Mathew King v. Graphic Packaging International, LLC

Opinion

MATHEW KING, Case No. 8:24-cv-01391-JWH-PD

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 16] INTERNATIONAL, LLC, ROBERTO VENTURA, and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants. Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Matthew King to remand this action to Orange County Superior Court.’ Defendants Graphic Packaging International, LLC (““GPI’’) and Roberto Ventura oppose the Motion,’ and the matter is fully briefed.* The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons detailed herein, the Court DENIES the Motion. King originally filed this action in Orange County Superior Court in May 2024.* King asserts the following 12 state and common law claims for relief: e age and disability related discrimination in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940 et seq., against GPI; e age and disability related harassment in violation of FEHA against GPI; e failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA against GPI; e retaliation in violation of FEHA against GPI; e failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA against GPI; e failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA against GPI; e retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2, against GPI; e violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 against GPI; Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “ Motion”) [ECF No. 16]. 2 Defs.’ Opp’n to Motion (the “Opposition”’) [ECF No. 18]. Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 19]. 4 See Notice of Removal (the ‘Notice of Removal”) [ECF No. 1] 7 1; see also id., Ex. B (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-1].

e violation of Cal. Labor Code § 232.5 against GPI; e violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 6310 & 6311 against GPI; e wrongful termination in violation of public policy against GPI; and e intentional infliction of emotional distress against both GPI and Ventura.° Although all of King’s claims for relief are based upon state law, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 & 1446, asserting federal question jurisdiction because— Defendants allege— &|| King’s claims require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, so they are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (the “LMRA”’). King disagrees, and he filed this Motion accordingly.° Il. LEGAL STANDARD Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. See zd. “Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the removing defendant “must demonstrate that original * See generally Complaint. ° See generally Motion.

subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. Accordingly, a defendant may remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332. “Complete diversity” means that “each defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). “The party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). “The presence or absence of federal- question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. “A defense is not part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). “The Ninth Circuit ‘strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,’ and ‘[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.’” Leon v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (citation omitted). In other words, any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The parties agree that Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007), sets the standard for removal pursuant to LMRA preemption. The Burnside court held as follows: [F]irst, [the Court must conduct] an inquiry into whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee the right exists solely as a result of the [collective bargaining agreement], then the claim is preempted, and our analysis ends there. If, however, the right exists independently of the [collective bargaining agreement], we must still consider whether it is nevertheless “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective- bargaining agreement.” If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301 [of the LMRA]; if not, then the claim can proceed under state law. Id. at 1059–60 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394) (internal citations omitted). In his Complaint, King alleges: “In late February, [King] was informed by [name] that he was going to be demoted from First Press Operator to Second Press Operator with a reduction in pay from $36.66/hr. to $32.51/hr. The demotion violated Teamsters Handbook Section 14.2, 16, and 16.2.2.”7 The notion that King’s demotion was wrongful—as must be determined pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement—underlies many of King’s claims for relief.8 The Court also notes that King’s Complaint directly implicates non- LMRA federal questions that Defendants did not address. For example, King alleges as follows: [d]uring the course of [his] employment, [King] disclosed information regarding conduct and/or actions by Defendants’ employees/supervisors that [King] reasonably believed constitute[ed] a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation . . . [including, with respect to federal law,] . . . Title VII of the [federal]

7 Complaint ¶ 33 (emphasis added). Civil Rights Act; . . . the Family Medical Leave Act; the Fair Labors Standards Act; [and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act].9 King also reports that he filed a complaint about Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct, including under the above-listed federal laws, with agencies including the National Labor Relations Board.10 Further, King avers that Defendants terminated him because he “refused to participate in an activity that would have resulted in a violation of state or federal [law].”11 And, in his eleventh claim for relief, King asserts that his termination was effected in violation of public policy because Defendants violated various state and federal laws including “Title VII of the [federal] Civil Rights Act; . . . the Family Medical Leave Act; the Fair Labors Standards Act; [and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act].”12 In his Motion, King argues that his claims are not substantially dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement, so removal pursuant to LMRA preemption was improper.13 Specifically, King avers that “whether Defendants failed to follow the grievance policies [dictated by the collective bargaining agreement], or whether any violation of the [collective bargaining agreement] occurred is irrelevant” to the resolution of his claims and that “there is no dispute regarding the meaning of any provision of the [collective bargaining agreement].”14

9 Id. at ¶ 114. 10 Id. at ¶ 116. 11 Id. at ¶ 117 (emphasis added). 12 Id. at ¶ 141. 13 See generally Motion. Because King’s claims for relief are “substantially dependent upon” federal labor laws and the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and remand is inappropriate. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059-60. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that King’s instant 7\| Motion to remand [ECF No. 16] is DENIED. Dated:__January 2, 2025 _ ae ta {SNITED STATES DISTRIC JUDGE