Marian A. Byrum, Under the Last Will and Testament of Milliken C. Byrum, Deceased v. United States
This text of 440 F.2d 949 (Marian A. Byrum, Under the Last Will and Testament of Milliken C. Byrum, Deceased v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
This is an appeal by the United States from an adverse ruling of the District Court, 311 F.Supp. 892, on the issue of whether certain assets transferred into an irrevocable trust could be included in decedent-grantor’s estate by operation of 26 U.S.C. § 2036.1 The action arose by a claim for refund of taxes paid and was decided on motions for summary judgment with a stipulated set of facts. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
That portion of the trust agreement2 that the Government contends made the [951]*951assets transferred into trust includable in the grantor’s estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2036 relates to the grantor’s retained powers to: 1) vote the shares of unlisted stock in the trust corpus; 2) veto the transfer by the trustee of any of these shares of stock; and 3) to remove and appoint a successor corporate trustee at will. It should be noted that the shares of unlisted stock transferred into trust [952]*952were those of a closed corporation, and the grantor’s retaining of the right to vote the stock in trust combined with the stock he personally retained kept him in voting control of the corporation.
The Government’s principal argument is that the powers retained by grantor made the value of the shares of stock transferred into trust includable in his estate because the grantor retained for his life “the possession or enjoyment of * * * the property * * 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (1). The District Court properly concluded that the retaining of the power to veto the sale of these shares of stock by the trustee did not, under present interpretation of the statute, make the value of the shares transferred includable in the grantor’s estate, see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123, 73 L.Ed. 410 (1929); Michigan Trust Company v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960); Hays’ Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1950); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1947); Estate of Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967); Cf., State Street Trust Company v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). Nor, for that matter, did the grantor’s retaining of the power to replace the trustee by another corporate trustee make the value of the shares includable. See Estate of Budd, supra and cf. Rev.Reg. 20.2036-1 (b) (3) with n. 2 Trust Agreement, Article VIII.
The only power retained by the grantor which may possibly have made the transferred assets includable in his estate was the power to vote the unlisted shares of stock. The District Court concluded that this did not make the assets includable and we agree. Several cases have considered this aspect of retained control and have concluded that it is not sufficient to make the value of shares transferred in trust includable in the grantor’s estate. See Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962); Yeasel v. Coyle, 2 CCH Fed.Estate and Gift Tax Rep. (68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) ¶ 12,524. The Government’s attempt to distinguish these cases is without substance. In addition, the Government’s reliance on United States v. O’Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 86 S.Ct. 1123, 16 L.Ed.2d 145 (1966) and Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968) is inappropriate under the facts of the present case. In O’Malley the crucial factor making the value of the transferred assets includable in the grantor’s estate was that the grantor retained the power to regulate or allocate the distribution of income. Similarly, in Joy v. United States, supra, it was the grantor’s retained power to accumulate and distribute income which proved fatal. This was not the situation under the present trust agreement. See n. 2 Trust Agreement, Pars. 5.13, 5.15, 6.02, 9.02. The Government contends that since the grantor remained in voting control of the corporation he could, by electing the Board of Directors, determine dividend policies and thus the grantor could indirectly regulate or control who enjoyed the income from the property. However, the grant- or by retaining the voting right of the stock only controlled who could serve as directors of the corporation. These individual directors would then be under a fiduciary obligation to exercise sound business judgment in declaring dividends and could not act in bad faith to the injury of the beneficial owners of the stock. This obligation is governed by an ascertainable standard and is analogous to the situation which exists in cases where the grantor retains broad managerial control of a trust, see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, supra; Jennings v. Smith, supra; Estate of Budd, supra, and does not result in making these assets includable in the grant- or’s estate.
While Revenue Ruling 67-54, 1967-1 Cum.Bull. 269, strictly construed is distinguishable from the facts in this case, it does tend to support the position advanced by the Government on this appeal. Rulings, however, do not have the force of law and are at most merely persuasive. Lincoln Savings and Loan Association v. Commissioner of Internal [953]*953Revenue, 422 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1970), U.S.App.Pndg.; 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 3.20. Insofar as such Ruling might be applied to the facts of this case, it is in conflict with the law as interpreted by the courts and should be disregarded. United States Truck Sales Company v. United States, 229 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1956); First Kentucky Company v. Gray, 190 F.Supp. 824, 825 (W.D.Ky., 1960), affirmed 309 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1962).
The judgment is affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
440 F.2d 949, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1744, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10865, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marian-a-byrum-under-the-last-will-and-testament-of-milliken-c-byrum-ca6-1971.