FILED Sep 14 2023, 8:41 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Megan Shipley Andrew B. Howk Marion County Public Defender Agency John D. French Appellate Division Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Indianapolis, Indiana Lyman Indianapolis
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Civil September 14, 2023 Commitment of: Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-MH-2960 C.P., Appeal from the Marion Superior Appellant-Respondent, Court v. The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge St. Vincent Hospital and Health The Honorable Marc J. Lloyd, Care Center, Inc. d.b.a. St. Senior Judge Vincent Stress Center, Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2211-MH-38929 Appellee-Petitioner
Opinion by Judge Mathias Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.
Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 1 of 16 [1] In 2019, our Supreme Court held that a consolidated appeal of two temporary-
commitment orders was moot where the terms of those commitments had
expired before the appeal of those orders was ripe for appellate review. In re
Commitment of T.W., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019). However, because the
parties before the Court had not developed a record on possible “harmful
collateral consequences” from the commitment orders aside from the terms of
those commitments, the Court “left open the possibility that respondents in
[temporary-commitment appeals] could seek relief” from allegedly invalid
orders due to any such consequences. Id. at 1044 n.5; E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam).
[2] Today, on a properly presented record, we reach the question left open by our
Supreme Court. On these facts, we hold that the collateral consequences that
accompany C.P.’s order of involuntary civil commitment make his appeal from
that order not moot even though the term of his commitment has expired.
Because meaningful effects of C.P.’s commitment will remain long after his
appeal period has passed, and because there is still meaningful relief that can be
had from our review of his commitment, his appeal is properly before us on its
merits. On the merits, we conclude that the St. Vincent Stress Center presented
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be involuntarily
committed for not more than ninety days. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 2 of 16 Facts and Procedural History [3] In 2022, C.P. was twenty-one years old and owned his own construction
business. He had also owned a handgun since he was eighteen, and he and his
father would go to the gun range and shoot together. Around late September or
early October 2022, C.P. seemed to be “doing fine,” according to his father. Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 10.
[4] However, over the ensuing four to six weeks, C.P.’s father “noticed a major
shift” in C.P.’s “approach to things,” and C.P. suddenly seemed “very
delusional.” Id. C.P. would say that “God [wa]s speaking to him,” and he
would call various people, including doctors, “the devil.” Id. at 11. C.P. began
spending money “left and right until . . . he basically” did not have “much left.”
Id. at 11. He made “unusually large purchases,” including “a shotgun, a
rifle, . . . two handguns, . . . two knives,” and “about $10,000 worth of tools.”
Id. at 11-12. He also purchased a “holster that he mounted inside of his boot,”
and he started carrying one knife on the side of his belt and the other on the
back of his belt. Id. at 12. C.P. stated that he was “going to buy a bow and
arrow set . . . to be silent when he shoots . . . so no one can hear it.” Id. at 13.
C.P.’s actions along with his “delusional talking” left C.P.’s father “scared” for
and “concerned about” C.P. Id. at 12.
[5] Sometime after making those purchases, C.P. had an “out-of-body experience”
where “God . . . told him to go to Florida to help the residents” there following
a hurricane. Id. at 23, 30. C.P. then drove a truck with a trailer, his tools, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 3 of 16 one of his firearms to Sarasota. But then C.P. “left his truck” and the other
items in Sarasota and, sometime later, “ended up in Orlando.” Id. at 14. He
called his parents from a hotel, and they flew to Orlando and met him at the
hotel. C.P. was “trying to come back” to Indiana, but he was unable to use his
credit cards and could not pay for a hotel room or an Uber driver who had
brought him to the hotel. Id. at 17-18. C.P.’s parents “help[ed] him out” with
those costs and then flew him back to Indiana. Id. at 18.
[6] In early November, C.P. drove to his old high school several days in a row
during the high school’s basketball practices. According to C.P., he went to the
practices to “teach these kids because I am financially free.” Id. at 36. On the
third or fourth day in a row, he took a firearm and ammunition with him,
which he placed in the front seat of his car.
[7] That evening, C.P., with the assistance of his former high school basketball
coach, checked himself into the St. Vincent Stress Center in Indianapolis.
