OPINION
ZAPPALA, Justice.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 (Local 85) and its President, Larry L. Klos, appeal from the adjudication and decree entered on April 10, 1992, by Judge Silvestri Silvestri of the Commonwealth Court permanently enjoining the work stoppage by the Union and directing the authorized representatives of Local 85 and the Port Authority of Allegheny County (PAT) to engage in court-supervised negotiations until an agreement was reached.1
Local 85 is the certified collective bargaining representative for approximately 2,700 individuals employed by PAT. Local 85 and PAT were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that expired by its terms on November 30, 1991. The parties’ negotiations for a successor agreement were initiated in October, 1991, but were unsuccessful.
On March 16,1992, the members of Local 85 went on strike. On March 31, 1992, Sophie Masloff, individually and as the mayor of the City of Pittsburgh, and the City of Pittsburgh filed a Complaint in Equity against PAT and Local 85 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking, inter [420]*420alia, injunctive relief enjoining the strike. The City also filed an Application for Extraordinary Relief with this Court requesting that we assume plenary jurisdiction of this matter under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 726. On April 1, 1992, we entered an order assuming jurisdiction of this matter.
Local 85 filed an answer to the equity complaint and PAT filed preliminary objections in the nature of a petition raising the defense of lack of capacity to sue. We dismissed PAT’s preliminary objections by Order of Court dated April 6, 1992, and determined that the City had standing to bring the Complaint in Equity. We remanded the matter to Commonwealth Court for expedited disposition and directed that President Judge David Craig assign the matter forthwith for disposition.
President Judge David Craig assigned the matter to Judge Silvestri. Hearings were held by Judge Silvestri on April 7-9, 1992, during which the City introduced testimony of various witnesses to demonstrate that the strike created a clear and present danger and a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Judge Silvestri concluded that the City had presented sufficient evidence of the far-reaching effect that the strike had upon commercial, academic, medical and social institutions and that the evidence submitted by PAT was neither of the quantity nor quality sufficient to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the City.2 Based upon the evidence, Judge Silvestri determined that a permanent injunction enjoining Local 85 from continuing the work stoppage was necessary to ensure the safety of the citizens and to prevent the immediate and irreparable harm that would result from a denial of the requested relief. An adjudication and decree was entered on April 10, 1992, enjoining the work stoppage, establishing a schedule for the representatives of Local 85 and PAT to engage in court-supervised negotiations, and directing the parties and participants to refrain from making any public statements without prior court approval.
On April 13,1992, Local 85 filed an Application for Expedited Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal with this Court which [421]*421was denied by order dated May 5, 1992. Local 85 appeals from the adjudication and decree issued by Judge Silvestri. Local 85 asserts that the City could not maintain an equity action to enjoin the strike under Section 3(k) of the Second Class County Port Authority Act (Port Authority Act), 55 P.S. § 563.2(k), and that the permanent injunction could not have been issued as a matter of law.
The standard of review of a decision by an equity court is limited. A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, a capricious disbelief of the evidence, or a lack of evidentiary support on the record for the findings. A chancellor’s conclusions of law are subject to stricter scrutiny. Unless the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, however, a grant of injunctive relief will not be reversed on appeal. Jersey Shore Area School District v. Jersey Shore Education Association, 519 Pa. 398, 548 A.2d 1202 (1988).
Prior to its amendment in 1986, the Port Authority Act required PAT to submit any labor dispute concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits to arbitration by a board composed of three persons. The board members included a member chosen by PAT, a member chosen by the employees’ representative, and a third member to be agreed upon by PAT and the employees’ representative. The determination of the majority of the board members was final and binding on all matters in dispute. The employees did not have a right to strike after the term of a collective bargaining agreement had expired.
