STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1951
Juan Cuate, Respondent,
vs.
Pedro Cuate-Dominguez, et al., Appellants.
Filed September 16, 2024 Affirmed Ede, Judge
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CV-23-4848
John G. Westrick, Samuel Savage, Savage-Westrick, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)
Daniel M. Eaton, Waypoint Law PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge. *
SYLLABUS
For the purpose of determining the notice period to terminate a tenancy at will under
Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135 (Supp. 2023), “rent” means regular, periodic
consideration paid for the use or occupation of property.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this appeal from an eviction judgment for respondent-landlord, appellant-tenants
assert that the district court abused its discretion (1) by requiring only a one-month notice
period to terminate their tenancy at will under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135 (Supp.
2023) and (2) by rejecting their retaliation defense. We conclude that, because appellants
paid monthly rent in the form of mortgage payments to respondent’s mortgagee, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring only a one-month notice period. We also
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellants
failed to establish a retaliation defense. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In 2016, respondent Juan Cuate bought a residence in South St. Paul. At the time
Cuate purchased the home, he planned for his aunt and uncle, appellants Pedro Cuate-
Dominguez and Francisca Roldan, to buy the property within two years. The parties orally
agreed that appellants would reside in the home and make monthly mortgage payments
directly to respondent’s mortgagee until appellants completed their purchase of the
residence in the two-year period that followed. But the parties never memorialized their
agreement in writing.
Appellants failed to buy the property from respondent within two years. Instead,
they continued living in the home and paid the mortgage each month from 2016 until 2023.
During that time, the mortgage payments were due in the first half of each month.
Appellants’ son made the mortgage payments to respondent’s mortgagee out of Roldan’s
2 bank account. One exception to this practice occurred in November 2023, when appellants
mailed payment to respondent instead of directly paying respondent’s mortgagee.
In 2023, appellants asked respondent to transfer title, but the parties could not agree
on a purchase price for the residence. On September 26, 2023, respondent mailed
appellants a written notice terminating the tenancy at will because he intended to sell the
property. The notice informed appellants that they had until November 1, 2023, to vacate
the premises. Appellants refused to leave the residence and would not provide respondent
with a copy of the keys to the property, preventing prospective buyers and real estate
professionals from accessing the home. Respondent filed an eviction complaint. The matter
proceeded to a two-day court trial in December, during which the district court heard
testimony from respondent, Roldan, and appellants’ son. 1
The district court later filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order in
respondent’s favor, and the court separately entered judgment for respondent. The district
court found that “[t]he parties had an oral month-to-month lease regarding the property at
issue” and that “[t]he notice was mailed on September 26, 2023 and received on
September 29, 2023.” Based on these findings, the district court determined that respondent
had provided appellants “sufficient notice to vacate by the end of the day on October 31,
2023[,]” that “[t]he fact that the notice indicated [appellants] had to vacate on or before
November 1, 2023, [did] not invalidate the notice[,]” and that the “[n]otice to vacate was
1 Consistent with the applicable standard of review, this factual summary is based on the evidence adduced at trial and other relevant proceedings before the district court, presented in the light most favorable to the court’s decision and with deference to the court’s credibility determinations.
3 properly given and [appellants] . . . failed to vacate said property.” Although the district
court acknowledged appellants’ “assert[ion] that [respondent was] retaliating against them
because they asserted their rights under an oral agreement to purchase the home[,]” the
district court reasoned that “a contract to purchase the real estate must be in writing
pursuant to the statute of frauds” 2 and that “[a]ny alleged [oral] contract to purchase is void
under the statute.” The district court therefore ruled that respondent could not “retaliate
against [appellants] for asserting a right under a void contract” and that “[t]here is otherwise
insufficient evidence to prove that [respondent’s] notice to vacate was retaliatory under the
existing month-to-month lease.”
This appeal follows.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by determining that respondent had provided appellants sufficient notice to terminate the tenancy at will?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by determining that appellants failed to establish a retaliation defense?
2 The statute of frauds, codified in Minnesota Statutes sections 513.01 through 513.07 (2022), provides in relevant part:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year or for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by the party’s lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing; and no such contract, when made by an agent, shall be entitled to record unless the authority of such agent be also recorded.
Minn. Stat. § 513.05 (2022).
4 ANALYSIS
Appellants challenge the district court’s eviction judgment in two ways. First,
appellants assert that the district court abused its discretion by requiring only a one-month
notice period to terminate the tenancy at will under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135.
Second, appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting their
retaliation defense. As explained below, we disagree with both arguments.
“[A]n eviction is a summary proceeding to determine an individual’s possessory
rights to real property.” Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.
App. 2018) (citing Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2016)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2018). “On review of a district court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district
court’s findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous.” NY Props., LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Minn. App. 2022); see
also Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Minn. App. 2014)
(“We review the district court’s findings for clear error and in the light most favorable to
the district court’s decision, and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations.”).
“In applying the clear-error standard, [an appellate court] view[s] the evidence in a light
favorable to the findings” and “will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on
the entire evidence, [the court is] left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quotations and citations omitted); see also Schuette, 977 N.W.2d at 865 (quoting this
aspect of Kenney).
5 “As for mixed questions of fact and law, we correct erroneous applications of law
but defer to the district court’s ultimate conclusions, which we review for abuse of
discretion.” Schuette, 977 N.W.2d at 865. And “[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question
of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621,
624 (Minn. 2016); see also Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of St. Cloud v. Royston, 990
N.W.2d 730, 735 (Minn. App. 2023) (quoting this aspect of Cocchiarella in an eviction
appeal), rev. denied (Aug. 22, 2023).
We address each of appellants’ assertions below.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that respondent provided appellants sufficient notice to terminate the tenancy at will.
Acknowledging that they occupied the residence as tenants at will, appellants
nonetheless maintain that they “did not pay rent” to respondent and instead “paid the costs
of the home.” According to appellants, “because no rent [was] due, respondent needed to
allow appellants three months to vacate” under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135.
Given that respondent only provided appellants notice one month before the termination of
their tenancy at will, appellants argue that the notice was “void” and that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that it was sufficient. Respondent counters that,
because appellants “made monthly periodic payments (albeit to the mortgage company) to
remain on the premises[,]” appellants paid monthly rent and the district court did not abuse
6 its discretion when it determined “that the notice to vacate was timely.” We agree with
respondent. 3
A tenancy at will “means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by
permission of the landlord but without a fixed ending date.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.001,
subd. 13 (2022); see also Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797, 797-98 (Minn. 1909)
(explaining that a tenancy at will “arise[s] by implication of law . . . where the tenant enters
into possession under an agreement to execute a contract for a specific term and [they]
subsequently refuse[] to do so, or one who enters under a void lease”). “A tenancy at will
may be terminated by either party by giving notice in writing. The time of the notice must
be at least as long as the interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever
is less.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.135. As used in section 504B.135, the term “rent” is not defined
3 We are also unpersuaded by appellants’ contention that respondent violated the South St. Paul Code of Ordinances by failing to obtain a rental license and that respondent therefore could not have collected “rent” for the purpose of determining the notice period under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135. Appellants rely on two nonprecedential cases in support of this argument. Both are distinguishable. In the first case appellants cite, we “conclude[d] that an eviction was not proper, in part, because respondent lacked a rental license,” but we also stated that “respondent and those in his situation are not without recourse” because “[r]espondent could have obtained an eviction with proper notice to quit.” Wajda v. Schmeichel, No. A18-0060, 2018 WL 6165295, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 26, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2019). As explained below, obtaining an eviction with proper notice to quit is exactly what respondent did here. The second case appellants cite is likewise inapposite because it is an appeal from an eviction action “based solely on [tenants’] failure to pay rent[,]” not on termination of a tenancy at will after written notice under section 504B.135, as in this case. See Beaumia v. Eisenbraun, No. A06-1482, 2007 WL 2472298, at *1 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 2007). Thus, even assuming without deciding that respondent failed to obtain a rental license, that failure—while troubling—would not alter our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that respondent provided appellants sufficient notice under section 504B.135.
7 by chapter 504B or another applicable statute. Nor has any precedential opinion defined
“rent” for purposes of section 504B.135.
Thus, to resolve the issue presented in this appeal, we must interpret section
504B.135, which requires our de novo review. See Royston, 990 N.W.2d at 735. “The
object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the
intention of the legislature.” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022)). “When interpreting
a statute, [appellate courts] must look first to the plain language of the statute.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d
487, 496 (Minn. 2009)). “When a statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts
is to enforce the statute according to its terms.” Id. (quoting Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics
Advanced Info. Sys., Inc., 869 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 2015)). We therefore apply the
plain meaning of unambiguous statutes and we do not “explore [an unambiguous statute’s]
spirit or purpose.” Id. (quoting Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624). “To determine the plain
meaning of a statute, the words and phrases in the statute are construed according to rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Id. (quoting State v.
Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019)). “[W]here the Legislature has not provided
definitions of the relevant terms, [appellate courts] may consider dictionary definitions to
determine a word’s common usage.” Laymon v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, 913 N.W.2d
449, 453 (Minn. 2018); see also Quinn v. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC, 972
N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting this aspect of Laymon in an eviction appeal),
rev. granted (June 29, 2022) and appeal dismissed, 985 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 2023).
