Matter of Caulfield

82 B.R. 55, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 51, 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 24, 1988 WL 5432
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJanuary 12, 1988
DocketBankruptcy 3-87-01779
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 82 B.R. 55 (Matter of Caulfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Caulfield, 82 B.R. 55, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 51, 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 24, 1988 WL 5432 (Ohio 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AUTHORIZING PRESENTATION OF ORDER GRANTING CONFIRMATION OF CHAPTER 13 PLAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH DECISION

THOMAS F. WALDRON, Bankruptcy Judge.

This proceeding, which arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) in a case referred to this court by the Standing Order of Reference entered in this district on July 30, 1984, is determined to be a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) — matters concerning the administration of the estate, (L) — confirmation of plans, and (O) — other proceedings affecting the adjustment of the debtor/creditor relationship. The proceeding is before the court on the debtor’s Modification To Plan Before Confirmation (Doc. 26), the Notification Of Modification Of Chapter 13 Plan Notice To File Objections To Confirmation By December 31, 1987 (Doc. 27), the Order Setting Hearing On Assumption Of Lease (Doc. 28) and the Objection To Debtor’s Modification To Plan Before Confirmation and accompanying memorandum (Doc. 29). This proceeding presents the issue of whether a Chapter 13 Plan which proposes to exclude an automobile lease debt from payment under the provisions of the Chapter 13 Plan will be confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court and, if so, under what circumstances.

The significant provisions of the Debtor’s Proposed Modification (Doc. 26) are:

*56 1. If this Plan is confirmed, the debtor assumes the lease on the 1986 Ford EXP with Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC).
2. The debtor will disburse the lease payment in the amount of $165.22 due February 25, 1988 to FMCC and each succeeding monthly payment, if this Plan has been confirmed.
5. After confirmation, the Trustee may seek recovery of any Refundable Security Deposit from FMCC, as additional plan payments.

Ford’s Objection (Doc. 29) is directed to paragraph five (5) of the debtor’s Modification which proposes to allow the trustee to seek recovery of the security deposit given by the debtor to Ford Motor Credit Company in connection with the execution of the lease. The security deposit appears in an attachment to Ford’s Lease Proof of Claim filed July 14, 1987, as “(1) Initial Charges, (c) Refundable Security Deposit $675.00.”

Although the procedural history of this case does not represent the clearest presentation of the issues, direct and dormant, in the assumption of a motor vehicle “true lease” in a Chapter 13 case, nevertheless, the court believes that its determinations in this proceeding may be of assistance in the resolution of this case and other pending and future Chapter 13 cases.

It is the court’s opinion that although 11 U.S.C. § 365, which is applicable in Chapter 13 proceedings (§ 1322(b)(7), § 1325(a)(1)), contains a specific reference to Chapter 13 (§ 365(d)(2)), it does not require that a “true lease” be paid only under the provision of a debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan. Although § 1322(a) contains the wording “the plan shall ” (emphasis added), the wording of § 1322(b) provides “[sjubject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may” (emphasis added).

Among the factors weighing most heavily in a determination of whether or not a specific debt must be paid pursuant to the provisions of a debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan, or may be excluded from a debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan, is the effect the excluded debt will have on the mandatory provisions of the debtor’s plan (§ 1322(a)) and the effect the excluded debt will have on other creditors’ rights.

In examining the debtor’s proposal to exclude the motor vehicle lease debt in this case, first, the court determines that the lease is property of the estate (11 U.S.C. § 541). Second, the lease is a “true lease” as that term is recognized in Sixth Circuit decisions. Jahn v. M.W. Kellogg Company, Inc. (In re Celeryvale Transport, Inc.), 822 F.2d 16 (6th Cir.1987), In re Farrell, 79 B.R. 300 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1987). Third, there is no suggestion from any party, nor is there any evidence in the record, that would indicate that the debtor is not otherwise able to comply with the provisions of § 1322(a), or that excluding this debt from the debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan would have an adverse effect on the debt- or’s general ability to fulfil the terms of the proposed plan. Fourth, the exclusion of this debt does not appear to have any effect on the rights of other creditors. There are no other “true leases” in the debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan. The debtor’s proposal and the creditor’s agreement to exclude this debt from the debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan does not appear to the Court to have any impact upon other creditors in this case. For example, this is not the type of “true lease” which could produce equity, exempt or non-exempt, in this estate. Neither the Chapter 13 Trustee, nor any other entity, has filed an objection to the debtor’s proposed plan.

Accordingly, with regard to those provisions of the debtor’s Modified Plan which propose to exclude from the operation of the debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan the obligation between the debtor and FMCC, the court will approve such a provision. 1

*57 The court, in this decision, has attempted to avoid using the terms “inside the plan” and “outside the plan”. These terms have a confusing history in bankruptcy courts and the use of these terms continues to generate confusion. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 there were payments made “outside” of the debtor’s plan to a significant number of creditors; because, among other reasons, Chapter XIII plans required acceptance by unsecured creditors and Chapter XIII plans could not deal with claims secured by real property, including the debtor’s principle residence. Accordingly, a debtor’s Chapter XIII plan provided for the payment of certain debts; but, because the Chapter XIII plan could not provide for the payment of all of the debtor’s debts, it was necessary for the debtor to make certain payments “outside” of the Chapter XIII plan. That situation changed completely with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. Under the provisions of the Code, all debts, administrative, priority, long term, short term, secured and unsecured, including debts arising from leases, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in a proposed Chapter 13 Plan. A Chapter 13 debtor is required to list all debts, (Bankr.R. 1007(b), Official Form 10). The provisions of the automatic stay became operative when the Chapter 13 petition is filed (11 U.S.C. § 362). The provisions of the confirmed plan become the sole basis for the payment of each creditor’s claim (11 U.S.C. § 1327), unless the court confirms a plan that contains a provision which excludes a particular debt.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
82 B.R. 55, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 51, 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 24, 1988 WL 5432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-caulfield-ohsb-1988.