In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth
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No. 02-25-00262-CV
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MARY & CO., LLC AND LETICIA CAMPBELL, Appellants V.
ALMA RAMIREZ AND RICHARD OBIEDO, Appellees
On Appeal from the 67th District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 067-350701-24
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal concerns a residential-lease dispute. Following a jury trial, upon Appellees Alma Ramirez and Richard Obiedo’s (the Tenants’) election of remedies, the trial court ordered Appellants Mary & Co., LLC and Leticia Campbell to pay the Tenants $8,140 in actual damages for their fraudulently inducing the Tenants into entering into a lease agreement. The judgment also ordered that the Tenants recover exemplary damages: $50,000 from Mary & Co. and $200,000 from Campbell.
Mary & Co. and Campbell filed a joint appellate brief. In the first two issues, Mary & Co. and Campbell separately challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings that they fraudulently induced the Tenants to enter into the lease agreement. In their third issue, they argue that the jury’s exemplary-damages awards are excessive and violate due process. We reverse the judgment as to the Tenants’ claims against Mary & Co. and remand those claims for a new trial, and we suggest a remittitur on the exemplary-damages award against Campbell.
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I. Background
A. A young family seeks a safer home.
Alma is a stay-at-home mom to four children,1 and her husband, Richard, works as a warehouse night-shift lead. In 2023, they wanted to move to a house because their apartment constantly flooded and was plagued by nearby gun violence.
In August of that year, Campbell invited the couple to attend a child’s birthday party at a home that she owned located at 2706 NW 17th Street in Fort Worth, Texas. Since high school, Alma had been friends with Campbell’s daughter, and Alma and Campbell knew one another. Alma and Richard spoke with Campbell about wanting to move, telling her about their safety concerns and discussing that many of the homes they had looked at “were kind of pricey.”
Campbell had leased the home over the years, and she told Alma and Richard that she “would be more than happy to rent” it to them “at a good price.” She told them that she was renovating the property and said “it would be available for rent within a couple [of] months.”
B. The Tenants tour the home and identify needed repairs that Campbell agreed to make.
The next month, Alma and Richard toured the home with Campbell. Some renovations had been completed, and it appeared that progress was being made, but
As of Christmas 2023, Alma and Richard had three children, and Alma was 1
pregnant with their fourth.
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many other repairs remained unfinished. Alma and Richard walked through every room and identified the work needing to be completed, including:
• Campbell agreed to clear out abandoned cars and other junk from the backyard.
• The house’s back wall was covered with exposed plywood. There was no back door; wood covered the hole where the door was supposed to be; and there were no exterior stairs to the ground four feet below. Alma was concerned about the back wall not being properly insulated.
• Electrical outlets throughout the house were not covered.
• Floor trim was not installed, and exposed nails stuck out of the baseboards and walls.
• The kitchen was dirty; the stove was “broken and disgusting”; and there was no refrigerator. After Campbell had the stove removed, Alma and Richard bought a new one, and they financed the purchase of a new refrigerator through Campbell.
• Alma and Richard were concerned about the gas heaters’ exposed flames and asked that they be removed. Campbell had them thrown in the backyard, and Alma and Richard eventually bought their own heaters, fans, and AC units.
• A closet door in the master bedroom kept falling, and the flooring was “really bad” “old dirty wood.”
• In another bedroom, junk and food were in a closet. The unfinished back of the house formed one of that bedroom’s walls. Because of the unfinished wall, the temperature was colder in that room. Also, the flooring tile was unfinished.
• In a third bedroom, the door stuck, and the flooring was similar to that in the other rooms. But in one place, one could see the dirt underneath the house through a palm-sized hole in the floor.
• Aside from general cleanliness issues in the bathroom, holes were accumulating in the bathtub liner, and one could see plumbing and outside light through the drain hole.
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Alma later testified that they decided to rent the property because she and Richard “had previously seen that [Campbell and her husband Julio Gaussin] were working on the home, modifying it, upgrading it, and [Campbell] assured [the Tenants] that . . . they would finish everything and have it ready.” According to Alma, Campbell told the Tenants that “she would have . . . Gaussin finish everything by the time [they] moved in, and if not, within a couple days after.”
About a week after the tour, Alma called Campbell for reassurance “that progress was being made” because she and Richard needed to give up their existing lease and move out by October 1. Campbell told them that “everything would be ready to go.”
C. Based on Campbell’s assurances that she would fix the property, the Tenants sign a lease.
Because Alma and Richard had to be out of their apartment by October 1, Campbell let them move in around September 30. As they moved in to Campbell’s rental home, many of their concerns remained unaddressed. Alma called Campbell, who “reassured [Alma] that she messed up [their] move-in day and that it was okay, though, that she was going to have . . . Gaussin go out there and get everything done within a couple [of] days of [their] moving in.” Based on that reassurance, they decided to continue moving in.
