07/22/2025
DA 24-0653 Case Number: DA 24-0653
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 157N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
KARLI R. ROADARMEL,
Petitioner and Appellee,
and
JOHN M. ROADARMEL,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DR 19-332A Honorable Peter B. Ohman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry F. Schaplow, P.C., Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Caitlin T. Pabst, Steven E. Goodson, Pabst Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 18, 2025
Decided: July 22, 2025
Filed: ( ,.- 6A---#f __________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Terry Schaplow appeals the October 25, 2024 judgment of the Eighteenth Judicial
District Court, Gallatin County.1 Judgment was entered against Schaplow personally after
the District Court imposed M. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions and denied his request for
M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) relief for his representation of John “Mike” Roadarmel (Mike) in a
dissolution proceeding between Mike and Karli Thompson, f/k/a Karli Roadarmel (Karli).2
¶3 In the underlying dissolution proceeding, Mike, with Schaplow as his counsel, filed
a motion to stay a final parenting plan issued by the Standing Master presiding over the
case. The parenting plan set a custody schedule under which the parties’ children would
reside with Karli approximately 60% of the time and with Mike 40% of the time. Karli,
represented by attorney Caitlin Pabst, opposed Mike’s motion. Relevant to this appeal,
Schaplow’s April 24, 2023 reply brief alleged:
1 Schaplow timely filed his opening brief in this appeal. Karli did not file an answer brief and instead moved to dismiss the appeal, which Schaplow opposed. Karli argues Schaplow’s appeal is frivolous and asks this Court to award her attorney fees related to the appeal. We took the motion under advisement pursuant to Section I(3)(b) of the Court’s Internal Operating Rules for consideration with the merits of the appeal. See In re Marriage of Roadarmel, No. DA 24-0653, Order (Mont. April 15, 2025). Because we hold the appeal was not entirely frivolous, we deny Karli’s motion to dismiss and request for attorney fees. 2 The District Court granted Karli’s petition for name change on May 8, 2023. 2 [The Standing Master] has once again engaged in the trafficking of little children, all in the name of creating a sanctuary court, and unabashed biased advocacy, for her lawyer Caitlin Pabst. . . . This is yet another example of the child trafficking that occurs in the [Standing Master’s] court, all in the name of bias, the appearance of impropriety, and advocacy for her lawyer [Caitlin Pabst].
¶4 On May 12, 2023, Karli moved to disqualify Schaplow from further representing
Mike, contending that disqualification was an appropriate sanction due to what she alleged
were multiple violations of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. In her motion,
Karli argued the allegations Schaplow made about the Standing Master trafficking children
and Pabst representing the Standing Master were false and sanctionable.3
¶5 On June 9, 2023, the District Court issued an order setting a hearing on Karli’s
motion to disqualify Schaplow. The order referenced the statements made in Mike’s reply
brief and required Mike and Schaplow to present specific evidence at the hearing in support
of these allegations. The court noted that “child trafficking involves the illegal movement
of children for forced labor or sexual exploitation,” and defined the term under
§ 45-5-702, MCA—the statute setting forth criminal penalties for sex trafficking. The
court advised Schaplow “that testimony regarding disagreements individuals may have
with [the] Standing Master’s decisions regarding custody of children does not constitute
child trafficking and is irrelevant unless it meets” the definitions set forth in the order.
¶6 Mike testified at the June 21, 2023 hearing, asserting his belief that the Standing
Master trafficked the parties’ children because the parenting plan allocated more parenting
3 On appeal, Schaplow asserts the statements “regarding the [Standing Master] trafficking children and that [Pabst] was the [Standing Master’s] lawyer, do not appear anywhere in the petitioner’s disqualification motion.” These statements clearly appear in the disqualification motion. 3 time to Karli, whose home, he alleged, was located in an unsafe neighborhood. The District
Court questioned Schaplow about the legal basis for using the term child trafficking.
Schaplow responded that he was not asserting that the Standing Master’s conduct satisfied
the statutory criminal definition of child trafficking. Instead, he claimed “trafficking in
children” had a different, commonly used definition in child custody cases and, as he
defined it, meant that a judge treated “children as a disposable commodity.” Schaplow was
unable to cite any cases to the District Court in which a court had used that term in this
manner.
¶7 Regarding the factual basis of the allegations against the Standing Master, Schaplow
offered as exhibits several online blogs and articles concerning services provided by an
organization known as Family Bridges, affidavits signed by Mike, and affidavits signed by
third-parties who were involved in unrelated family law matters over which the Standing
Master presided. Except for Mike, none of the authors testified at the hearing. The court
sustained Karli’s hearsay objections after reviewing the affidavits and other offered
exhibits. The court granted Karli leave to file a reply brief within 10 days of the hearing.
Karli’s reply brief requested an award of attorney fees and costs related to the motion to
disqualify.
¶8 On August 21, 2023, the District Court issued its Order Re Rule 11 Notice (Rule 11
Notice), citing M. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). The District Court’s Rule 11 Notice stated that,
based on its review of the record and after conducting the June 21, 2023 evidentiary
hearing, Schaplow violated Rules 11(b)(1)–(3) when he accused the Standing Master of
4 trafficking children and accused Pabst of acting as the Standing Master’s attorney. The
court provided Schaplow with 21 days to respond.
¶9 Schaplow’s response reiterated the same allegations based on evidence rejected at
the hearing. Schaplow maintained that he never accused the Standing Master of criminal
acts, but was instead concerned with investigating the “integrity” of local judges and
preventing the Standing Master from turning Bozeman into a “sanctuary city” for domestic
abusers. Schaplow asserted that he presented a good faith argument in support of his
definition, and he had a reasonable basis to allege that the Standing Master trafficked
children due to her decision to award more parenting time to Karli and the Standing
Master’s alleged ties to Family Bridges. Because Karli opposed Mike’s earlier motions to
disqualify the Standing Master, Schaplow contended that Pabst became the Standing
Master’s lawyer and represented her in an official capacity.
¶10 The District Court’s October 24, 2023 order (Rule 11 Order) denied Karli’s motion
to disqualify Schaplow, but concluded Schaplow violated Rules 11(b)(1)–(3) when he
made the allegations against the Standing Master and Pabst in the April 24, 2023 reply
brief supporting Mike’s motion to stay. The Rule 11 Order provided that, if Schaplow
persisted in filing documents containing the allegations, then the court would “issue an
Order to Show Cause to demonstrate why [Schaplow] should not be held in contempt or
removed as counsel in this proceeding.” Schaplow was ordered to pay Karli’s attorney
fees related to her motion to disqualify, “which appropriately brought the Rule 11 matters
to the Court’s attention.” After providing Schaplow with an opportunity to file written
5 objections and holding a hearing on the attorney fee issue, the District Court ordered
Schaplow to pay $6,630.23.
¶11 On November 22, 2023, Schaplow moved for relief from the order imposing Rule
11 sanctions pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Schaplow’s brief in support lodged the
same allegations against the Standing Master and Pabst. Karli did not respond to the
motion.4 The District Court denied Schaplow’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. On
October 25, 2024, the court entered judgment against Schaplow in the amount of
$6,630.23, plus post-judgment interest pursuant to § 25-9-205, MCA.5
¶12 We review a district court’s decision denying a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Remitz, 2018 MT 298, ¶ 8, 393 Mont. 423, 431 P.3d 338. “A
district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without employment of
conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.”
In re Marriage of Orcutt, 2011 MT 107, ¶ 6, 360 Mont. 353, 253 P.3d 884.
¶13 We review de novo a district court’s conclusion that a pleading, motion, or other
paper violates Rule 11. In re Estate of Boland, 2019 MT 236, ¶ 20, 397 Mont. 319,
450 P.3d 849 (citing Byrum v. Andren, 2007 MT 107, ¶ 19, 337 Mont. 167,
159 P.3d 1062). We review a district court’s findings of fact underlying that conclusion
for clear error. Estate of Boland, ¶ 20. If the district court determines that Rule 11 was
4 On December 15, 2023, Karli moved for a show cause hearing pursuant to the Rule 11 Order to determine whether Schaplow should be held in contempt or disqualified for raising the same unfounded allegations in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 5 The District Court did not impose Rule 11 sanctions on Mike. 6 violated, then we review the court’s choice of sanction for abuse of discretion. Estate of
Boland, ¶ 20.
Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
¶14 Schaplow argues the District Court committed reversible error by denying his
Rule 60(b)(6) motion because Karli did not file a response, and by failing to do so, she
conceded the merits of Schaplow’s arguments pursuant to MUDCR 2.
¶15 After the filing of a motion, MUDCR 2(c) provides that the adverse party’s failure
to timely file an answer brief may subject the motion to summary ruling and “shall be
deemed an admission that the motion is well taken.” MUDCR 2(c). But MUDCR 2 does
not compel a district court to grant an unanswered motion. See In re Marriage of
Lundstrom, 2007 MT 304, ¶ 23, 340 Mont. 83, 172 P.3d 588; State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460,
466, 914 P.2d 592, 596 (1996); Maberry v. Gueths, 238 Mont. 304, 309, 777 P.2d 1285,
1289 (1989). The district court retains discretion to grant or deny unanswered motions as
it sees fit. Marriage of Lundstrom, ¶ 23.
¶16 The District Court denied Schaplow’s November 22, 2023 motion for Rule 60(b)(6)
relief notwithstanding Karli’s failure to timely file an answer brief as contemplated by
MUDCR 2. The District Court reasoned that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was not justified
because Schaplow’s motion cited the same arguments and evidence the court had already
considered in its Rule 11 Order.
¶17 To receive relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), a movant must meet “the
higher burden of proving extraordinary circumstances” and show the movant was
7 “blameless and acted within a reasonable amount of time.” Estate of Kinnaman v. Mt.
W. Bank, N.A., 2016 MT 25, ¶ 30, 382 Mont. 153, 365 P.3d 486 (citation omitted). Rule
60(b)(6) is not intended to be a substitute for appeal. Estate of Kinnaman, ¶ 30 (citation
omitted). A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be more “than a request for rehearing or a
request that the District Court change its mind. It must be shown that something prevented
a full presentation of the cause or an accurate determination on the merits and that for
reasons of fairness and equity redress is justified.” Estate of Kinnaman, ¶ 30 (citation
omitted).
¶18 Schaplow’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion in this case was essentially a request that the
District Court change its mind. The District Court correctly observed that Schaplow’s
motion was “simply a rehash of the previous claims . . . [that] reference[d] documentation
from third parties to support the contentions [Schaplow] made, and which were the basis
for the Court’s previous Rule 11 Order.” The fact that Schaplow was unsuccessful in his
arguments before the District Court is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying
Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
¶19 Citing Eisenhart v. Puffer, 2008 MT 58, 341 Mont. 508, 178 P.3d 139, Schaplow
argues Karli made a “judicial admission” that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was well taken. In
that case, the district court granted a motion to dismiss the Puffers’ counterclaims after the
Puffers failed to respond to the motion. Eisenhart, ¶ 36. We affirmed, reasoning “[t]he
Puffers have alleged no factual or legal authority that would indicate why” the motion to
dismiss should not be considered well taken under MUDCR 2. Schaplow’s reliance on
8 Eisenhart is misplaced. Unlike Eisenhart, there was ample factual and legal authority in
this case indicating why Schaplow’s motion should not be considered well taken. The
parties had already fully briefed and argued the merits of the claims Schaplow repeated in
his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The District Court had also ruled in its Rule 11 Notice that Karli
did not need to further brief her position as to those claims. Moreover, “a deemed
admission” that a motion is well taken under MUDCR 2 “cannot convert a motion which
is incorrect as a matter of law into a motion which is well taken as a matter of law.” State v.
Pizzola, 283 Mont. 522, 525, 942 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). The District Court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Schaplow’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief.
Rule 11 Sanctions
¶20 Under Rule 11, when an attorney presents a written motion or other document to the
court—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—the attorney certifies
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims
or legal contentions are supported by existing law or make a good faith argument to change
existing law; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support, or will likely have
support following further investigation. M. R. Civ. P. 11(a)–(b)(3).
¶21 On appeal, Schaplow argues he made a good faith argument that his definition of
child trafficking was supported by existing law and was commonly used in divorce cases
because the documents he submitted to the District Court—including the affidavits of his
9 client, Mike, the affidavits of third-parties, and the online articles—used the term in
reference to services provided by Family Bridges and the Standing Master’s conduct.
¶22 To satisfy Rule 11, “a party need not be correct in his view of the law, but the party
must have a good faith argument for his or her view of what the law is or should be.”
