Marlon Rosasen v. Kingdom of Norway
This text of Marlon Rosasen v. Kingdom of Norway (Marlon Rosasen v. Kingdom of Norway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 15 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLON ABRAHAM ROSASEN, No. 22-55980
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-06811-SPG-SP and
DTR, a minor; LAR, a minor, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiffs,
v.
KINGDOM OF NORWAY, as Responsible Party for the Following Agencies and Instrumentalities; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 15, 2024**
Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Plaintiff-Appellant Marlon Abraham Rosasen appeals pro se from the
district court’s order dismissing his First Amended Complaint (FAC) against
Defendant-Appellee Kingdom of Norway.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to allege
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Broidy Cap.
Mgmt., LLC v. State of Qatar, 982 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2020). We conclude
Norway is immune from suit under the FSIA because Rosasen has not pointed to
any applicable exception to sovereign immunity.
1. The district court appropriately addressed sovereign immunity sua sponte
because “federal jurisdiction does not exist unless one of the exceptions to
immunity from suit applies.” Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117,
1125 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Rosasen contends the
district court erred by litigating on Norway’s behalf, but “even if the foreign state
does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a District Court still
must determine that immunity is unavailable.” Peterson, 627 F.3d at 1125
(quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983)).
1 When we refer to “Norway,” we also refer to the defendant agencies and instrumentalities of Norway. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b)(2). Rosasen does not contest the district court’s dismissal of all individual defendants, so that issue is waived. See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 The plaintiff must “prove that immunity does not exist.” Id.
Rosasen asserts that the FSIA’s domestic tort exception to immunity applies
to his claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). But that exception does not apply to
“any claim arising out of malicious prosecution [or] abuse of process.” Id.
§ 1605(a)(5)(B). Rosasen alleged that Norway instigated and supported his wife’s
custody petition under the Hague Convention and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, which resulted in his wife obtaining custody of their
children. See Rosasen v. Rosasen, No. 20-55459, 2023 WL 128617 (9th Cir. Jan.
9, 2023). Although Rosasen did not plead malicious prosecution or abuse of
process claims, the gravamen of his claims is that Norway “misused legal
procedures” to return his children to Norway. Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of
Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Rosasen’s
claims are all predicated on Norway’s alleged “wrongful use of legal process,” the
exception in § 1605(a)(5) does not apply. Id. at 1204; see also id. at 1203 (holding
that the defendant was immune from emotional distress and loss of consortium
claims because those claims “derive from the same corpus of allegations” as abuse
of process and malicious prosecution claims). Rosasen’s use of labels such as
kidnapping, deprivation of rights, or conspiracy is insufficient to apply the
exception because “[w]e look beyond the complaint’s characterization to the
conduct on which the claim is based.” Id. at 1203 (alterations omitted) (quoting
3 Mt. Homes, Inc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff
“cannot overcome sovereign immunity for claims of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process by calling them a different name.” Id. at 1206.
We also reject Rosasen’s argument that Norway’s alleged acts fall under the
commercial tort exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Rosasen’s suit is not “based
upon,” id., commercial acts by Norway, such as hiring a law firm, because even if
the commercial acts were proven, “those facts alone entitle [Rosasen] to nothing
under [his] theory of the case.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358 (1993);
see also Broidy, 982 F.3d at 594 (concluding that claims were not based on
commercial activity when there was merely a connection between noncommercial
torts and commercial conduct, “such as the hiring of a public relations firm”).
Absent any applicable exception to sovereign immunity, the district court properly
dismissed the FAC for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Because Rosasen’s claims all arise from alleged conduct for which Norway
is immune, “it is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved by
amendment,” and the district court properly denied leave to amend. Webb v.
Trader Joe’s Co., 999 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Eminence Cap.,
LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). Without
any likelihood of success on the merits, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to appoint counsel. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965,
4 970 (9th Cir. 2009). We also reject Rosasen’s argument that the district court
committed reversible error by failing to order the clerk of court to effectuate
service on Norway, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), because his claims fail regardless
of whether Norway was served, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
AFFIRMED.2
2 We deny as moot the motions to file supplemental exhibits and a supplemental brief. Dkts. 7, 15.
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