On October 1, Campbell told Alma and Richard that they needed to sign a lease agreement. Campbell, some of her children, and Gaussin were present, and
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Campbell called her son Donny to “bring the lease over so [Alma and Richard] could sign it.” Campbell and Donny went over the lease with the couple. The lease was for a year; rent was $1,200 a month; and Alma negotiated for a $900 security deposit instead of $1,200.
Before signing the lease, Alma and Richard asked Campbell about when the identified repairs would be made. Campbell again told them “they would be done within a couple [of] days of moving in.” Alma testified that had Campbell not agreed to make the requested repairs within a few days, she and Richard would not have signed the lease.
D. Campbell fails to repair the property and then ignores, threatens, and retaliates against the Tenants.
Alma and Richard signed the lease, but Campbell failed to complete the identified repairs as she had repeatedly assured them. For around eight months, the Tenants continuously asked Campbell to repair the property, but she never did. Among other things, they repeatedly asked Campbell to fix unsafe conditions at the property and things that Campbell admitted “look[ed] really bad,” including plumbing problems, holes in the flooring, electrical issues, exposed nails, the junked-out backyard, and the unfinished back wall with plywood covering the backdoor opening, which also lacked exterior stairs.
But no one made the repairs, and Campbell told the Tenants it was because Gaussin had hurt his back. She apologized for the delays but gave “no estimate[d]
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time frame of completion,” stating for instance that the back of the house would “be completed when it’s done.” In December, Campbell claimed that the repairs “would have been completed a while ago” if Gaussin “[had] not hurt himself,” and she claimed that he would finish the work after the doctors “released” him.
But Gaussin never finished the work. When in early January 2024 Alma again asked about the backyard cleanup, Campbell responded that their rent was late. Alma testified, however, that they had paid their rent in full. Campbell then accused the Tenants of breaching the lease by having an “inoperable vehicle” in the driveway— even though Campbell’s junk vehicles remained on the property. Alma explained at trial that Richard had been in a wreck and was working to get his vehicle fixed but said that it was still operable. When the couple had tried to discuss the situation with Campbell, she claimed that they had committed “many lease violations” and threatened to evict them.
The Tenants requested a copy of their lease, and Campbell responded, “I do not have a copy. The leasing agency [that is, Mary & Co.] has it.” Campbell explained in a text that she had been dealing with their lease “due to knowing” Alma and Richard and because they were “family,” but she wrote that going forward, she wanted them to “deal with the rental agency” because their tone was “disrespectful and unacceptable.”
Alma and Richard had previously been unaware of Mary & Co. Both testified that it was not a party to the lease agreement, and Richard also testified that even
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though Donny brought the lease agreement to the October 1, 2023 signing, he did not believe that Donny was representing Mary & Co. at that time.2 Campbell provided Mary & Co.’s email address to the Tenants. They emailed their complaints to Mary & Co. and Campbell. Campbell did not respond in her own name, but using Mary & Co.’s email address—without disclosing that she was actually the one responding—Campbell responded on behalf of the leasing agency to the Tenants. She wrote that Mary & Co. could not locate the lease, that the original lease “ha[d] been voided,” and that a new lease with a $700 increase in rent needed to be executed within 24 hours or else the Tenants would have to vacate by January 31.
A few days later, the Tenants experienced a night below freezing in the rental home. The children’s bedroom with the unfinished wall was much colder, so the Tenants placed their children in one room with two heaters. The children woke up “extremely cold” and crying. Alma and Richard tried to get everyone warm, but Alma noticed marks running down one of her children’s arms and legs, and she described the child’s toes as being “very red, almost purple.”
Because of these conditions, the Tenants decided to stay with Richard’s family.
When they returned to the rental property a few days later, there was no water. Campbell had directed the City of Fort Worth to turn off the water, claiming that she
2 Campbell and Donny were both member–managers of Mary & Co.
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was in the process of evicting “squatters” from the property—neither of which was true.
The Tenants tried to get the water turned back on, and on January 24, a city code-compliance inspector found six major code violations at the property, including Campbell’s shutting off the water “while tenant occupied.” The Tenants engaged a lawyer to try to get the water restored, and Campbell kept resisting. She eventually sent a demand for the Tenants to vacate the property, claiming they had caused pipes to freeze and had not allowed access for repairs.
The Tenants had to go to court to get a judge to order Campbell to turn the water back on. When it was turned back on in February, there was no hot water and poor water pressure. Alma also described the water that came out of the pipes as “brown.”
Among the other major code violations the code inspector had found were unfinished exterior walls, exposed electrical wiring and outlets, breaches and gaps in the flooring, and a blocked rear door. The city asked Campbell to repair the property, but she did not.
