1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA PALOMA LEMUS PEREZ, No. 1:26-cv-00064-DMC (HC) 12 Petitioner, ORDER 13 v. 14 TODD M. LYONS, et. al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding with counsel, brings this petition 18 for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, 19 ECF Nos. 7 and 8, this case is before the undersigned judge for all purposes, including entry of a 20 final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); see also ECF No. 10 (consent order). Pending before the 21 Court is Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, ECF No. 2. Respondents filed a 22 response, ECF No. 5, and Petitioner filed a reply, ECF No. 9. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who entered the United States in October 2023. See 26 ECF No. 2-2, pg. 8. According to Petitioner, she left Mexico “after a cartel leader attempted to 27 murder her and forced her daughter into sexual servitude.” Id. Petitioner was “apprehended at or 28 near the border over two weeks after her initial entry to the United States.” ECF No. 9, pg. 2. 1 Then, Petitioner was “issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging her with removability under 2 INA Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (non-citizen who is present without parole or inspection is 3 inadmissible).” ECF No. 2-2, pg. 9. Petitioner filed an application for asylum, settled in the Los 4 Angeles area with her children and subsequently became engaged to a U.S. citizen.” Id. Petitioner 5 contends that she has no criminal convictions. See id. at 10. Respondents do not challenge this 6 claim. See ECF No. 5. 7 On November 6, 2025, when reporting to ICE as instructed, Petitioner was 8 detained by ICE. See ECF No. 2-2, pg. 2. While in detention, prior to filing a petition in this 9 Court, Petitioner made a request to be released on bond, which was subsequently denied “based 10 on the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) assertion that he lacks jurisdiction under Matter of Yajure 11 Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).” ECF No. 2-2, pg. 2. 12 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 A temporary restraining order (TRO) is an extraordinary remedy. In general, 15 “[t]emporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary 16 injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1 17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal citations omitted); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a). 18 For both a TRO and a preliminary injunction, courts consider whether Petitioner 19 has established: “ [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 20 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 21 favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 22 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. 23 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a 24 petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements 25 using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may 26 support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner shows that there are “serious questions on the 27 merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and 28 that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, Petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] 1 serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] 2 sharply” in Petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35. The 3 Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s Motion. 4 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 5 Petitioner argues she is likely to succeed on her claim that, “[a]s a member of the 6 Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner is entitled to consideration for release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 7 1226(a),” ECF No. 1, pg. 7, because Petitioner’s re-detention is punitive and occurred without 8 notice and without a custody hearing, ECF No. 2-2, pgs. 16-20 (citing Bond Eligible Class 9 certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 U.S. Dist. 10 LEXIS 231977, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)). Petitioner asserts that substantive 11 due process requires that immigration detention “be justified by a sufficient purpose . . . either (1) 12 dangerousness or (2) flight risk.” ECF No. 2-2, pg. 11. Petitioner asserts she is “neither a danger 13 nor a flight risk,” she has no criminal convictions, and therefore her detention is not justified. See 14 id. at 17. 15 Petitioner contends that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “explicitly 16 acknowledged that individuals who have already entered the United States and are not 17 apprehended within 100 miles of the border or within 14 days of entry are subject to discretionary 18 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not mandatory detention under § 1225(b)” during oral 19 arguments for Jennings v. Rodriguez. Id. at 13 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, 20 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (No. 15-1204)). Thus, Petitioner argues that she is 21 not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), because she was “encountered in 22 the interior of the country more than two weeks after entry.” Id. at 16. 23 Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 24 § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is ineligible as a Bautista class member because Petitioner1 “was 25 apprehended upon her arrival in the United States.” ECF No. 5, pgs. 1-2. Respondents contend 26
27 1 Respondents state that “Respondent was apprehended . . . Respondent concedes as much . . .,” but cites to Petitioner’s petition to support these assertions. Thus, the Court assumes 28 Respondents meant to say Petitioner in those sentences. 1 that because Petitioner’s petition and motion for TRO rely on Petitioner being a member of the 2 Bautista class, her petition and motion should be denied. See id. at 2. Respondents assert that 3 “even if [Petitioner’s] release document cited 8 U.S.C. § 1226,” Petitioner still has not been 4 admitted and therefore is subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. Thus, Respondents assert that because 5 Petitioner is “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), Respondents assert that ICE 6 has the discretion to re-detain Petitioner at any time.” Id. 7 1. Bautista Class Eligibility 8 In Bautista, the District Court certified a nationwide Bond Eligible Class, defined 9 as: “[a]ll noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter 10 the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and 11 (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at 12 the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.” Bautista 13 v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 LX 563862, at *26-27 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 14 2025). The following month, the District Court declared that Bond Eligible Class members are: 15 “detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are not subject to mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2) 16 . . . and are entitled to consideration for release on bond by immigration