4) that Sue Ann's mother and father have the authority to withdraw consent for unwanted health care under Indiana Code § 16-8-12-4; (5) that the parents can order the withdrawal of artificially delivered nutrition and hydration for their daughter under an objective "best interests" standard; (6) that the United States and Indiana constitutions guarantee Sue Ann the right to refuse unwanted treatment, including nutrition and hydration; and that Sue Ann's parents can make this refusal on her behalf. March 15 Amended Petition.
The trial court held a hearing on March 26, 1991. The testimony demonstrated that Sue Ann's parents and four siblings all agreed with the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. Sue Ann's treating physician, Dr. Thomas Miller, testified at the hearing, and the court received into evidence a letter from Sue Ann's neurologist Dr. Wesley Wong. Both doctors confirmed that the patient was in a persist ent vegetative state, that recovery was not expected, and that the doctors supported the family's decision.1
[36]*36Manor House, though not a party, participated at the hearing. Counsel for the nursing home cross-examined each of the family's witnesses and also presented her own witnesses. Diane Huestis, the home's administrator, testified that Manor House was taking no position on the parents' petition, and that the home would comply with the decision of the court. Throughout the proceeding, however, Manor House made clear its concern that the home remained subject to state and federal regulation and sanction regardless of the decision of Sue Ann's family and doctors.
Judge Jerry Barr entered his order on May 2, 1991, and made minor amendments on May 8 and May 16, 1991. He held in relevant part: (1) that Sue Ann was in a persistent vegetative state; (2) that Sue Ann's parents had authority under the HCCA "to consent, as surrogate decision-makers, to the withdrawal of artificially delivered nutrition and hydration from their daughter ... who would otherwise remain indefinitely in a persistent vegetative state"; (8) that "the liberty interest of the individual, as set forth in Article I, See. 1 of the Indiana Constitution, does include the right of Sue Ann Lawrance to be free from unwanted medical treatment and that said Article further requires the State to give effect to the decision of Sue Ann's surrogate decision makers"; (4) that the Indiana State Board of Health has no further jurisdiction regarding Sue Ann's nutrition and hydration, and that they should not interfere with the decisions of Sue Ann's surrogate decisionmakers and doe-tors; (5) that Manor House "or any successor nursing home facility, any hospital, or any health care provider" should not interfere with the treatment plans of the surrogate decisionmakers, and that they should permit withdrawal of "all or part of any artificial nutrition and hydration of Sue Ann Lawrance as her physicians and surrogate decision makers shall direct."
Some time after May 2, 1991, the family moved Sue Ann from the nursing home in Hamilton County to St. Vincent's Hospice in Marion County. A group called The Christian Fellowship with the Disabled then petitioned for her guardianship in the probate division of the Marion Superior Court. On May 16, 1991, Judge Charles J. Deiter held a hearing at which the Fellowship, Sue Ann's parents, Manor House, St. Vincent's, and others were present. Judge Deiter appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Sue Ann for purposes of that hearing. The court granted the Fellowship's petition and appointed its attorney Patti Mullins as Sue Ann's temporary limited guardian. Mullins' authority was limited to seeking a stay or other relief from the judgment of the Hamilton Superior Court and seeking appellate review of the judgment of the Hamilton Superior Court.
On May 17, 1991, Mullins requested a stay of the Hamilton County order from Judge Barr. At a hearing on May 18, 1991, the parents agreed to stay withdrawal of nutrition and hydration for twenty-one days. In light of this agreement, the court stayed its order for twenty-one days.
On May 23, 1991, Mullins resigned as temporary limited guardian. Judge Deiter appointed Daniel Avila as successor temporary limited guardian. Avila is an attorney with the National Legal Center for the Medically Disabled and Dependent. On May 30, Avila moved to be joined as an additional party in the Hamilton case. Judge Barr denied the motion the same day. On June 3, Avila moved Judge Barr to stay his order pending appeal; Judge Barr denied this motion on June 5.
Avila as appellant next filed a motion in the Court of Appeals on June 6 asking for a stay pending appeal. The Court of Appeals heard argument concerning that request on June 7 and granted a stay providing a record of the proceedings was filed by June 14, 1991, at 4:30 p.m. The record was timely filed on June 14. This Court then granted the parent-appellees' "Veri fied Petition for Transfer to the Supreme Court," which they had filed on June 5.
