OPINION
LANCASTER, Justice.
We are confronted with the difficult and important issue of when to permit modification of an award of sole physical custody. This is a case involving a custody dispute that has lasted nearly three years; the parties in this case have been to the district court twice and the court of appeals twice before we granted review. The issue before us is whether parties who agree in their dissolution decree to grant sole physical custody to one parent may stipulate to a standard for modification of physical custody different than the standard provided by statute. We conclude that the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 518.18 (1998) for modification of sole physical custody apply even when the parties have stipulated to a different standard in their dissolution decree. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
Appellant, Sherrie L. Giese (formerly known as Sherrie L. Frauenshuh) and respondent, Ronald R. Frauenshuh, were married in October 1986. Their son Logan was born in March 1991, and was three years old at the time of the marital dissolution in November 1994.1 The parties’ judgment and decree of dissolution was based upon a stipulated marital termination agreement (MTA). Frauenshuh, who is a lawyer, was represented throughout the divorce, but Giese, who at the time of the dissolution was in training to be a county executive director for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture, was unrepresented at the time the agreement was signed. The MTA granted sole physical custody to Giese and awarded each parent joint legal custody.2 Frauenshuh was [155]*155awarded visitation on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings and every other weekend during the school year along with a four-week extended visitation in the summer. The MTA provided:
The modification statute, Minn.Stat. § 518.18 shall not be applicable for a modification under the following situations:
1. If either party shall move a distance greater than fifty (50) miles. Under this circumstance, the best interest of the child will be thoroughly examined pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.17.
The agreement provided that if either party moved, the move would “constitute a substantial change in circumstances and the [visitation] schedule will be re-done in [a] fair manner.”
Giese learned in August 1996 that she had been appointed to the job of county executive director for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture in Cambridge. Two days after accepting her new job, Giese notified Frauenshuh of her new position, and she moved with Logan to Cambridge from Ortonville. Following Giese’s decision to move, Frauenshuh brought a motion for modification of physical custody, claiming that he was entitled to a de novo review of custody because Giese’s 150-mile move constituted a substantial change in circumstances pursuant to the parties’ MTA.
A.District court’s initial order
The district court issued an order dated November 18, 1996, allowing Giese to move with Logan to Cambridge. The district court relied upon the endangerment standard found in Minn.Stat. § 518.18 and rejected the best interests standard of Minn.Stat. § 518.17 (1998) stipulated to by the parties in their dissolution decree. Specifically, the district court found that even if Frauenshuh’s allegations were substantiated at an evidentiary hearing, there was no showing that Logan’s environment endangered his physical or emotional development.
B. First decision of the court of appeals
Frauenshuh appealed, and the court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, reversed in part and remanded the case to the district court, instructing the district court to apply the best interests standard as found in the parties’ dissolution decree. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, No. C8-96-2609, 1997 WL 275002 (Minn.App. May 27, 1997) (Giese I). The court of appeals noted that even if Frauenshuh and Giese “should not have been allowed to stipulate to a standard other than the one in the statute, they did so, the trial court approved the stipulation, judgment was entered thereon, and there was no appeal.” Id. at *1 (citations omitted). Giese did not petition this court for further review of the court of appeals’ decision.