officers and, if not 17 released, a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge.” Bautista v. Santacruz, 18 No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 LX 523334, at *88 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 19 Though Respondents argue the Petitioner is not a member of the class because she 20 was apprehended when she arrived, it appears Respondents solely rely on the language in 21 Petitioner’s petition to support that claim. See ECF No. 5, pg. 2 (quoting ECF No. 2-2, pg. 9) 22 (“[Petitioner] was apprehended upon her arrival in the United States. [Petitioner] concedes as 23 much, stating in her motion for a temporary restraining order that she ‘was apprehended after her 24 entry and issued . .’”). In her reply, Petitioner clarified that she was “apprehended at or near the 25 border over two weeks after her initial entry to the United States.” ECF No. 9, pg. 2. Given that 26 Respondents’ argument relies on Petitioner’s representation, and Petitioner clarified in the Reply 27 that Petitioner was apprehended over fourteen days after her arrival, the Court finds Petitioner has 28 established a strong likelihood of success in showing she is a member of the Bautista Bond Class 1 and therefore entitled to the status afforded to class members in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25- 2 cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 LX 523334 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 3 2. Due Process 4 Given Respondents’ challenges to Petitioner’s class membership, the Court will 5 additionally consider the likelihood of success on the merits of Petitioner’s due process claims, 6 assuming arguendo that Petitioner is not eligible for class membership. 7 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 8 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 9 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 10 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 11 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 12 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 13 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. 14 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether 15 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines 16 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with 17 the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 18 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 19 the question remains what process is due.”). The Court considers each step in turn. 20 a. Liberty Interest 21 Respondents argue that because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 22 pursuant to §1225(b)(2), which the Court will address in the following section, “ICE has the 23 discretion to re-detain Petitioner at anytime.” ECF NO. 5, pg. 2. This Court disagrees and finds 24 Petitioner has shown she has a protectable liberty interest. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 25 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 26 restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 27 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 28 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” 1 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in some 2 circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 3 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates 4 ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only 5 if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 6 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a noncitizen release from custody pending 7 immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo 8 Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 9 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a protected 10 liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them 11 with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- 12 cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 13 Sections 1225 and 1226 both govern the detention and removal of noncitizens 14 from the United States. However, § 1225 provides for mandatory detention of certain individuals, 15 while § 1226 establishes a discretionary detention scheme. Section 1225 provides that a 16 noncitizen “who is an applicant for admission . . . shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In 17 contrast, under Section 1226’s discretionary scheme, a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained 18 pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C 19 § 1226(a). Pending this decision, the Attorney General may continue to detain the arrested 20 individual or may release the individual on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C § 1226(a)(2)(A)– 21 (B). Section 1226(a) affords noncitizens a statutory right to a bond hearing before an immigration 22 judge. Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025)2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 23 2 Respondents assert that because this case, Bostock, is pending Ninth Circuit appeal, and 24 “the issues in [Bostock] are likely to be dispositive of the issues in this case, Respondents ask that any further briefing deadline be held in abeyance until the resolution of the [Bostock]case.” ECF 25 No. 5, pgs. 2-3. To the extent that Respondents seek to delay briefing on the merits due to this appeal, the Court will consider such a delay should Respondents file a motion to that effect. 26 Additionally, Respondents contend that their opposition to the TRO is substantively the same as 27 their opposition to the petition itself, and therefore their opposition to the TRO “contains the entirety of the Respondents’ opposition to both forms of relief.” Id. at 2, n. 1. However, “a request 28 for affirmative relief is not proper when raised for the first time in an opposition.” Smith v. 1 1236.1(d)); see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding 2 that under “§ 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may request a bond hearing 3 before an IJ at any time before a removal order becomes final”). “At that hearing, the noncitizen 4 may present evidence of their ties to the United States, lack of criminal history, and other factors 5 that show they are not a flight risk or danger to the community.” Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 6 1256. 7 This Court agrees with Petitioner that she is likely subject to § 1226(a)’s 8 discretionary detention scheme rather than § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme and, 9 therefore, is entitled to a bond hearing. Respondents argue Petitioner is an applicant for 10 admission, and therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). See ECF No. 5, pg. 11 1. This argument reflects a recent executive branch policy change directing federal immigration 12 officials to seek expedited removal of a larger swath of noncitizens by classifying all noncitizens 13 present in the United States as “applicant[s] for admission” under § 1225. C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, 14 No. 1:25-cv-01395-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (quoting 15 Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept 16 12, 2025), describing this policy change). 