The collective bargaining provisions of the Port Authority Act were substantially revamped by the legislative amendments in 1986. Section 3 of the Port Authority Act, 55 P.S. § 563.2, establishes the revised collective bargaining procedures governing PAT and its employees. Collective bargaining must begin at least one hundred days prior to the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. In the case of any labor dispute where collective bargaining does not result in an agreement, the dispute may be submitted to final and binding interest arbitration only with the written consent of both [422]*422parties. The composition of the board of arbitration and the method of selecting its members remained the same as provided for in the previous statute.
When the parties have agreed to submit the labor dispute to binding arbitration, all contract provisions remain the status quo during the period of arbitration. No lock-outs, strikes, or other interference with or interruption of transit operations are permitted during the arbitration period. 55 P.S. § 563.2(f).
Within forty-five days of the termination date of the collective bargaining agreement, either party may make a written request for the appointment of a neutral factfinder by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB). When factfinding has not been requested by either party prior to the expiration of the term of the collective bargaining agreement, both parties must immediately make a written request that the PLRB appoint a neutral factfinder. Collective bargaining may continue during the factfinding process. 55 P.S. § 563.2(g).
Within forty-five days of the appointment, the factfinder must submit findings of facts and recommendations to the PLRB and both parties. 55 P.S. § 563.2(i). The parties are required to notify the PLRB and each other whether or not the recommendations of the factfinder are accepted. The findings and recommendations are publicized if they are rejected. 55 P.S. § 563.2(3).
Once the recommendations have been rejected and PAT and the employees’ representative have refused to mutually agree to final and binding interest arbitration, the employees shall have the right to strike in regard to that dispute. No strike is permitted, however, until the completion of a thirty-day “cooling-off’ period, beginning immediately after the termination of the collective bargaining agreement. 55 P.S. § 563.2(l). When the employees have exercised their right to strike, the Port Authority Act provides:
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OPINION
ZAPPALA, Justice.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 (Local 85) and its President, Larry L. Klos, appeal from the adjudication and decree entered on April 10, 1992, by Judge Silvestri Silvestri of the Commonwealth Court permanently enjoining the work stoppage by the Union and directing the authorized representatives of Local 85 and the Port Authority of Allegheny County (PAT) to engage in court-supervised negotiations until an agreement was reached.1
Local 85 is the certified collective bargaining representative for approximately 2,700 individuals employed by PAT. Local 85 and PAT were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that expired by its terms on November 30, 1991. The parties’ negotiations for a successor agreement were initiated in October, 1991, but were unsuccessful.
On March 16,1992, the members of Local 85 went on strike. On March 31, 1992, Sophie Masloff, individually and as the mayor of the City of Pittsburgh, and the City of Pittsburgh filed a Complaint in Equity against PAT and Local 85 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking, inter [420]*420alia, injunctive relief enjoining the strike. The City also filed an Application for Extraordinary Relief with this Court requesting that we assume plenary jurisdiction of this matter under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 726. On April 1, 1992, we entered an order assuming jurisdiction of this matter.
Local 85 filed an answer to the equity complaint and PAT filed preliminary objections in the nature of a petition raising the defense of lack of capacity to sue. We dismissed PAT’s preliminary objections by Order of Court dated April 6, 1992, and determined that the City had standing to bring the Complaint in Equity. We remanded the matter to Commonwealth Court for expedited disposition and directed that President Judge David Craig assign the matter forthwith for disposition.
President Judge David Craig assigned the matter to Judge Silvestri. Hearings were held by Judge Silvestri on April 7-9, 1992, during which the City introduced testimony of various witnesses to demonstrate that the strike created a clear and present danger and a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Judge Silvestri concluded that the City had presented sufficient evidence of the far-reaching effect that the strike had upon commercial, academic, medical and social institutions and that the evidence submitted by PAT was neither of the quantity nor quality sufficient to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the City.2 Based upon the evidence, Judge Silvestri determined that a permanent injunction enjoining Local 85 from continuing the work stoppage was necessary to ensure the safety of the citizens and to prevent the immediate and irreparable harm that would result from a denial of the requested relief. An adjudication and decree was entered on April 10, 1992, enjoining the work stoppage, establishing a schedule for the representatives of Local 85 and PAT to engage in court-supervised negotiations, and directing the parties and participants to refrain from making any public statements without prior court approval.