Jacildo v. McFadden, 253 Mont. 114, 116, 831 P.2d 597, 597 (1992). The standard for
determining whether a document has sufficient legal basis is reasonableness under the
circumstances. Estate of Boland, ¶ 50 (citing D’Agostino v. Swanson, 240 Mont. 435, 445,
784 P.2d 919, 925 (1990)).
¶23 The District Court determined that “child trafficking” is defined under the Montana
criminal code and does not have a different, distinct meaning in divorce cases under
Montana law. The District Court noted that Schaplow was unable to cite any precedent,
and the District Court was unable to find any rulings by this Court or other district courts,
utilizing the term in such a manner. The District Court determined that the dictionary
definitions Schaplow provided were inconsistent with the definition he created. Our own
review of the record leads us to conclude that the District Court did not err in this
determination. Schaplow has not cited any legal authority indicating that child trafficking
means “treating children as a disposable commodity.” The unproven allegations
concerning Family Bridges and the Standing Master in the articles and affidavits to which
Schaplow directs this Court fail to provide legal grounds supporting his claim. First of all,
the Standing Master made no referral to Family Bridges in this case. It was in response to
the Standing Master’s decision to give Karli more parenting time that Schaplow made these
10 inflammatory allegations and characterized a custody decision as “child trafficking.” As
appropriately noted by the District Court, Schaplow’s April 24, 2023 reply brief made no
attempt to distinguish criminal child trafficking—as defined by the Montana Code
Annotated—from the definition he created himself. Schaplow attempted to justify his use
of the term by stating, “I knew what I meant when I said it.” Schaplow’s personal belief
as to what he may have meant by use of the term fails to satisfy Rule 11(b)(2)’s objective
reasonableness standard. The District Court did not err by holding that Schaplow’s claim
against the Standing Master in the April 24, 2023 reply brief was made without legal
support.
¶24 Schaplow argues the District Court erred by finding his statements regarding Pabst
were made without evidentiary support and for an improper purpose. The standard for
determining whether a written statement has sufficient factual basis or whether a party
acted with an improper purpose is reasonableness under the circumstances. Estate of
Boland, ¶¶ 50–51 (citing D’Agostino, 240 Mont. at 445, 784 P.2d at 925). This Court gives
district courts wide latitude to determine whether the factual circumstances amount to
abusive litigation tactics, because the district court “has tasted the flavor of the litigation
and is in the best position to make these kinds of determinations.” D’Agostino,
240 Mont. at 446, 784 P.2d at 926 (citation omitted).
¶25 The District Court found Schaplow made the accusation against Pabst “for no
purpose other than to harass opposing counsel” and without any factual basis. Schaplow
directs this Court to responses Pabst filed, which opposed his motions to disqualify the
11 Standing Master, as evidence that Pabst had “impermissibly advocated” for the Standing
Master. Beyond these conclusory statements, Schaplow provides no substantive legal
analysis for his nonsensical contention that an attorney who opposes a motion to disqualify
a standing master effectively becomes the standing master’s attorney. The District Court
did not err by holding that Schaplow’s statements about Pabst in the April 24, 2023 reply
brief were made without evidentiary support and for the improper purpose of harassment.
¶26 Schaplow argues the District Court violated the plain language of Rule 11 by
referencing testimony from the June 21, 2023 hearing in its Rule 11 Order and by stating
in its Rule 60(b)(6) order that “representations in pleadings or oral arguments” are subject
to Rule 11. The District Court did not base its Rule 11 Order on statements made at the
June 21, 2023 hearing; it merely discussed the hearing testimony to support its findings
that the written allegations lacked a factual and legal basis. Regarding the court’s reference
to oral argument, the federal cases Schaplow cites are distinguishable.6 The sanctions order
in Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) was reversed because it
was unclear whether the lower court’s ruling was based on oral or written statements. In
Bus. Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enter. Inc., 892 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 1989),
the sanctions for written statements were affirmed. The District Court’s Rule 11 Order
leaves no doubt that its bases for imposing sanctions were the written statements in
Schaplow’s April 24, 2023 reply brief, which accused the Standing Master of being
6 Federal jurisprudence is persuasive authority when interpreting our Rule 11 because it is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Byrum, ¶ 70. 12 “engaged in the trafficking of little children” and accused Pabst of being the Standing
Master’s attorney.
¶27 Even if the District Court’s Rule 11 Order was somehow based on oral reiterations
of the same allegations contained in his reply brief, Schaplow’s argument would remain
unavailing. Although “matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the
court” may not be subject to Rule 11, an oral statement may form the basis for Rule 11
sanctions if it advocates a contention previously contained within a written submission. In
re Bees, 562 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments, Subdivisions (b) and (c)). The hearing was
held solely for the purpose of determining whether a factual and legal basis existed for the
written contentions submitted in Schaplow’s April 24, 2023 reply brief. The District Court
did not err by referencing testimony in its Rule 11 Order or by stating Schaplow’s
statements at oral argument were subject to Rule 11 under these circumstances.
¶28 Schaplow argues the District Court could not award Karli her attorney fees because
she filed a motion to disqualify rather than a Rule 11 motion. We are not persuaded by the
federal cases cited by Schaplow. In Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
174 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 1999) and Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2003), the
parties were awarded attorney fees without filing a motion raising the issue of sanctions or
any document describing the sanctionable conduct, and thus, the courts of appeals
concluded the respective parties were not entitled to attorney fees. Nuwesra, 174 F.3d at
94–95; Norsyn, 351 F.3d at 832. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an attorney
13 fee award in Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2009) because the parties conceded
the sanction was imposed on the court’s own initiative. Brunig, 560 F.3d at 298. In this
case, Karli’s motion to disqualify set forth a litany of reasons sanctions would be justified
and specifically referenced the statements Schaplow made in the April 24, 2023 reply brief.
The District Court found the motion to disqualify “appropriately brought the Rule 11
matters to the Court’s attention.” Karli also moved for attorney fees related to the motion
to disqualify in her July 5, 2023 reply brief. The circumstances of this case are
demonstrably different from those in Nuwesra, Norsyn, and Brunig.
¶29 In any event, the District Court properly followed the due process requirements set
forth in Rule 11. Before Rule 11 sanctions are imposed, a district court must hold a hearing
on whether sanctions are proper and give notice to the party it proposes to sanction, so that
the party “will be provided with due process before it is punished.” Byrum, ¶ 32 (citations
omitted). The District Court held a hearing at which Schaplow had the opportunity to
present testimony and evidence concerning his assertions regarding Pabst and the Standing
Master. The District Court gave notice to Schaplow in its Rule 11 Notice that it was
considering Rule 11 sanctions and provided Schaplow with 21 days to respond. The
District Court complied with all of the requirements in Byrum and its predecessors. See
Byrum, ¶ 34. The provision regarding contempt in the Rule 11 Order also does not violate
Schaplow’s due process rights or constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. A district
court has the power to compel obedience to its orders, § 3-1-111(4), MCA, and to punish
14 disobedience of an order in a cause before it as contempt of court, § 3-1-501(1)(e), MCA.
See Grenfell v. Grenfell, 200 Mont. 490, 493, 652 P.2d 1170, 1171 (1982).
¶30 “The purpose of Rule 11 is to discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and to streamline
the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.” Estate of Boland, ¶ 54.
If a document is signed and submitted in violation of Rule 11, the district court “shall
impose . . . an appropriate sanction.” Morin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
2013 MT 146, ¶ 38, 370 Mont. 305, 302 P.3d 96 (emphasis added). A district court retains
the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with Rule 11 violations and has discretion to
tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case. Davenport v. Odlin, 2014 MT 109, ¶ 9,
374 Mont. 503, 327 P.3d 478. As in Estate of Boland, the District Court in this case
evaluated the reasonableness of Karli’s attorney fees under the seven factors set forth by
this Court in Plath v. Schonrock, 2003 MT 21, ¶ 36, 314 Mont. 101, 64 P.3d 984. Estate
of Boland, ¶ 54. The District Court’s analysis of attorney fees in its September 5, 2024
order is sufficient to support the award in this case. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing $6,630.23 in attorney fees plus post-judgment interest as a sanction
against Schaplow.
¶31 Karli moved to dismiss this appeal as frivolous and requested attorney fees on
appeal. “In determining whether an appeal is frivolous and unreasonable, we generally
assess whether the arguments were made in good faith.” Estate of Boland, ¶ 61. Although
we have determined that Schaplow’s claims lack merit, we do not conclude his arguments
on appeal were entirely frivolous or lacking in good faith. Accordingly, we deny Karli’s
15 motion to dismiss and decline to award her attorney fees and costs on appeal. It is therefore
ORDERED that Karli’s motion to dismiss and for attorney fees and costs on appeal are
DENIED.
¶32 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and application of the
law were correct, its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its
discretion by awarding attorney fees as a sanction against Schaplow. The District Court’s
judgment is affirmed.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE