#30063-a-SRJ 2023 S.D. 16
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL BY AN IMPLICATED INDIVIDUAL
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE JAMES A. POWER Judge
STACY R. HEGGE of Gunderson, Palmer, Nelson & Ashmore, LLP Pierre, South Dakota
TALBOT J. WIECZOREK of Gunderson, Palmer, Nelson & Ashmore, LLP Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for appellant Implicated Individual.
ARGUED MARCH 23, 2023 OPINION FILED 04/05/23 PAUL S. SWEDLUND Solicitor General Pierre, South Dakota Attorney for appellee State of South Dakota.
JEFFREY R. BECK Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for appellee ProPublica.
JON E. ARNESON Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for appellee Argus Leader. #30063
JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Following the completion of the State’s criminal investigation involving
T. Denny Sanford, also known as Implicated Individual, 1 the circuit court entered
an order to unseal the search warrant affidavits related to the investigation.
Sanford appeals, challenging the denial of his request to inspect and participate in
redacting the affidavits before the circuit court unseals them. We affirm.
Background
[¶2.] This is the second appeal by Sanford challenging the unsealing of a
search warrant file containing five separate search warrants, returns of the
warrants, inventories, and affidavits in an investigation involving Sanford. See In
re an Appeal by an Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, 966 N.W.2d 578
(Implicated Individual I). In Implicated Individual I, the circuit court had initially
sealed the entire search warrant file based upon law enforcement’s representation
that disclosure would impede the then-ongoing investigation. A ProPublica reporter
requested the documents in the sealed file, prompting the circuit court to review the
scope of its authority to seal the entirety of the search warrant file. ProPublica and
intervenor Argus Leader (Press, collectively) submitted a joint brief to the circuit
court arguing for the file to be unsealed. At the time, the State resisted unsealing
the file, raising concerns that doing so would interfere with the investigation.
1. During the proceedings involved in the first appeal in In re an Appeal by an Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, 966 N.W.2d 578, T. Denny Sanford was referred to as Implicated Individual because his identity was not a matter of public record. The warrants were unsealed following our decision, and his identity is now a matter of public record.
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Sanford also resisted the request, arguing that the release would impact his privacy
and reputation.
[¶3.] Relying upon SDCL 23A-35-4.1, the circuit court issued amended
orders providing that it was not authorized to seal the contents of the warrants,
return of the warrants, or the inventories. The court ordered such “documents shall
be unsealed and become publicly accessible court records.” The court concluded
pursuant to SDCL 23A-35-4.1 that the affidavits in support of the five search
warrants would remain sealed, but “[f]ollowing termination of the investigation or
filing of an indictment, the document’s contents will [be] unsealed and available to
public inspection or disclosure as a publicly accessible court record.” Sanford and
the State appealed the orders, and the circuit court stayed its ruling pending
appeal.
[¶4.] On appeal to this Court, Sanford argued that rules governing access to
court records found in SDCL chapter 15-15A, promulgated by the South Dakota
Supreme Court, conflicted with statutes enacted by the Legislature and must
prevail because of the judiciary’s inherent authority over its records. Implicated
Individual I, 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 19, 966 N.W.2d at 584. We interpreted the plain
language of SDCL 23A-35-4.1 to permit a circuit court to “seal the contents of an
affidavit in support of a search warrant upon a showing of reasonable cause, but
only until the investigation is terminated or an indictment or information is filed.”
Id. ¶ 18, 966 N.W.2d at 583. We further observed that “[t]he statute’s text is
equally clear in its command that the court ‘may not prohibit’ the public disclosure
of other specific records, namely, the contents of the warrant, the return of the
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warrant, and the inventory. Nor may the court prohibit public disclosure of the fact
that a search warrant affidavit has been filed.” Id.
