Martinez v. Mendoza

595 F. Supp. 2d 923, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 2009 WL 268626
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 2, 2009
Docket4:08-cv-00021
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 595 F. Supp. 2d 923 (Martinez v. Mendoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martinez v. Mendoza, 595 F. Supp. 2d 923, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 2009 WL 268626 (N.D. Ind. 2009).

Opinion

ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Prove Default Damages filed on August 15, 2008 by plaintiffs, Crystal Rivas, Sindy Salazar, Adrian Martinez, and Siria Rivas (“plaintiffs”). (Docket No. 26). The latter two plaintiffs brought this suit against the Defendants both individually, and on behalf of the following minors: A.R., and J.G.R. III.

On October 10, 2008, default judgment was entered against Defendants Carlos and Perla Mendoza (“the Mendozas”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2) due to the fact that the Mendozas failed to enter an appearance or respond to the plaintiffs’ complaint in any way. (Docket No. 30). Plaintiffs now move this Court to enter an award of damages against the Mendozas for violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“the AWPA” or “the Act”).

I. Background

In support of their motion, plaintiffs represent numerous facts to the Court, out of which the following narrative emerges: On or about July 2006, plaintiffs traveled from Texas to Indiana for the purpose of performing agricultural work for the Mendo-zas. During their trip north, and for some time thereafter, plaintiffs were under the impression that they were working for the Mendozas. In fact, plaintiffs were working in fields owned by Remington Hybrid Seed Company, Inc., a defendant against whom this action was dismissed by stipulation of the parties on October 14, 2008. (Docket No. 29).

Nonetheless, plaintiffs allege that they were promised free transportation to Indiana by Carlos Mendoza and that he instructed each plaintiff as to where to meet the bus that would take them to their new job. Each plaintiffs deposition testimony concerning the trip from Texas to Indiana echoes that of plaintiff Adrian Martinez, who stated “The bus we migrants were transported to Indiana in was not safe. There were broken windows and the rain came in the bus through the broken windows. Also, the bus driver had us put all of the luggage in front of the emergency exits so they were blocked.” (Docket No. 36-2 at 2). Additionally, plaintiff *925 Sindy Salazar, who traveled to Indiana with her two children stated, “Because the bus was so full, my two children had to sit on the floor of the bus the entire trip.” (Docket No. 36-3 at 2).

Similarly, each plaintiff offers deposition testimony as to the “free accommodations” that were promised to each of them. Adrian Martinez states that he shared a room with three men to whom he was not related, and he slept on the floor. (Docket No, 36-2 at 2). Sindy Salazar stated that her two children “slept on the floor with blankets given to us by the migrant school,” and that the four remaining women in the room shared two beds. (Docket No. 36-3 at 2). Plaintiff Siria Rivas, who has brought suit on behalf of herself and her two minor children, was housed with her two children and her daughter, plaintiff Crystal Rivas. She states that the hotel room “smelled bad and the carpet was humid,” that there was no stove, as she had been promised, and that Carlos Mendoza told her that there had been a flood in the room a few weeks prior to their arrival. (Docket No. 36-4 at 2).

Additionally, when plaintiffs were paid by defendant Perla Mendoza, they claim that they were not given the $7.00 per hour that they had been promised by defendant Carlos Mendoza. For example Adrian Martinez, Siria Rivas, and Crystal Rivas each stated, “... they promised me I’d be paid by the hour when in reality, I was sometimes paid by the acre.” (Docket No. 36-2 at 2; 36-4 at 2; 36-5 at 2). Plaintiff Sindy Salazar, who was pregnant at the time, realized after she arrived in Indiana that she could not work in the fields due to the risk the chemicals used in the fields posed to her pregnancy. Despite prior reassurances from Carlos Mendoza that it would be safe for her to work in the fields, she was assigned to babysit the children of other migrant workers, a task she performed “approximately eleven (11) hours a day, seven days a week,” and for which she was not fully compensated. (Docket No. 36-3 at 3).

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs brought suit under the AWPA and now request statutory damages under the Act.

II. Discussion

The AWPA was adopted by Congress in 1983, replacing an earlier statute known as the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (“the FLCRA”). The two statutes were virtually identical, with the latter seeking to redress weaknesses in the implementation of the former.

The legislative purpose behind the AWPA was to improve conditions for migrant agricultural laborers who, Congress found, had “long been among the most exploited groups in the American labor force.” S.Rep. No. 93-1295, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6441, 6441-43. Thus, the AWPA provides a variety of protections for migrant workers, including the regulation of their housing and transportation, and requirements for written disclosures of working conditions. Some of the provisions of the AWPA-such as the requirement that all farm contractors be li-cenced by the Secretary of Agriculture— are quite technical in nature. See 29 U.S.C. § 1811(a). Other provisions — such as regulation of housing conditions-directly affect the working and living conditions of migrant workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 1823(a). Regardless of the type of violation, the AWPA provides migrant workers with a private right of action for each violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1854.

Moreover, since the AWPA is designed to be remedial in nature, courts may shape remedies that go beyond actual damages. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Benter Farms, 2000 WL 1372848, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13670 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 19, 2000) (citing Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, *926 1334 (11th Cir.1999) (“since the AWPA is a remedial statute, we must construe it broadly.”)); Calderon v. Witvoet, 764 F.Supp. 536, 544 (C.D.Ill.1991) (“Like Title VII, the AWPA is a remedial statute that allows the court to shape a remedy which may or may not include backpay or other money damages.”). Indeed, the AWPA provides for statutory damages of up to $500.00 per plaintiff per violation for willful violations of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1854. In awarding damages under the AWPA, courts are generally given much discretion. See, e.g., De Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc., 497 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir.2007) (“[i]t is within the district court’s discretion to award statutory damages where proof of actual damages is scarce.”); Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1332 (5th Cir.1985) (“A district court has discretion to fix the amount of the award.”).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Garcia Gutierrez v. Puentes
D. New Mexico, 2020

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
595 F. Supp. 2d 923, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8984, 2009 WL 268626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martinez-v-mendoza-innd-2009.