17 This Court rejects Respondents’ argument and finds that the applicability of these 18 provisions is governed by when and where a noncitizen encounters immigration enforcement 19 officials. Courts in this Circuit have found that § 1225 applies to those apprehended upon arrival 20 to the United States while § 1226 applies to those already living within the United States. See, 21 e.g., Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 (finding petitioner likely to succeed on merits of argument 22 that 1225(b)(2)(A) “should be read to narrow mandatory detention under that subsection to 23 noncitizens who are apprehended while seeking to enter the country, and that noncitizens already 24 residing in the United States, including those who are charged with inadmissibility, continue to 25 fall under the discretionary detention scheme in Section 1226”) (internal quotation marks 26 omitted); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354-KES-SKO-HC, 2025 WL 3013328, at *6–7 27 Premiere Valet Servs., Inc., No. 2:19-cv-09888-CJC-MAA, 2020 WL 7034346, at *14 (C.D. Cal. 28 Aug. 4, 2020) (internal citations omitted); see (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1); L.R. 230(b)). 1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). This interpretation of these provisions is further supported by the 2 amendments made by the Laken Riley Act, recent Supreme Court analysis of the statutory 3 scheme, and longstanding agency practice. 4 Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the statute disregards the relationship 5 between §§ 1225 and 1226 and would render the recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous. See 6 Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 7 Sept. 23, 2025). Specifically, in 2025 Congress enacted the Laken Riley Act, which added 8 additional categories of individuals to those subject to mandatory detention under Section 9 1226(c). As many courts have discussed in length, if every “applicant for admission” is subject to 10 mandatory detention under § 1225, there would have been no need for § 1226(c)(1)(E), which 11 mandates detention for every noncitizen who is “present in the United States without being 12 admitted or paroled” and who has been “charged with, arrested for, or admits to” committing 13 certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-CV-3142 (SRN/SGE), 14 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug 19, 2025) (“The Court will not find that Congress 15 passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by § 16 1225(b)(2).”); Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. 17 Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (explaining that “assuming any inadmissible noncitizen is an ‘applicant for 18 admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’ and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention under § 19 1225(b)(2)), would render the Riley Laken Act unnecessary”). 20 Additionally, this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the Supreme 21 Court’s recent description of these provisions in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018). In 22 Jennings, the Supreme Court explained that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to 23 detain certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It 24 also authorizes the Government to detain certain [noncitizens] already in the country pending the 25 outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. at 289. The Supreme Court 26 described proceedings under Section 1225 as a process that “generally begins at the Nation’s 27 borders and ports of entry, where the government must determine whether a [noncitizen] seeking 28 to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. “Then, when discussing Section 1 1226, Jennings describes it as governing ‘the process of arresting and detaining’ noncitizens who 2 are living ‘inside the United States’ but ‘may still be removed,’ including noncitizens ‘who were 3 inadmissible at the time of entry.’” Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1258 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. 4 at 288). 5 Next, this Court’s interpretation is consistent with longstanding agency practice. 6 Indeed, prior to a July 2025 memorandum changing its’ policy, the government consistently 7 applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who 8 were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 9 1196 (concluding that “§1226 provides the general process for arresting and detaining aliens who 10 are present in the United States and eligible for removal.”). “ Executive Branch regulations 11 implementing these provisions issued just six months after their enactment provide that “[d]espite 12 being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without having been admitted or 13 paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without inspection) will be eligible for 14 bond and bond determination.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). As this interpretation 15 “was issued roughly contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute and remained 16 consistent over time,” this “longstanding practice of the government—like any other interpretive 17 aid —can inform a court’s determination of what the law is.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 18 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (cleaned up). 19 This Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the 20 Eastern District of California, in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226. 21 See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 22 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government's [interpretation of § 1225] 23 belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and 24 longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 25 2025) (collecting more than thirty cases rejecting the government's assertion that § 1225 26 empowers the DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent 27 years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v. Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 28 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of 1 Immigration Appeals’] construction of the INA is incorrect and that petitioners who have long 2 resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting 3 cases); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 4 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention 5 and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and 6 citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) 7 (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) 8 (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected 9 respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”); but see Alonzo v. Noem, No. 10 1:25-cv-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 LX 597162 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025)). 