C. District court order on remand
On remand, the district court considered the case on affidavits and written arguments; no new oral testimony was taken. The district court determined that Giese’s move with Logan was “unilateral,” and ordered that no evidence of events occurring after October 16, 1996, could be submitted. This restriction was coupled with an agreement by the parties in their MTA that because each was in a temporary [156]*156work situation,3 the parties agreed that “no evidence shall be introduced during the period regarding [the temporary work] situations for a change of custody proceeding.” The district court determined that Giese’s training period lasted from December 1, 1994, until November 30, 1995, and ruled that no evidence from this time period would be considered in determining custody. Essentially, because of the parties’ stipulation and the district court’s ruling, the time period from which to evaluate custody was reduced to December 1995 to September 1996, just 10 months of Logan’s life. Logan was almost seven years old when the district court issued its order on February 9, 1998, ruling: “[1] It is in Logan’s best interest to reside with [Giese] in Ortonville, MN; [2] In the event # 1 above is not a possibility, it is in Logan’s best interests to reside in Ortonville, MN, with [Frauenshuh].” The district court ordered that physical custody of Logan be awarded to Frauenshuh, but stayed its order pending appeal.4
D. Second decision of the court of appeals
Giese appealed and the court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, affirmed the district court. Frauenshuh v. Giese, No. C8-98-444, 1998 WL 481890 (Minn.App. Aug.18, 1998) (Giese II). We granted Giese’s petition for review, which included a claim that the court of appeals in Giese I erred by remanding the case to the district court for a determination using the best interests standard contained in the parties’ MTA. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04 (“On appeal from or review of an order the appellate courts may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment. They may review any other matter as the interest of justice may require.”).
Our role in reviewing custody modification cases is limited. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.1985). An appellate court will not reverse a custody determination unless the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. See id. On appeal, a district court’s findings of fact, whether based on documentary or oral evidence, are not set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the record is reviewed in a light most favorable to the findings. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn.1993).
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OPINION
LANCASTER, Justice.
We are confronted with the difficult and important issue of when to permit modification of an award of sole physical custody. This is a case involving a custody dispute that has lasted nearly three years; the parties in this case have been to the district court twice and the court of appeals twice before we granted review. The issue before us is whether parties who agree in their dissolution decree to grant sole physical custody to one parent may stipulate to a standard for modification of physical custody different than the standard provided by statute. We conclude that the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 518.18 (1998) for modification of sole physical custody apply even when the parties have stipulated to a different standard in their dissolution decree. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
Appellant, Sherrie L. Giese (formerly known as Sherrie L. Frauenshuh) and respondent, Ronald R. Frauenshuh, were married in October 1986. Their son Logan was born in March 1991, and was three years old at the time of the marital dissolution in November 1994.1 The parties’ judgment and decree of dissolution was based upon a stipulated marital termination agreement (MTA). Frauenshuh, who is a lawyer, was represented throughout the divorce, but Giese, who at the time of the dissolution was in training to be a county executive director for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture, was unrepresented at the time the agreement was signed. The MTA granted sole physical custody to Giese and awarded each parent joint legal custody.2 Frauenshuh was [155]*155awarded visitation on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings and every other weekend during the school year along with a four-week extended visitation in the summer. The MTA provided:
The modification statute, Minn.Stat. § 518.18 shall not be applicable for a modification under the following situations:
1. If either party shall move a distance greater than fifty (50) miles. Under this circumstance, the best interest of the child will be thoroughly examined pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.17.
The agreement provided that if either party moved, the move would “constitute a substantial change in circumstances and the [visitation] schedule will be re-done in [a] fair manner.”
Giese learned in August 1996 that she had been appointed to the job of county executive director for the Minnesota Department of Agriculture in Cambridge. Two days after accepting her new job, Giese notified Frauenshuh of her new position, and she moved with Logan to Cambridge from Ortonville. Following Giese’s decision to move, Frauenshuh brought a motion for modification of physical custody, claiming that he was entitled to a de novo review of custody because Giese’s 150-mile move constituted a substantial change in circumstances pursuant to the parties’ MTA.
A.District court’s initial order
The district court issued an order dated November 18, 1996, allowing Giese to move with Logan to Cambridge. The district court relied upon the endangerment standard found in Minn.Stat. § 518.18 and rejected the best interests standard of Minn.Stat. § 518.17 (1998) stipulated to by the parties in their dissolution decree. Specifically, the district court found that even if Frauenshuh’s allegations were substantiated at an evidentiary hearing, there was no showing that Logan’s environment endangered his physical or emotional development.
