Markman v. Lehman

987 F. Supp. 25, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847, 1997 WL 765776
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedDecember 3, 1997
DocketCIV.A. 96-2635 (JR)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 987 F. Supp. 25 (Markman v. Lehman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Markman v. Lehman, 987 F. Supp. 25, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847, 1997 WL 765776 (D.D.C. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ROBERTSON, District Judge.

This is an action for review under 35 U.S.C. § 145 of a Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) decision rejecting all fifteen claims in United States Patent No. Re.33,054 (“the ’054 patent”) for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The ’054 patent was before the PTO on reexamination pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07. The relief plaintiff seeks is an order compelling the PTO to issue a reexamination certificate. This memorandum sets forth the Court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law after a bench trial held August 11-13,1997.

BACKGROUND

The ‘054 patent covers an inventory control and reporting system in which bar codes are printed in coincidence with transactions having associated articles. Exh. 1. The patent discloses a preferred embodiment in which bar codes are printed in coincidence with dry-cleaning transactions in which the associated articles are garments to be cleaned. Id.

The ‘054 patent originated with patent application 06/599,948 (the ‘948 application), filed with the PTO on April 13, 1984 by plaintiff Herbert L. Markman, who is the named inventor. On October 29, 1985, the PTO issued the application as United States Patent No. 4,550,246 (“the ‘246 patent”), having 13 claims covering an inventory control and reporting system. Stip. Facts ¶¶ 5-6. On August 28, 1987, Markman filed an application for the reissue of the ‘246 patent, adding two new claims. Id. ¶ 7-8. On September 12, 1989, the PTO reissued the ‘246 patent as the ‘054 patent, having 15 claims. Id. ¶ 9.

On August 26, 1993, a competitor of Mark-man filed a request for reexamination of the ‘054 patent. Id. ¶ 10. A PTO examiner granted the reexamination request and rejected claims 1-15 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103 for obviousness. The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection on September 25, 1996. Plaintiff filed the present suit on November 21,1996.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Reexamination” pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 is a procedure by which the Commissioner may resolve a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 303. Cf. In re Recreative Technologies Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1398 (Fed.Cir.1996) (no reexamination for questions of patentability decided in the original examination). A patent undergoing reexamination has no presumption of validity. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed.Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828, 106 S.Ct. 88, 88 L.Ed.2d 72 (1985).

The PTO can reject claims during reexamination when the rejection is supported by a combination of prior art previously before the PTO and prior art previously not before the PTO, but not if it is supported only by prior art previously considered by the PTO in relation to the same or broader claims. Etter, 756 F.2d at 855. In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed.Cir.1997). In this case, prior art was brought to the PTO’s attention that had not been previously considered by the PTO and reexamination was granted because this art raised a substantial new question of patentability.

In a proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 145 the Court may find that the applicant is entitled to a patent “as the facts in the case may appear.” Id. Basically,

[t]he thrust of [a § 145] complaint is that the decision of the board is erroneous on the facts, the law, or both. Indeed, the board’s, decision is the jurisdictional base for the suit and the record before the office is the evidentiary nucleus. The proceed *29 ing, however, is not simply an appeal since the parties are entitled to submit additional evidence. Thus, an action under § 145 is conducted as a trial; however, it is in essence a suit to set aside the final decision of the board ....

Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (Fed.Cir.1985). In light of the hybrid nature of a § 145 proceeding, which has aspects of both a trial and an appeal, the appropriate standard of review is as follows:

[I]n the absence of additional evidence affecting a particular finding, a finding of fact by the board may be set aside by the district court if clearly erroneous.... [W]here new evidence is presented to the district court on a disputed fact question, a de novo finding will be necessary to take such evidence into account together with the evidence before the board.

Id. at 1038. In the present case, the parties presented additional evidence on nearly every issue.

THE OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATION

A patent may not be granted if

the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.

35 U.S.C. § 103. While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the obviousness determination is based on fact. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). Determining whether the claimed invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill requires the finder of fact (a) to review the scope and content of the prior art, (b) to ascertain the level of ordinary skill in the art, and (c) to identify the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention. Id. Factors such as commercial success and long-felt but unresolved need are secondary but also relevant to the obviousness determination. Id.

A. Scope of the Prior Art

The prior art relevant to an obviousness determination includes references within the inventor’s particular field of endeavor and any “analogous art.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed.Cir.1995).

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987 F. Supp. 25, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1385, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19847, 1997 WL 765776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/markman-v-lehman-dcd-1997.