[¶5.] We emphasized that “a court’s discretion to ‘prohibit public access to
information in a court record’” as set forth in SDCL 15-15A-13 is limited by the
existence of “sufficient grounds to prohibit access according to applicable
constitutional, statutory and common law.” Id. ¶ 21, 966 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting
SDCL 15-15A-13). 2 We further noted, under SDCL 15-15A-8, that certain
personally identifying information within court records must be redacted as a
matter of course. 3 Id. ¶ 24, 966 N.W.2d at 585. While in Implicated Individual I
A request to prohibit public access to information in a court record may be made by any party to a case, the individual about whom information is present in the court record, or on the court’s own motion. Notice of the request must be provided to all parties in the case and the court may order notice be provided to others with an interest in the matter. The court shall hear any objections from other interested parties to the request to prohibit public access to information in the court record. The court must decide whether there are sufficient grounds to prohibit access according to applicable constitutional, statutory and common law. In deciding this the court should consider the purpose of this rule as set forth in § 15-15A-1. In restricting access, the court will use the least restrictive means that will achieve the purposes of this access rule and the needs of the requestor.
3. SDCL 15-15A-8 provides for automatic redaction of the following:
(1) Social security numbers, employer or taxpayer identification numbers, and financial or medical account numbers of an individual. (2) Financial documents such as income tax returns, W-2’s and schedules, wage stubs, credit card statements, financial (continued . . .) -3- #30063
there was “no redaction question before us[,]” we stated that “[w]e perceive no
tension between our rules allowing for the limited redaction of this information to
protect individual privacy interests and SDCL 23A-35-4.1’s requirement to allow
access to the broader ‘contents’ of a search warrant.” Id.
[¶6.] Following our decision in Implicated Individual I, the Press filed with
the circuit court a motion to unseal the affidavits and a motion to compel discovery
on the status of the State’s investigation. The court denied the motion to unseal the
affidavits because the State indicated the investigation was ongoing.
[¶7.] The State filed a notice of completed investigation with the circuit
court on May 27, 2022, satisfying one of the triggering conditions upon which the
circuit court’s amended orders required the affidavits to be unsealed. In response,
Sanford filed a motion to stay the unsealing of the affidavits. He asserted a number
of arguments in support of his claim, including: (1) that the Press was required to
file a motion and make a showing supporting the unsealing of the affidavits; (2) that
SDCL 23A-35-4.1 unconstitutionally violates rights of victims provided for in Article
VI, § 29 of the South Dakota Constitution (Marsy’s Law); (3) that the absence of any
court discretion under SDCL 23A-35-4.1 to stay the unsealing of the affidavits
violated the presumption of innocence afforded to him by the Due Process Clause;
(4) that certain comments by the media raised questions whether the State’s
investigation had been completed; and (5) that Sanford should be provided access to
________________________ (. . . continued) institution statements, check registers, and other financial information. (3) The name of any minor child alleged to be the victim of a crime in any adult criminal proceeding.
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the affidavits and allowed to participate in redaction before they are unsealed. The
Press filed another motion to unseal the affidavits, arguing that the court had
previously ordered the affidavits to be unsealed upon termination of the
investigation while simultaneously arguing the inspection and redaction process
proposed by Sanford was unnecessary.
[¶8.] On June 6, 2022, the circuit court denied Sanford’s request to inspect
the affidavits prior to their unsealing. In a June 16, 2022 order, the circuit court
denied the motion to stay the unsealing of the affidavits and reiterated denial of the
inspection request, finding that further delay would serve no valid purpose given
the two years of litigation and ample opportunity for Sanford to have previously
raised these issues. 4
[¶9.] In ordering the affidavits to be unsealed, the circuit court concluded
that nothing in SDCL 23A-35-4.1, this Court’s interpretation of that statute in
Implicated Individual I, or the circuit court’s amended orders required the Press to
make a formal request to unseal the affidavits. The court also rejected the Marsy’s
Law and Due Process constitutional claims as well as Sanford’s argument that
there were questions whether the State’s investigation had concluded. Finally, the
circuit court indicated its intent to redact “personally sensitive or identifying
information, which in this case consists of personal email addresses, home
addresses, phone numbers, and birth dates.” The court noted that Sanford had not
4. The circuit court agreed to stay the order pending appeal. It found that further delay would substantially prejudice the Press because of the time- sensitive nature of the public interest in the investigation, however, and “gently remind[ed] the Implicated Individual and his counsel to remember the obligations imposed by Rule 11 as they contemplate[d] an appeal.”
