Marvin v. Jennings

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 17, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-11603
StatusUnknown

This text of Marvin v. Jennings (Marvin v. Jennings) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marvin v. Jennings, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARK MARVIN, Plaintiff, 19-CV-11603 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND MARY JENNINGS; THELMA LEE; NYS OFFICE OF DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his SNAP benefits were unlawfully reduced. By order dated January 6, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff makes the following allegations in this complaint. After Plaintiff, who is 70 years old, began receiving social security benefits, the amount of his monthly SNAP benefits, also known as food stamps, was reduced from $195 to $16. Plaintiff sought administrative review of that decision. Attached to the complaint is a “Decision After Fair Hearing” holding that “the Agency correctly determined” that Plaintiff “is eligible for a monthly SNAP benefit of $16.00.” Plaintiff alleges that this reduction is “unlawful” and violates the SNAP program’s “specific purpose of improving nutrition.” Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of his benefits, and money damages. Named as Defendants are Mary Jennings, who represented the state at the fair hearing, Thelma Lee, who presided over the fair hearing, and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA).1 DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants denied Plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). To state a § 1983 due process claim, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that he possessed a protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.” Hynes v. Squillance, 143 F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998); see Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted). Generally, due process requires some kind of hearing prior to a final deprivation of an individual’s liberty or property interest. See Hodel v.

Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); DiBlasio v. Novello,

1 Plaintiff has filed a number of pro se cases in this Court, most of which have been dismissed as nonmeritorious. See Marvin v. Orange Cnty Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 16-CV-1456, (NSR) (S.D.N.Y.) (motion to dismiss pending); Marvin v. CED-Child Support Enforcement Section, No. 15-CV-7663 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (dismissing complaint without prejudice as duplicative of No. 15-CV-7429), 16-224-cv (2d Cir. July 13, 2016) (dismissing appeal as frivolous); Marvin v. CED-Child Support Enforcement Section, No. 15-CV-7429 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2015) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), 16-0215- cv (2d Cir. July 12, 2016) (dismissing appeal as frivolous); Marvin v. Orange Cnty. Support Collections Unit, No. 09-CV-6320 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim), 09-3573-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2009) (dismissing appeal as frivolous); Marvin v. Zieran , No. 95-CV-4074 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1995) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim). 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). “[W]here a plaintiff alleges a deprivation of property in violation of the due process clause, the federal court’s initial inquiry must be whether the state has provided adequate remedies to redress such unlawful acts. If so, there will be no claim before the federal court, whether or not plaintiff took advantage of the state procedure.” Vialez v. New

York City Hous. Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Goldberg v. Kelly
397 U.S. 254 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Nnebe v. Daus
644 F.3d 147 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Vialez v. New York City Housing Authority
783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. New York, 1991)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
M.K.B. v. Eggleston
445 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D. New York, 2006)
Kapps v. Wing
404 F.3d 105 (Second Circuit, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Marvin v. Jennings, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marvin-v-jennings-nysd-2020.