Mary Moses v. United States Postal Service

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided July 13, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-01078·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARY MOSES,

Plaintiff, v. CASE NO. 3:25-cv-1078-WWB-SJH

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Defendant. ________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Stay the Filing of a Case Management Report and to Stay Discovery (“Motion to Stay”), Doc. 22, and Plaintiff’s response thereto, Doc. 23. For the reasons herein, the Court will grant the Motion. Plaintiff filed a Complaint, Doc. 1, “seeking judicial enforcement of a decision of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,” id. at 1. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule(s)”), Doc. 21, which Plaintiff opposes, Doc. 24. In the Motion to Stay, Defendant seeks to stay the filing of a case management report and discovery pending a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 22. Defendant argues, among other things, that the Motion to Dismiss presents multiple grounds for dismissal, that no discovery will be necessary if the Motion to Dismiss is granted, that the parties are unable to determine the scope of discovery while the Motion to Dismiss is pending, and that Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a temporary stay. Id. In response, Plaintiff argues, among other things, that Defendant misconstrues the nature

of this action, that “this matter has been delayed long enough and any necessary discovery in a case of this nature would be extremely limited” if discovery is even needed at all; that “the court could properly dispense with the filing” of a case management report, but even if needed, preparation of any case management report would involve minimal work; and that the Motion to Dismiss lacks merit. Doc. 23.

The Court has “broad discretion in managing pretrial discovery matters.” Rivas v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 676 F. App’x 926, 932 (11th Cir. 2017)1 (quoting Perez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2002)). Given that broad discretion, the Eleventh Circuit has “emphasize[d] the responsibility of trial courts to

manage pretrial discovery properly in order to avoid a massive waste of judicial and private resources and a loss of society’s confidence in the courts’ ability to administer justice.” Id. (quoting Perez, 297 F.3d at 1263). And ordering “a discovery stay until an impending motion to dismiss is resolved is a proper exercise of that responsibility.” Id.; see also Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2020)

(holding the district court “did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending resolution of [a] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenging the legal sufficiency of [the

1 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, they may be cited when persuasive on a particular point. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2000); 11th Cir. R. 36-2. plaintiff’s] claims” because district courts should resolve “[f]acial challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense … before discovery begins” and “the failure to consider and rule on these potentially dispositive pretrial motions can be an abuse of

discretion” (quoting Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)); Est. of Parreno by & through Garcia-Bengochea v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-229- HES-PDB, 2024 WL 3826792, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2024) (“[A] circumstance warranting a stay of discovery is the pendency of a motion to dismiss raising a facial challenge to the legal sufficiency of a claim.”); cf. Hikma Pharms. USA Inc. v. Amarin

Pharma, Inc., 146 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (2026) (“In order to proceed to discovery, a plaintiff must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (citation omitted)).2

2 One aspect of the Motion to Dismiss merits brief further discussion. There is a distinction between motions to dismiss that present facial challenges to the sufficiency of a claim, which ought to be resolved before discovery, and others that may turn on findings of fact and in turn require some limited discovery before a ruling (e.g., a challenge as to personal jurisdiction). See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367. It appears from the briefing on the Motion to Dismiss that the parties’ dispute is legal and is appropriate for resolution without need for, and prior to, discovery. See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1308–09; Rivas, 676 F. App’x at 932; Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367. The undersigned notes that Defendant seeks relief under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under 12(b)(1) can be facial or factual, and a facial challenge would be analyzed like a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge (and like such a challenge would not require discovery). See Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021); McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). To be sure, the Motion to Dismiss relies on two attached exhibits. Doc. 21 at 2. But it does so under the theory that such exhibits are subject to the incorporation-by-reference doctrine—and thus suitable for consideration even under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See id.; see also Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 187 (11th Cir. 2024). The undersigned need not determine whether Defendant is correct; the point is that Defendant appears to confine argument to, and seek review under, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, thus presenting the sort of facial challenge that is suitable for resolution before and without need for discovery. Cf. Airbnb, 2024 WL 3826792, at *3. In addition, even if the Motion to Dismiss presented any non-facial challenges as to which discovery might otherwise be available, Plaintiff did not request any before responding to the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 24. Rather, the Motion to The Court’s broad discretion to manage its docket similarly allows for a stay of the filing of a case management report pending resolution of a dispositive motion. See Gibbs v. United States, 517 F. App’x 664, 670 (11th Cir. 2013); Green v. United States

Dep't of Just. Opr, No. 5:23-cv-62-MMH-PRL, 2023 WL 4743610, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2023); David v. United States, No. 8:19-cv-2591-T-36JSS, 2020 WL 1862606, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2020). This case is particularly suited for a brief stay.3 For example, it is in its infancy,

with no case management and scheduling order yet issued. See Rokit World, Inc. v.

Dismiss is now fully briefed without any stated need for discovery, and with Plaintiff insisting the two exhibits relied upon by Defendant are irrelevant (and with Plaintiff further insisting she might not need discovery at all in this case). See Doc. 24; Doc. 23 at 2–3; Airbnb, 2024 WL 3826792, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] responds to the arguments [for dismissal] without contending discovery is necessary for a complete response to the motion to dismiss.”); see also Rokit World, Inc. v. Williams Grand Prix Eng’g Ltd., No. 3:24-cv-878-MMH-LLL, 2025 WL 1222467, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr.

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