Browning, President:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Mercer County perpetually enjoining the defendants Williams and Othling from “conducting, operating and maintaining at its present location the used car sale business described in the pleadings and the evidence; and it is further adjudged, ordered and decreed that said defendants shall, within thirty days from the date of entering the decree, remove from said tract or parcel of land all automobiles, trucks, light poles, wires, lights, equipment, installations and structures used by them in the conduct of the used car sales business.”
The property of the defendants consists of an 11.75 acre tract fronting 312.6 along the south line of a portion of U. S. Routes 21 and 52, known locally as the Cumberland Road. The northern line of the Cumberland Road is also the southern corporate limit of the City of Bluefield. The plaintiffs Martin and Lilly reside on the northern side of the road, within the corporate limits, and in an area zoned by the City of Bluefield as residential, Martin directly opposite a portion of the frontage of the defendants, and Lilly the second lot to the east of Martin. The plaintiffs Doak, Moyer and Richardson live on the southern side of the road, Doak adjoining the land of defendants to the west, and Moyer adjoining the land of defendants to the east. Richardson adjoins Moyer to the east. All land lying on the southern side of the road is without the corporate limits of [597]*597Bluefield, and, of course, not zoned for any purpose, and no restrictions are contained in the deeds thereto. The plaintiff Richardson built his home in 1923, and, at the present time, has “considerably more than $50,000.00.” invested in it; Doak, in 1946-47, more than $40,000.00; Lilly, 1948, Martin, 1949, $18,500.00; and Moyer, 1950-51, $48,400.00.
Prior to 1953, there were no businesses located along the south side of the road from the intersection of Cumberland Road with Bland Road, to the east, to the intersection with Jefferson Drive to the west, a distance of approximately 1,000 feet and the area in which the plaintiffs and defendants have their properties. However, there was a small grocery store just to the east of Bland Road, and farther on, approximately a mile, a motel. To the west there was a group of business establishments at the intersection of Cumberland Road and Washington Street, approximately 300 feet west of Jefferson Drive. Farther west are located several farms which, from aerial photographs, have fine homes and well tended acreages. Due to the topography, none of the business establishments in either direction were visible from the properties of the plaintiffs, with perhaps the exception of Doak. Cumberland Road is heavily travelled, approximately 3,000 vehicles a day, and there is evidence that other business establishments and a new high school are contemplated along the southern side of the road within a mile on either side of the plaintiffs.
Defendant Williams, after a long search for a suitable site on which to expand his automobile business, acquired his land from one Matz in 1953. Matz had acquired the land from one Peters, who had offered to sell to some of the plaintiffs. Matz, prior to Moyer’s building his home, had conveyed to him the information, directly or indirectly, that he had acquired the land for business purposes, having in mind a motel, and offered to either sell that land or buy Moyer’s land, which offer was declined.
[598]*598After acquiring the land from Matz, defendants proceeded to install a “used car lot” on the front portion of the property. A small office was built, painted a vivid yellow and vermillion, three parallel strings, of approximately 100 bulbs each, of electric lights were suspended at a height of approximately 15 feet, a canopy sufficient for one automobile to be placed thereunder, and an advertising banner and streamers were placed on the lot. As described by one witness, it was a “typical, well-kept used car lot”, and, by another, that it had a “garish, carnival atmosphere.” The lot was open from 8:30 A. M. to 8:30 P. M., Monday through Saturday, and from 12:30 until 8:30 P. M. on Sunday. The 8:30 closing hours fluctuated with the presence or absence of customers on the lot.
Plaintiffs testified that the strings of lights, which were kept on until approximately 9:00 P. M., after which one half of the back row of lights were kept burning, lighted up their yards and porches, and in some instances the inside of their dwellings, including the bedrooms, and greatly interfered with, if not destroying, their use and enjoyment of their properties; that the noises, incident to raising and lowering of automobile hoods, testing of brakes, voices of customers and employees (in two instances profanity) ; the unsightliness of some of the merchandise; the attendant incidents of such a business depreciated the values of the properties some 50% in most instances, and slightly less in regard to the Doak and Lilly properties; and constitutes a nuisance. The plaintiffs, while varying as to resentment of various types of business which might be established on the lot, concur in their abhorrence of the used car business, and, generally, would resent the properties’ use for anything other than residential purposes.