11 Further, this interpretation is consistent with the record here. Courts have 12 concluded “[f]or [§1225] to apply, several conditions must be met — in particular, an ‘examining 13 immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) 14 ‘seeking admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Martinez v. 15 Hyde, No. CV 25-11613- BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). There is no 16 evidence in the record that an immigration officer made the requisite determinations for § 1225 to 17 apply or that Petitioner is seeking admission and not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 18 admitted. Following and adopting the reasoning of other courts, this Court finds Petitioner is not 19 actively seeking lawful entry because he already entered the United States over two years ago. 20 See Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (collecting cases concluding that § 1225 applies 21 only to noncitizens “seeking admission,” a category that does not include noncitizens like 22 Petitioner, living in the interior of the country.). 23 Finally, Respondents never explain how and why, if Petitioner’s detention is 24 mandatory and he is ineligible for a custody redetermination, Petitioner was previously released 25 after being taken into custody, which would have presumably required a custody redetermination. 26 Respondent’s claim that Petitioner’s detention is mandatory and ineligible for a custody 27 redetermination is inconsistent with the record. Thus, the record supports this Court’s 28 interpretation. 1 For these reasons, this Court rejects the government’s contention that Petitioner is 2 an “applicant for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2) and that because Petitioner has been present 3 in the United States for over two years, ECF No. 2-2, pg. 8, this Court finds she is likely to 4 succeed on the merits of her claim that she is unlawfully detained under Section 1225(b)(2)’s 5 mandatory detention provision. See J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 (finding Petitioner was 6 likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that they were not subject to mandatory detention 7 under section 1225(b)(2)(A) under similar circumstances); Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1261 8 (same). 9 Moreover, Petitioner was released from immigration detention, which created a 10 reasonable expectation that she would be entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in 11 circumstances. Petitioner’s detention, and Respondents assertion that ICE has discretion to re- 12 detain Petitioner at any time, goes against United States Supreme Court precedent which 13 recognizes that individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is 14 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued release. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482. 15 Therefore, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he is subject to the 16 procedures laid out by and entitled to the rights afforded under § 1226(a), most notably, a bond 17 hearing. 18 B. Irreparable Harm 19 Petitioner argues she will suffer irreparable harm were she to remain deprived of 20 her liberty and subjected to continued incarceration. ECF No. 2-2, pgs. 8-9. Specifically, 21 Petitioner contends she is being detained under the wrong statute, has been denied the procedures 22 Congress provided under § 1226, and has been deprived of a hearing, despite more than two years 23 of perfect compliance with the conditions of her release and no criminal convictions. See id. 24 Petitioner also argues she faces indefinite detention in violation of Due Process and that her prior 25 release “constitutes a binding judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel and cannot be 26 disturbed absent materially changed circumstances or new facts.” Id. at 16-17. Respondents 27 assert that because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, “ICE has the discretion to re- 28 detain Petitioner at any time.” ECF No. 5, pg. 2. Though not explicitly stated, the Court assumes 1 that Respondents mean that such discretion does not require any change in circumstances, such as 2 violation of terms of release or conviction of a crime. Respondents make no argument as to 3 Petitioner’s alleged harms of being detained. See ECF No. 5. 4 The Court finds Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 5 preliminary injunctive relief. Prior to her re-detention, Petitioner had been out of custody for over 6 two years, during which time Petitioner appears to have made meaningful connections with her 7 community. See ECF No. 2-2, pg. 10 (“Petitioner settled in the Los Angeles area with her 8 children and subsequently became engaged to a U.S. citizen.”) Despite being released on parole, 9 Petitioner was re-detained without the opportunity to be heard by a neutral adjudicator on whether 10 re-detention is warranted. This violation of Petitioner’s due process rights is sufficient to satisfy 11 the irreparable harm requirement. Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 12 691664, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). 13 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 14 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis 15 of the balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 16 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 17 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). 18 The Court finds the balance of equities and public interest weighs in Petitioner’s 19 favor given that the Court has found that Petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on the 20 merits and Respondent’s lack of irreparable harm. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F. 3d 1127, 1145 21 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[The Government] cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an 22 unlawful practice . . . “). 23 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining 24 order, ECF No. 2. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Ill. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2, is 4 | GRANTED. 5 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Maria Paloma Lemus 6 || Perez from custody under the same conditions as she was released previously, prior to her re- 7 || detention. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on her, unless such 8 | restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. 9 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re- 10 || detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including notice and a 11 || hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are material changed 12 || circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in 13 || the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing 14 || evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, 15 || Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present. 16 4. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for 17 || modification or dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order on two days’ notice or such 18 || shorter notice as the Court may allow. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4). 19 5. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 20 || regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 21 | 2011). 22 23 || Dated: January 20, 2026 = Co 24 DENNIS M. COTA 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28 13