She instead retaliated against the Tenants for contacting the city and reported the Tenants to the police, requesting a wellness check on their children. Upon investigating the matter, the police closed it as “unfounded.”
About a week later, Campbell called CPS and reported that the Tenants were “drug addicts” and “alcoholics,” that they “were beating [their] children and starving
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them, that Richard was a vicious, angry parent and had threatened to kill the neighbors, . . . that [they] had no water because [they] were too busy buying drugs[,] and . . . a lot of other stuff.” After investigating, CPS closed the case. But the children were nervous about the situation.
The Tenants had paid Campbell for eight months of rent and utilities but eventually moved out on May 31. After they moved out, Campbell called the police several more times to claim that Richard had committed various crimes. She reported that he had destroyed and damaged property, assaulted her, harassed her, and stolen her mail. He denied all these allegations and testified that he thought she made these reports to retaliate against him and his family. The jury heard no evidence that any charges were ever brought against Richard. E. The Tenants sue and prevail against Campbell and Mary & Co.
Ultimately, the Tenants sued both Campbell and Mary & Co. for failing to repair or remedy the property, fraudulently inducing them to enter into the lease agreement, retaliation, and breach of contract. At trial, Alma and Richard both testified, and they played excerpts from Campbell’s deposition and Donny’s deposition when he served as Mary & Co.’s corporate representative. Among the documentary evidence, Alma and Richard presented Campbell’s text messages, including those in which she made repeated promises to repair the property.
They also presented evidence about a lease that Campbell had produced during the lawsuit that purportedly showed Richard’s and Alma’s signatures. Alma denied
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signing the lease that Campbell produced because it was longer than the one she had signed and did not reflect the agreed-upon security-deposit modification. She pointed out that the purported lease also stated that they were accepting the property “as is,” which was not contained in the lease that she and Richard signed on October 1. Campbell offered no evidence or testimony explaining the purported lease’s origin and had no response to the Tenants’ argument that she was trying to use a forged lease to deny responsibility.
Alma and Richard also described the financial and emotional toll from dealing with Campbell and told the jury that they “didn’t want her to try and take advantage of anybody else.” In addition to the evidence they had offered about what Campbell had done to them, they offered evidence that they argued showed a “pattern of misconduct”—her leasing the same uninhabitable property to three other young families, including while the underlying lawsuit was pending, and then suing those tenants when they moved out early. 3 Other than calling Alma to address a few follow-up questions, Campbell and Mary & Co. put on no additional evidence. After hearing the evidence, the jury found that Campbell and Mary & Co. had breached the lease agreement, fraudulently induced the Tenants to enter into the lease agreement, failed to make repairs they had a duty to make, and retaliated against the Tenants. The jury awarded $8,140 in actual
Campbell claimed to be unable to recall whether she had also reported at least 3
one of those other tenants to the police.
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damages, and it also awarded the Tenants $200,000 from Campbell and $50,000 from Mary & Co. for exemplary damages.
After trial, the Tenants filed an election of remedies and opted to recover on their fraudulent-inducement claims, indicating that they no longer intended to seek their attorneys’ fees. The trial court signed a final judgment in conformity with the jury’s findings on the fraudulent-inducement claims and its awards of actual and exemplary damages. Mary & Co. challenged the jury’s findings through a combined motion for new trial and for remittitur. Campbell filed both (1) a combined motion for new trial and for remittitur and (2) a motion to disregard the jury’s findings.4 The trial court denied these postjudgment motions.
II. Fraudulent-Inducement Findings In the first two issues, Campbell and Mary & Co. challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings that they each fraudulently
4 We note that the jury certified that its verdict was “not unanimous” and that only ten of the twelve jurors had agreed to their Yes answers on the predicate fraudulent-inducement liability question. Yet neither Mary & Co. nor Campbell objected to the charge or complained in their postjudgment motions about the jury charge’s allowing the jury’s exemplary-damages findings (which were unanimously made) to be predicated on its nonunanimous findings on the predicate liability question. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 292(b); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.003(d); Redwine v. Peckinpaugh, 535 S.W.3d 44, 52 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.); Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d 173, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). We may not address any such unassigned error and note the issue only for the parties’ and trial court’s consideration in the event of a new trial. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020) (“A court of appeals may not reverse a trial court judgment on a ground not raised.”).
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induced the Tenants to enter into the lease agreement. We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s fraudulent-inducement finding as to Campbell but not as to Mary & Co. A. Standards of Review 1. Legal Sufficiency We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–28 (Tex. 2003). More than a
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scintilla exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658. On the other hand, no more than a scintilla exists when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak that it creates no more than a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence. McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Lopez, 576 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. 2019); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983).