Defendants, during the pendency of the suit, installed hooded flood lights for the purpose of all night lighting, which lights are directed down into the lot, and cast no [599]*599light on plaintiffs’ properties. However, since there is no testimony that the string lights were removed, it may be presumed that they are still burned until approximately 9:00 P. M. Defendants also minimize any noise that results from the conduct of the business, and state that it is small in comparison to the noise normally arising from the highway in front of plaintiffs’ properties. Defendant Williams maintained a table showing the number of people visiting the lot during a twenty day test period which shows that the maximum number of people in one day was 65, the minimum, 11; the daily average, 30, and the hourly average 11. He further stated that the present use as a used car lot is temporary, that he contemplates erecting a modern new car showroom and office with service building, and, perhaps erecting a shopping center in the central part of the property. Testimony was offered in his behalf that this area was an excellent business location, and, as heretofore mentioned, other businesses have acquired or are attempting to acquire property along the southern edge of Cumberland Road.
The court found that the used car business in this area constitutes a nuisance, and granted the injunction above quoted. The operation of a used car lot is a lawful business, and, as a general rule, it cannot be a nuisance per se. However, from the circumstances surrounding its location and operation, it may become, a nuisance per accidens or a nuisance in fact. The threshold question for determination then is whether the trial chancellor was justified from this record in holding that the defendants’ used car lot was placed in an exclusive residential area. Much of the hundreds of pages of testimony taken, and many of the scores of exhibits and photographs introduced as evidence, are directed to that question. The distances estimated in the testimony and the contentions with regard thereto in briefs of counsel do not clearly show the proximity of certain business establishments situated on the south side of Cumberland Road, and their proximity to the area in question.
[600]*600Defendants’ Exhibit No. 1, prepared by Elmer C. Barton, Civil Engineer, on February 3, 1954, showing the entire City of Bluefield, and the location of the residences, business establishments and vacant areas south of Cumberland Road, is revealing. Beginning at a point approximately one mile east of the used car lot, there is a motel, and between the motel and the used car lot, there is only one business establishment, that being a one story brick building, the Henderson Grocery Store, which is approximately 600 feet east of the nearest residence of the plaintiffs. Continuing along Cumberland Road toward the west beyond the used car lot, the next business establishment is a two story asbestos shingle building operated as a grocery store by a man named Burton. That store is approximately 350 feet west of the nearest residence of plaintiffs. The Burton Grocery Store and a gasoline service station are on or near the southeast corner of Cumberland Road and Bland Road. Route 52 turns south at this point along Bland Road, and in close proximity to Cumberland Road there are several business establishments, such as a plumbing company, an electrical shop, a laboratory, an apartment building and a cinder block building in which is operated “Slaughter’s Garage”. As heretofore stated, because of the topography of the area, none of these establishments can be seen from the residences of any of the plaintiffs, with the possible exception of the Doak property, and noises emanating therefrom cannot be heard by any of the plaintiffs where they reside. Continuing west on Cumberland Road, there is located on the Cal-fee estate, approximately one mile west of the used car lot, an establishment described as a “Drive-In Restaurant”, known as the “Beacon”, and a short distance west of the Beacon, there is a substation of the Appalachian Electric Power Company. There are no other business or commercial establishments between the substation and the West Virginia-Virginia State line, which constitutes the western limits of the City of Bluefield. Beginning a few hundred feet west of the Bland Road - Washington Street intersection, and continuing east to the motel, [601]*601there are thirty-one residences, and many vacant lots or tracts of land south of Cumberland Road. The trial chancellor confined his holding to the area between the intersection of Bland Road with Cumberland Road and the Jefferson Drive-Cumber land Road intersection, a distance of approximately 1,250 feet, in which lies the used car lot and the residences of the plaintiffs, as well as other residences both on the north and the south sides of Cumberland Road. There was sufficient evidence before the trial chancellor to justify his finding that the defendants placed their used car lot in an exclusive residential district.
The plaintiffs alleged in their bill, and by their evidence attempted to prove, that the manner of operation of the used car lot was such as to constitute a nuisance because of the effect of the lights, noises, unsightliness of the lot, and the resulting diminution in value of their properties. Since the determination of the questions presented depends upon the facts, it becomes necessary to relate some of the evidence.
Plaintiff Richardson stated that: “***-- so we have been driven off our west porch. In.the front yard there is nothing between us and this used car lot, and the high illumination from all of those lights is so strong that you can read a newspaper in my front yard, and certainly that destroys any sense of privacy that might exist about a home and is an unwelcome intrusion.” He testified further that the lights did not bother his family inside their home, but that the brilliance of the lights was such that it was a strain on a person’s eyes to face them. He said: “To be sure — you wouldn’t sit and face them.” He further testified as to the reduction in value of his property as a result of the establishment of the lot.