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cited any authority that would require the court to permit the parties to participate
in the redaction process or to extend the scope of redaction beyond personally
identifying information in the affidavits.
[¶10.] Sanford raises a single issue on appeal: 5
Whether the circuit court erred in denying Sanford’s request to inspect the affidavits prior to their unsealing so that he may invoke his rights guaranteed by SDCL 15-15A-13.
Analysis
Standard of review.
[¶11.] “Issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation are . . . subject to
de novo review.” Thom v. Barnett, 2021 S.D. 65, ¶ 13, 967 N.W.2d 261, 267 (citing
Jans v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2021 S.D. 51, ¶ 10, 964 N.W.2d 749, 753). We also
review the interpretation of our own court rules “de novo, utilizing our established
rules for statutory construction.” Leighton v. Bennett, 2019 S.D. 19, ¶ 7, 926 N.W.2d
465, 467–68. “Our standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation is well
established.” Stanley v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2023 S.D. 13, ¶ 10, __ N.W.2d __, __.
“‘[T]he language expressed in the statute is the paramount consideration’ in
statutory construction. Further, ‘we give words their plain meaning and effect, and
5. On appeal, Sanford abandons the other arguments he made to the circuit court in opposing the unsealing of the affidavits. Interwoven within Sanford’s inspection/redaction arguments, however, is a new claim that he has a Fourth Amendment privacy right in the investigative materials contained in the affidavits. The Fourth Amendment privacy right recognized in the cases cited by Sanford involved a challenge to the reasonableness of the search and seizure of property, not a privacy interest in the contents of the information that would be publicly disseminated in the search warrant affidavits. Sanford has failed to articulate a viable Fourth Amendment argument, and we determine this claim to be without merit.
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read statutes as a whole.’ ‘When the language of a statute is clear, certain and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the court’s only function is
to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2021 S.D. 17,
¶¶ 12–13, 956 N.W.2d 799, 802–03). Likewise, “[t]his [C]ourt assumes that court
rules mean what they say[.]” In re Yanni, 2005 S.D. 59, ¶ 8, 697 N.W.2d 394, 398
(quoting State v. Sorensen, 1999 S.D. 84, ¶ 14, 597 N.W.2d 682, 684).
[¶12.] We have not previously addressed our standard of review for a court’s
consideration under SDCL 15-15A-13 of a “request to prohibit public access to
information in a court record . . . .” We conclude that a review under an abuse of
discretion standard is appropriate. The circuit court’s order responding to Sanford’s
request to view the affidavits and participate in redaction in advance of unsealing
them is analogous to a request for a protective order relating to discovery, which we
review for abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Jones, 2022 S.D. 9, ¶ 14, 970 N.W.2d
520, 526; see also State v. Ralios, 2010 S.D. 43, ¶ 47 n.4, 783 N.W.2d 647, 660 n.4 (in
evidentiary context, “whether to redact and to what extent was within the sound
discretion of the trial court”). “An abuse of discretion is ‘a fundamental error of
judgment, a choice outside the reasonable range of permissible choices, a decision
. . . [that], on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.’” In re Estate of Jones,
2022 S.D. 9, ¶ 14, 970 N.W.2d at 526 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting
Coester v. Waubay Twp., 2018 S.D. 24, ¶ 7, 909 N.W.2d 709, 711).
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Applicable statutory law.