When we reverse the trial court’s judgment because the evidence is legally insufficient, we must explain our analysis with specificity; we cannot merely say that we have reviewed all the evidence and reached a conclusion contrary to the factfinder’s. Citizens Nat’l Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006). Although we generally render judgment after sustaining a legal-sufficiency challenge, we cannot do so in a jury-trial case if the appellant preserved the challenge only in a motion for new trial; in such a case, we must remand for a new trial. Horrocks v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 852 S.W.2d 498, 498–99 (Tex. 1993); Huntley v. Enon Ltd. P’ship, 197 S.W.3d 844, 853 n.6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
2. Factual Sufficiency When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v.
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Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 770–76 (Tex. 2003) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g)); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). B. Applicable Law “Fraudulent inducement is a ‘species of common-law fraud’ that ‘arises only in the context of a contract.’” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Lufkin Indus., 573 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018)). Such a claim requires proof of the following elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or asserted without knowledge of its truth, (3) made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, (4) which the other party relied on and (5) which caused injury.” Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 614. Fraudulent inducement is actionable if “the defendant falsely promises to perform a future act while having no present intent to perform it.” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 S.W.3d at 228.
“Justifiable reliance usually presents a question of fact for the jury to decide.”
Maya Walnut LLC v. Ly, No. 24-0171, 2026 WL 1854358, at *3 (Tex. June 26, 2026) (citation modified). But sometimes this element can be negated as a matter of law. Id. “In measuring justifiability, we must inquire whether, given a fraud plaintiff’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged fraud, it is extremely unlikely that there is actual reliance on the plaintiff’s part.” Matlock Place Apartments, L.P. v. Druce, 369 S.W.3d 355,
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373 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tex. 2010) (citation modified and emphasis added)). C. Campbell’s Fraudulently Inducing the Tenants In the second appellate issue, Campbell challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s fraudulent-inducement finding. Campbell argues that the Tenants were not justified in relying on her repair promises because the house had so many “red flags” as to indicate that “such reliance [was] unwarranted.” Grant Thornton LLP, 314 S.W.3d at 923 (internal citation and quotations omitted). She also claims that “[t]here is insufficient evidence that [she] made a false promise of future performance with the present intent not to perform.” On both points, we disagree.
1. Red Flags Concerning Campbell’s “red flags” argument, she claims that the Tenants “saw the extensive list of repairs and witnessed the lack of progress throughout September . . . [and] were simply disappointed when [her] aspirational estimates for the yard and house proved overly optimistic.” She points to photos showing the unfinished back wall, the floors and walls needing repairs in one of the children’s bedrooms, and the junked-out backyard, and she argues that “no reasonable juror could credit this evidence and find that [the Tenants] justifiably relied on [her] promise to fix everything within a couple of days.” She claims that the Tenants
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“ignored the red flags seen with their own eyes, choosing instead to negotiate a reduction in the security deposit and sign the [l]ease.”
Here, the jury had before it evidence that the Tenants were a young family, and Campbell offered no evidence suggesting that they were experienced or sophisticated in leasing as compared to her. The fact that they did not immediately retain a copy of the lease suggests the Tenants’ lack of experience. And instead of their approaching a potential landlord they did not know and had no particular reason to trust, here the evidence demonstrated that the Tenants personally knew Campbell. She considered them family, and they considered her a part of their community. Indeed, they learned of the house’s availability at a child’s birthday party they attended at the house, during which Campbell appeared sympathetic to their leasing situation and offered to help them.
When the Tenants toured the house with Campbell, they of course saw the areas needing repair and specifically addressed those with her, receiving her oral assurances that she would fix the house. Far from blindly accepting her word, they also saw that some improvements were in progress, suggesting that Campbell would fulfill her promises to complete the identified repairs. In fact, even after touring the home with the Tenants, Campbell did some of the things they had asked her to do— like taking out the gas heaters and an old stove that did not work. Several times before signing the lease, they asked her whether the repairs would be made, and Campbell kept reassuring them that the repairs would be made, even initially apologizing about
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confusing their move-in date. But as the jury heard, this was just one of the many excuses Campbell gave for not repairing the house.
Nothing before the Tenants signed the lease suggested to them that Campbell was not telling the truth, and she offered no evidence that the Tenants had any reason not to believe her. The Tenants thus argue that they presented evidence of “an advantageous relationship, partial performance, and express assurances”—presenting facts that support the jury’s finding of justifiable reliance, and we agree with this position. Viewing the circumstances in their entirety, accounting for the parties’ relative levels of sophistication, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that it was “extremely unlikely” that the Tenants actually relied on Campbell’s repeated promises to repair the house before they signed the lease agreement. Cf. Maya Walnut LLC, 2026 WL 1854358, at *3–4 (citing Grant Thornton LLP, 314 S.W.3d at 923). 5 They testified that they did rely on Campbell’s repeated reassurances, and the jury found that that they did so justifiably. See id. at *5 (“[W]hen evidence does not cause an actual or reasonable suspicion that the representation is false, that evidence alone generally is not enough to negate justifiable reliance.”).