There, he was examined by Dr. Carl Ratliff. Dr. Ratliff observed that C.P. had
“rapid, illogical statements and thoughts” and exhibited “grandiose delusions”
and “religious preoccupations.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Ratliff also observed that C.P.
exhibited a “fluctuating mood, from irritability[ and] aggressive behavior[] to
pleasant and cooperative at very rapid shifts [that we]re difficult to predict,
and[,] at times, difficult . . . to manage.” Id. at 23.
[8] As an example of C.P.’s rapid and illogical statements, Dr. Ratliff later
recounted C.P. stating that he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 4 of 16 want[ed] to leave the unit to return to Florida to be with his various employees, pick[] up his car at the DMV or he’s going to go to jail, visit[] his grandparents at their grave[s], as well as statements indicating that he has chlamydia, he needs to leave the unit to get treated, and[,] finally, he needs to leave the unit because he cannot drink the water on our unit because he can taste the salt.
Id. at 22. Dr. Ratliff emphasized that it was the manner in which C.P. made
those statements, not the substance of the statements themselves, that was
indicative of mental illness. Specifically, Dr. Ratliff clarified that C.P.’s
statements were all made “in one sentence,” which indicated “pressured
speech” and “rapid, illogical thoughts . . . .” Id. at 23-24.
[9] Regarding C.P.’s “grandiose delusions,” Dr. Ratliff recounted C.P. stating that
“he owns at least five businesses, that he sold approximately $70,000 of stock at
a $40,000 loss to help the residents of Florida, and that he plans on being a
millionaire, if not[] trillionaire.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Ratliff also noted that C.P.’s
“religious preoccupations” include believing that God is talking directly to him,
“that no one is able to hold the [B]ible except himself, and that he is able to
identify devil worshippers,” which included Dr. Ratliff and a case manager. Id.
at 23.
[10] Dr. Ratliff diagnosed C.P. with bipolar I disorder, most recent episode manic,
which is a mood disorder where the patient fluctuates between depressive
episodes and episodes of mania. Dr. Ratliff concluded that C.P.’s treatment
plan would be a medicinal regimen. However, C.P. refused to take his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 5 of 16 prescription medication and stated that he did not need it. Dr. Ratliff concluded
that C.P. does not have any insight into his condition and that, if left untreated,
C.P. would likely relapse into mania or depression.
[11] The Stress Center then filed a petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary
commitment. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the Stress Center’s
petition, and Dr. Ratliff and C.P.’s father both testified in favor of C.P.’s
involuntary temporary commitment. During his testimony, Dr. Ratliff stated
that C.P.’s clinical symptoms were such that C.P. “will have a difficult time
functioning” independently as an outpatient, that Dr. Ratliff had “concerns
about [C.P.’s] . . . safety” because C.P.’s symptoms “will predispose him to
poor decision-making,” and that C.P.’s access to firearms was “very
concern[ing]” and, “potentially,” made C.P. “a danger to himself.” Id. at 26.
[12] Similarly, C.P.’s father testified that he was concerned about C.P.’s ability to
function independently, noting that C.P. is “not working right now,” “hasn’t
worked in the last few weeks,” “ran out of gas twice,” and has “depleted the
money he’s had.” Id. at 18. C.P.’s father also noted that C.P. will not listen to
his parents and “gets really angry at us.” Id. C.P. testified against the Stress
Center’s petition at the hearing, insisting that he was not suffering from a
mental illness but, rather, “life.” Id. at 32.
[13] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found that C.P. is both a
danger to himself and also is gravely disabled. The court then granted the Stress
Center’s petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary commitment. C.P. now
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 6 of 16 appeals that order. On February 14, 2023, six days before C.P.’s initial brief in
our Court was due, his ninety-day term of commitment expired.