Both sides raise a number of issues on appeal. These issues generally touch on three questions: whether the temporary limited guardian has standing to bring this appeal; whether Judge Barr erred in denying Avila's motion to be joined as a party; [37]*37and whether Judge Barr erred in holding that the Health Care Consent Act authorized the Lawrances as surrogate decision-makers to withdraw Sue Ann's nutrition and hydration.
On July 18, 1991, Sue Ann Lawrance died of natural causes. Both sides to this litigation have expressed their desire to proceed with the case despite her death.
The Question of Mootness
The long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court. When the concrete controversy at issue in a case "has been ended or settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved," the case will be dismissed. Dunn v. State (1904), 163 Ind. 317, 321, 71 N.E. 890, 894. The death of Sue Ann Lawrance means this Court can no longer provide the requested relief to the parties. We therefore address first whether this case should be dismissed as moot.
While Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies, the Indiana Constitution does not contain any similar restraint. Thus, although moot cases are usually dismissed, Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may be decided on its merits under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions of "great public interest." See, e.g., Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Mill Creek Classroom Teachers Ass'n (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 709, 711-12; State ex rel. Smitherman v. Davis (1958), 238 Ind. 563, 151 N.E.2d 495; State ex rel. Gregory v. Boyd (1909), 172 Ind. 196, 87 N.E. 140. Cases found to fall within the public interest exception typically contain issues likely to recur.2 See, eg., Mill Creek Teachers Ass'n, 456 N.E.2d at 712; Smitherman, 238 Ind. at 568, 151 N.E.2d at 497. The instant case falls within this exception to our general rule. The public interest at stake is demonstrated in part by the great number of high quality amicus briefs submitted to this Court. These briefs suggest that, irrespective of the death of the patient in this litigation, many Indiana citizens, health care professionals, and health care institutions expect to face the same legal questions in the future. We are also persuaded to proceed because of the high caliber of the findings and analysis in Judge Barr's orders. In light of Sue Ann Lawrance's death, however, this Court no longer need address all of the issues in the case as presented by the parties. Cf. City of Jeffersonville v. Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. (1908), 169 Ind. 645, 656, 83 N.E. 337, 340 (when public questions remain at issue in case otherwise disposed of, Court may select "the essential questions in the case, so far as the record may be said to present them").
Issues
We have elected to address the following issues in this case:
I. Whether the Model Health Care Consent Act (HCCA), Ind. Code §§ 16-8-12-1 to -12 (West Supp.1990), applies when the family of a never-competent patient in a persistent vegetative state seeks to withdraw the patient's artificially provided nutrition and hydration.
II. Whether court proceedings are required to effectuate the will of decision-[38]*38makers if the Health Care Consent Act does apply to such nutrition and hydration decisions.
III. Whether the Marion Superior Court erred in appointing a temporary limited guardian for Sue Ann Lawrance.
I. Does the Health Care Consent Act Apply?
Judge Barr found that Sue Ann's parents had authority to withdraw Sue Ann's nutrition and hydration under Indiana Code § 16-8-12-4, part of Indiana's Health Care Consent Act. The first step in assessing the validity of the trial court's order must therefore be determining whether the HCCA properly applies to decisions to withdraw artificially provided nutrition and hydration.
The HCCA applies to "health care" decisions. As defined in the act, " 'Thlealth care' means any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental condition. The term includes admission to a health care facility." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-1(2). This definition does not expressly include or exclude artificial nutrition and hydration decisions from the HCCA..
Appellant contends that the HCCA does not apply to the Lawrances' decision. He relies on Indiana Code § 16-8-12-11 which provides: "This chapter does not affect Indiana law concerning an individual's authorization to make a health care decision for the individual or another individual, or to provide, withdraw, or withhold medical care necessary to prolong or sustain life." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-11(a) (emphasis added).
Our objective in statutory construction is to determine and effect the intent of the legislature. Thompson v. Thompson (1972), 259 Ind. 266, 286 N.E.2d 657. We examine a statute as a whole, giving common and ordinary meaning to the words used. Foremost Life Ins. v. Department of Ins. (1980), 274 Ind. 181, 409 N.E.2d 1092.