5 Unlike this case, Maya Walnut LLC involved a sophisticated commercial tenant who suspected that the landlord’s representations were false and therefore could not blindly rely on such representations without further investigation. 2026 WL 1854358, at *6. No such evidence is present here.
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2. Intent We likewise reject Campbell’s argument that the Tenants failed to prove the intent element—that she made a false promise of future performance with the present intent not to perform. See Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 S.W.3d at 228. The Tenants presented evidence that Campbell was making some progress on repairing the home before they signed the lease. Campbell repeatedly assured them that such repairs would be completed. But after the Tenants signed the lease, Campbell gave them only excuses and did not complete the repairs—even after the city became involved—and she instead turned to retaliating against the Tenants. Campbell threatened to evict them, communicated through Mary & Co.’s email to try to void their lease, falsely told the city that the Tenants were squatters to get their water turned off, and otherwise harassed the Tenants.
Campbell scoffs that such “purported grievances are irrelevant to the representations at issue.” But such evidence allowed the jury to determine that when Campbell promised the Tenants that she would repair the property, she did not intend to do so. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48–49 (Tex. 1998); see also M & M Joint Venture v. Layton, No. 02-15-00357-CV, 2017 WL 3429141, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 10, 2017, no pet.) (“[A] party’s intent is determined at the time the party made the representation, [but] it may be inferred from the party’s subsequent acts after the representation is made.”
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(quoting Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 774–75 (Tex. 2009))).
Here, the jury determined that Campbell breached the lease agreement—a finding that she does not challenge on appeal. The unchallenged breach finding along with the evidence of Campbell’s conduct toward the Tenants is enough to support the jury’s fraud finding. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2006) (“[B]reach combined with ‘slight circumstantial evidence’ of fraud is enough to support a verdict for fraudulent inducement.” (quoting Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986))).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Tenants, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Campbell fraudulently induced them into signing the lease agreement. See Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658. Additionally, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we further conclude that the credible evidence supporting the finding is not so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 770–76; Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635. Therefore, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s fraudulent-inducement finding against Campbell. We overrule the second issue. D. Mary & Co.’s Fraudulently Inducing the Tenants On the first issue, we consider Mary & Co.’s argument that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative finding that it
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fraudulently induced the Tenants to sign the lease agreement. We agree that the evidence is legally insufficient.
Mary & Co. argues that it was not involved at the time of the October 1, 2023 signing of the lease and that the Tenants had not even heard of the entity until Campbell’s January 2, 2024 email. It thus argues that there is no evidence that it fraudulently induced the Tenants to sign the lease agreement. In support of this position, Mary & Co. points to Alma’s and Richard’s testimony.
Alma testified as follows:
Q. . . . So in August 2023, when you were discussing the potential leasing [of] the property at that party, did [Campbell] discuss Mary & Co. as being the leasing manager or leasing agency?
A. No, sir.
Q. In October 2023, when you guys were signing that agreement, was there any conversation about Mary & Co. being the leasing agency?
A. No, sir.
Q. Who was that agreement between?
A. Us and Leticia Campbell.
Q. Was Mary & Co. written anywhere in the lease?
A. No, sir.
Q. So at that point in time when you had just signed that leasing agreement, if you had an issue or question regarding the property, who did you contact?
A. Leticia Campbell.
....
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Q. So do you recall when [Campbell] first directed you to e-mail Mary & Co.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you describe what -- what led to that?
A. It was our interaction, January 2nd, that at the end of that text thread, she sent me Mary & Co.’s e-mail.
Q. So before that point, had you ever heard of Mary & Co.?
A. No, sir.
Q. What individual did you think you were contacting whenever you e-mailed Mary & Co.?
A. I didn’t know who.
....
Q. Can you tell us again who was present during the signing of the lease agreement?
A. Yes, sir. It was me, Richard, our children, my dad, Ms.
Campbell, Kaitlyn Campbell, Clarissa Campbell, . . . Donny Campbell[,] and Julio Gaussin.
Q. Okay. And it was your understanding at that time that the owner of the property was just Leticia Campbell, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So why do you think Donny . . . was there?
A. She called him to bring the contract. She said that he typed it up on his phone -- on his computer, so he had to print it out and bring it.
Q. Okay. At that time, you didn’t -- at that time, did you believe that [Donny] was representing Mary & Co.?
A. No, sir.
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Similarly, Richard testified as follows:
Q. . . . In October 2023, did you sign the agreement to lease the property?
A. The three-page agreement, yes.
Q. Who was the agreement between?
A. It would be between [Campbell], my wife, and I.
Q. Was Mary & Co. written in the lease at all?
A. Not that I was aware of.
Q. And during the signing of the lease, were there any conversations about Mary & Co. being the leasing agent?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you remind us who was present that day when you signed the lease?