[¶13.] Sanford’s appeal is based on his extrapolation of SDCL 15-15A-13,
under which a party to a case may make “[a] request to prohibit public access to
information in a court record . . . .” He argues that “[a]s a party to this matter and
the subject of the court records, [Sanford] has requested a copy of the affidavits so
that he may analyze them prior to their unsealing and invoke his rights under
SDCL 15-15A-13 for redaction purposes if necessary.” He thus attempts to frame
this latest appeal as involving an entirely novel issue unresolved by Implicated
Individual I. This case is no longer about the rules that apply to sealing the
affidavits, he urges, but about the rules for redacting them upon their unsealing.
He argues that for SDCL 15-15A-13 to be meaningful, the party challenging public
access to information must be given an opportunity to inspect the records in order to
make informed constitutional, statutory, and other legal objections to the public
release of information contained in the affidavits and to provide input on
appropriate redactions of the information.
[¶14.] Sanford also references SDCL 15-15A-7 (prohibiting public access to
information excluded by federal or state law) and SDCL 15-15A-8 (prohibiting
public access to certain information, such as social security numbers, financial
information, and names of child victims) in support of his claims. Sanford contends
that SDCL 23A-35-4.1 pertains to a general right of public access to search warrant
records, whereas SDCL 15-15A-13 pertains to a specific prohibition against public
access in certain circumstances.
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[¶15.] The Press responds that Sanford’s statutory claims are based upon the
same arguments that this Court rejected in Implicated Individual I. The Press
asserts that Sanford has not provided any substantive privacy right that would
supplant the plain language of SDCL 23A-35-4.1 or the First Amendment right of
the press and public to access the information contained in the affidavits.
[¶16.] The State also argues that the circuit court properly determined that
the affidavits should be unsealed under SDCL 23A-35-4.1. The State highlights
that the compelling interest it held in preventing public disclosure of the affidavits
and facts underlying the investigation, as recognized by SDCL 23A-35-4.1, no longer
exists now that the State has concluded its investigation. The State argues that
requiring the unsealing of an affidavit, after the investigation has been completed,
is consistent with “[s]ocietal interests in having law enforcement and the judiciary
operate in the public eye [that are] not overcome simply because no indictment is
returned. Society has as much interest in understanding why no indictment was
returned as it does in understanding why one was.” The State also rejects Sanford’s
claims that he should be permitted a special right of access to the sealed affidavits
now that the investigation has been completed and the State has announced that
charges will not be filed in South Dakota.
[¶17.] Sanford’s reliance on SDCL 15-15A-13 to support his claim that the
circuit court was required to stay the unsealing of the affidavits pending resolution
of the inspection/redaction issue lacks support in the text of the rule and is
irreconcilable with our decision in Implicated Individual I. SDCL 15-15A-13 simply
provides a procedure for a party seeking “to prohibit public access to information in
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a court record” when “there are sufficient grounds to prohibit access according to
applicable constitutional, statutory and common law.” There is nothing in the
language of SDCL 15-15A-13 that affords an affirmative or substantive privacy
right to Sanford in the content of the affidavits. Nor does the rule forestall public
access to the affidavits, as mandated by SDCL 23A-35-4.1, after the criminal
investigation has been completed. 6
[¶18.] Sanford’s effort to delay public access to the affidavits is also precluded
by our decision in Implicated Individual I, where we stated that “[t]he plain
language of [SDCL 23A-35-4.1] provides an unmistakable expression of legislative
intent. A court may seal the contents of an affidavit in support of a search warrant
upon a showing of reasonable cause, but only until the investigation is terminated
or an indictment or information is filed.” 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 18, 966 N.W.2d at 583.
