UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 6:22-cv-00171 Cristian Martinez et al., Plaintiffs, V. Anderson County, TX, et al., Defendants.
ORDER Plaintiffs filed this action asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. The magistrate judge issued a report rec- ommending that defendants’ motion to abstain be granted. Doc. 112. Plaintiffs filed written objections. Doc. 115. Defendants re- sponded to the objections. Doc. 117. The court reviews objected- to portions of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In this consolidated case, plaintiffs challenge pretrial, pre- conviction, non-refundable fees assessed for all individuals placed on pretrial bond supervision in criminal cases in Anderson County, Texas, including pretrial questionnaires as well as bond supervision and urinalysis fees. The court granted class certifica- tion and certified two classes: (1) a damages class of all persons who are or have been on pretrial bond supervision in Anderson County and charged bond supervision and/or urinalysis fees; and (2) an injunctive class of all persons who are or will be on pretrial bond supervision in Anderson County and charged bond supervi- sion and/or urinalysis fees. Docs. 83, 92. The Fifth Circuit recently applied the Younger abstention doc- trine in the context of challenges to state bail procedures. See Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 548 (2024). The Fifth Circuit—noting the sig- nificant number of cases “asking federal courts to judicially order and enforce state court bail reforms” —recognized that abstention
is particularly appropriate for interventions into state criminal procedures. Id. at 623. Younger abstention applies where: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an ade- quate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Id. at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot- ing Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012)). In their objections, plaintiffs argue that the motion to abstain was untimely, there is no ongoing state proceeding, the case does not involve judicially imposed fees, and there are no available state proceedings to challenge the bond conditions. Doc. 115. Plaintiffs also suggest that the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dis- missal is impermissible under Younger. Id. at 8. However, these objections ignore the report’s application of a case decided after Daves—Little v. Doguet, 71 F.4th 340 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1001 (2024). In Little, the Fifth Circuit applied its anal- ysis in Daves to class-action litigation challenging bail practices in a Louisiana parish. The court explained that its en banc decision in Daves “held that district courts must abstain from suits con- testing a local jurisdiction’s bail practices when there is an oppor- tunity in state court to present constitutional challenges to bail,” id. at 342, and there are “remedies available under state law to address bail,” id. at 345. Like the plaintiffs in Little, plaintiffs here seek injunctive relief aimed at providing procedural and substantive protections for all arrestees released on pretrial bond. Doc. 1 at 25–29. This satisfies the first condition of Younger abstention requiring interference with ongoing state proceedings—here, plaintiffs’ ongoing crimi- nal proceedings in which the challenged bond conditions and fees are employed. Id. at 346. The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs would require this court to indefinitely oversee these proceed- ings—and potentially even mandate procedural safeguards—to prevent the alleged “unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices” described in plaintiffs’ complaint. Doc. 1 at 28. Such intrusion seems incompatible with Younger, Daves, and Little.1 In addition, the fees at issue are part of the pretrial criminal procedure for arrestees released on bond. Daves did not narrowly limit the abstention doctrine to judicially set bail as argued by plaintiffs. Instead, the court explicitly determined that abstention applies to state criminal procedures. See Daves, 64 F.4th at 625. “[S]tates have a vital interest in regulating their pretrial criminal procedures including assessment of bail bonds.” Id. at 627 n.21; Little, 71 F.4th at 346. The supervision fees here also vindicate the state’s “compelling interest in assuring the presence at trial of persons charged with crime.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978). Finally, neither Daves nor Little requires an immediate oppor- tunity to litigate these claims within state proceedings. Instead, what is required is that there be “an opportunity to raise federal claims in the course of state proceedings.” Daves, 64 F.4th at 629. “[S]tate remedies are inadequate only where ‘state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Little, 71 F.4th at 347 (emphasis in original) (quoting Daves, 64 F.4th at 632). Here, Texas laws concerning state court procedures “‘do not clearly bar the raising of’ federal constitutional challenges to a state system.” Id. at 348 (quoting Daves, 64 F.4th at 633). To the contrary, defendants provide several examples where Texas courts in Fort Bend County have modified bond conditions. See Doc. 117 at 6–7 (citing State v. Thinh Vuong, No. 19-DCR-88504,
1 Plaintiffs cite three cases—two from the Fifth Circuit and one from the Su- preme Court—for the proposition that federal courts have previously considered challenges to pretrial fees. Doc. 115 at 11 (citing Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003); Enlow v. Tishmingo Cnty., 45 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1995); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)). However, all three opinions rejected these challenges on the merits and did not analyze the issue of abstention. These opin- ions thus do not suggest that abstention is inappropriate in cases involving pretrial fees, especially where the requested relief would disrupt ongoing state criminal proceedings. Notably, in none of these cases was the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court willing to permit federal injunctive oversight of state criminal pretrial pro- ceedings. 2020 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 4024 (400th Judicial District, Fort Bend County, April 8, 2020) (granting defendant’s motion to modify bond conditions by waiving pretrial service fees for a period of time and removing GPS monitor); State v. Ukwamedua, No. 18- DCR-080233, 2019 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 26009 (458th Judicial Dis- trict, Fort Bend County, June 24, 2019) (ordering that monthly monitoring fees only be assessed against defendant’s case rather than paid immediately); State v. Rosales, No. 18-DCR-082753, 2018 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 9070 (434th Judicial District, Fort Bend County, August 6, 2018) (suspending drug/alcohol testing re- quirement and related fees until further consideration); State v. Espinal, No. 19-DCR-088997, 2019 Tex. Dist.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 6:22-cv-00171 Cristian Martinez et al., Plaintiffs, V. Anderson County, TX, et al., Defendants.
ORDER Plaintiffs filed this action asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. The magistrate judge issued a report rec- ommending that defendants’ motion to abstain be granted. Doc. 112. Plaintiffs filed written objections. Doc. 115. Defendants re- sponded to the objections. Doc. 117. The court reviews objected- to portions of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In this consolidated case, plaintiffs challenge pretrial, pre- conviction, non-refundable fees assessed for all individuals placed on pretrial bond supervision in criminal cases in Anderson County, Texas, including pretrial questionnaires as well as bond supervision and urinalysis fees. The court granted class certifica- tion and certified two classes: (1) a damages class of all persons who are or have been on pretrial bond supervision in Anderson County and charged bond supervision and/or urinalysis fees; and (2) an injunctive class of all persons who are or will be on pretrial bond supervision in Anderson County and charged bond supervi- sion and/or urinalysis fees. Docs. 83, 92. The Fifth Circuit recently applied the Younger abstention doc- trine in the context of challenges to state bail procedures. See Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 548 (2024). The Fifth Circuit—noting the sig- nificant number of cases “asking federal courts to judicially order and enforce state court bail reforms” —recognized that abstention
is particularly appropriate for interventions into state criminal procedures. Id. at 623. Younger abstention applies where: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an ade- quate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Id. at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot- ing Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012)). In their objections, plaintiffs argue that the motion to abstain was untimely, there is no ongoing state proceeding, the case does not involve judicially imposed fees, and there are no available state proceedings to challenge the bond conditions. Doc. 115. Plaintiffs also suggest that the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dis- missal is impermissible under Younger. Id. at 8. However, these objections ignore the report’s application of a case decided after Daves—Little v. Doguet, 71 F.4th 340 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1001 (2024). In Little, the Fifth Circuit applied its anal- ysis in Daves to class-action litigation challenging bail practices in a Louisiana parish. The court explained that its en banc decision in Daves “held that district courts must abstain from suits con- testing a local jurisdiction’s bail practices when there is an oppor- tunity in state court to present constitutional challenges to bail,” id. at 342, and there are “remedies available under state law to address bail,” id. at 345. Like the plaintiffs in Little, plaintiffs here seek injunctive relief aimed at providing procedural and substantive protections for all arrestees released on pretrial bond. Doc. 1 at 25–29. This satisfies the first condition of Younger abstention requiring interference with ongoing state proceedings—here, plaintiffs’ ongoing crimi- nal proceedings in which the challenged bond conditions and fees are employed. Id. at 346. The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs would require this court to indefinitely oversee these proceed- ings—and potentially even mandate procedural safeguards—to prevent the alleged “unconstitutional and illegal policies and practices” described in plaintiffs’ complaint. Doc. 1 at 28. Such intrusion seems incompatible with Younger, Daves, and Little.1 In addition, the fees at issue are part of the pretrial criminal procedure for arrestees released on bond. Daves did not narrowly limit the abstention doctrine to judicially set bail as argued by plaintiffs. Instead, the court explicitly determined that abstention applies to state criminal procedures. See Daves, 64 F.4th at 625. “[S]tates have a vital interest in regulating their pretrial criminal procedures including assessment of bail bonds.” Id. at 627 n.21; Little, 71 F.4th at 346. The supervision fees here also vindicate the state’s “compelling interest in assuring the presence at trial of persons charged with crime.” Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978). Finally, neither Daves nor Little requires an immediate oppor- tunity to litigate these claims within state proceedings. Instead, what is required is that there be “an opportunity to raise federal claims in the course of state proceedings.” Daves, 64 F.4th at 629. “[S]tate remedies are inadequate only where ‘state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.’” Little, 71 F.4th at 347 (emphasis in original) (quoting Daves, 64 F.4th at 632). Here, Texas laws concerning state court procedures “‘do not clearly bar the raising of’ federal constitutional challenges to a state system.” Id. at 348 (quoting Daves, 64 F.4th at 633). To the contrary, defendants provide several examples where Texas courts in Fort Bend County have modified bond conditions. See Doc. 117 at 6–7 (citing State v. Thinh Vuong, No. 19-DCR-88504,
1 Plaintiffs cite three cases—two from the Fifth Circuit and one from the Su- preme Court—for the proposition that federal courts have previously considered challenges to pretrial fees. Doc. 115 at 11 (citing Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003); Enlow v. Tishmingo Cnty., 45 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 1995); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)). However, all three opinions rejected these challenges on the merits and did not analyze the issue of abstention. These opin- ions thus do not suggest that abstention is inappropriate in cases involving pretrial fees, especially where the requested relief would disrupt ongoing state criminal proceedings. Notably, in none of these cases was the Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court willing to permit federal injunctive oversight of state criminal pretrial pro- ceedings. 2020 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 4024 (400th Judicial District, Fort Bend County, April 8, 2020) (granting defendant’s motion to modify bond conditions by waiving pretrial service fees for a period of time and removing GPS monitor); State v. Ukwamedua, No. 18- DCR-080233, 2019 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 26009 (458th Judicial Dis- trict, Fort Bend County, June 24, 2019) (ordering that monthly monitoring fees only be assessed against defendant’s case rather than paid immediately); State v. Rosales, No. 18-DCR-082753, 2018 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 9070 (434th Judicial District, Fort Bend County, August 6, 2018) (suspending drug/alcohol testing re- quirement and related fees until further consideration); State v. Espinal, No. 19-DCR-088997, 2019 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 25611 (400th Judicial District, Fort Bend County, October 14, 2019) (re- lieving defendant of drug/alcohol testing requirement and associ- ated County Community Supervision and Corrections Depart- ment fees)). Defendants point out that these cases feature underlying court orders setting bond conditions, as opposed to the supervision fees in this case, which are determined by the Anderson County Com- munity Bond Supervision Office. However, the Texas cases above also include judicial modification of fees not set by court order but by the Fort Bend County Community Supervision and Correc- tions Department. Even if this were not the case, the bond condi- tions form here appears to be signed by a state judge and requires plaintiffs to report to the Anderson County Bond Office and pay for randomized drug testing. Docs. 90-5 at 9–10, 90-6 at 6. It is unclear to this court why plaintiffs seem unwilling to petition the state court for modification of these conditions to waive any fees that they may find overly burdensome or otherwise objectionable. As recognized in Daves, the Texas Code of Criminal Proce- dure also provides an avenue for collateral relief “[w]here a person has been committed to custody for failing to enter into bond.” Tex. Code. Crim. P. art. 11.24. Plaintiffs argue that this would not apply to the fees at issue. However, they fail to make any showing that Texas detainees have been imprisoned for similar fee nonpayment and subsequently denied relief under this provision. Absent Texas court precedent denying such relief, the court is unable to con- clude that habeas review of bond conditions is clearly barred by Texas law. At the very least, there has been no showing that Texas law clearly bars Texas courts from considering constitutional chal- lenges to bond supervision, including conditions imposed as a part of that bond supervision. All three conditions for Younger abstention are met, no excep- tions to Younger apply,2 and abstention is appropriate. Accord- ingly, “[t]he abstention doctrine applied in Daves requires that [this court] decline to exercise jurisdiction” over plaintiff’s claims. Little, 71 F.4th at 345. The recent decisions in Daves and Little, emphasizing the importance of abstention considerations for interventions into state criminal procedures, warrant recon- sideration of this court’s prior order denying abstention, see Per- kins v. Anderson Cnty., No. 