A. As my wife stated, it was myself, my kids, her, her father, Ms.
Campbell, Donny . . . Campbell, Caitlyn Campbell, and Julio.
Q. Why do you think [Donny] was there that day?
A. Because she had called [Donny] to bring the -- the three-page lease over for us to sign.
Q. Okay. And did you believe that [Donny] was representing Mary & Co. at that time?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Had you -- at that time, did you ever hear the company of Mary & Co.?
A. No, sir.
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From this testimony, the evidence established that Mary & Co. was not on the lease agreement, Mary & Co. itself made no representations to the Tenants before they signed the lease agreement, they had not heard of Mary & Co. at the time they signed the lease agreement, and they were unaware of Mary & Co. being the leasing agent at the time they signed the lease agreement. In short, the evidence demonstrates that the Tenants thought they were dealing directly with the home’s owner— Campbell.
Without directly stating that Campbell was acting as the agent for an undisclosed principal, the Tenants attempt to say as much by claiming that they presented evidence that Campbell had the authority to act as Mary & Co.’s agent— including at the time of the misrepresentation—based on the fact that she was one of its member–managers. The Tenants, however, fail to point to any conclusive evidence that Campbell was actually acting in that capacity when she assured them that she would repair the property before they signed the lease, as opposed to her acting solely as the property’s owner and on her own behalf at that time.6 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that
6 The Tenants did not present conclusive evidence on the agency issue, and they also did not submit a jury issue on whether Campbell was acting as Mary & Co.’s agent. See, e.g., Bianco Brain & Spine, PLLC v. Jones, No. 02-23-00220-CV, 2025 WL 1141886, at *53 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 17, 2025, pet. filed) (holding that plaintiffs waived their independent respondeat superior recovery ground by failing to submit a jury issue on the ground when the evidence establishing the ground was not conclusive).
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Mary & Co. fraudulently induced the Tenants to enter into the lease agreement. See McAllen Hosps., L.P., 576 S.W.3d at 397; Kindred, 650 S.W.2d at 63.
In conjunction with its legal-sufficiency appellate issue, Mary & Co. asks us to render a take-nothing judgment in its favor. But as we previously pointed out, Mary & Co. raised its legal-sufficiency complaint solely in a motion for new trial and did not file a motion to disregard the jury’s findings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 301, 320–29. On this procedural posture, we may not render judgment and must remand the Tenants’ claims against Mary & Co. for a new trial. See Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 498–99; Huntley, 197 S.W.3d at 853 n.6. We sustain Mary & Co.’s first issue in part.7 III. Exemplary-Damages Findings In the third issue, Campbell and Mary & Co. both complain that the jury’s respective exemplary-damages awards are excessive and unconstitutional under the federal Due Process Clause. Mary & Co. seeks a reversal of its award, and Campbell asks for a remittitur. Addressing Campbell’s argument, we agree that the $200,000 exemplary-damages award should be reduced and suggest a remittitur. 8
7 Because of our disposition on this issue, we need not reach the part of Mary & Co.’s first issue challenging the factual sufficiency of the jury’s fraudulent-inducement finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
8 Based on our disposition of the first issue, we need not address the part of the third issue in which Mary & Co. challenges the jury’s $50,000 exemplary-damages award. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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A. Standard of Review “[C]ompensatory and exemplary damages serve different purposes;
compensatory damages redress concrete losses caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct, while exemplary damages are aimed at deterrence and retribution.” Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 873 (Tex. 2017); see also Bennett v. Grant, 525 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. 2017) (“As an overarching premise, exemplary damages further the state’s interest in punishing and deterring unlawful conduct.”). But exemplary damages “should not be so grossly excessive as to further no legitimate purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property.” Bennett, 525 S.W.3d at 650 (citation modified). Thus, even when an award is within Texas’s statutory exemplary-damages cap, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor,” Horizon Health Corp., 520 S.W.3d at 873 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1519–20 (2003)); see also Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 307 (explaining that a capped amount “is still subject to an ultimate constitutional check for exorbitancy”) (citation modified).
Our analysis is anchored by three guideposts:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the [exemplary] damages award; and (3) the difference between the [exemplary] damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
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Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418, 123 S. Ct. at 1520; see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598–99 (1996); Horizon Health Corp., 520 S.W.3d at 873–74. Such a review is conducted de novo. Horizon Health Corp., 520 S.W.3d at 874.
Concerning the second guidepost, the United States Supreme Court has “decline[d] . . . to impose a bright-line ratio” of exemplary to actual damages but has stated that “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio . . . will satisfy due process” and that “an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 877 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S. Ct. at 1524). For example, in a fraud case involving an automobile dealer alleged to have misrepresented a vehicle’s luxury quality in which the Texas Supreme Court considered the jury’s 4.33 to 1 exemplary-to-actual-damages ratio, the court held:
Pushing exemplary damages to the absolute constitutional limit in a case like this leaves no room for greater punishment in cases involving death, grievous physical injury, financial ruin, or actions that endanger a large segment of the public. On this record, [the dealer’s] conduct merited exemplary damages, but the amount assessed by the court of appeals exceeds constitutional limits.
Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 310. B. Analysis Campbell’s sole argument is that the 24.57 to 1 ratio of exemplary damages to actual damages “is beyond exorbitant and egregious and beyond any boundary of due
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process.” We consider this argument in light of Gore’s three guideposts. See Bunton v. Bentley, 153 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Tex. 2004).
1. Reprehensibility The Texas Supreme Court has described reprehensibility as “the most important of the guideposts.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 308. We consider whether: (1) the harm inflicted was physical or economic; (2) the tortfeasor was indifferent to or recklessly disregarded the health or safety of others; (3) the victim was financially vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions; and (5) the harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit. Bennett, 525 S.W.3d at 650.
Campbell’s opening brief does not mention the reprehensibility factor, and she makes no effort to dispute the evidence supporting any of these considerations; she simply challenges the ratio as excessive. Alma and Richard argue, in contrast, that Campbell’s “conduct displayed nearly every reprehensibility factor.”
Here, the Tenants point to the evidence of Alma (who was pregnant) and Richard living in the house with their three small children. They cite evidence that Campbell knew of their limited means and argue that this demonstrated their financial vulnerability. Although they cite the financial harm they incurred, they also point to evidence of their worry and emotional toll from Campbell’s actions, including from her turning their water off, calling the police, calling CPS, and never repairing the property despite her assurances otherwise. They cite the evidence of Campbell’s ignoring them, refusing to deal with them other than as Mary & Co., and then
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threatening to void their lease if they did not sign a new one. Additionally, Alma and Richard cite the evidence that this was not an isolated situation and that Campbell had acted similarly toward other families. Finally, they point to the nature of their claims—that Campbell repeatedly told them she would fix the property and did not— and the forged lease as evidence of her untruthfulness and deceit.
In reply, Campbell denies “intentionally disregarding the rights, safety, and welfare of” the Tenants. But she does not refute their evidence. She simply argues that they moved in before signing the lease and negotiated their security deposit down by $300. As the evidence shows, they moved in only after she had repeatedly assured them that she would make repairs. That the Tenants were able to negotiate $300 off their security deposit before Campbell again assured them that she would make the repairs does not negate the evidence of her reprehensible conduct toward them and other tenants. We agree that the evidence demonstrates that Campbell acted in a particularly reprehensible manner as their landlord, supporting an award of exemplary damages. But there are limits to such an award.
2. Proportionality On that point, Campbell’s main focus is that a 24.57 to 1 ratio is too great. As the Dallas Court of Appeals recently explained, the “rigid application of a 4:1 ratio is not universally required and . . . an upward-departure exception would be appropriate where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” Smith-Lisle Holdings, Ltd. v. DO-MO Joint Venture, No. 05-24-01341-CV,
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2026 WL 386239, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2026) (internal citations and quotations omitted), supplemented, No. 05-24-01341-CV, 2026 WL 565847 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2026, no pet.). Most such upward-departure cases have involved nominal damages. See id. (first citing Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 287, 294– 95 (5th Cir. 2003) (“110:1 in a housing-discrimination case where compensatory damages were only $500”); and then citing Williams v. Kaufman County, 343 F.3d 689, 711 & n.75 (5th Cir. 2003) (“50:1 in a civil-rights case where nominal damages were only $100”)).
The Tenants cite cases in which courts have upheld double-digit ratios, but those decisions predate cases such as Reynolds (from 2010), Chapa (from 2006), and Campbell (from 2003).9 In Campbell, the United States Supreme Court explained how in Gore it had derived the 4 to 1 ratio by considering the 700-year-long Anglo-American tradition of lawmakers’ imposing “double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S. Ct. at 1524. Building on Campbell’s foundation, the Texas Supreme Court stated in Reynolds that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio . . . will satisfy due process.” 315 S.W.3d at 877. But courts have
9 See Riedell v. Hoffman Controls Corp., No. 05-00-00658-CV, 2001 WL 832342, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2001, no pet.) (ratio of 11:1); Goswami v. Thetford, 829 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied) (ratio of 19:1); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (ratio of 12.5:1), writ ref’d n.r.e. sub nom. Trotti v. K-Mart Corp. No. 7441, 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991) (ratio of 4:1 compensatory damages and 200:1 out-of-pocket expenses); Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1096 (5th Cir. 1991) (ratio of 20:1).
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considered whether it is appropriate to go over 4 to 1 when particularly egregious conduct is at issue.
For instance, the Amarillo Court of Appeals somewhat recently considered whether a 6 to 1 ratio was unconstitutionally excessive. See XNA Corp. v. Williams, No. 07-23-00251-CV, 2024 WL 3296951, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 3, 2024, pet. denied). In that case, the court examined three cases allowing 11:1, 5:1, and 5:1 ratios but ultimately concluded that the 6:1 ratio was unconstitutionally excessive because the act at issue was not egregious. Id. at *6–7 (first citing Riedell, 2001 WL 832342, at *3–5; then citing Huynh v. Phung, No. 01-04-00267-CV, 2007 WL 495023, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 16, 2007, no pet.); 10 and then citing Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 693 S.W.3d 23, 38-39 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2021), rev’d on other grounds, 688 S.W.3d 872, 873 (Tex. 2024)); see also SAS & Assocs., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Servicing, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 296, 308 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (agreeing that the trial court properly ordered a remittitur of the $200,000 exemplary-damages award to $22,722, which was three times the jury’s fraud award). In short, although no recent precedent supports a 24.57 to 1 ratio, courts have upheld or suggested single-digit-ratio adjustments above a 4 to 1 ratio based on the reprehensibility guidepost.
In Huynh, the court examined a 10:1 ratio because it “exceed[ed] single digits”
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and suggested a remittitur of 5:1. 2007 WL 495023, at *13–14.
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3. Comparability We additionally consider Campbell’s arguments concerning the comparability guidepost. As the Dallas Court of Appeals has explained,
The final guidepost compares the exemplary damages with legislatively authorized civil sanctions. See Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418[, 123 S. Ct. at 1520]). This factor fortifies the notion that legislatures make policy and are well positioned to define and deter undesired behavior. See id. Accordingly, reviewing courts “should accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.” Id. at 880–81 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 583[, 116 S. Ct. at 1603]). In cases where applicable civil penalties exist, this guidepost gives bad actors fair notice of what is forbidden and of potential penalties. Id. at 881.
Smith-Lisle Holdings, Ltd., 2026 WL 386239, at *7.
Campbell did not argue this guidepost in her opening brief, but in her reply brief, she cites Section 92.0563 of the Texas Property Code, which allows a residential tenant to sue a landlord for its failure to make repairs for reduced rent, a civil penalty of one month’s rent, an additional $500 penalty, actual damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees. See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.0563. She argues that one month’s rent of $1,200 plus an additional $500—totaling $1,700—“is . . . a very far cry from $200,000.” Of course, she ignores the inclusion of the reduced-rent-value remedy while repairs remain incomplete, actual damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees, which would most certainly increase a potential recovery available under the Texas Property Code. We therefore do not find Campbell’s argument persuasive that we should simply use $1,700 as a comparison to the $200,000 jury award.
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4. Suggested Remittitur With that being said, we acknowledge that the evidence demonstrates that Campbell acted particularly reprehensibly toward the Tenants and that the evidence supports an award of exemplary damages. But in light of what both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court have said about the proportionality guidepost, we conclude that the jury’s $200,000 award—representing a 24.57 to 1 ratio—exceeded the bounds of due process.
Both the Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court have declined to provide a “mathematical formula, bright-line ratio, or rigid benchmark for determining the reasonableness and proportionality” of an exemplary-damages award. See Huynh, 2007 WL 495023, at *14 & n.14 (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S. Ct. at 1524). But on the record before us, given the utterly reprehensible conduct at issue—including Campbell’s calling the police and CPS on the Tenants, depriving the young family of water, and endangering their children’s health during extreme cold— in line with Reynolds’s approval of a single-digit ratio, we suggest a remittitur to $65,120, which is eight times the amount of actual damages awarded against Campbell. 315 S.W.3d at 877; Huynh, 2007 WL 495023, at *13–14. We sustain the part of the third issue in which Campbell challenged the exemplary-damages award against her.
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IV. Conclusion
Having sustained the legal-sufficiency challenge within the first issue, we reverse the trial court’s judgment on the Tenants’ claims against Mary & Co. and remand those claims for a new trial. After overruling the second issue but sustaining the third in part—relating to the exemplary-damages award against Campbell—we suggest a remittitur.
In accordance with Rule 46.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, if the Tenants file with this Court, within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, a remittitur to reduce the exemplary-damages award against Campbell to $65,120, the trial court’s judgment will be reformed on that exemplary-damages award and affirmed concerning the claims against Campbell. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.3. But if they do not timely file the suggested remittitur, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the exemplary damages against Campbell, and this cause will be remanded to the trial court for a new trial on all issues. See Duncan v. Prescott, No. 07-12-00330-CV, 2013 WL 5614314, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2013, no pet.); Khorshid, Inc. v. Christian, 257 S.W.3d 748, 770 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: August 13, 2026