The plaintiff M. R. Moyer stated: “* * * the whole thing, as a matter of fact, is just about as hideous in my opinion, as any one would care to look upon.” The witness further described the “unsightly truck bodies” upon the lot near his premises, and, with reference to [602]*602the lights, stated: “Now, in our home the lights flood our living room; they flood our library to the extent that it’s necessary that we keep our draperies in that room drawn. They flood our dining room, and, to a degree, our kitchen. From the rear of the home the sleeping area and the entire back part of the mountain is just almost as light as day. * * *” He stated that after nine o’clock P. M., there was usually only one strand of lights burning during the remainder of the night, but that there had been two recent exceptions when there was “great business going on in the business hut, and they were on until after 10:00 o’clock all over the lot.” He further stated that there was “* * * a constant racing of cars around there, on a gravel terrain, and anyone with any experience certainly can comprehend what that does to one’s surroundings.” His testimony was to the effect that business was conducted on the lot on Sundays beginning at approximately 12:00 o’clock noon.
Goldie Moyer, one of the plaintiffs and the wife of M. E. Moyer, testified as to the lights as follows: “Well, in the first place, it has ruined the privacy of my living room. It has ruined the privacy of my front yard. It has ruined the privacy of my side porch. It has ruined the privacy of my terrace, and it has almost ruined the privacy of my bedroom. We can’t draw the curtains because we have to have a little air at night, & the whole back yard is flooded with light from the bright lights, his back lights. He leaves them on, of course, all the time — all night long.” “* * * As I said, it has ruined the privacy of the whole house unless I go to the bathroom and close the door and pull the shades down.” She further described the noise from the lot by men talking in a loud tone of voice, “racing of motors — they do that a lot, and it’s terrible — and lifting up hoods and slamming them down.” She stated, in answer to the question as to how the enjoyment of her home had been affected, that: “It has ruined it.” When asked if she was a woman of normal sensibilities, Mrs. Moyer stated: [603]*603“I certainly am. I taught school for twenty years, and I feel if you teach school that long, you’re pretty normal.”
Lillian Lilly, wife of Robert C. Lilly, whose residence is directly across the road from the Moyer residence, stated that the operation of the lot interfered with the “comfort and enjoyment” of their residence, and further stated: “You don’t like to get out in your yard with all that racket and the bright lights.” She was asked if the lights affected “the eyes in any way”, and stated: “Well, there is some glare.” She further testified that the lot was a very busy place on Sunday, and that it was kept open for business on Sunday evening until “About eight or nine.”
Carl V. Martin, another plaintiff, testified that: “One of the main features besides the lights is that people come there, sometimes children and sometimes not, and throw paper cups and napkins into our yard, and it necessitates a continuous picking up.” He stated that: “We only have one bedroom that the light shines in. That’s on the west side. But our porch — you don’t like to sit out there. It’s bright as daylight.” With reference to the noise, he stated: “Well, opening and closing car doors and slamming down the hoods and pulling in there and putting on the brakes and sliding on the gravel. Lots of times there’s loud talking.” He was further asked about “the sign and the canopy and the little hut”, and stated: “* * * it has a carnival appearance, pretty gaudy colors; then at night when the wind blows those lights, they move, and you catch your head going this way and that way. We keep our blinds closed and our front door closed on account of them.” This witness, whose residence is within the corporate limits of the City of Blue-field, stated that since 1948 there had been ten or twelve residences erected within three or four hundred feet of his property.
Eva Martin, another plaintiff, whose residence is directly across the road from the lot, stated: “Well, I think it’s objectionable in every way. You can’t lie [604]*604down to take a little nap. Now, I had been sick for a good, long while, and Sunday afternoon I thought I’d sleep a little. The cars were pulling in and out there the whole time, brakes being put on, hoods raising and lowering — you couldn’t rest for the noise. I think Sunday was about one of the worst days I have ever seen there.” She stated that: “* * * we pick up trash constantly. * * * ”, which is blown from the lot into her yard. She also testified that: “* * * I have seen cars up there where it would be congested, and the cars couldn’t get by, and they have turned around through our circular driveway — right in my driveway — came in this way and went out that way.” With reference to the lights, she stated: “* * * Now, our front door has four little panes about like this (indicating). I take a towel each night and put adhesive tape on each corner and cover that. I have to, because I couldn’t even sleep with the glare in there. I have a mirror that that light reflects right on — that light.” She also stated that: “* * * We can’t sit on our porch any more.” Prior to the establishment of the used car business, the witness stated that there was no business establishment within view of her home.
