WAHL, Justice.
The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 dissolution decree for a child between the ages of 18 and 21. Respondent Gail Katz became the custodial parent of Ronald Katz and Sheryl Katz following the divorce of the parties in 1972, when the age of majority was 21 years. She moved, in 1984, for an increase in child support payments for the two children, who were 20 and 17 years of age respectively at the time of the hearing. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to increase child support for the children until they reached the age of 21 and that the child support guidelines of Minn.Stat. § 518.551 (1984) were applicable in determining the amount of the support obligation. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1 We affirm.
The judgment and decree dissolving the marriage of these parties in 1972 incorporated the terms of a stipulation providing for alimony, child support, custody, and property division. Respondent Gail Katz was awarded custody of Ronald, then age seven, and Sheryl, then age four, and has continuously been their custodial parent. The decree provided that appellant would pay $250 per month for support of each child, $500 per month permanent alimony (now called maintenance) and the cost of medical insurance for the children. Gail Katz received the homestead, subject to a mortgage; Larry Katz received all other marital assets, the value of which was not specified in the decree. Six years later, in 1978, the parties voluntarily agreed, after respondent had brought a motion for increased support, that appellant Larry Katz would pay child support of $300 per month per child, would pay all medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, and would pay the cost of the children’s religious training. Since Ronald Katz has entered the University of Minnesota, appellant has likewise voluntarily paid Ronald’s expenses for tuition and books, and his fraternity dues.
A Hennepin County District Court referee originally heard respondent’s motion for increase in child support. The referee ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction to increase child support payments for Ronald because he was over the age of 18. With regard to Sheryl, the referee found that increases in the cost of living since 1972 [837]*837had rendered the terms of the original decree unreasonable and unfair. In ordering an increase in child support for Sheryl to $350 per month, however, the referee deviated downward from the amount established by state child support guidelines found in Minn. § 518.551 (1984).2 On review the district court found that Gail Katz, who had been unemployed at the time of the decree with monthly expenses of $540 for herself and two children, now earned $22,000 a year with a net annual income of $13,200 plus $250 per month from a renter, with a current monthly budget of $1,800, two-thirds apportioned to the children; that Larry Katz, with a gross annual income at the time of the decree of $91,000, received gross income in 1984 of $119,000, including a nonrecurring distribution of $20,000 with no evidence on the record of net income.3 The court also found that the consumer price index had increased approximately 250 percent since the time of the judgment and decree. On this evidence the district court affirmed the referee’s findings that there had been a change in circumstances since the judgment and decree which rendered the child support terms of, the decree unfair and unreasonable. Reversing the referee on the merits, however, the court held it had jurisdiction to increase support for a child over the age of 18 when the obligation to support the child was governed by a pre-1973 decree; that no grounds existed justifying a downward deviation from the statutory child support guidelines with reference to child support for Sheryl; and that in this case they should be applied. The court considered the needs of the children and concluded, in addition, that a child should not be precluded from benefitting from the father’s income merely because the child’s expenses had been maintained at a minimum. Accordingly, the district court scheduled a hearing to determine appellant’s net income to enable application of the child support guidelines.4 The court noted that appellant’s monthly child support obligation should be credited with the payments he makes directly for the children’s uninsured medical expenses, tuition, and book costs. The remaining provisions of the referee’s order were to continue in full force and effect to the extent they were not inconsistent with the order of the district court.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that under a pre-1973 decree the trial court had jurisdiction over child support until age 21 and within its discretion could increase or decrease the amount of child support. The court of appeals further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a change of circumstances justified increasing child support to the amount contained in the child support guidelines, and awarded Gail Katz attorney fees for the cost of the appeal.
In this court appellant argues (1) that the trial court erred in finding it had jurisdiction to increase the amount of support for a child between the ages of 18 and 21; 2) that the trial court erred in ruling that support for Sheryl should be increased to the amount set by the child support guidelines; and 3) that the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees.5
I.
Does the trial court have jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 dissolution decree for a child between the ages of 18 and 21? Prior to 1973, in Minnesota the age of majority was the age of 21. By an Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 725, [838]*838§§ 83 and 84, 1973 Minn.Laws 2082, 2131-32, the legislature lowered the age of majority to 18. Pre-1973 stipulations and dissolution decrees based upon stipulations commonly provided that the obligor parent pay child support at a specified rate until the dependent child reached the age of 21 or otherwise earlier became emancipated. Following enactment of the 1973 statute, we held that the statute reducing the age of majority did not apply retroactively to invalidate provisions for the support of children contained in divorce decrees entered prior to the enactment of that statute. Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488, 495, 229 N.W.2d 131, 136 (1975); Yaeger v. Yaeger, 303 Minn. 497, 498-99, 229 N.W.2d 137, 138 (1975). Whether the pre-1973 obligation for support of children till age 21 in a divorce decree rests on judicial decree alone, as in Brugger, or on judicial decree incorporating a stipulation of the parties as in Yaeger, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction. This continuing jurisdiction extends to the modification or enforcement of the decree. Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Minn.1981). As we noted in Angelos v. Angelos, 367 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Minn.1985), “domestic relationships, by their nature, continue under the jurisdiction of the court virtually throughout the lives of the parties.
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WAHL, Justice.
The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 dissolution decree for a child between the ages of 18 and 21. Respondent Gail Katz became the custodial parent of Ronald Katz and Sheryl Katz following the divorce of the parties in 1972, when the age of majority was 21 years. She moved, in 1984, for an increase in child support payments for the two children, who were 20 and 17 years of age respectively at the time of the hearing. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to increase child support for the children until they reached the age of 21 and that the child support guidelines of Minn.Stat. § 518.551 (1984) were applicable in determining the amount of the support obligation. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1 We affirm.
The judgment and decree dissolving the marriage of these parties in 1972 incorporated the terms of a stipulation providing for alimony, child support, custody, and property division. Respondent Gail Katz was awarded custody of Ronald, then age seven, and Sheryl, then age four, and has continuously been their custodial parent. The decree provided that appellant would pay $250 per month for support of each child, $500 per month permanent alimony (now called maintenance) and the cost of medical insurance for the children. Gail Katz received the homestead, subject to a mortgage; Larry Katz received all other marital assets, the value of which was not specified in the decree. Six years later, in 1978, the parties voluntarily agreed, after respondent had brought a motion for increased support, that appellant Larry Katz would pay child support of $300 per month per child, would pay all medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, and would pay the cost of the children’s religious training. Since Ronald Katz has entered the University of Minnesota, appellant has likewise voluntarily paid Ronald’s expenses for tuition and books, and his fraternity dues.
A Hennepin County District Court referee originally heard respondent’s motion for increase in child support. The referee ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction to increase child support payments for Ronald because he was over the age of 18. With regard to Sheryl, the referee found that increases in the cost of living since 1972 [837]*837had rendered the terms of the original decree unreasonable and unfair. In ordering an increase in child support for Sheryl to $350 per month, however, the referee deviated downward from the amount established by state child support guidelines found in Minn. § 518.551 (1984).2 On review the district court found that Gail Katz, who had been unemployed at the time of the decree with monthly expenses of $540 for herself and two children, now earned $22,000 a year with a net annual income of $13,200 plus $250 per month from a renter, with a current monthly budget of $1,800, two-thirds apportioned to the children; that Larry Katz, with a gross annual income at the time of the decree of $91,000, received gross income in 1984 of $119,000, including a nonrecurring distribution of $20,000 with no evidence on the record of net income.3 The court also found that the consumer price index had increased approximately 250 percent since the time of the judgment and decree. On this evidence the district court affirmed the referee’s findings that there had been a change in circumstances since the judgment and decree which rendered the child support terms of, the decree unfair and unreasonable. Reversing the referee on the merits, however, the court held it had jurisdiction to increase support for a child over the age of 18 when the obligation to support the child was governed by a pre-1973 decree; that no grounds existed justifying a downward deviation from the statutory child support guidelines with reference to child support for Sheryl; and that in this case they should be applied. The court considered the needs of the children and concluded, in addition, that a child should not be precluded from benefitting from the father’s income merely because the child’s expenses had been maintained at a minimum. Accordingly, the district court scheduled a hearing to determine appellant’s net income to enable application of the child support guidelines.4 The court noted that appellant’s monthly child support obligation should be credited with the payments he makes directly for the children’s uninsured medical expenses, tuition, and book costs. The remaining provisions of the referee’s order were to continue in full force and effect to the extent they were not inconsistent with the order of the district court.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that under a pre-1973 decree the trial court had jurisdiction over child support until age 21 and within its discretion could increase or decrease the amount of child support. The court of appeals further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a change of circumstances justified increasing child support to the amount contained in the child support guidelines, and awarded Gail Katz attorney fees for the cost of the appeal.
In this court appellant argues (1) that the trial court erred in finding it had jurisdiction to increase the amount of support for a child between the ages of 18 and 21; 2) that the trial court erred in ruling that support for Sheryl should be increased to the amount set by the child support guidelines; and 3) that the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees.5
I.
Does the trial court have jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 dissolution decree for a child between the ages of 18 and 21? Prior to 1973, in Minnesota the age of majority was the age of 21. By an Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 725, [838]*838§§ 83 and 84, 1973 Minn.Laws 2082, 2131-32, the legislature lowered the age of majority to 18. Pre-1973 stipulations and dissolution decrees based upon stipulations commonly provided that the obligor parent pay child support at a specified rate until the dependent child reached the age of 21 or otherwise earlier became emancipated. Following enactment of the 1973 statute, we held that the statute reducing the age of majority did not apply retroactively to invalidate provisions for the support of children contained in divorce decrees entered prior to the enactment of that statute. Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488, 495, 229 N.W.2d 131, 136 (1975); Yaeger v. Yaeger, 303 Minn. 497, 498-99, 229 N.W.2d 137, 138 (1975). Whether the pre-1973 obligation for support of children till age 21 in a divorce decree rests on judicial decree alone, as in Brugger, or on judicial decree incorporating a stipulation of the parties as in Yaeger, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction. This continuing jurisdiction extends to the modification or enforcement of the decree. Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Minn.1981). As we noted in Angelos v. Angelos, 367 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Minn.1985), “domestic relationships, by their nature, continue under the jurisdiction of the court virtually throughout the lives of the parties. Accordingly, the legislature specifically authorized modification, in cases of changed circumstances, of those provisions of divorce decrees affecting custody, visitation, maintenance, and support. MinmStat. §§ 518.18 and 518.64 (1984).” (Emphasis added). This authority of the trial court, absent an explicit statutory prohibition, is unaffected by a change in status such as that from minority to majority.
The trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify the child support provisions of a pre-1973 judgment and decree is unaffected by our holding in Hampton v. Hampton, 303 Minn. 500, 503, 229 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1975), though appellant argues otherwise. In Hampton we held that the extraordinary remedy of contempt is not available for enforcement of support orders for children after they have reached the age of 18, that only ordinary judgment enforcement remedies such as levy, attachment, and garnishment are available. Hampton stands for the proposition that the extraordinary remedy of civil contempt should not be extended needlessly, not that the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court otherwise to enforce or modify a decree according to its original intent is in any way diminished. There can be no doubt, and the court of appeals has so indicated in Streitz v. Streitz, 363 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), that the trial court can reduce support payments for children between the ages of 18 and 21 ordered by pre-1973 decrees when the financial ability of the parent obligated to make support payments has been decreased. The trial court also has the concomitant authority, in its discretion, to increase support for children between the ages of 18 and 21 where the applicable age of majority is 21.6 In this case the court of appeals followed its holding in Winter v. Winter, 375 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985), that when the pre-1973 decree provides for jurisdiction over child support until age 21, the trial court may modify that obligation at its discretion, either by increasing or decreasing the amount. This is a correct state[839]*839ment of the law. We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a child support order in a pre-1973 dissolution decree for a child between the ages of 18 and 21.
II
Did the trial court correctly consider statutory factors and guidelines in granting a petition for an increase in child support for a minor? The trial court ruled that appellant’s obligation for Ronald’s and Sheryl’s support should be increased to the amount set by the child support guidelines found in Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5 (1984).7 In Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 860, 864 (Minn.1986), this court held that the Minn.Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5 guidelines apply in all child support cases and modification proceedings. We then clarified the application of those statutory guidelines to cases not involving public assistance, finding in such cases a legislative intent that courts should use the amounts set forth in the guidelines as starting points for the determination of child support awards. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d at 863. We required the trial court in each case to make specific findings of fact as to the factors it considered in formulating the award. Id. Those findings must take into account “all relevant factors including” the factors set forth in Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 4 (1984):
(a) The financial resources and needs of the child;
(b) The financial resources and needs of the custodial parent;
(c) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved;
(d) The physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educational needs; and
(e)The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
Moylan, 384 N.W.2d at 863-64.
In this case the trial court, without the benefit of Moylan, which had not yet been decided, apparently considered application of the guidelines to be mandatory. As we indicated in Moylan, where the broad and sound discretion of the trial court is exercised within the limits set out by the legislature, an appellate court will not reverse unless it finds a “clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.” Moylan, 384 N.W.2d at 864 (quoting Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.1984)). Beyond that, we will not reverse a correct decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasons. Kahn v. State, 289 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Minn.1980). In the case before us, the record shows that the trial court did consider the appropriate factors after first making the determination that there had been a change in circumstances since the judgment and decree which rendered the child support terms of the decree unfair and unreasonable. The trial court considered Sheryl’s desire to participate in certain activities, which is consistent with Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 4(a) and (d). The trial court considered the financial resources of respondent under Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 4(b). Likewise it considered appellant’s income, consistent with Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 4(c) and (e). Finally, it considered the financial resources of Sheryl, consistent with Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 4(a). Notwithstanding that it considered the guidelines were mandatory, we hold that the trial court correctly considered statutory factors and guidelines in granting the petition for an increase in child support. We remand the [840]*840case for the hearing and for the purposes ordered by the trial court.
Ill
The court of appeals awarded respondent her attorney fees for the cost of appeal, Minn.Stat. § 518.14 (1984), and ordered the trial court on remand to determine a reasonable amount to be paid for those attorney fees. Contrary to appellant's contention here, respondent did request attorney fees in the court of appeals. Moreover, the record contains considerable evidence from which the trial court can evaluate the respondent’s need for fees. Generally, the award for attorney fees lies in the discretion of the court. Davis v. Davis, 306 Minn. 536, 538, 235 N.W.2d 836, 838 (1975), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943, 96 S.Ct. 3160, 49 L.Ed.2d 1180 (1976). We hold that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees for the respondent’s costs of appeal to that court. Costs to respondent on appeal to this court are allowed in the amount of $800.
Affirmed and remanded.
KELLY, J., dissents.
SCOTT, J., took no part.