6:20-cv-00076, ECF 53 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021), and overcome any timeliness concerns raised by plaintiffs. Turning to the proper disposition of this case given absten- tion, dismissal is appropriate where Younger applies to claims for injunctive relief. See Boyd v. Farrin, 575 F. App’x 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (holding that plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief “must be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doc- trine”). On the other hand, this court acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit has generally “held that Younger is not applicable to claims for damages.” Id. (citing Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994)). However, the Fifth Circuit has qualified this gen- eral rule, recognizing that, if Younger does apply to a damages claim, “the proper course of action is for a district court to stay the claims for damages pending the outcome of the state
2 Defendants initially raised the irreparable-injury exception, see DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176–77 (5th Cir. 1984), but did not object to the report’s conclusion that “a delay in the ability to raise a constitutional challenge to bond conditions, resulting in cost, anxiety, and inconvenience, does not create an irrep- arable injury.” Doc. 112 at 7. The court finds no clear error in this conclusion. proceedings.” Id. (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988)). The Supreme Court has also noted that abstention prin- ciples are “not . . . completely inapplicable in damages actions.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996). This is particularly true where a damages award may “interfere with or pre-empt the progress of state criminal proceedings.” Deakins, 484 U.S. at 208 (White, J., concurring). The damages requested here prompt such federalism and comity concerns as would justify applying Younger abstention. Plaintiffs seek “[a] judgment compensating Plaintiffs and the Classes of similarly-situated individuals for the damages that they suffered as a result of Defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct, specifically all sums paid to the Bond Office.”3 Doc. 1 at 28. The damages class includes all persons who are or have been on pretrial bond supervision in Anderson County and charged bond supervision and/or urinalysis fees. Doc. 22 at 7. This class thus likely includes numerous individuals who are currently the subject of state criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs would have this court order repayment of fees that are being collected as part of these proceedings. In so doing, this court would necessarily have to determine the constitutionality of various aspects of Anderson County’s bond conditions and pro- cedures. Indeed, if abstention does not apply in such situations, Younger and Daves would essentially be a dead letter as ar- restees—foreclosed from equitable relief—could still force a “federal audit of state criminal proceedings” by asking federal courts to comb through criminal pre-trial supervision fee deter- minations in ongoing criminal cases, searching for constitutional error that could justify repayment. Daves, 64 F.4th at 631. When an individual brings a common-law damages claim as to which a federal court must abstain, a stay pending completion of the related state proceedings is generally appropriate. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730–31. But Quackenbush “left open the
3 Plaintiffs identify the relevant time period as fees paid on or after February 14, 2018. Doc. 83 at 12. question of how abstention principles might be extended to grant federal courts power to dismiss other damages actions.” Casa Bella Luna, LLC »v. Gov’t of U.S. Virgin Islands, No. 3:22-cv- 00015, 2024 WL 4347767, at *8 n.12 (D.V.I. Sept. 30, 2024). And unlike in Quackenbush, this case is not a common-law action for damages but rather an action alleging an unconstitutional applica- tion of Texas’s statutorily authorized scheme for imposing fees for supervision upon pretrial bond release. As such, any award of damages turns first on a declaration that the government violated constitutional rights. And the Supreme Court has upheld the dis- missal of actions as to which federal courts must abstain because the recovery of damages would first require a declaration or de- termination of the unconstitutionality of a state action. Fair As- sessment in Real Est. Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115 (1981); see Casa Bella, 2024 WL 4347767, at *8 n.12. Moreover, Quackenbush is further distinguishable because plaintiffs brought and obtained certification of this case as a class action. As a result, there is no single or readily identifiable under- lying state court proceeding whose completion would serve as an endpoint for a stay of this federal action. Nor did plaintiffs seek to cure this issue by conditionally moving to decertify the damages class in the face of defendants’ motion to abstain. The court thus concludes that the damages claim at issue here should also be dis- missed based on abstention principles. * OK OK The court grants the motion to abstain, overrules plaintiffs’ objections, accepts the magistrate judge’s findings and recom- mendation, and dismisses this case without prejudice. Any pend- ing motions are denied as moot. So ordered by the court on February 20, 2025.
j! (nL BARKER United States District Judge
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