The plaintiff C. W. Doak did not testify, he being in bad health and away from the City of Bluefield at the time depositions were taken, but his son, Earl Doak, stated that his father’s property was adversely affected by the lights. He testified that: “All of Mr. Doak’s bedrooms are on that side where the lights are on, and they shine in those windows. Mr. Cousins has put up draw drapes, and they always had Venetian there before.”
Several witnesses who were engaged in the real estate business in the City of Bluefield, and others qualified as appraisers of real property values in that area, testified as to the substantial reduction in the value of the plaintiffs’ properties, as a result of the establishment of the used car lot in close proximity thereto. J. S. Hall, who stated that he had been in the real estate business in [605]*605the City of Bluefield for approximately fifty years, testified as to the area lying between Jefferson Street and Jefferson Drive on the west, and Bland Road where it intersects with Cumberland Road on the east, prior to the establishment of the used car lot, that: “* * * it was a high-class neighborhood, and until this sales lot was opened out there, it was exclusively residential.” He further stated that it was “desirable for residential purposes.”
As heretofore stated, the defendants no longer kept the rear strand of lights burning after business hours, approximately 9 P. M., but it is not clear whether that precaution was taken before or after the testimony of the plaintiffs had been introduced. Thereafter, hooded flood lights were installed for the purpose of night lighting after closing hours.
The Legislature has given authority to cities and towns of this State to establish residential areas by zoning ordinances, but it has not adopted legislation in this regard in unincorporated areas, although some states have done so. Since there is no legislation to the contrary, the common law remains in effect. It has long been established that courts of equity may, in a proper case, abate a private nuisance. Mandatory injunctions are awarded for the abatement of nuisances more frequently than for other purposes. Lyons v. Viglianco, 122 W. Va. 257, 8 S. E. 2d. 801.
Although this Court has considered the question of private nuisances upon many occasions, and the cases elsewhere are innumerable, we find few in which the sole question at issue was the casting of lights upon another person's premises. In The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corporation, 95 N. J. Eq. 188, 122 A. 749, an injunction was issued prohibiting the use after midnight of an electric sign which cast light on plaintiff’s hotel in such a manner that the light shone directly into the bedrooms of the hotel, thereby lowering their value as such. No other factor but light was involved in that case,
[606]*606There are numerous nuisance cases where artificial light was cast upon the premises of another, by the operation of gasoline service stations, playgrounds, circuses, athletic events, et cetera, but it is not clear from many of the decisions whether relief was granted upon that ground alone, or whether other elements of nuisance contributed to the final adjudication of the case. 5 A.L.R. 2d 705, under the annotation “Casting of light on another’s premises as constituting actionable wrong.”; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, P. 323, et seq.; 66 C. J. S., Nuisances, §8; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 28A, Nuisance Per Accidens, Page 744.
In Snyder et al. v. Cabell, et al., 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S. E. 241, occupants of dwelling houses sought to enjoin the defendants from operating a skating rink situate near the residences of plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed the bill, but this Court reinstated the original temporary injunction, and made it perpetual. The Court, in the opinion, said: “* * * We base the propriety of the injunction on the noise alone.” The 5th syllabus point reads as follows: “Where the prosecution of a business in itself lawful in the neighborhood of a dwelling-house renders the occupation of it materially uncomfortable by noises alone, the carrying on of such business, while it produces such results, will be restrained by a court of equity.”
In Powell v. Bentley & Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S. E. 1085, plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from the operation of a furniture factory on the ground that it was a nuisance to the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his nearby lot and dwelling house. Plaintiff subsequently instituted an action of trespass on the case for damages, which action at law was pending in the same court when the decree enjoining the operation of the factory was pronounced. The Court said: “On the question of nuisance, the evidence is conflicting; at any rate the plaintiff does not put his case high and dry, above all ground of fair questioning. There is enough perhaps for the chancellor to have directed an [607]*607issue. But this issue the plaintiff by his suit at law has already brought on and made up. Under such a conflict of evidence, the suit at law should have been tried first. * * *” The factory had been erected at a cost of $30,-000.00, and employed more than sixty people. This Court also found that the plaintiff and his witnesses “seem to be, by reason of ill health or by nature, rather supersensitive to such things.”