B. First decision of the court of appeals
Frauenshuh appealed, and the court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, reversed in part and remanded the case to the district court, instructing the district court to apply the best interests standard as found in the parties’ dissolution decree. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, No. C8-96-2609, 1997 WL 275002 (Minn.App. May 27, 1997) (Giese I). The court of appeals noted that even if Frauenshuh and Giese “should not have been allowed to stipulate to a standard other than the one in the statute, they did so, the trial court approved the stipulation, judgment was entered thereon, and there was no appeal.” Id. at *1 (citations omitted). Giese did not petition this court for further review of the court of appeals’ decision.
C. District court order on remand
On remand, the district court considered the case on affidavits and written arguments; no new oral testimony was taken. The district court determined that Giese’s move with Logan was “unilateral,” and ordered that no evidence of events occurring after October 16, 1996, could be submitted. This restriction was coupled with an agreement by the parties in their MTA that because each was in a temporary [156]*156work situation,3 the parties agreed that “no evidence shall be introduced during the period regarding [the temporary work] situations for a change of custody proceeding.” The district court determined that Giese’s training period lasted from December 1, 1994, until November 30, 1995, and ruled that no evidence from this time period would be considered in determining custody. Essentially, because of the parties’ stipulation and the district court’s ruling, the time period from which to evaluate custody was reduced to December 1995 to September 1996, just 10 months of Logan’s life. Logan was almost seven years old when the district court issued its order on February 9, 1998, ruling: “[1] It is in Logan’s best interest to reside with [Giese] in Ortonville, MN; [2] In the event # 1 above is not a possibility, it is in Logan’s best interests to reside in Ortonville, MN, with [Frauenshuh].” The district court ordered that physical custody of Logan be awarded to Frauenshuh, but stayed its order pending appeal.4
D. Second decision of the court of appeals
Giese appealed and the court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, affirmed the district court. Frauenshuh v. Giese, No. C8-98-444, 1998 WL 481890 (Minn.App. Aug.18, 1998) (Giese II). We granted Giese’s petition for review, which included a claim that the court of appeals in Giese I erred by remanding the case to the district court for a determination using the best interests standard contained in the parties’ MTA. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04 (“On appeal from or review of an order the appellate courts may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment. They may review any other matter as the interest of justice may require.”).
Our role in reviewing custody modification cases is limited. See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.1985). An appellate court will not reverse a custody determination unless the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. See id. On appeal, a district court’s findings of fact, whether based on documentary or oral evidence, are not set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the record is reviewed in a light most favorable to the findings. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn.1993).
We begin our analysis by looking to the definitions of physical and legal custody provided by the legislature. The legislature has defined physical custody and residence as “the routine daily care and control and the residence of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (1998). The legislature has defined legal custody as “the right to determine the child’s upbringing, including education, health care, and religious training.” Id. at subd. 3(a). Joint legal custody is defined as “both parents [having] equal rights and responsibilities, including the right to participate in major decisions determining the child’s upbringing, including education, health care, and religious training.” Id. at subd. 3(b).
Here, the parties’ stipulated dissolution decree awarded sole physical custody to Giese and awarded each parent joint legal custody. Frauenshuh argued at the district court that de facto joint physical [157]*157custody existed based on the amount of time he spent 'with Logan. This argument was rejected by the district court, which described Frauenshuh’s argument as “way off base.” We have held that when parties have agreed to a specific denomination of physical and legal custody and that denomination has been accepted by the district court, the parties will be bound by it. See Ayers, 508 N.W.2d at 520. Such denominations, we have said, “will require careful drafting by the parties in the first instance [and] will provide more certainty in resolving future disputes.” Id. Thus, we will consider the parties’ claims in light of the award of sole physical custody to Giese as contained in their dissolution decree.
As we stated nearly three decades ago in Tammen v. Tammen: “Courts * * * will be controlled by the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration.” 289 Minn. 28, 30, 182 N.W.2d 840, 842 (1970). At the same time, the role of the courts in dissolution proceedings is “strictly limited to that provided for by statute.” Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn.1979); see also Morey v. Pepfin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn.1985) (stating that “statutes have superseded the common law in most aspects of family law”); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Minn.1981) (stating that “dissolution is a statutory action and the authority of the trial court is limited to that provided for by statute”) (citation omitted).
The legislature has established procedures and standards for modification of physical custody. Modification of sole physical custody orders is governed by Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d). Section 518.18(d) provides that the court shall retain the custody arrangement previously ordered unless:
(i) both parties agree to the modification;
(ii) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with the consent of the other party; or
(iii) the child’s present environment endangers the child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.
Id. Here, the parties have not agreed to the modification and the district court found, on a record that amply supported the finding, that the child had not been integrated into the family of Frauenshuh with the consent of the other party.5 The remaining provision, subdivision (iii), which is referred to sometimes as the “endangerment” standard, is the fulcrum of this custody dispute.
A party seeking a modification of physical custody under subdivision (iii) must establish four elements to make a prima facie case for modification: (1) circumstances have changed involving the child or custodial parent; (2) the modification would be in the best interests of the child; (3) the child’s physical or emotional health or emotional development is endangered by his or her present environment; and (4) that harm associated with the proposed change in custody would be outweighed by the benefits of the change. See Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d); see also Valentine v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn.1994).
The legislature has provided different standards for cases involving awards of joint physical custody than cases involving sole physical custody. When joint custody [158]*158is awarded, the statute allows parents to bind the court to a stipulated standard for modification of custody. See Minn.Stat. § 518.18(e) (1998). Section 518.18(e) provides:
In deciding whether to modify a prior joint custody order, the court shall apply the standards set forth in paragraph (d) unless: (1) the parties agree in writing to the application of a different standard, or (2) the party seeking the modification is asking the court for permission to move the residence of the child to another state.
Id. (emphasis added). In marked contrast, the legislature has not enacted a comparable provision for parties to agree to a different modification standard when one parent is awarded sole physical custody. If the legislature wanted parties to be afforded the opportunity to stipulate to a different modification standard in cases involving sole physical custody, it would have said so with unambiguous language, as it did for joint custody situations. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1998) (providing purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intentions of the legislature and the courts will not disregard the plain language of statutes). We conclude that section 518.18 unambiguously provides that the endangerment standard applies to parties seeking a modification of an award of sole physical custody.
The determination by the legislature to provide different standards for modification of sole physical and joint physical custody awards “is indicative of a legislative intent to impart a measure of stability to custody determinations in most circumstances.” State ex rel. Gunderson v. Preuss, 336 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Minn.1983). Our case law is in accordance with the approach taken by the legislature and reflects a settled policy view that stability of custody is usually in the child’s best interest. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711-12.6
In this case, the court of appeals in Giese I determined that the parties should be permitted (or at least had in fact been permitted by the district court order approving the marital termination agreement) to establish their own standard for modification of custody, despite the legislature’s clear intent to limit the application of the best interests standard of section 518.17 to situations involving joint physical custody. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in remanding the case to the district court for application of the best interests standard agreed to by the parties.7
We acknowledge the importance of stipulations as a means for resolving martial dissolutions and in no way seek to discourage creative and amicable resolution of these cases within the confines of the law. We have said that considerable weight will be given to stipulations entered with the benefit of counsel, but the para[159]*159mount consideration is the welfare and best interests of the children. See Petersen v. Petersen, 296 Minn. 147, 148, 206 N.W.2d 658, 659 (1973) (stating that courts are not bound by stipulations). We have held that parties may stipulate to waive statutory rights in dissolution cases. See Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn.1989) (allowing for an express waiver of spousal maintenance). However, we cannot allow parties to contravene the plain and unambiguous intent of the legislature to provide permanence and closure in child custody matters. We cannot equate decisions regarding child custody to decisions regarding property. It is one thing to hold for another day issues related to money or property of a party; it is quite another to permit a stipulation which effectively holds for another day the decision of who has custody of a child.
Based upon the plain language provided by the legislature, we hold that the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 518.18 for modification of sole physical custody apply even when the parties have stipulated to a different standard in their dissolution decree. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals and conclude that the district court correctly applied the endangerment standard of section 518.18(e) in its original ruling.8 Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.