8 The Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “rent” is “[c]onsideration paid, usu[ally]
periodically, for the use or occupancy of property (esp[ecially] real property).” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1554 (12th ed. 2024). This definition aligns with other definitions of “rent”
used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in contexts aside from section 504B.135. See, e.g.,
Nelson’s Off. Supply Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 508 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn.
1993) (in a certiorari appeal from the Minnesota Tax Court under the Minnesota
Apportionment and Alternative Minimum Tax statutes, observing that “Black’s Law
Dictionary defines ‘rent’ as ‘consideration paid for use or occupation of property’”); State
v. Royal Min. Ass’n, 156 N.W. 128, 129 (Minn. 1916) (in a property tax appeal concerning
iron mining leases, defining rent as “the compensation which the occupier pays the landlord
for that species of occupation which the contract between them allows” (quotation
omitted)). We therefore hold that, for the purpose of determining the notice period to
terminate a tenancy at will under section 504B.135, “rent” means regular, periodic
Applying this definition of “rent,” we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by determining that the one-month notice respondent provided to appellants
was sufficient under section 504B.135. It is undisputed that appellants had a tenancy at will
based on the parties’ oral agreement that appellants could continue residing in the residence
in exchange for making monthly mortgage payments directly to respondent’s mortgagee.
These payments were “consideration,” which is generally defined as “[s]omething (such as
an act, a forbearance, or a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from
a promisee; that which motivates a person to do something, esp[ecially] to engage in a legal
9 act.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 384. Indeed, the record reflects that appellants lived
in the residence for seven years while making payments to respondent’s mortgagee in the
first half of each month, the only exception being the November 2023 payment that
appellants mailed to respondent. Thus, each monthly mortgage payment constituted rent
for the purpose of section 504B.135 because it was regular, periodic consideration paid by
appellants for the use and occupation of the property. And because on September 26, 2023,
respondent mailed appellants notice that the tenancy at will would terminate on
November 1, 2023, “[t]he time of the notice” that respondent provided appellants was “at
least as long as the interval between the time rent is due”—one month. 4 Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.135.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that respondent provided appellants sufficient notice to terminate the tenancy
at will.
4 Although we recognize that the district court did not explicitly find that the “interval between the time the rent [was] due” for purposes of Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135 was one month, that finding was implicit in the district court’s determination that respondent had provided appellants “sufficient notice to vacate by the end of the day on October 31, 2023[,]” by mailing the notice on September 26, 2023, which appellants received on September 29, 2023. See White Earth Hous. Auth. v. Schwabe, 375 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Minn. App. 1985) (recognizing an implicit finding that a housing authority’s unlawful detainer action did not constitute a retaliatory eviction in a district court’s determination that a tenant had violated the terms of her lease (citing Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 240 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1976))). We also note that appellants do not challenge as clearly erroneous any of the district court’s findings about when respondent mailed the notice, when they received it, and the date on which respondent sought termination of the tenancy at will.
10 II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellants failed to establish a retaliation defense.
Appellants also assert that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting their
retaliation defense, maintaining that the eviction was “presumptively retaliatory” because
respondent mailed the notice to quit “less than 90 days after appellants sought to secure
their rights to the property” by asking respondent to transfer title in 2023. 5 Citing
Minnesota Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 2 (2022), appellants contend that
respondent failed to carry his burden of proving that the notice to quit was not mailed in
whole or part for a retaliatory purpose. Respondent argues that the district court properly
determined that appellants failed to establish a retaliation defense because the parties’ oral
agreement for appellants to purchase the property within two years was not a “landlord-
tenant” contract. We again agree with respondent.
A tenant may defend against “an action for recovery of premises following the
alleged termination of a tenancy by notice to quit” if the tenant can “prove by a fair
preponderance of the evidence” that “the alleged termination was intended in whole or part
as a penalty for the [tenant’s] good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease
or contract, oral or written, under the laws of the state or any of its governmental
subdivisions, or of the United States.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 2. “If the notice to
5 In their brief, appellants state that this request occurred in July 2023. The record citations appellants rely on for that proposition, however, do not reflect that the request occurred in July. Because our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting appellants’ retaliation defense is unaffected by this factual issue, we assume without deciding that appellants asked respondent to transfer title within 90 days of the September 26, 2023 notice.
11 quit was served within 90 days of the date of” such a good-faith attempt to secure or enforce
rights, “the burden of proving that the notice to quit was not served in whole or part for a
retaliatory purpose shall rest with the [landlord].” Id.
Here, the district court determined that respondent could not “retaliate against
[appellants] for asserting a right under a void contract.” Although the district court reached
this conclusion based on its determination that appellants’ oral agreement to buy the
residence was void under the statute of frauds, we need not decide that issue to conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting appellants’ retaliation
defense. 6
6 We are mindful of appellants’ argument that the district court “erred by making a finding beyond its authority” in ruling that the oral purchase agreement was void under the statute of frauds. See Eagan E. Ltd. P’ship v. Powers Investigations, Inc., 554 N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. App. 1996) (concluding that the district court “went beyond deciding issues determinative of the present right to possession” and “beyond the scope of an unlawful detainer” when it ruled on rent-increase clauses of commercial tenants’ leases and a request for attorney fees). But even assuming without deciding that the district court went beyond the issues determinative of respondent’s present right to possession here, appellate courts “will not reverse a correct decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasons.” Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). We nevertheless note that, according to their brief, appellants have reportedly commenced a separate action in the district court to determine their rights to the property under a constructive trust. We express no opinion about the validity of appellants’ oral agreement to buy the residence for purposes of their constructive-trust action, and nothing in this opinion should be construed as deciding any of the parties’ rights to the property beyond the eviction appeal that is before us. Cf. Amresco Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 631 N.W.2d 444, 444 (Minn. App. 2001) (affirming the district court’s rejection of appellants’ “proposal to enlarge the nature and scope of the eviction proceeding to hear their claims that respondent . . . was not entitled to possession of the property because of alleged defects in their underlying foreclosure” based on the conclusion that “appellants . . . chose[] the wrong forum to bring their claims”).
12 Appellants’ use and occupancy of the residence under a tenancy at will is undisputed
and evinced by the record. As appellants acknowledge, “the parties did not enter into a
lease or other formal agreement.” Construing Minnesota Statutes section 566.03,
subdivision 2(1) (1996)—a predecessor statute to section 504B.285, subdivision 2—we
have concluded that “the term contract” for purposes of a “good faith attempt to secure or
enforce rights under a lease or contract, oral or written . . . mean[s] a contract governing
the landlord-tenant relationship.” Cloverdale Foods of Minn., Inc. v. Pioneer Snacks, 580
N.W.2d 46, 51 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted). Given that appellants’ tenancy at
will stemmed from their continued possession of the premises with respondent’s
permission but without a fixed ending date, lease, or other formal agreement, see Minn.
Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 13, we cannot say that appellants’ oral agreement to buy the
residence within two years of their use and occupancy of the premises in 2016 was a
contract that governed the parties’ landlord-tenant relationship in 2023. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellants’
2023 request that respondent transfer title to them was not a good-faith attempt to secure
or enforce rights under a contract for purposes of section 504B.285, subdivision 2(1).
We likewise conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
that “[t]here is otherwise insufficient evidence to prove that [respondent’s] notice to [quit]
was retaliatory under the existing month-to-month lease.” Even if respondent bore “the
burden of proving that the notice to quit was not served in whole or part for a retaliatory
purpose” under section 504B.285, subdivision 2, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held
that “[a] nonretaliatory reason is a reason wholly unrelated to and unmotivated by any
13 good-faith activity on the part of the tenant protected by the statute[,]” such as
“nonpayment of rent, other material breach of covenant, continuing damage to premises by
tenants, or removal of housing unit from market for a sound business reason[].” Parkin,
240 N.W.2d at 832-33. And nothing in the record suggests that respondent’s notice to quit
followed a statutorily protected good-faith activity by appellants, such as reporting housing
code violations to authorities. See id. (holding that an eviction was retaliatory where “the
sequence of events . . . reveal[ed] a clear relationship between the notice to quit and [the]
landlord’s reaction to [the] tenants’ protected activities.”); see also Minn. Stat. § 504B.285,
subd. 2(2) (providing for a retaliation defense where “the alleged termination was intended
in whole or part as a penalty for the [tenant’s] good faith report to a governmental authority
of the [landlord’s] violation of a health, safety, housing, or building code or ordinance”).
Respondent testified that he decided to end the tenancy at will because he intended to sell
the property. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
decision and deferring to the court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations, we are
not left with a definite and firm conviction that the court committed a mistake in
determining that the record did not sufficiently demonstrate that respondent’s notice to quit
was retaliatory. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221; Schuette, 977 N.W.2d at 864-65; Bass,
849 N.W.2d at 91.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
appellants’ retaliation defense.
14 DECISION
Under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.135, to determine the notice period to
terminate a tenancy at will, “rent” means any regular, periodic consideration paid for the
use or occupation of property. Because appellants had a tenancy at will and paid monthly
rent in the form of mortgage payments, the proper notice period per section 504B.135 was
one month, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that respondent
provided appellants sufficient notice. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by
rejecting appellants’ retaliation defense.
Affirmed.