On April 13,1992, Local 85 filed an Application for Expedited Stay and Injunction Pending Appeal with this Court which [421]*421was denied by order dated May 5, 1992. Local 85 appeals from the adjudication and decree issued by Judge Silvestri. Local 85 asserts that the City could not maintain an equity action to enjoin the strike under Section 3(k) of the Second Class County Port Authority Act (Port Authority Act), 55 P.S. § 563.2(k), and that the permanent injunction could not have been issued as a matter of law.
The standard of review of a decision by an equity court is limited. A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, a capricious disbelief of the evidence, or a lack of evidentiary support on the record for the findings. A chancellor’s conclusions of law are subject to stricter scrutiny. Unless the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, however, a grant of injunctive relief will not be reversed on appeal. Jersey Shore Area School District v. Jersey Shore Education Association, 519 Pa. 398, 548 A.2d 1202 (1988).
Prior to its amendment in 1986, the Port Authority Act required PAT to submit any labor dispute concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits to arbitration by a board composed of three persons. The board members included a member chosen by PAT, a member chosen by the employees’ representative, and a third member to be agreed upon by PAT and the employees’ representative. The determination of the majority of the board members was final and binding on all matters in dispute. The employees did not have a right to strike after the term of a collective bargaining agreement had expired.
The collective bargaining provisions of the Port Authority Act were substantially revamped by the legislative amendments in 1986. Section 3 of the Port Authority Act, 55 P.S. § 563.2, establishes the revised collective bargaining procedures governing PAT and its employees. Collective bargaining must begin at least one hundred days prior to the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. In the case of any labor dispute where collective bargaining does not result in an agreement, the dispute may be submitted to final and binding interest arbitration only with the written consent of both [422]*422parties. The composition of the board of arbitration and the method of selecting its members remained the same as provided for in the previous statute.
When the parties have agreed to submit the labor dispute to binding arbitration, all contract provisions remain the status quo during the period of arbitration. No lock-outs, strikes, or other interference with or interruption of transit operations are permitted during the arbitration period. 55 P.S. § 563.2(f).
Within forty-five days of the termination date of the collective bargaining agreement, either party may make a written request for the appointment of a neutral factfinder by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB). When factfinding has not been requested by either party prior to the expiration of the term of the collective bargaining agreement, both parties must immediately make a written request that the PLRB appoint a neutral factfinder. Collective bargaining may continue during the factfinding process. 55 P.S. § 563.2(g).
Within forty-five days of the appointment, the factfinder must submit findings of facts and recommendations to the PLRB and both parties. 55 P.S. § 563.2(i). The parties are required to notify the PLRB and each other whether or not the recommendations of the factfinder are accepted. The findings and recommendations are publicized if they are rejected. 55 P.S. § 563.2(3).
Once the recommendations have been rejected and PAT and the employees’ representative have refused to mutually agree to final and binding interest arbitration, the employees shall have the right to strike in regard to that dispute. No strike is permitted, however, until the completion of a thirty-day “cooling-off’ period, beginning immediately after the termination of the collective bargaining agreement. 55 P.S. § 563.2(l). When the employees have exercised their right to strike, the Port Authority Act provides:
... such strike shall not be prohibited unless or until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public: Provided that such [423]*423strike shall not be prohibited on the grounds that it creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public unless the court’s order granting relief further mandates that both parties submit the labor dispute to final and binding interest arbitration by a board of arbitration under the provisions of this section. No party, other than the authority, shall have any standing to seek any relief in any court of this Commonwealth under this subsection.
55 P.S. § 563.200.
In its equity action, the City challenges the constitutionality of this provision insofar as it denies access to the courts to any party other than PAT to seek injunctive relief to prohibit a strike when there is a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. The City asserts that § 563.2(k) violates Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to the extent that the City is denied access to the courts to enjoin the strike. The City contends also that § 563.2(k) is an impermissible delegation to PAT of its duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens in contravention of Article 3, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The burden of proof rests on the one challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. It is presumed that lawfully enacted legislation is constitutional. The challenger must meet the burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality by a clear, palpable, and plain demonstration that the statute violates a constitutional provision. James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
It is indeed troubling and at times disconcerting that parties to an agreement cannot resolve their disputes in an amicable fashion. Be that as it may, the courts cannot and will not sit idly by while others who are non-participants in the dispute essentially suffer the greatest harm. In the wisdom of the framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution, such incidents were anticipated so that the framers provided that where a legal [424]*424injury is sustained, there shall and will always be access to the courts of this Commonwealth.
Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.
“It is the constitutional right of every person who finds it necessary or desirable to repair to the courts for the protection of legally recognized interests to have justice administered without sale, denial or delay.” Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244 (1943). Article 1, Section 11 can be invoked only with respect to a legal injury. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919), aff'd 260 U.S. 22, 43 S.Ct. 9, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922).
Local 85 contends that the Legislature was acting within its authority to foreclose certain avenues of relief for aggrieved plaintiffs and that Article 1, Section 11 does not grant every individual or entity who believes that a wrong has been suffered a right of redress in the courts. Concurring in that position, PAT asserts that the City does not have a legally cognizable interest in the matter because the 1986 amendments to the Port Authority Act gave PAT the sole right to seek injunctive relief. The rationale underlying their conclusion is that the Legislature has eliminated a cause of action for all those who are injured by a transit strike, except for PAT. The Legislature has not.in fact done so.
The Legislature has neither eliminated a cause of action nor foreclosed an aggrieved individual from seeking redress in the courts. Section 563.2(k) expressly recognizes that the health, safety, and welfare of the public may be endangered by a transit strike, and, also, that redress for such injury may be sought in the courts. The oddity of the statute is that while the Legislature has not extinguished a cause of [425]*425action for injuries sustained by the public as a result of a transit strike, it has restricted standing to seek any relief in the courts to PAT, a party which is not representative of the public. Thus, while the public has a legally cognizable interest that may be protected by resort to the courts, by legislative design access to the courts is denied unless PAT exercises its discretion to seek relief for the injury to the public.3
In vesting the discretion to seek redress for a legal injury in an entity other than the one who sustains the injury, the statutory provision has run afoul of Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. While Article 1, Section 11 does not prevent the Legislature from extinguishing a cause of action in all instances, it does prevent the Legislature from denying an injured party the right to seek relief from the courts for a legal injury by vesting that right solely in a third party who has the absolute discretion to choose whether to do so. PAT may well exercise its prerogative to not seek injunctive relief in the courts. The administrative decisions made by PAT in declining to exercise that option cannot deprive an individual of the right to seek a remedy from the courts for any legal injury sustained as a result of the strike. To the extent that Section 563.2(k) restricts standing to seek relief in any court of this Commonwealth under subsection (k) to PAT, it is hereby declared to be unconstitutional.
Local 85 contends that the City failed to establish the existence of a clear and present danger to the public that would justify the issuance of an injunction. The case law definition of “clear and present danger” which has been employed in the context of labor disputes by public employees under the Public Employee Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq. is applicable in this instance. In Armstrong Education Association v. Armstrong School District, 5 Pa.Cmwlth. 378, [426]*426383, 291 A.2d 120, 123 (1972) (citation omitted.), the Commonwealth Court utilized the following definition:
The “clear” in that epigram is not limited to a threat indubitably etched in every microscopic detail. It includes that which is not speculative but real, not imagined but actual. The “present” in the epigram is not restricted to the climatically imminent. It includes that which exists as contrasted with that which does not yet exist and that which has ceased to exist.