In Ritz, et al., v. The Woman’s Club of Charleston, 114 W. Va. 675, 178 S. E. 564, this Court affirmed a decree of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County finding that dances conducted at the clubhouse of the defendant, in a residential district of the City of Charleston, were a nuisance, and enjoining their continuation after nine o’clock at night. The first syllabus point states: “Noise alone may create a nuisance, depending on time, locality and degree.”
The cases from other jurisdictions upon this phase of the issue are so numerous that it would serve no good purpose to attempt to discuss them in detail. Suffice to say that, like all of the other cases involving injunctive relief against nuisances, each was decided upon its particular facts, and the facts of no two such cases are identical. 14 M. J., Nuisances, §8; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, P. 323, et seq., 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, P. 781, et seq.; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 28A, Page 669.
In considering the aesthetic aspects of this cause, we have given careful consideration to three decisions of this Court. In Fruth, et al., Trustees, Etc. v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105, the 3rd. syllabus point reads as follows: “An ordinance of a municipal corporation ordained pursuant to a provision of its charter authorizing it, establishing a building line on a certain street, and inhibiting abutting owners from encroaching thereon, based on merely aesthetic considerations, is not within the police power, and is unenforceable as a police regulation.” In State ex rel. Nunley v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Montgomery, 94 [608]*608W. Va. 189, 117 S. E. 888, a peremptory writ of mandamus was awarded directing the City of Montgomery to grant a permit to Nunley to build a public garage in a residential district of the city. Although the decision was based upon the inaccuracy of the ordinance, in that it did not fully prescribe for the regulation of such buildings, and definitely set forth the area in which they could not be constructed, the respondents contention that the garage would be unsightly, obnoxious and objectionable to the residents of the block, was discussed briefly. The latest decision of this Court upon the question is Parkersburg Builders Material Company, et al., v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S. E. 368, 192 S. E. 291. Upon the suit of the owners of property in the vicinity of a lot used by the defendant for the outdoor storage and wrecking of abandoned automobiles, the Circuit Court of Wood County entered a decree abating the alleged nuisance. The decree was reversed by this Court, the injunction dissolved, and the bill dismissed upon the ground that the section of the City of Parkersburg, wherein the defendant’s wrecking lot was situated, was “not a clearly established residential community.” The only syllabus point states: “Where a section of a city is not a clearly established residential community, equity will not be warranted in excluding therefrom as a nuisance an automobile wrecking business merely on the ground of unsightliness.” While it may be considered obiter dictum because of the holding that the defendant’s business was not in a clearly established residential community, Judge Maxwell, speaking for the Court, used language which creates a strong implication that the decision would have been to the contrary had the wrecking business been established in an exclusive residential area. It was said in the opinion that: “Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation of the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their love of the beautiful, without becoming objects of opprobrium. Basically, this is because a thing visually offensive may seriously affect the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes, and [609]*609may produce a decided reduction in property values. Courts must not be indifferent to the truth that within essential limitations aesthetics has a proper place in the community affairs of modern society.” “Of course, equity should not be aroused to action merely on the basis of the fastidiousness of taste of complainants. Equity should act only where there is presented a situation which is offensive to the view of average persons of the community. And, even where there is a situation which the average person would deem offensive to the sight, such fact alone will not justify interference by a court of equity. The surroundings must be considered. Unsightly things are not to be banned solely on that account. Many of them are necessary in carrying on the proper activities of organized society. But such things should be properly placed, and not so located as to be unduly offensive to neighbors or to the public. * * *” Judge Maxwell quoted at some length from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, a part of which states: “* * * A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, — like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. * * *” He further stated that: “An automobile junk yard is not necessarily an objectionable place. The business of buying old automobiles, wrecking them and selling serviceable parts as such and junking the residue is an honorable and useful business. But an outdoor lay-out of a business of that kind necessarily is not pleasing to the view. Such business, therefore, should not be located in a community of unquestioned residential character.” Judge Kenna, in a concurring opinion, took sharp issue with the language of the Court upon the discussion of the aesthetic phase of the case. He contended that it was not only obiter dictum, but in conflict with the decision of this Court in Fruth, et al., Trustees, Etc. v. Board of Affairs, supra.
Upon the question of reduction in value of the plaintiffs’ properties, as the result of the establishment of the used car lot nearby, we find this statement in Wood on [610]*610Nuisances, 3rd Edition, § 640: “Mere diminution of the value of the property, in consequence of the use to which adjoining premises are devoted, unaccompanied with other ill-results, is damnum absque injuria.” Also in 66 C. J. S., Nuisances, §19, P. 771, it is stated that: “However, a use of property which does not create a nuisance cannot be enjoined or a lawful structure abated merely because it renders neighboring property less valuable.”