1. Where, as here, commitment orders carry consequences beyond the terms of the commitments and appellate review can provide meaningful relief from those collateral consequences, appeals from expired involuntary civil commitment orders are not moot, and they are properly before us on their merits. [14] Indiana law provides that a trial court may order a mentally ill person who is
dangerous or gravely disabled to be committed to a facility for either a
temporary period of not more than ninety days or for a regular period of more
than ninety days. Ind. Code §§ 12-26-6-1, 7-1 (2023). In 2002, a panel of this
Court sua sponte declared that an appeal from a temporary-commitment order
was moot because the ninety-day term of the commitment had expired by the
time the appeal was ripe for our review, and, thus, we were unable to provide
the respondent the relief of his release from that term of commitment. In re
Commitment of J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[15] Although the “long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been” that a moot
appeal “will be dismissed,” instead of dismissing the J.B. panel applied a
narrow exception for matters of “great public interest” to reach the merits of its
appeal based on the respondent’s liberty interests in not being unlawfully
committed. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991); J.B., 766 N.E.2d at
798-99. In the several years that followed the panel opinion in J.B., our Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 7 of 16 “routinely considered the merits” of temporary-commitment appeals by
following the same analytical approach as the panel in J.B., namely, by
declaring the appeals moot but nonetheless reaching their merits under the
purportedly narrow great-public-interest exception. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467; see,
e.g., In re Commitment of J.M., 62 N.E.3d 1208, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App 2016).
[16] In 2019, our Supreme Court, for the first time, declared an appeal from two
temporary-commitment orders moot because “[t]he period [of the
commitments] . . . ha[d] passed.” T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1042. A few years later,
our Supreme Court clarified that its opinion in T.W. was not intended to
“disapprove of [the] practice” of applying the great-public-interest exception to
reach the merits of temporary-commitment appeals. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467.
But the Court added that we are “not required to issue an opinion in every
moot case,” that we “should avoid issuing advisory opinions,” and that each
temporary-commitment appeal should be considered “on a case-by-case basis.”
Id. at 465, 467. Following E.F., various panels of our Court have continued to
dismiss some temporary-commitment appeals while other panels have
continued to decide some of these appeals on their merits. See, e.g., In re
Commitment of K.K., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2023 WL 4875197, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App.
Aug. 1, 2023) (deciding the appeal on its merits); In re Commitment of J.G., 209
N.E.3d 1206, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (dismissing the appeal as moot).
[17] However, our Supreme Court’s opinions in this area have made it a point to
leave open the possibility of an alternative analytical framework in which to
reach the merits of expired involuntary civil commitment orders on appeal. In
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 8 of 16 particular, because the parties before our Supreme Court had not developed a
record on possible “harmful collateral consequences” from those commitment
orders aside from the terms of those commitments, our Supreme Court “left
open the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could
seek relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any such consequences. E.F.,
188 N.E.3d at 466; T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1044 n.5. Here, C.P. properly raises for
our review the question left open by our Supreme Court. And, on this record,
we agree with C.P. that the collateral consequences that accompany his
involuntary civil commitment order make his appeal from that order not moot
even though the term of his commitment has expired.
[18] As we have long recognized:
An appeal or an issue becomes moot when:
1. it is no longer “live” or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome;
2. the principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real controversy between the parties; or
3. the court on appeal is unable to render effective relief upon an issue.
Haggerty v. Bloomington Board of Public Safety (1985), Ind. App., 474 N.E.2d 114, 115-116. Because this court decides only real controversies or questions, we dismiss appeals which raise moot or abstract propositions. Perkins v. Kocher (1988), Ind. App., 531 N.E.2d 231, 233. However, the appeal before us is not moot. An
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 9 of 16 appeal may be heard . . . where leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral consequences. In Re Marriage of Stariha (1987), Ind. App., 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123. The reasoning behind this exception is that “it is far better to eliminate the source of a potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequence of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time.” Id.; citing Sibron v. New York (1968), 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917.
Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 867-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (emphases added).
[19] Indiana’s appellate courts have applied the “collateral consequences” doctrine
to hold that appeals are not moot where meaningful relief may still be had by
our review of those appeals on their merits. For example, in In re S.D., our
Supreme Court considered the validity of a Child in Need of Services
(“CHINS”) adjudication. 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 2014). However, while the
appeal was pending, the child was returned to her mother’s care, and the
CHINS case was closed. Accordingly, the Indiana Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) moved to dismiss the appeal as moot.
[20] Our Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot based on the following
“long-lasting collateral consequences” that accompany CHINS adjudications:
a CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for terminating parental rights. Under Indiana Code section 31-35-2- 4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2013), the State may terminate parental rights if a child has been adjudicated [a] CHINS on two prior occasions, without proving either that the conditions resulting in a child’s removal will not be remedied or that continuing the parent-child relationship threatens the child’s well-being. And a prior CHINS finding may have adverse job consequences as well,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 10 of 16 such as precluding Mother from employment with any DCS contractor. See generally Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., Ind. Child Welfare Policy Manual § 13.4 (2013), available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/13.4_Evaluation_of_Background_ Checks_ for_DCS_Contractors.pdf. Similarly, a CHINS finding may preclude her from become a licensed foster parent. Id. at § 13.10, available at http://www.in. gov/dcs/files/13_10_Evaluating_Background_Checks_for_Foste r_Family_Licensing. pdf. Reversal cannot change the efforts Mother expended in complying with the CHINS case, but it still affords her meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens. We therefore decline to find the case moot.
Id. at 1285, 1290 (emphasis added).1
[21] Our appellate courts have likewise repeatedly invoked the collateral-
consequences doctrine to review the merits of appeals where the order at issue,
if invalid and left undisturbed, could contribute to a future adverse finding
against the appellant. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. 2012)
(reviewing the merits of the trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated
the conditions of his placement in community corrections due to possible
“negative collateral consequences” from such a finding, even though the
defendant had “served his sentence”); Hamed v. State, 852 N.E.2d 619, 622-23
1 Our Supreme Court’s analysis in S.D. was based on collateral consequences that attach to any CHINS adjudication; the analysis was not based on a showing of specific facts that the mother in S.D. was facing a termination petition, that she sought employment with a DCS contractor, or that she sought to become a licensed foster parent. Id. at 1285-86, 1290. No matter how compelling a comparison of CHINS and mental- health consequences may be, we limit our holding to these specific facts and need not reach the question of whether the same showing C.P. makes would suffice to enable appellate review of the merits of every involuntary civil commitment order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 11 of 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing the merits of an expired no contact order
because, if a violation of the order were later alleged, it could contribute to a
contempt proceeding or a criminal charge); Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097,
1101 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing the merits of a post-conviction
petition, even though the sentence for the underlying conviction had been
served, because “convictions have collateral consequences inasmuch as
they . . . may form the basis of a habitual offender enhancement”), trans. denied;
McBain v. Hamilton Cnty., 744 N.E.2d 984, 987-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(reviewing the merits of a tax sale, even though the original owners had
redeemed their property, based in part on “negative collateral consequences
that would be unjustified if the sale w[ere] invalid . . . .”); Roark, 551 N.E.2d at
867-68 (reviewing the merits of a CHINS adjudication, despite the matter being
closed, “because of the potentially devastating consequences” of the
adjudication); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that a father’s appeal of his contempt conviction for failure to
pay child support was not moot, even though his sentence had been served,
because of “possible collateral consequences”); see also S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290
(holding that a closed CHINS case is not moot in part because a CHINS
adjudication can result in “relax[ing] the State’s burden for terminating parental
rights”).
[22] We agree with C.P. that the order for his involuntary civil commitment carries
significant negative collateral consequences from which appellate review may
afford him meaningful relief. In particular, federal law prohibits a person who
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 12 of 16 has been committed to a mental institution from knowingly possessing a
firearm, the violation of which may result in a fifteen-year sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(4), 924(a)(8) (2022). Likewise, Indiana law generally prohibits a
person who has been involuntarily committed from knowingly or intentionally
carrying a handgun, the violation of which can be a Class A misdemeanor or a
Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(a)(3)(B), (b)(7)(C), (e) (2022). Here, the record
is clear that C.P. has long exercised his right to possess a handgun, having
owned at least one since he was eighteen and having spent time shooting it at
gun ranges with his father. Thus, the collateral consequence of C.P.’s loss of his
right to lawfully possess a handgun makes his appeal worthy of appellate
review.2
[23] For all of these reasons, we reach the question that our Supreme Court left open
in T.W. and E.F., we decline to follow the sua sponte analysis of J.B. here, and
we hold that C.P.’s appeal from his expired involuntary civil commitment order
is not moot but, rather, is properly before us on its merits based on the negative
collateral consequences that accompany that order. We therefore turn to the
merits of this appeal.
2 C.P. also argues that a history of commitments itself is a collateral consequence that enables appellate review, noting that Indiana Code section 12-26-3-9 expressly restricts the type of commitment a trial court may order based on the respondent’s history of commitments and that our Court has likewise recognized that a “history of mental illness requiring hospitalizations” may be probative of whether a person is “gravely disabled and should be involuntarily committed.” Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. Denied. However compelling this argument may be, since we hold that C.P.’s loss of his right to lawfully possess a handgun is sufficient to enable appellate review of his commitment, we need not consider this additional possible basis for reviewing the merits of his commitment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 13 of 16 2. The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to support C.P.’s temporary commitment. [24] We thus turn to C.P.’s argument on appeal that the Stress Center failed to
present sufficient evidence to support his temporary commitment. In our review
of such issues, we consider “only that evidence most favorable to the judgment,
along with” the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re Commitment of T.K., 27
N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up). We will not reweigh the evidence or
reassess witness credibility on appeal. Id. at 273. It is the petitioner’s burden in
the trial court to support the petition for an involuntary civil commitment by
clear and convincing evidence. Id.
[25] To support its petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary commitment, the Stress
Center was required to show that C.P. was (1) mentally ill; (2) either dangerous
or gravely disabled; and (3) that his commitment was appropriate. I.C. § 12-26-
2-5(e) (2022) (emphasis added). On appeal, C.P. challenges only whether the
Stress Center’s evidence was sufficient to show that he was either dangerous or
gravely disabled. As the Stress Center’s burden on that element was disjunctive,
we need only consider whether the Stress Center’s evidence was sufficient to
show that C.P. was gravely disabled.
[26] The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to show that C.P. was gravely
disabled. According to Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 (2022), “gravely
disabled,” as relevant here, “means a condition in which an individual, as a
result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the
individual . . . has a substantial impairment . . . of that individual’s judgment,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 14 of 16 reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual’s inability to function
independently.”
[27] The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to satisfy that definition. C.P.
suffered a rapid deterioration of his sense of reality, going from “fine” to “very
delusional” in a matter of four to six weeks. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. C.P. believed that
God was talking to him and that his caregivers were the devil or devil
worshipers. He began experiencing very rapid mood swings, from irritable and
aggressive to pleasant and cooperative, which sudden shifts were difficult for
skilled caregivers to predict and manage.
[28] He began spending unusually large amounts of money to the point that he had
none left. He purchased multiple weapons and began carrying them around,
including to a local high school and across state lines. Believing he was
following God’s directions, he drove himself to Sarasota, Florida, with a truck,
tools, and a firearm, only to end up in Orlando without his personal property
and without access to money. C.P.’s parents ended up flying to Orlando,
covered C.P.’s expenses, and then flew him back to Indiana.
[29] At the time of the fact-finding hearing on the Stress Center’s petition, C.P. was
not working and appeared to be unable to provide for basic needs such as gas
for his car. He had started becoming unusually angry at his parents. He refused
to acknowledge his mental illness and refused to take prescribed medication.
Ultimately, Dr. Ratliff opined that C.P.’s mental illness was such that C.P.
“will have a difficult time functioning” independently as an outpatient, and Dr.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 15 of 16 Ratliff had “concerns about [C.P.’s] . . . safety” because C.P.’s symptoms “will
predispose him to poor decision-making.” Id. at 26. We hold that a reasonable
fact-finder could conclude from those facts that C.P. was gravely disabled.
[30] Still, C.P. asserts that the Stress Center’s evidence was insufficient to show that
he was “in danger of coming to harm,” as required under Indiana Code section
12-7-2-96. But we cannot agree. The Stress Center’s evidence readily supported
the trial court’s conclusion, and C.P.’s argument to the contrary is merely a
request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Conclusion [31] In sum, we hold that C.P.’s appeal of his temporary-commitment order is not
moot, even though the term of his commitment has expired, based on the
collateral consequences that accompany his order of involuntary civil
commitment. On the merits of this appeal, we hold that the Stress Center
presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be
committed for not more than ninety days. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
[32] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023 Page 16 of 16