We take the use of the word "affect" in § 16-8-12-11(a) to indicate the legislature's intent that the HCCA be a procedural statute. The comments to the uniform act on which the HCCA is based indicate that this is its purpose. See Unif. Law Commissioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act, 9 U.L.A. part 1, 458 (1988) [hereinafter Model Act] (prefatory note) ("'This Act is procedural in nature and is purposefully narrow in scope.") id. at § 11, 472 (comment) ("Nothing in this Act changes existing law [regarding termination of treatment]"); Eads v. J & J Sales (1971), 257 Ind. 485, 491, 275 N.E.2d 802, 806 (permissible "to consider the notes of the Commissioners of Uniform Laws when construing a uniform statute"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Indiana Civil Liberties Union at 28 n. 7.
The HCCA was hardly enacted in a legal vacuum. In recognition of existing law, the act is designed to establish procedures for health care decision making without altering the substantive rights of patients and their families. In this sense, the HCCA does not "affect" substantive Indiana law on withdrawal of treatment. We cannot accept appellant's reading of Indiana Code § 16-8-12-ll1(@) that the HCCA does not apply to decisions about nutrition and hydration.
Regarding the HCCA as procedural, we are led to examine the substantive laws of the state, that is, the legal landscape in which the act was written. The HCCA was written in a culture in which families typically make health care decisions when patients cannot. Indiana common law and statutory law both describe an environment in which patient decision making is a central tenet.
Indiana's common law doctrine of informed consent recognizes the right of the patient "to intelligently reject or accept treatment." Revord v. Russell (1980), Ind. App., 401 N.E.2d 763, 767. Perhaps the strongest explanation of the basis for this rule is contained in Payne v. Marion General Hospital (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 1043, 1046, trams. denied: "The patient's right of self-determination is the sine gua non of the physician's duty to obtain informed consent. As Justice (then Judge) Cardozo said: 'Every human being of adult [39]*39years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body ....' Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital (1914), 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93."
This common law has evolved in a legal culture governed by the Indiana Constitution, which begins by declaring that the liberty of our citizens is inalienable. Ind. Const. art. I, § 1. The debates of our constitutional convention suggest that those who wrote the constitution believed that liberty included the opportunity to manage one's own life except in those areas yielded up to the body politics3
Like the common law and our constitution, Indiana's statutes reflect a commitment to patient self-determination. The Living Will Act, though inapplicable to the case at bar, declares that "[clompetent adults have the right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the decision to have medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong their lives provided, withheld, or withdrawn." Ind.Code § 16-8-11-1 (West Supp.1990). The new Powers of Attorney Act, by allowing patients to designate individuals to consent to or refuse their own health care, also demonstrates respect for patient autonomy. Ind.Code § 30-5-5-16(b)(2) (Burns Supp.1991). This policy is also evident in the HCCA, which allows patients to select individuals to consent to their health care. Ind.Code § 16-8-12-6; Ind.Code § 16-8-12-8; Model Act, 9 U.L.A,. part 1 § 6, 465 (comment) ("'The decision to allow the transfer of authority rests on the principle of the basic human need of self determination and individual autonomy.").
Respect for patient autonomy does not end when the patient becomes incompetent. In our society, health care decision making for patients typically transfers upon incompetence to the patient's family. "Our common human experience informs us that family members are generally most concerned with the welfare of a patient. It is they who provide for the patient's comfort, care, and best interests, and they who treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause." In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 894, 416, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987) (citations omitted). Even when they have not left formal advance directives or expressed particular opinions about life-sustaining medical treatment, most Americans want the decisions about their care, upon their incapacity, to be made for them by family and physician, rather than by strangers or by government. This preference is reflected in the HCCA's default provision, which says the patient's close family may make health care decisions when no other health care representative or guardian has been designated for the patient. Ind.Code § 16-8-12-4. This right to consent to the patient's course of treatment necessarily includes the right to refuse a course of treatment.
Determining the existence of a substantive right of a patient or her representative to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment does not dispose of the issue at hand. Only if artificially provided nutrition and hydration falls within the definition of such treatment do the procedures of the HCCA properly apply to the Lawrances' petition.
We conclude that the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration (most people call it "tube-feeding") is medical treatment which can be refused. Three sources inform our understanding: the view of the Indiana medical community; Indiana statutory law, including the HCCA; and persuasive authority from numerous courts across the country.