Further, in rejecting Sanford’s claim in Implicated Individual I that the provisions
of SDCL chapter 15-15A supersede this statutory mandate, we stated:
The Legislature has enacted SDCL 23A-35-4.1, and nothing in our current rules conflicts with the statute’s provisions. To the contrary, our rules specifically contemplate the role of statutory authority in resolving questions concerning access to court records. We can no more overlook SDCL 23A-35-4.1 than we could ignore binding legal authority in this or any case that
6. The circuit court exhaustively reviewed the submissions of the parties in determining that the criminal investigation of Sanford had been completed, triggering the court’s obligation to unseal the search warrant affidavits under SDCL 23A-35-4.1. The court noted Sanford appeared to agree that the State had completed its investigation and concluded no crimes had been committed in South Dakota. The court observed the possibility of other states proceeding with a criminal investigation or prosecution but noted that neither party had informed the court of other pending investigations. On appeal, Sanford does not challenge the determination by the circuit court that the investigation had been completed.
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comes before us.
Id. ¶ 27, 966 N.W.2d at 586.
[¶19.] Nonetheless, Sanford asks that we read SDCL 15-15A-13 to require the
circuit court to allow inspection of the affidavits before they are unsealed to
determine whether there may be confidential or sensitive information supporting
redaction of some or all of the contents of the affidavits. There is nothing in SDCL
23A-35-4.1 or SDCL 15-15A-13 that mandates the circuit court to allow such an
inspection. Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny
Sanford’s request to inspect the affidavits and participate in the redaction of
personal information before unsealing the affidavits.
[¶20.] In denying the request to review the affidavits, the circuit court
determined that during the two years of litigation leading up to its current decision,
Sanford had been afforded all the procedural protections set forth in SDCL 15-15A-
13, requiring the court to “hear any objections from other interested parties to the
request to prohibit public access to information in the court record[]” and to “decide
whether there are sufficient grounds to prohibit access according to applicable
constitutional, statutory and common law.” Throughout the course of this litigation,
the circuit court had the ability to review the information in the sealed affidavits
and consider Sanford’s privacy objections, as well as the statutory mandates in
SDCL 23A-35-4.1. It is evident that the circuit court viewed Sanford’s most recent
motion as a belated and unpersuasive effort to further delay the unsealing of the
affidavits required by statute.
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[¶21.] Prior to ordering the affidavits unsealed, however, the court provided a
thorough, well-reasoned decision denying Sanford’s request to inspect the affidavits
and participate in the routine redaction of certain personally identifying
information. In considering Sanford’s request to participate in the redaction process
before unsealing the affidavits, the court determined that it was appropriate for the
court, rather than Sanford, to redact any “personally identifying information,” such
as “personal email addresses, home addresses, phone numbers, and birth dates.” In
doing so, the court aptly expressed concerns that allowing the parties to participate
in the redaction process would further extend the litigation and unnecessarily delay
the unsealing of the affidavits required by SDCL 23A-35-4.1. The court also
identified the greater potential for premature leaks of the information if the
affidavits were provided to the parties. Finally, the court noted that the affidavits
contained personally identifying information of others whose participation may also
be required if the court granted Sanford’s request. The court concluded that “each
of these problems can be avoided if the [c]ourt and its staff simply make these
redactions which they routinely and frequently make without participation by the
interested parties.”
[¶22.] The only significant change between Implicated Individual I and now
is a factual one—the State has terminated its investigation, triggering the
unsealing of the affidavits in support of search warrants under SDCL 23A-35-4.1
and the circuit court’s amended court orders. The circuit court properly applied the
provisions of SDCL 15-15A-13 and SDCL 23A-35-4.1 in considering, and ultimately
denying, Sanford’s request to inspect and redact the affidavits before they are
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unsealed. Before ruling on the request, the court thoroughly considered the various
statutory and constitutional grounds asserted by Sanford with respect to
information that could conceivably be contained in the affidavits. The court’s
approach to redaction fell soundly within its discretion, and the court appropriately
exercised its discretion to “decide whether there [were] sufficient grounds to
prohibit access . . . .” to contents of the affidavits under SDCL 15-15A-13.
[¶23.] Affirmed.
[¶24.] KERN, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, and GILBERTSON,
Retired Chief Justice, concur.
[¶25.] GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, sitting for SALTER, Justice,
who recused himself and did not participate in this matter.
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