Martinez v. University of San Diego

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HALEY MARTINEZ, et al., Case No.: 3:20-cv-01946-RBM-VET Plaintiffs, 12 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ v. 13 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO, APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 14 Defendant. SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE PLAN 15 [Doc. 220] 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs1 Edgar Chavarria, Catherine Holden, and 19 Matthew Sheridan’s (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Preliminary Approval of 20 Class Action Settlement and Notice Plan (“Motion for Preliminary Approval”), which was 21 filed on May 16, 2024. (Doc. 220.) 22 In their Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiffs move this Court pursuant to 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for an order (i) preliminarily approving the proposed 24 settlement agreement, including the exhibits attached thereto (“Settlement Agreement”); 25 (ii) appointing the named plaintiffs as class representatives; (iii) appointing Plaintiffs’ 26 27 28 1 1 counsel—Leeds Brown Law, P.C.; The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; The Golan Firm PLLC; 2 Shegerian & Associates, Inc.; and Francis Mailman Soumilas, P.C.—as class counsel; (iv) 3 approving the notice plan and forms of notice to the class; and (v) setting all future dates 4 and procedures for opt-outs, objections, and a final approval hearing. (Id. at 2.2) 5 On September 23, 2024, the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding 6 certification of the class defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement.” (Doc. 221 at 4.) 7 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Further 8 Support of Preliminary Approval (“Supplemental Briefing”). (Doc. 228.) 9 To date, Defendant University of San Diego (“Defendant” or “USD”) has not filed 10 any opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval or their Supplemental 11 Briefing. 12 The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument 13 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion 14 for Preliminary Approval is GRANTED subject to the guidance and conditions set forth 15 below. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 The Court summarizes all filings relevant to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 18 Approval below. 19 A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 20 On March 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. (See Docs. 21 108, 116.) Plaintiffs sought certification of the following class: 22 All students enrolled at the University of San Diego during the Spring 2020 semester who (i) were registered for at least one on-site course, and (ii) who 23 paid tuition, course fees, and/or Student Wellness fees, or on whose behalf 24 tuition, course fees, and/or Student Wellness fees were paid. 25 (Doc. 116-1 at 7.) 26 27 28 2 1 In this motion, Plaintiffs argued that the proposed class meets the four requirements 2 set forth in Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 3 representation. (Doc. 116-1 at 14–18.) First, Plaintiffs argued that the proposed class is 4 so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. (Id. at 14–15.) Second, 5 Plaintiffs asserted that there are questions of law and facts common to the proposed class, 6 e.g., whether Defendants failed to provide the in-person classes and services promised and 7 whether USD’s past performance created an implied-in-fact contract to provide in-person 8 educational services. (Id. at 15–16.) Third, Plaintiffs argued that their claims are typical 9 of the proposed class’s claims because the damages calculation is the same for Plaintiffs as 10 it would be for the proposed class. (Id. at 16–17.) Finally, Plaintiffs asserted that their 11 representation of the proposed class is adequate because they have engaged experienced 12 counsel, they have the same claims and interests as the proposed class members, and they 13 have dedicated significant time and energy to this lawsuit. (Id. at 17–18.) 14 Plaintiffs also argued that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 15 23(b)(3). (Id. at 18–26.) First, Plaintiffs argued that issues common to the proposed class, 16 e.g., whether USD promised students in-person education and whether USD breached that 17 promise, predominate over any individual issues. (Id. at 19–21.) Second, Plaintiffs 18 asserted that damages will be calculated the same for every member of the proposed class 19 and need not account for individual circumstances. (Id. at 21–23.) Finally, Plaintiffs 20 contended that the proposed class is the best method for adjudicating the proposed class 21 members’ claims because a single class action achieves “significant economies of time, 22 effort, expense, and promote uniformity of decision.” (Id. at 24–26 (internal quotation 23 omitted).) 24 Plaintiffs concluded that the Court should appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel 25 pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1).3 26

27 3 On May 8, 2023, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 28 1 In its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Rule 72 Motion to 2 Overturn Magistrate Judge Gallo’s May 23 Order Striking Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Expert 3 Report (“Rule 72 Order”) dated February 7, 2024, the Court ordered that discovery be 4 reopened for 60 days, allowed Plaintiffs to refile their Motion for Class Certification 30 5 days after the close of discovery, and therefore denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 6 Certification without prejudice. (See Doc. 209 at 23.) Plaintiffs did not refile a Motion for 7 Class Certification. 8 B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval 9 In their Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiffs seek the Court’s preliminary 10 approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 220.) In the proposed Settlement 11 Agreement, the Parties define the class as “all enrolled students at USD who paid tuition, 12 the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, or who were credited with having paid 13 such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020 term/semester.” (Doc. 14 220-5 [Settlement Agreement] § 1.29.) This definition differs from the class definition in 15 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. 16 Plaintiffs then argue the proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and 17 adequate under Rule 23(e)(2). (Doc. 220 at 6, 13–14.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that 18 the Rule 23(e)(2) factors weigh in favor of preliminary approval because (1) the class 19 representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposed 20 settlement was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided to the class is adequate 21 considering the costs, risks, and delay of trial, the effectiveness of the class notice and 22 processing of claims, and the proposed attorneys’ fees; and (4) the proposal treats members 23 of the class equitably. (Id. at 13–22.) Plaintiffs also assert that the proposed Settlement 24 25 26 Supplemental Authority in Support of their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 27 Certification. (Doc. 155.) On June 1, 2023, September 12, 2023, and October 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed three Notices of Supplemental Authority in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 28 1 Agreement satisfies the factors set forth in Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 2 566 (9th Cir.2004) (id. at 22–24) and that the views of counsel should be given substantial 3 weight (id. at 24–25). Finally, Plaintiffs contend that their proposed notice plan provides 4 class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances and adequately informs 5 class members of the settlement and their right to object or opt-out. (Id. at 25–27.) 6 Although Plaintiffs reference their prior Motion for Class Certification (see id. at 6, 8, 15) 7 and request the Court confirm certification of the class (id. at 27), Plaintiffs did not re-brief 8 class certification for the newly defined class. 9 C. Settlement Terms 10 Plaintiffs attach the proposed Settlement Agreement to the Declaration of Michael 11 A. Tompkins, Esq. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Tompkins 12 Decl.”) as Exhibit D. (See Doc. 220-1 [Tompkins Decl.] ¶ 23, Ex. D; Doc. 220-5 13 [Settlement Agreement].) The Court summarizes the relevant provisions here. 14 1. The Class, the Class Representatives, and the Parties 15 “Settlement Class, Class or Class Members means: all enrolled students at USD who 16 paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, or who were credited 17 with having paid such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020 18 term/semester.” (Doc. 220-5 [Settlement Agreement] § 1.29.) Plaintiffs are the “Class 19 Representatives” or “Named Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 1, § 1.15.) 20 “Class Counsel” means Yvette Golan of The Golan Firm PLLC; Carney R. 21 Shegerian and Anthony Nguyen of Shegerian & Associates, Inc.; James Francis of Francis 22 Mailman Soumilas, P.C.; Jason Sultzer of The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; and Michael A. 23 Tompkins of Leeds Brown Law, P.C. (Id. § 1.4.) 24 Plaintiffs and Defendant are referred to collectively as the “Parties.” (Id. at 1.) 25 2. Monetary Relief 26 In the proposed Settlement Agreement, “Defendant agrees to pay an additional One 27 Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,400,000.00) to fully satisfy any and all current 28 cash benefits to be paid to all Class Members, any Court-approved Costs and Fees, and all 1 costs and fees associated with the Settlement Claims Administrator.” (Settlement 2 Agreement § 3.1.4) “Defendant shall make payments into the [Qualified Settlement Fund 3 (“QSF”)] as follows: (i) on or before 14 days after Preliminary Approval, Defendant shall 4 pay $35,000 for the primary purpose of funding the Settlement Claims Administrator and 5 paying the costs associated with effectuating notice; and (ii) on or before 10 days after the 6 Final Effective Date, Defendant shall fund the remainder of the Gross Settlement Fund into 7 the QSF.” (Id. §§ 1.23, 3.1.1.) 8 Additionally, “Class Counsel will petition the Court for an award of no more than 9 Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($275,000.00) for attorneys’ fees and will 10 additionally petition the Court for reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs, and 11 expenses not to exceed $300,000.” (Id. § 3.3.1.) “Named Plaintiffs may [also] apply to 12 the Court to receive a Service Award of no more than Fifteen Thousand Dollars total 13 ($15,000).” (Id. § 3.4.1.) “The sum of all calculated amounts is expected to be $750,000, 14 after payment of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Award, and costs of the Settlement 15 Claims Administrator.”5 (Id. § 3.5.2.) 16 “The Settlement Claims Administrator shall prepare calculations to be approved by 17 the Parties, and the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed proportionately to all Class 18 Members based on the following terms and criteria: … Students who enrolled for online 19 only classes at the beginning of the Spring 2020 Semester, who paid no tuition or fees, or 20 who left USD prior to March 16, 2020, are not eligible to collect any proceeds. … The 21 remainder of the Net Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class Members on a prorated 22 basis based on a percentage of tuition and fees paid to USD during the Spring 2020 23 24 25 26 4 This section provides for the payment of “an additional” $1.4 million; however, the Court 27 is not certain from the context of the Settlement Agreement what this payment is “in addition” to. 28 5 1 Semester, taking into account any USD-funded amounts that did not require repayment.” 2 (Id. § 3.5.1.) 3 3. The Release 4 “Releasing Parties means Named Plaintiffs [and] those Class Members who do not 5 timely opt out of the Settlement Class ….” (Id. § 1.26.) “Released Parties means USD 6 ….” (Id. § 1.25.) 7 “Released Claims means any and all actual, potential, filed, known or unknown, 8 fixed or contingent, claimed or unclaimed, suspected or unsuspected, claims, demands, 9 liabilities, rights, causes of action, contracts or agreements, extra contractual claims, 10 damages, punitive, exemplary or multiplied damages, expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees and 11 or obligations … regarding USD’s actions, inactions, decisions, and/or indecisions with 12 respect to COVID-19 during the Spring 2020 Semester, including transitioning in-person 13 instruction, educational services, campus events, and other USD services to a remote 14 format during the Spring 2020 Semester, including but not limited to all claims that were 15 brought or could have been brought in the Action by Releasing Parties relating to any and 16 all of the Released Parties.” (Id. § 1.24.) 17 “Upon the Final Effective Date, the Releasing Parties … shall be deemed to have … 18 released, relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims.” (Id. § 3.6.1.) 19 4. Settlement Administration and Notice Procedures 20 “Settlement Claims Administrator means a qualified third-party administrator 21 agreed upon by the Parties and retained by Plaintiffs, including the following pre-approved 22 list: CPT Group, Epiq, Apex, and Simpluris.” (Id. § 1.28.) “The Settlement Claims 23 Administrator shall be paid out of the QSF.” (Id. § 2.1.1.) 24 The responsibilities of the Settlement Claims Administrator include, but are not 25 limited to, the following: “(i) printing and disseminating, via mail and/or e-mail to the 26

27 6 The Court notes that the subsections under Settlement Agreement § 3.5.1 are incorrectly 28 1 Settlement Class the Notice and Election Forms; … (v) promptly furnishing to counsel for 2 the Parties copies of any requests for exclusion, objections or other written or electronic 3 communications from each Class Member that the Settlement Claims Administrator 4 receives; (vi) receiving, retaining and reviewing the Election Forms submitted by each 5 Class Member; (vii) keeping track of requests for exclusion or objection, including 6 maintaining the original envelope in which the request or objection was mailed; (viii) 7 distributing the Settlement Checks to Class Members and/or Court-approved Costs and 8 Fees, as necessary; (ix) preparing, sending and/or wire-transferring Class Counsel’s 9 attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs; (x) mailing Service Award and Settlement Checks in 10 accordance with this Agreement and the Approval Order; … (xx) obtaining, administering, 11 and maintaining a settlement website; … and (xxii) such other tasks as the Parties mutually 12 agree.” (Id. § 2.1.2.) 13 5. Opt-Outs and Objections 14 “Class Members who elect to opt-out of the settlement as set forth in this Agreement 15 must mail … a written, signed statement to the Settlement Claims Administrator that states 16 he or she is opting out of the settlement (‘Opt-out Statement’).” (Doc. 220-5 [Settlement 17 Agreement] § 2.4.1.) “Any Class Member who does not timely submit an Opt-out 18 Statement pursuant to this Agreement will be deemed to have accepted the settlement and 19 the terms of this Agreement, will be bound by the Approval Order, and will have any and 20 all Released Class Claims released and dismissed with prejudice.” (Id. § 2.4.4.) 21 “Class Members who wish to present objections to the proposed settlement must do 22 so in writing …. To be considered, such statement must be mailed to the Settlement Claims 23 Administrator ….” (Id. § 2.5.1.) “Any Class Member who has elected to opt-out may not 24 submit objections to the settlement.” (Id. § 2.5.2.) 25 “[T]he Settlement Claims Administrator shall certify jointly to Class Counsel and 26 Defendant’s Counsel: (a) a list of all Class Members, (b) a list of all Objectors, (c) a list of 27 all Class Members who timely submitted an Opt-out Statement, and (d) an estimated 28 calculation of the Settlement Proceeds to Class Members ….” (Id. § 2.6.) 1 D. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing 2 After the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding certification of the class 3 defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement” (Doc. 221 at 4), Plaintiffs filed their 4 Supplemental Briefing (Doc. 228). In their Supplemental Briefing, Plaintiffs modified “the 5 Settlement Class definition to more accurately reflect the intention of the Parties[.]” (Id. 6 at 7.) The new Settlement Class is defined as follows: 7 All enrolled students at USD who paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, or who were credited with having paid such tuition and/or 8 Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020 term/semester, subject to the 9 seven exclusions set forth below. Those seven categories of individuals are excluded from the Settlement Class definition: (1) students who enrolled in 10 online-only classes at the beginning of the Spring 2020 semester, (2) students 11 who paid no tuition or fees (i.e., students who received more in scholarships or grants from USD than what was charges in tuition and/or Mandatory Fees), 12 (3) students who left or withdrew from USD prior to March 16, 2020, (4) any 13 District Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this Action and members of their families, (5) the defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parent companies, 14 successors, predecessors, and nay entity in which the Defendant or its parents 15 have controlling interest and their current or former officers, directors, agents, attorneys, and employees; (6) persons who properly execute and file a timely 16 request for exclusion; and (7) the legal representatives, successors or assigns 17 of any such excluded person. 18 (Id. at 7–8; Doc. 228-14.) Plaintiffs explain that the revised Settlement Class intends to 19 exclude “(1) students that enrolled in online-only classes to begin the semester, (2) students 20 that paid no tuition or fees (i.e., students on full scholarship by USD backed scholarships 21 or grants), and (3) students who left USD prior to March 16, 2020.” (Doc. 228 at 7.) 22 Plaintiffs then argue that the newly defined Settlement Class meets the requirements 23 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)–(4). (Id. at 8–19.) First, Plaintiffs calculate 24 that the proposed Settlement Class size is approximately 7,323, which satisfies the 25 numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1).7 (Id. at 11–13.) Second, Plaintiffs assert that 26

27 7 In making this argument, Plaintiffs appear to express frustration with having to use 28 1 Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is satisfied because Plaintiffs and the prospective 2 class members share a common claim—that they signed up and paid for in-person classes 3 but only received in-person classes for half of the Spring 2020 semester—as well as 4 common questions of fact and law—e.g., whether students were entitled to receive access 5 to in-person, campus-based educational services when they paid main campus tuition and 6 fees. (Id. at 13–14.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement 7 is satisfied because Plaintiffs claims are typical of the Settlement Class’s claims because, 8 among other things, the “[t]he implied-in-fact promise of in-person education is the same 9 for both Plaintiffs and the Class[,]” “Plaintiffs’ claimed breach is the same as the Settlement 10 Class’s claimed breach[,]” and Plaintiffs’ claimed damages are the same as the Settlement 11 Class’s claimed damages. (Id. at 14–16.) Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 23(a)(4)’s 12 adequacy requirement is satisfied because Plaintiffs’ counsel has decades of experience 13 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and Plaintiffs’ 14 counsel has demonstrated their commitment to this action by filing extensive briefing. (Id. 15 at 16–18.) Plaintiffs also assert that the Named Plaintiffs’ interests are in line with those 16 of the proposed Settlement Class and that each Named Plaintiff has demonstrated their 17 commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for depositions and before 18 the Court. (Id. at 18–19.) 19 Next, Plaintiffs argue that the newly defined Settlement Class meets the 20 predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). (Id. at 19–25.) First, 21 Plaintiffs assert that “the common issues (with common proof),” e.g. whether Defendant 22 promised the class members an in-person education and whether it breached that promise, 23

24 25 (“While the Parties had not anticipated needing to apply the Section 3.5.1 Exclusions at this stage of the action and had hoped to cost-effectively utilize the services of the third- 26 party Settlement Administrator—rather than Plaintiff’s expert or USD’s resources—the 27 Parties have conferred to determine ….”).) Plaintiffs’ frustration is not well taken given the Court’s obligation to evaluate class certification in light of the terms of the proposed 28 1 “‘are more prevalent or important’ that any individual issues.” (Id. at 20–21.) Second, 2 Plaintiffs contend that the “common proof” consists of the same standardized documents 3 and the same representations because Defendant cancelled in-person instruction for all 4 class members and retained the tuition paid by all class members. (Id. at 21–22.) Third, 5 Plaintiffs assert that they can calculate damages and distribute settlement proceeds on a 6 class-wide basis and that the presence of individualized damages cannot defeat class 7 certification. (Id. at 22– 24.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that there is no better method 8 available for adjudicating the claims. (Id. at 24–25.) 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 A. Class Certification—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)–(b) 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides, “[o]ne or more members of a class 12 may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class 13 is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [i.e., numerosity]; (2) there are 14 questions of law or fact common to the class [i.e., commonality]; (3) the claims or defenses 15 of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [i.e., 16 typicality]; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 17 of the class [i.e., adequacy].” 18 Relatedly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provides, “[a] class action may 19 be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: … the court finds that the questions of law 20 or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 21 members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 22 efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” “The matters pertinent to [Rule 23(b)(3)] 23 include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or 24 defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 25 controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 26 undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) 27 the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Id. 28 1 Rule 23(e) regarding class action settlements, discussed below (see Section II.B), 2 “was designed to function as an additional requirement [to Rule 23(a)–(b)], not a 3 superseding direction … Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether a 4 proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions 5 of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than 6 trial, is proposed.” Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 621 (internal citation omitted) 7 (emphasis added). Additionally, the terms of the proposed settlements are relevant to class 8 certification. Id. at 619. For example, “[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only 9 class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 10 intractable management problems … for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other 11 specifications of the Rule—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted 12 or overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the 13 settlement context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a 14 settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the 15 class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.” Id. at 620; see also Hanlon v. Chrysler 16 Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e must pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, 17 attention’ to class certification requirements in a settlement context.”). Thus, in deciding 18 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Court must first address whether Plaintiffs 19 have met the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a)–(b). The Court addresses 20 each requirement in turn. 21 1. Rule 23(a) 22 “Our threshold task is to ascertain whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the 23 requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to all class 24 actions, namely: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of 25 representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. “At the class certification stage, a court ‘is 26 required to examine the merits of an underlying claim … only inasmuch as it must 27 determine whether common questions exist; not to determine whether class members could 28 actually prevail on the merits of their claims.’” Arredondo v. Univ. of La Verne, 341 F.R.D. 1 47, 51 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 2 (9th Cir. 2011)). 3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the proposed Settlement Class 4 of “students at USD who paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, 5 or who were credited with having paid such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the 6 Spring 2020 term/semester” satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a). (Doc. 228 at 7.) See 7 e.g., In re Univ. of S. Cal. Tuition & Fees COVID-19 Refund Litig., 695 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 8 1154–1162 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (certifying contested class of more than 40,000 “students who 9 paid or were obligated to pay tuition, fees, or other costs to [t]he University of Southern 10 California for the Spring 2020 academic term.”); Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 50–55 11 (certifying contested class of approximately 2,787 undergraduate students that were 12 enrolled at University of La Verne during the spring 2020 semester). 13 a) Numerosity 14 “The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if ‘the class is so large that joinder of 15 all members is impracticable.’” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 23(a)(1)). Plaintiffs assert that the proposed Settlement Class size is approximately 7,323. 17 (See Doc. 228 at 11–13; see id., Ex. 6, Table 2.) The Court finds that the proposed class is 18 sufficiently numerous. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 51 (finding that a class size of 19 approximately 2,787 meets the numerosity requirement in a similar COVID tuition case); 20 In re Pepperdine Univ. Tuition & Fees Covid-19 Refund Litig., No. CV 20-4928-DMG 21 (KSx), 2023 WL 6373845, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2023) (“The proposed class contains 22 more than 7,000 class members. There is no dispute that numerosity is satisfied.”) (internal 23 citation omitted). 24 b) Commonality 25 Commonality is “the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions of 26 law or fact common to the class.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 27 (2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). “Commonality [also] requires the plaintiff to 28 demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury[.]’” Id. at 349–50 1 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “The commonality 2 preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule 3 23(b)(3).” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. 4 Here, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs and the prospective class members share a 5 common claim—that they signed up and paid for in-person classes but only received in- 6 person classes for half of the Spring 2020 semester—as well as common questions of fact 7 and law—e.g., whether students were entitled to receive access to in-person, campus-based 8 educational services when they paid main campus tuition and fees. (See Doc. 228 at 13– 9 14.) The Court also finds that the prospective class members have suffered the same 10 economic injury—the overpayment of tuition. Therefore, the commonality requirement 11 has been met. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 51 (identifying “several common questions 12 that are capable of ‘a common answer’ across the class” in a similar COVID-19 tuition 13 refund case) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352). 14 c) Typicality 15 Typicality requires a showing that “the claims or defenses of the representative 16 parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The 17 purpose of this requirement “‘is to assure that the interest[s] of the named representative[s] 18 align[] with the interests of the class.’” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 19 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 20 (9th Cir.1992)). “‘The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar 21 injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, 22 and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Id. 23 (quoting same). Typicality is a “permissive standard” and requires only that the 24 representative’s claims be “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; 25 they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 26 Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims are typical of the 27 Settlement Class’s claims because, among other things, the “[t]he implied-in-fact promise 28 of in-person education is the same for both Plaintiffs and the Class[,]” “Plaintiffs’ claimed 1 breach is the same as the Settlement Class’s claimed breach[,]” and Plaintiffs’ claimed 2 damages are the same as the Settlement Class’s claimed damages. (See Doc. 228 at 14– 3 16.) As the district court in In re University of Southern California Tuition and Fees Covid- 4 19 Refund Litigation explained, “there is no question that each USC student, and each 5 person in the United States, experienced the spring of 2020 in a different way. That does 6 not make their claim for a tuition refund atypical of the rest of the class. They paid the 7 same tuition and were subject to the same policies as the rest of the Proposed Class.” 695 8 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality 9 requirement. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 52 (finding “the harm, or lack thereof, caused 10 by restricting use of on-campus services is typical to the entire class” in a similar COVID- 11 19 tuition refund case). 12 d) Adequacy 13 “The named Plaintiffs must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 14 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 23(a)(4)). “To determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately represent a class, courts 16 must resolve two questions: ‘(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any 17 conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their 18 counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?’” Id. (quoting Hanlon, 150 19 F.3d at 1020). 20 Here, the Court agrees that both the Named Plaintiffs and their counsel have 21 demonstrated a commitment to pursuing this class action litigation. (See Doc. 228 at 16– 22 19.) Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel has decades of experience 23 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and Plaintiffs’ 24 counsel has demonstrated their commitment to this action by filing extensive briefing. (Id. 25 at 16–18.) Plaintiffs correctly note that Plaintiffs’ counsel has been appointed and 26 recognized as class counsel in other COVID-19 tuition and fee refund actions. (Id. at 17.) 27 See e.g., Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 54. The Court also agrees that the Named Plaintiffs’ 28 interests align with those of the proposed class members and that each Named Plaintiff has 1 demonstrated their commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for 2 depositions and settlement conferences. (Doc. 228 at 18–19.) Therefore, the Court finds 3 that the adequacy requirement has been met. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 52–53 (“[The 4 plaintiff] has already represented her willingness to vigorously prosecute the action 5 because she has sat for a deposition and worked with class counsel. … [C]lass counsel is 6 experienced and has decades of experience prosecuting class actions. … [The plaintiff] has 7 no conflicts with other class members. The Court accepts these representations as true 8 given the evidence supporting them. Thus, the proposed class satisfies the adequacy 9 requirement.”). 10 2. Rule 23 (b)(3) 11 As set forth above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires [1] that 12 “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 13 affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available 14 methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The Court addresses each 15 issue below. 16 a) Predominance 17 “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are 18 sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 19 U.S. at 623. “This calls upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the relation between 20 common and individual questions in a case. An individual question is one where ‘members 21 of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member,’ 22 while a common question is one where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each member to 23 make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’” 24 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein, 25 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp. 196–197 (5th ed. 2012)). “The predominance 26 inquiry ‘asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more 27 prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’” 28 Id. (quoting same). “When ‘one or more of the central issues in the action are common to 1 the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 2 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as 3 damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.’” Id. at 4 453–454 (quoting 7AA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 5 § 1778, pp. 123–124 (3d ed. 2005)). 6 As part of the predominance inquiry, “plaintiffs must show that ‘damages are 7 capable of measurement on a classwide basis,’ in the sense that the whole class suffered 8 damages traceable to the same injurious course of conduct underlying the plaintiffs’ legal 9 theory.” Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2017). “The presence of 10 individualized damages calculations, however, does not defeat predominance.” Ruiz 11 Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Leyva v. 12 Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013)). Thus, “‘Rule 23(b)(3)’s 13 predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a).’” Just Film, Inc., 847 14 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013)). 15 As set forth above (see Section II.A.1.b (discussing the commonality requirement of 16 Rule 23(a))), the Court finds that the class members share common claims and common 17 questions of fact and law and that the class members have suffered the same economic 18 injury. Additionally, the Court finds that these common issues require common proof, e.g., 19 the same documents and representations by Defendants, and are more prevalent and 20 important than any individual issues that could arise. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 21 demonstrated that damages can be calculated on a class-wide basis. In fact, the Settlement 22 Agreement accounts for the amount of tuition and fees paid by each individual student. It 23 provides: 24 Allocation. The Settlement Claims Administrator shall prepare calculations to be approved by the Parties, and the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed 25 proportionately to all Class Members based on the following terms and 26 criteria: 27 Students who enrolled for online only classes at the beginning of the Spring 2020 Semester, who paid no tuition or fees, or who left USD 28 1 prior to March 16, 2020, are not eligible to collect any proceeds. 2 The remainder of the Net Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class Members on a prorated basis based on a percentage of tuition and fees 3 paid to USD during the Spring 2020 Semester, taking into account any 4 USD funded amounts that did not require repayment. 5 (Settlement Agreement § 3.5.1 (emphasis added).) Therefore, the predominance 6 requirement has been met. 7 b) Superiority 8 The superiority inquiry “involves a comparative evaluation of alternative 9 mechanisms of dispute resolution.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. “In determining superiority 10 of a class action to individual litigation, courts consider the interests of the individual 11 members in controlling their own litigation, the desirability of concentrating the litigation 12 in the particular forum, and the manageability of the class action.” Ballard v. Equifax 13 Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 600 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 14 and Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615). “The purpose of the superiority requirement is 15 to assure that the class action is the most efficient and effective means of resolving the 16 controversy.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 17 2010) (quotation omitted). “Where recovery on an individual basis would be dwarfed by 18 the cost of litigating on an individual basis, this factor weighs in favor of class 19 certification.” Id. 20 Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that litigating this case in a single class action 21 will save time, effort, and expense, and allow for a uniform decision across the class. 22 Additionally, the Court agrees that, without this representative class action, it is unlikely 23 that the class members would be able to seek relief. The Court finds that “recovery on an 24 individual basis would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an individual basis[.]” Wolin, 25 617 F.3d at 1175 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the superiority requirement is met. 26 27 28 1 B. Preliminary Approval—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides, “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of 3 a certified class—or a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be 4 settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” There is a 5 “strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action 6 litigation is concerned[.]” In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 556 (9th 7 Cir. 2019) (quoting Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015)). 8 1. Rule 23(e)(2) 9 “If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a 10 hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering 11 whether: 12 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief 13 provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and 14 delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class- 15 member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, 16 including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably 17 relative to each other. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (emphasis added).8 Courts may also consider: 19 (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and 20 likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent 21 of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience 22 and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement. 23 24 25 26

27 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(3) states, “[t]he parties seeking approval must file 28 1 In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 2 Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir.2004)).9 For the reasons 3 set forth below, the Court finds that the aforementioned factors weigh in favor of 4 preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement. 5 First, Class Counsel and the Class Representatives have adequately represented the 6 Class throughout this litigation and in settlement negotiations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 23(e)(2)(A)–(B) (requiring courts to consider “the class representatives and class counsel 8 have adequately represented the class” and that “the proposal was negotiated at arm’s 9 length”); In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 946 (allowing courts to 10 consider “the experience and views of counsel”). Plaintiffs’ counsel has experience 11 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and has 12 demonstrated their commitment to this action by litigating this matter through the close of 13 discovery and filing extensive pre-trial motions. The Named Plaintiffs have similarly 14 demonstrated their commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for 15 depositions and settlement conferences. Additionally, the Court is persuaded that Class 16 Counsel negotiated the Settlement Agreement as arm’s length. The Settlement 17 Agreement’s provision for attorneys’ fees is not disproportionate to the Class award, and 18 any uncashed or unclaimed funds shall be distributed to scholarship and financial aid funds. 19 C.f. In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 947 (“[T]he settlement’s 20 provision for attorneys’ fees is apparently disproportionate to the class reward, which 21 includes no monetary distribution[.]”). 22 Second, the relief provided to the class is adequate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 23(e)(2)(C)(i)–(iv) (requiring courts to consider whether “the relief provided for the class 24 is adequate”); In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 946 (allowing courts 25 to consider “the strength of the plaintiff’s case;” “the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 26 27 28 9 1 duration of further litigation;” “the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the 2 trial;” and “the amount offered in settlement[.]”). The Settlement Agreement states that 3 “[t]he sum of all calculated amounts is expected to be $750,000, after payment of 4 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Award, and costs of the Settlement Claims 5 Administrator.” Considering the unlikelihood that class members would otherwise obtain 6 relief, particularly given the risks, costs, and uncertainties of litigation, a sum of $750,000 7 is adequate.10 8 Finally, the Settlement Agreement treats each member of the class equitably. See 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D) (requiring courts to consider whether the “proposal treats class 10 members equitably relative to each other”). The Settlement Agreement accounts for the 11 amount of tuition and fees paid by each individual student. It provides that “the Net 12 Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class Members on a prorated basis based on a 13 percentage of tuition and fees paid to USD during the Spring 2020 Semester, taking into 14 account any USD funded amounts that did not require repayment.” (Settlement Agreement 15 § 3.5.1 (emphasis added).) In other words, each class member’s payment is based on the 16 amount of tuition he or she paid in tuition and fees. The Court finds this equitable. 17 Based on the foregoing analysis of the relevant factors, and evaluating the Settlement 18 Agreement as a whole, the Court preliminarily finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, 19 reasonable, and adequate. Ruch v. AM Retail Grp., Inc., No. 14-cv-05352-MEJ, 2016 WL 20 1161453, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016) (“‘[I]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather 21 than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.’”) (quoting 22 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026). 23 24 25

26 27 10 As set forth above (see Section I.C.2), by the Court’s calculations, the total is expected to be $745,000, not $750,000. Whether the total recovery is $750,000 or $745,000, the 28 1 2. Rule 23(e)(1) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1) provides: “[t]he following procedures 3 apply to a proposed settlement …: 4 (1) Notice to the Class. (A) … The parties must provide the court with information sufficient to enable it to determine whether to give notice of the 5 proposal to the class. (B) … The court must direct notice in a reasonable 6 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal if giving notice is justified by the parties’ showing that the court will likely be able to: 7 (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for 8 purposes of judgment on the proposal.” 9 Relatedly, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides: 10 [U]pon ordering notice under Rule 23(e)(1) to a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement under Rule 23(b)(3)—the court must direct to class 11 members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 12 individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood 13 language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; 14 (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court 15 will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time 16 and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 18 Having carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Court finds 19 that it directs the best notice practicable in a “reasonable manner”—via physical mail or 20 email. (See Settlement Agreement §§ 1.5, 2.2.3, 2.3.5.) Likewise, having reviewed the 21 Proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Notice”) (see Tompkins Decl., ¶ 23, Ex. B; 22 Doc. 220-3), the Court finds that it clearly and concisely explains in plain English what 23 this lawsuit is about, why it is a class action, why there is a settlement, who is in the 24 settlement class, and what class members’ options are (see Doc. 220-3 at 3–6). For 25 example, the Notice informs potential class members how to “opt out” or “object” to the 26 Settlement. (Id. at 5–6.) The Notice also explains what rights class members give up if 27 they choose to join the Settlement. (Id. at 6.) 28 1 However, the Court also notes that, as with the Settlement Agreement, the Notice 2 must be updated to reflect the class definition set forth in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing. 3 (See id. at 2, WHY DID I GET THIS NOTICE?, ¶ 2; id. at 4, WHO IS IN THE 4 SETTLEMENT CLASS?.) Additionally, the Court notes that there is a grammatical error 5 at the beginning of the notice. (See id. at 2 (“If you are an enrolled students at USD who 6 paid ….”) (emphasis in original).) As written, the language wrongly implies that class 7 members must currently be enrolled at USD. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 In accordance with the Court’s guidance above, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to 10 submit revised versions of the proposed Settlement Agreement and the proposed Notice on 11 or before November 15, 2024. The revised documents must incorporate the class 12 definition set forth in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing and address any issues identified 13 by the Court above. 14 Subject to Plaintiffs’ compliant re-submission of the proposed Settlement 15 Agreement and the proposed Notice, the Court PRELIMINARILY APPROVES the 16 Settlement Agreement, including the exhibits attached thereto. The Court also 17 APPOINTS the Plaintiffs as the class representatives; APPOINTS Plaintiffs’ counsel— 18 Leeds Brown Law, P.C.; The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; The Golan Firm PLLC; Shegerian 19 & Associates, Inc.; and Francis Mailman Soumilas, P.C.—as class counsel; and 20 APPROVES the notice plan and forms of notice. 21 The Parties and the Settlement Claims Administrator shall comply with all the dates 22 and deadlines set forth in the proposed Settlement Agreement, including the following: 23 1. Pursuant to the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, “[w]ithin ten 24 (10) days of [the Court’s approval of the revised Settlement Agreement and Notice], 25 Defendant shall provide the Settlement Claims Administrator and Class Counsel with the 26 Class List to allow for the distribution of Notice in the manner described in [the proposed 27 Settlement Agreement], including via email and physical mailing, as necessary.” 28 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.1 (emphasis added).) 1 2. “Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Class List … the Settlement 2 Claims Administrator shall (l) email a copy of the Notice to all Class Members for whom 3 the Settlement Claims Administrator has a valid email address, then (2) shall wait seven 4 days for emails to be unopened or returned, and then (3) mail a copy of the Notice and 5 Election Form to all Class Members for whom the Settlement Claims Administrator does 6 not have a valid email address or an unopened email through regular U.S. Mail to such 7 students’ last known mailing address as listed in USD’s records (or as otherwise updated).” 8 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.2 (emphasis added).) 9 3. “The Notice Response Deadline for Election Forms shall be (i) thirty (30) 10 days from the date of the initial mailing … and (ii) an additional fifteen (15) days later for 11 any Class Members who were unable to file a timely Election Form, due to factors such as 12 change of address, military service, hospitalization, or other extraordinary circumstances.” 13 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.4 (emphasis added).) 14 4. “On the same date as initial mailing and/or e-mailing of Notices, notice shall 15 also be provided on a website at an available settlement URL including 16 https://www.USDTuitionFeeSettlement.com/, which shall be obtained, administered, and 17 maintained by the Settlement Claims Administrator.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.5 18 (emphasis added).) 19 5. “No later than thirty (30) days after the Notice Response Deadline, the 20 Settlement Claims Administrator shall certify jointly to Class Counsel and Defendant’s 21 Counsel: (a) a list of all Class Members, (b) a list of all Objectors, (c) a list of all Class 22 Members who timely submitted an Opt-out Statement, and (d) an estimated calculation of 23 the Settlement Proceeds to Class Members in accordance with [the terms of the Settlement 24 Agreement].” (Settlement Agreement § 2.6.2 (emphasis added).) 25 6. “No later than thirty (30) days after the Notice Response Deadline, or in 26 accordance with any orders set by the Court, Plaintiff shall move for Final Approval of the 27 Settlement, including dismissal of the claims with prejudice and approval of all procedures 28 1 || for effectuating the terms of the settlement.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.7.1 (emphasis 2 || added).) 3 7. The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing on March 3, 2025 at 9 a.m.. 4 8. “Within 15 days after Final Approval Order from the Court, the Settlement 5 ||Claims Administrator shall finalize calculations for allocation of the Settlement proceeds 6 || and provide a version to the Parties.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.7.2 (emphasis added).) 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || DATE: November 7, 2024 Rea ete 10 HON? RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 95