In addition to the diminution of property value, plaintiffs rely upon the casting of light upon their premises, disturbance by noises, and the destruction of the aesthetic nature of the neighborhood. The following statement in 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, §45, we believe states the general rule: “The law takes care that lawful and useful business shall not be put a stop to on account of every trifling or imaginary annoyance, such as might offend the taste or disturb the nerves of a fastidious or over refined person. But, on the other hand, it does not allow anyone, whatever his circumstances or conditions may be, to be driven from his home or compelled to live in it in positive discomfort, although caused by a lawful and useful business carried on in his vicinity. The maxim ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’ expresses the well established doctrine of the law.” However, this maxim, that a person should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another, is of little value in a determination of the issue in this or similar cases. Again, it is a question of fact in each case as to whether the lawful use of the property by one person causes such damage to the property of another that a court of equity will take cognizance of it, and relieve the injured person by the drastic procedure of requiring the one who produces the injury to cease a lawful business.
Particular reference will be made to only a few of the many cases in the digests to which general reference has been made in this opinion. A nuisance is anything which annoys or disturbs the free use of one’s property, or which renders its ordinary use or physical occupation un[611]*611comfortable. Adams v. Hamilton Carhartt Overall Co., 293 Ky. 443, 169 S. W. 2d 294. A nuisance is anything which interferes with the rights of a citizen, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 111 P. 899. A condition is a nuisance when it clearly appears that enjoyment of property is materially lessened, and physical comfort of persons in their homes is materially interfered with thereby. Russell v. Nostrand Athletic Club, 209 N. Y. S. 76, 212 App. Div. 543. When the prosecution of a business, of itself lawful, in a strictly residential district, impairs the enjoyment of homes in the neighborhood, and infringes upon the well-being, comfort, repose, and enjoyment of the ordinary normal individual residing therein, the carrying on of such business in such locality becomes a nuisance, and may be enjoined. Jordan v. Nesmith, 132 Okl. 226, 269 P. 1096. In Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656, 193 N. W. 214, it was held that noises made on a Sunday may constitute a nuisance, although they would not be such if made on a week day.
We have given careful consideration to a modification of this decree. That it is drastic in that it not only requires the defendants to cease the business which they are now conducting, but to remove all of the fixtures from the lot which they own, cannot be denied. However, we have determined that no modification can be made which will permit the efficient exercise of the defendants’ rights to conduct this particular business at that place, and still protect the plaintiffs against the injury which must result to them therefrom. Perhaps the decree could be modified to require the defendants to close their business at sunset so that no lights would have to be burned, and that they should cease to do business on Sunday. However, the testimony, and the inferences that may be drawn from it, indicate that the defendants’ business is best on week-ends, particularly on Sunday, and at night. Even such a modification would not eliminate the other elements of nuisance upon which the [612]*612decree was based. That part of the decree which requires defendants to remove their equipment from the lot cannot be harmful to them if they must cease the used car business at that place. The hut, the lights, the poles and the displays are necessary in the operation of their used car business; they can be easily transported and used at another location.
The question of whether there exists a nuisance per accidens, or a nuisance in fact, is, by its very definition, dependent upon the proof adduced before the trial chancellor. The well established rule, that the findings of a trial court will not ordinarily be disturbed upon appeal, applies to the findings of the chancellor. A finding of fact from conflicting depositions is entitled to peculiar weight, and will not be disturbed by this Court unless it is manifestly wrong. Poling v. Bennett, 103 W. Va. 456, 137 S. E. 883. In Matney, et al. v. Blakely, et al., 97 W. Va. 291, 124 S. E. 918, the Court stated in the opinion that: “* * * The general rule is that this court will not reverse a decree rendered on conflicting depositions of such doubtful and unsatisfactory character that different judges might reach different conclusions, although the appellate court might have rendered a different decree if it had acted in the first instance. * * *” The rule was enunciated in this language in Spurgin v. Spurgin, 47 W. Va. 38, 34 S. E. 750: “It has also been well settled that in doubtful cases the decree of the circuit court will prevail, as this Court never makes a ‘last guess’, nor disturbs the decree of the lower court unless plainly erroneous.” Upon a careful examination of the testimony, the exhibits and the law applicable to the issue presented, we are unable to say that the decree of the trial chancellor in this cause was erroneous. The decree will be affirmed.
Affirmed.