We often rely on the medical community for accepted definitions of concepts commonly applied in that discipline. On this subject, the Indiana State Medical Associa[40]*40tion, a state affiliate of the American Medical Association (AMA), explains:
The clear weight of medical opinion recognizes that artificially provided nutrition and hydration constitute medical treatment. For example, the AMA's Ethical Opinion 2.20 ... expressly defines the artificial provision of nutrition and hydration as medical treatment that may be withdrawn from a person in a persistent vegetative state. The AMA's position is consistent with other prominent organizations and commissions, including the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, the Hastings Center, and the American Academy of Neurology.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Indiana State Medical Ass'n at 9; see also AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Current Opinions 18 (1989).
The very broad scope which the legislature gave the HCCA also persuades us that its procedures may be applied to decisions concerning artificial nutrition and hydration (even if the act itself did not affect existing substantive authority)4 The HCCA defines health care as "any care, treatment, service, or procedure...." Ind. Code § 16-8-12-1(2). The legislature did not even limit the term "treatment" to "medical treatment." Read through the lens of the medical community's view, even a limitation to "medical treatment" would include nutrition and hydration decisions. We conclude that artificial nutrition and hydration is health care within § 16-8-12-1(2)."5
This conclusion is consistent with the apparently widespread view of courts that "'there is no objective distinction between withdrawal or withholding of artificial feeding and any other medical treatment." In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 382, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-73, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985) ("Onee one enters the realm of complex, high-technology medical care, it is hard to shed the 'emotional symbolism' of food. However, artificial feedings such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions are significantly different from bottle-feeding or spoonfeeding....") (citation omitted); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I.1988); Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal.App.3d 185, 195, 245 Cal.Rptr. 840, 846 n. 9 (Cal.Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S.Ct. 399, 102 L.Ed.2d 387 (citing numerous courts in agreement).
We recognize that categorizing artificial nutrition and hydration as medical treatment does not necessarily mean that many citizens would consider such procedures to be the same as, say, invasive surgery. Some family members who would refuse permission for extraordinary surgery [41]*41might feel compelled to continue tube-feeding. Still, artificial nutrition and hydration can be successfully provided only by trained professionals working in a controlled environment.6
In sum, we conclude that artificial nutrition and hydration is treatment that a competent patient can accept or refuse, that-the family of an incompetent patient can accept or refuse it on behalf of the patient, and that the procedures of the HCCA apply to such decisions.
IL Is a Court Proceeding Necessary?
Having determined that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration is a health care decision within the scope of the HCCA, we turn now to Judge Barr's findings. We read the Lawrances' amended petition as a request for declaratory relief only. The family sought assurance that the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration fell within the scope of the HCCA, and that they could order such withdrawal, as Sue Ann's parents, under Indiana Code § 16-8-12-4. In ruling on the petition, however, the trial court issued both declaratory and injunctive relief. The court enjoined the State Board of Health, Manor House, successor nursing homes, hospitals, and health care providers, none of which were parties to the action.
The HCCA, written for a society in which health care decisions are routinely made by families on advice of physicians, is designed to resolve health care decisions without a need for court proceedings. Thus, in § 16-8-12-4, the legislature establishes the desired priority for substitute decisionmakers.7 See Model Act, 9 U.L.A. part 1 § 4, 462 (comment). In the case at bar, Sue Ann Lawrance was (1) incapable of consenting to her own health care, Ind. Code § 16-8-12-4(a); (2) had not appointed a health care representative herself under § 16-8-12-6, Ind.Code § 16-8-12-4(a); (8) had no guardian or appointed health care representative under § 16-8-12-7, Ind. Code § 16-8-12-4(a)(2)(A); and (4) had not disqualified her parents as decision makers under § 16-8-12-8, Ind.Code § 16-8-12-4(a)(2). In short, all of the conditions of Indiana Code § 16-8-12-4(a)(2) were met for a "spouse, parent, adult child, or adult sibling" to make a health care decision for Sue Ann Lawrance under the provisions of Indiana Code § 16-8-12-4. The HCCA mandates that such authorized decision-makers "shall act in good faith and in the best interest of the individual incapable of consenting." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-4(d). Court proceedings were not required for the Lawrances to make health care decisions for their daughter.
Given the legislature's design that the HCCA operate without court intervention in instances where none of the interested participants disagree, we think that any future declaratory proceedings under § 16-8-12-4 would be inappropriate.8 [42]*42Decisions concerning withdrawal of treat ment are not necessarily better decided by the courts. It would be hubris to think otherwise.
Our desire to leave future health care decisions to patients, their families, and their physicians comports not only with the will of the General Assembly, but also with the decisions of other courts who have reached the same conclusion. See, eg., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at 451 ("Courts are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie these cases. Our legal system cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient, those caring for the patient, and those who care about the patient."); Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal.App.3d at 198, 245 Cal.Rptr. at 847 ("[Clourts do not have a general commission to supervise medical treatment decisions. Patients make their own treatment decisions with the advice of their physicians. Family members, and sometimes other persons, participate when the patients cannot. Courts, on the other hand, become involved only when no one is available to make decisions for a patient or when there are disagreements.").
Permitting most medical decisions to be made without court intervention does not irresponsibly place helpless patients in a position of unusual risk. Families called upon to act without coming to court do not operate without restraint. Neither health care providers nor families of patients are given unbridled discretion in treatment decisions. Numerous other safeguards serve to constrain health care decision making.
We expect the first line of defense against abuses in withdrawal of treatment to be the ethical guidelines of the medical profession. Advances by medical ethics committees and ethics opinions issued by groups like the AMA keep pace with rapid progress in the field of medical technology; we perceive that medical ethics committees grow stronger every year and that ethics opinions grow increasingly sophisticated. "[Elthics lies in the realm of practice as opposed to theory. That's well established from the time of Aristotle. And I think that's what we're talking about here. What does it mean to practice good medicine?" Record at 315 (testimony of Dr. Greg Gramelspacher, medical ethicist). The history of respect for decisions of ethics committees in the withdrawal of treatment field, where reliance on court decisions would be unduly burdensome, has its origins as early as the first well known case in this area. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
Health care providers involved in withdrawal of treatment decisions are also likely to act very conservatively in light of the external constraints on their professional conduct. Appellant, along with amici curiae Manor House at Riverview, the Indiana Health Care Association, and the Indiana State Board of Health, ably point out numerous state and federal regulations governing the health care profession. For example, Indiana Code §§ 16-10-4-1 to -27 (West 1991) establishes rules for the licensing of health facilities; Indiana Code §§ 16-10-4.1-1 to ~4 (West Supp.1990) requires compliance with federal medicaid regulations; and Indiana Administrative Code title 410, article 16.2 (1988 and Supp. 1991) establishes licensing and operational standards for health facilities. Additionally, Indiana Code § 35-46-1-4 (West 1986) establishes the neglect of a dependent as a felony; Indiana Code §§ 4-28-5-1 to -18 (West 1991) creates an adult protective services unit; and Indiana Code § 31-6-11-10 (West Supp.1990) establishes a local child protection service by county.
These constraints are hardly hypothetical, but they do attempt to sort out abuses from reasonable behavior. See Hall v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 433 (affirming reckless homicide conviction of parents who withheld medical treatment from son); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 195 Cal.Rptr. 484 (1983) (dismissing indictment against physician)} Altman, [43]*43Jury Declines to Indict Doctor Who Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
The existence of this great variety of safeguards does not leave patients or their representatives who refuse treatment including artificial nutrition and hydration unprotected from collateral consequences. The HCCA contains extensive immunity provisions for health care providers relying on decisionmakers whom they "believe in good faith" are authorized to consent to health care. Ind.Code § This same code section seems to protect the decisionmakers as well. Ind.Code § 16-8-12-9(c). Numerous briefs submitted to this Court, however, highlight the great number of other constraints operating on health care providers. We expect that these constraints will serve to prevent hasty or inappropriate treatment decisions.
We expect, for example, that in cases like the one at bar, in which the patient's physicians and family members unanimously agree to a course of action, the good faith requirement of the HCCOA, Ind.Code § 16-8-12-9, will be met, and complete immunity will follow. In keeping with the design of an HCCA that usually works independently of the courts, this result, where appropriate, will attach despite the lack of a court proceeding.
When a patient's health care provider or some family member disagrees with the course of action preferred by the patient's parents or other health care decisionmaker, Indiana Code § 16-8-12-7 provides a mechanism for challenges, regardless of whether the initial decision involves court action. Court action under this section is appropriate where an "individual authorized to consent to health care is not reasonably available, declines to act, or is not acting in the best interest of the individual in need of health care." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-7(d)(8). The commentary of the uniform act from which Indiana adapted the HCCA indicates that resolving disputes is the very purpose of this section. Model Act, 9 U.L.A. part 1 § 4, p. 462 {comment) (suggesting objections to decisions be considered under seetion 7)..
Because the Lawrances were authorized to act and apparently willing to do so and because the physicians and family agreed with their decision, there was no basis for a proceeding under § 16-8-12-7.9 Indeed, under these sorts of cireumstances, there should be no withdrawal of treatment cases before an Indiana court under § 16-8-12-4 either.
IIL. Did the Probate Court Err in Appointing a Guardian?
The Marion Superior Court appointed a temporary limited guardian for Sue Ann Lawrance under Indiana Code § 29-3-8-4 (West Supp.1990), an emergency appointment provision of the code's article on guardianship. The Lawrances appeal this as a cross error, in accordance with Ind. Trial Rule 59(G).
At least four statutory requirements must be met before a court can make such an appointment. The trial court must find that:
(1) a guardian has not been appointed for an incapacitated person or minor;
(2) an emergency exists;
(8) the welfare of the incapacitated person or minor requires immediate action; and
{4) no other person appears to have authority to act in the circumstances....
Ind.Code § 20-8-8-4(a)(1) to -4(a)(4).
In appointing Patti Mullins as temporary limited guardian, Judge Deiter found that all four conditions were met. At least with respect to the fourth condition, this finding was clearly erroneous. Because the HCCA applied to the decision about whether to remove Sue Ann's gastric tube, Sue Ann's family clearly "appear[ed] to have authority to act in the circumstances" under Judge Barr's order. Ind.Code § 29-8-8-4(a)(4).
[44]*44Furthermore, the fourth requirement of the emergency guardianship statute would have failed in this case even without the Hamilton court proceedings. Acting without court intervention under HCCA § 16-8-12-4(a)(2), the Lawrance family as Sue Ann's "spouse, parent[s], adult child, or adult sibling[s]," still would have had the requisite authority to act for the purposes of § 29-3-83-4(a)(4). Because we expect that a collateral attack of an HCCA decision under the emergency guardianship statute should always fail to meet § 29-3-3-4(a)(4), we have no occasion to consider whether any of the other three conditions were satisfied in the case at bar. The appointment of Patti Mullins as temporary limited guardian, and her replacement by Daniel Avila, were invalid.
Although the emergency guardianship statute cannot be used to challenge an HCCA decision collaterally, Indiana Code § 16-8-12-7 does provide a mechanism for challenging health care decisions. That Indiana Code § 16-8-12-7 could have been used to challenge the Lawrances' decision, however, does not mean that Mr. Avila could have successfully petitioned the Marion Superior Court had he properly used the HCCA instead of the emergency guardianship statute. Two factors suggest that such a petition by Mullins or Avila would not have been entertained.
First, the HCCA requires such petitioners be "a health care provider or any interested individual." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-7(a). There is no evidence that Mullins or Avila were providing health care to Sue Ann Lawrance, or were interested individuals, or that they even knew her. They were "interested" in her only in the generic sense that any person who makes the effort to go to court is interested. If the General Assembly intended to permit strangers to litigate family decisions, it could have said a challenge may be mounted by "any individual." The use of the word "interested" suggests that strangers need not apply.10
Second, a challenging petition under § 16-8-12-7 must be made to "the court having jurisdiction under IC 29-3-2 in the county where the individual is present for purposes of receiving health care." Ind.Code § 16-8-12-7(a). The relevant venue requirement can be found at Indiana Code § 29-38-2-2 (West Supp.1990). Even if we assume that the patient had moved to Marion County at the time of the Marion County proceeding, the code dictates that "[i]f proceedings are commenced in more than one (1) county, they shall be stayed except in the county where first commenced until final determination of the proper venue by the court in the county where first commenced." Ind.Code § 29-3-2-2(b). Because proceedings had already begun in Hamilton County, any proceedings in Marion County should have been stayed until Judge Barr determined whether transfer of the case to Marion County was proper under Indiana Code § 29-8-2-2(c).
Conclusion
The law of our state permits families to decide, in consultation with their physicians, that tube-feeding of a loved one in a persistent vegetative state should be ended. Our law permits them to make these decisions without coming to court. When there is not unanimity amongst those with tangible professional or personal interest in the patient, the courts are available to resolve the dispute if need be.
GIVAN, DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion.