Martinez v. New York Police Department

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 26, 2019·No. 1:19-cv-09885·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | . SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IAN CARLOS MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, NOV 2 6 2046 -against- 19-CV-9885 (AJN)

NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; ORDER OF SERVICE DAWIL VALDEZ, Shield 6573; OFFICER JOHN DOE, Defendants.

ALISON J. NATHAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who appears pro se, brings this action asserting that the defendants have violated his rights under both federal and state law. He sues the New York Police Department (“NYPD”), NYPD Officer Dawil Valdez, and another unidentified “John Doe” NYPD officer. The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law. By order dated November 22, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD as brought against the City of New York, dismisses Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD, and directs the Clerk of Court to add the City of New York as a defendant. The Court directs service on Valdez and the City of New York. And the Court directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to identify the John Doe defendant, his shield number, and the address where he may be served.

DISCUSSION A. NYPD The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD because an agency of the City of New York, like the NYPD, is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the NYPD with the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert. B. Service on Valdez and the City of New York Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all

process... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the Court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint on Valdez and the City of New York until the Court reviewed the complaint

and ordered that summonses be issued for those defendants. The Court therefore extends the time to serve Valdez and the City of New York until 90 days after the date that the summonses for those defendants are issued. If the complaint is not served on those defendants within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Valdez and the City of New York through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return forms (“USM-285 form”) for Valdez and the City of New York. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses for Valdez and the City of New York, and deliver to the Marshals Service all of the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service

on Valdez and the City of New York. Plaintiff must notify the Court if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss this action if Plaintiff fails to do so.

C. The John Doe Defendant Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying an unidentified defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the NYPD to fully identify the John Doe Defendant. The John Doe Defendant is a member of the NYPD who, with Valdez, handcuffed Plaintiff on October 22, 2016, at an apartment building located at 875 Columbus Avenue, New York, New York, and brought him to an NYPD precinct. The John Doe Defendant may be

assigned to the NYPD’s 24th Precinct. It is therefore ordered that the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, who is the attorney for and agent of the NYPD, must ascertain the full identity and shield number of the John Doe Defendant who Plaintiff seeks to sue here, as well as the address where the John Doe Defendant may be served. The Corporation Counsel must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this order. Within thirty days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the newly identified individual as defendant. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly named defendant. CONCLUSION The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with

an information package. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against the NYPD. The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to add the City of New York as a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The Court further directs the Clerk of Court to complete USM-285 forms with the service addresses for Defendants Valdez and the City of New York, and deliver all documents necessary to effect service on those defendants to the U.S. Marshals Service.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Jenkins v. City Of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)