The ordinary inconveniences resulting from a strike will not suffice to establish a clear and present danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the public. The concept of “clear and present danger” will encompass the consideration of the effects which are ordinarily incidental to a strike, however, when such matters accumulate to such an extent, have continued for so long, or are aggravated by unexpected developments that the public’s health, safety, or welfare is endangered. Bristol Township Education Association v. School District, 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 463, 322 A.2d 767 (1974).
In his adjudication and decree, Judge Silvestri addressed the testimony that was introduced by the City, stating:
During the parade of thirty (30) witnesses presented by the City, testimony was elicited about the impact of the mass transit strike upon families, individuals, and businesses. Blind, epileptic, professional, student, and blue-collar witnesses testified about the effect of the lack of public transportation upon their lives. While the lack of such transportation is a matter of inconvenience for some, it is devastating to others. Renal, cancer and psychiatric patients are often unable to get to appropriate medical facilities for treatment. Emergency medical services are delayed in attempts to reach citizens in need. Citizens are endangering their safety by walking along public roads to get to work because other modes of transportation are unavailable. Residents have been forced to find alternate living accommodations with friends or family because of the inaccessibility to work, school or day care. From the testimony pre[427]*427seated, the City has demonstrated the far-reaching effect the strike has had upon commercial, academic, medical and social institutions.
Local 85 argues that the evidence was insufficient because it reflected what one would ordinarily expect to occur in the event of a cessation of virtually all public transportation in a metropolitan area. The City’s evidence did not simply establish the disruption of the witnesses’ daily routines, however. The evidence established, inter alia, that public services, such as ambulance, Are, and police services, were severely hampered by the increased traffic congestion resulting from the strike. To the extent that Local 85’s argument suggests that the adverse effect on and threat to essential public services such as fire and police protection and emergency medical services are the ordinary and anticipated consequences of a transit strike, we are unpersuaded. We conclude that reasonable grounds existed for the equitable relief ordered by Judge Silvestri.
The remaining issue is whether Judge Silvestri erred in failing to order PAT and Local 85 submit their unresolved labor dispute to binding arbitration. Prior to its amendment, the Port Authority Act provided for mandatory binding arbitration. As amended, however, the Port Authority Act makes arbitration discretionary with the parties. Section 3(k), 55 P.S. § 563.2(k), requires the parties to submit the labor dispute to final and binding interest arbitration only when PAT has sought injunctive relief from the courts.
Local 85 argues that the Commonwealth Court had only two options under Section 3(k) of the Port Authority Act: (1) refuse to issue an injunction and allow the strike to continue; or (2) issue an injunction and direct that the labor dispute be submitted to binding arbitration. It contends that any other relief would be inappropriate because the Legislature had determined that binding arbitration is the appropriate and ultimate method of resolving these disputes. The legislative scheme was crafted, however, with the limitation that PAT would be the only party that could seek injunctive relief. It does not necessarily follow that the Legislature intended [428]*428binding arbitration to be mandatory when individuals or entities other than PAT bring an action to enjoin the strike. Under the Public Employe Relations Act, for example, the Legislature provided a right to strike for public employees, but did not require their labor disputes to be submitted to binding arbitration upon issuance of a court order enjoining the strike. 43 P.S. § 1101.1003.
In the absence of a legislative directive, we conclude that in this instance the soundest approach is to treat the employees of PAT consistently with public employees governed by the Public Employe Relations Act. Local 85 argues that it would be unfair to deprive its members of the right to strike without submitting the dispute to binding arbitration, and that it will be left without a method by which labor disputes can be resolved. It is clear that Local 85 is not without a remedy. Local 85’s remedy is with the courts of this Commonwealth, as is other public employees.
Accordingly, the adjudication and decree of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
McDERMOTT, former Justice, did not participate in the decision of this case.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which NIX, C.J., joins in parts I, II and III.