1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HALEY MARTINEZ, et al., Case No.: 3:20-cv-01946-RBM-VET
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 MOTION TO SEAL v.
14 UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO, [Doc. 226] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 On May 16, 2024, Plaintiffs Edgar Chavarria, Catherine Holden, and Matthew 19 Sheridan’s (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class 20 Action Settlement and Notice Plan (“Motion for Preliminary Approval”). (Doc. 220.) 21 On September 23, 2024, the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding 22 certification of the class defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement.” (Doc. 221 at 4.) 23 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Further 24 Support of Preliminary Approval (“Supplemental Briefing”). (Doc. 228.) 25 In conjunction with their Supplemental Briefing, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Motion to 26 File Under Seal (Doc. 226), the Declaration of Michael A. Tompkins, Esq. in Support of 27 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal (Doc. 226-1), and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion 28 to File Under Seal (Doc. 226-2) (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Seal”). 1 In their Motion to Seal, Plaintiffs move this Court for an order allowing them to file 2 documents that Defendant University of San Diego (“Defendant”) has marked confidential, 3 highly confidential, or attorneys’ eyes only under seal because they contain financial and 4 student information. (See Doc. 226 at 3; Doc. 226-1 at 5–6; Doc. 226-2 at 3.) Plaintiffs 5 argue that the “good cause” standard for sealing records governs their Motion to Seal 6 because “this matter concerns a discovery dispute presently pending before Judge Gallo[,]” 7 which “is not a dispositive motion.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) Plaintiffs argue that the Court 8 found “good cause” to file the confidential documents under seal when it granted the 9 parties’ protective order. (Id. at 6–7 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 10 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).) Plaintiffs add that “[o]ther exhibits are logical 11 extensions of Defendant’s prior confidential designations, including the deposition 12 transcript excerpts.” (Id. at 6.) 13 I. DISCUSSION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 16 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 17 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 18 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 19 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz, 20 331 F.3d at 1135). “The presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts … 21 to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the 22 administration of justice.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 23 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). 24 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 25 presumption of public access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this 26 burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more 27 than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. 28 When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the 1 “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does 2 not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 3 “Preliminary approval of a settlement is an issue more than tangentially related to 4 the merits of the case, and therefore the ‘compelling reasons’ standard applies.” Thomas 5 v. MagnaChip Semiconductor Corp., No. 14-cv-01160-JST, 2017 WL 4750628, at *4 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2017) (citing Kiersey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2013 WL 7 5609318, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (“[A] motion seeking the Court’s preliminary 8 approval of the settlement of the case may be effectively dispositive. … [T]he Court 9 concludes that the ‘compelling reasons’ standard is the appropriate standard.”)); Hefler v. 10 Wells Fargo & Co., No. 16-cv-05479-JST, 2018 WL 4207245, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 11 2018) (same). Similarly, “[b]ecause [a] Motion for Class Certification is more than 12 tangentially related to the merits of the case, the compelling reasons standard applies in 13 determining whether to grant [a related] Application to Seal.” Weisberg v. Takeda Pharms. 14 U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 18-784 PA (JCx), 2018 WL 6252458, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018). 15 The “compelling reasons” standard is generally satisfied if the moving party can 16 show that the “‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as 17 the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 18 statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 19 U.S. at 598). The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of 20 the trial court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 21 case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 22 Compelling reasons may exist to seal the personal information of putative class 23 members. See Mendell v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., No. 19-cv-01227-BAS-KSC, 2021 WL 24 778624, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding compelling reasons to seal putative class 25 members’ sensitive personal information, including personal identifying information and 26 health information); True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219- 27 HSG, 2022 WL 6584485, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2022) (finding compelling reasons to 28 seal subpoena responses containing personal identifying information of potential class 1 members, including phone numbers and specific information regarding customers’ 2 services). Compelling reasons may also exist to seal Defendant’s confidential financial 3 information. See Kessler v. Bishop, No. C 08-5554 PJH, 2011 WL 4635117, at *7 (N.D. 4 Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) (permitting the parties to stipulate to redaction of “any confidential 5 financial information about the University”). 6 B. Analysis 7 Plaintiffs first argue that the “good cause” standard for sealing records governs their 8 Motion to Seal because “this matter concerns a discovery dispute presently pending before 9 Judge Gallo[,]” which “is not a dispositive motion.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) However, this 10 matter does not concern a non-dispositive discovery dispute presently pending before 11 Judge Gallo, whom is no longer assigned to this case. (See Doc. 202.) This matter concerns 12 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval and Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing 13 regarding class certification, which trigger the “compelling reasons” standard. See 14 Thomas, 2017 WL 4750628, at *4; Kiersey, 2013 WL 5609318, at *2; Hefler, 2018 WL 15 4207245, at *7; Weisberg, 2018 WL 6252458, at *2. 16 Plaintiffs then argue that the exhibits they seek to seal were marked as confidential, 17 highly confidential, or attorneys’ eye only pursuant to the parties’ November 22, 2022 18 protective order (Doc. 66) and that the other exhibits Plaintiffs seek to seal are “are logical 19 extensions of Defendant’s prior confidential designations, including the deposition 20 transcript excerpts.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) However, under the “compelling reasons” 21 standard, “the presumption of [public] access is not rebutted where … documents subject 22 to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive motion.” Foltz, 23 331 F.3d at 1136.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HALEY MARTINEZ, et al., Case No.: 3:20-cv-01946-RBM-VET
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 13 MOTION TO SEAL v.
14 UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO, [Doc. 226] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 On May 16, 2024, Plaintiffs Edgar Chavarria, Catherine Holden, and Matthew 19 Sheridan’s (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class 20 Action Settlement and Notice Plan (“Motion for Preliminary Approval”). (Doc. 220.) 21 On September 23, 2024, the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding 22 certification of the class defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement.” (Doc. 221 at 4.) 23 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Further 24 Support of Preliminary Approval (“Supplemental Briefing”). (Doc. 228.) 25 In conjunction with their Supplemental Briefing, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Motion to 26 File Under Seal (Doc. 226), the Declaration of Michael A. Tompkins, Esq. in Support of 27 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal (Doc. 226-1), and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion 28 to File Under Seal (Doc. 226-2) (collectively referred to as Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Seal”). 1 In their Motion to Seal, Plaintiffs move this Court for an order allowing them to file 2 documents that Defendant University of San Diego (“Defendant”) has marked confidential, 3 highly confidential, or attorneys’ eyes only under seal because they contain financial and 4 student information. (See Doc. 226 at 3; Doc. 226-1 at 5–6; Doc. 226-2 at 3.) Plaintiffs 5 argue that the “good cause” standard for sealing records governs their Motion to Seal 6 because “this matter concerns a discovery dispute presently pending before Judge Gallo[,]” 7 which “is not a dispositive motion.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) Plaintiffs argue that the Court 8 found “good cause” to file the confidential documents under seal when it granted the 9 parties’ protective order. (Id. at 6–7 (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 10 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).) Plaintiffs add that “[o]ther exhibits are logical 11 extensions of Defendant’s prior confidential designations, including the deposition 12 transcript excerpts.” (Id. at 6.) 13 I. DISCUSSION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 16 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 17 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 18 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 19 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz, 20 331 F.3d at 1135). “The presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts … 21 to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the 22 administration of justice.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 23 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). 24 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 25 presumption of public access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this 26 burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more 27 than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. 28 When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the 1 “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does 2 not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 3 “Preliminary approval of a settlement is an issue more than tangentially related to 4 the merits of the case, and therefore the ‘compelling reasons’ standard applies.” Thomas 5 v. MagnaChip Semiconductor Corp., No. 14-cv-01160-JST, 2017 WL 4750628, at *4 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2017) (citing Kiersey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-01200-JST, 2013 WL 7 5609318, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (“[A] motion seeking the Court’s preliminary 8 approval of the settlement of the case may be effectively dispositive. … [T]he Court 9 concludes that the ‘compelling reasons’ standard is the appropriate standard.”)); Hefler v. 10 Wells Fargo & Co., No. 16-cv-05479-JST, 2018 WL 4207245, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 11 2018) (same). Similarly, “[b]ecause [a] Motion for Class Certification is more than 12 tangentially related to the merits of the case, the compelling reasons standard applies in 13 determining whether to grant [a related] Application to Seal.” Weisberg v. Takeda Pharms. 14 U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 18-784 PA (JCx), 2018 WL 6252458, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018). 15 The “compelling reasons” standard is generally satisfied if the moving party can 16 show that the “‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as 17 the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 18 statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 19 U.S. at 598). The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of 20 the trial court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 21 case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 22 Compelling reasons may exist to seal the personal information of putative class 23 members. See Mendell v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., No. 19-cv-01227-BAS-KSC, 2021 WL 24 778624, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding compelling reasons to seal putative class 25 members’ sensitive personal information, including personal identifying information and 26 health information); True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219- 27 HSG, 2022 WL 6584485, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2022) (finding compelling reasons to 28 seal subpoena responses containing personal identifying information of potential class 1 members, including phone numbers and specific information regarding customers’ 2 services). Compelling reasons may also exist to seal Defendant’s confidential financial 3 information. See Kessler v. Bishop, No. C 08-5554 PJH, 2011 WL 4635117, at *7 (N.D. 4 Cal. Oct. 5, 2011) (permitting the parties to stipulate to redaction of “any confidential 5 financial information about the University”). 6 B. Analysis 7 Plaintiffs first argue that the “good cause” standard for sealing records governs their 8 Motion to Seal because “this matter concerns a discovery dispute presently pending before 9 Judge Gallo[,]” which “is not a dispositive motion.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) However, this 10 matter does not concern a non-dispositive discovery dispute presently pending before 11 Judge Gallo, whom is no longer assigned to this case. (See Doc. 202.) This matter concerns 12 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval and Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing 13 regarding class certification, which trigger the “compelling reasons” standard. See 14 Thomas, 2017 WL 4750628, at *4; Kiersey, 2013 WL 5609318, at *2; Hefler, 2018 WL 15 4207245, at *7; Weisberg, 2018 WL 6252458, at *2. 16 Plaintiffs then argue that the exhibits they seek to seal were marked as confidential, 17 highly confidential, or attorneys’ eye only pursuant to the parties’ November 22, 2022 18 protective order (Doc. 66) and that the other exhibits Plaintiffs seek to seal are “are logical 19 extensions of Defendant’s prior confidential designations, including the deposition 20 transcript excerpts.” (Doc. 226-2 at 6.) However, under the “compelling reasons” 21 standard, “the presumption of [public] access is not rebutted where … documents subject 22 to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive motion.” Foltz, 23 331 F.3d at 1136. In other words, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the parties’ protective order is 24 insufficient. Additionally, Plaintiffs wrongly state that some of the exhibits lodged with 25 the Court were marked as attorneys’ eyes only and that the lodged exhibits include 26 deposition transcript excerpts. 27 Despite the significant substantive errors permeating Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal, the 28 Court finds “compelling reasons” to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal. First, the Court is not 1 ||inclined to publish the personal, financial, and enrollment information pertaining to 2 || unrepresented potential class members. See Mendell, 2021 WL 778624, at *4; True Health 3 || Chiropractic Inc., 2022 WL 6584485, at *2. Second, to the extent the lodged exhibits 4 ||reveal confidential financial information about Defendant, this information is also subject 5 ||to protection. See Kessler, 2011 WL 4635117, at *7. 6 IW. CONCLUSION 7 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal is GRANTED. The Court 8 || DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to file the lodged exhibits (Doc. 227) under seal. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 DATE: October 23, 2024 cele Mortage 2. D HON?’ RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28