NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0998-22
MARGARET GOODE, NICOLE MANN, JESSICA DEQUITO, THERESA ATWATER, and JACQUELINE BALLINGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
RENA PIERCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Respondent. ____________________________
Submitted January 16, 2024 – Decided March 1, 2024
Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4986-19. Kober Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Peter M. Kober, on the briefs).
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys for respondent (Walter F. Kawalec, III, and Richard L. Goldstein, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs are former teachers who worked for the Camden City School
District (the District). They all resigned or requested to be placed on medical
leave after receiving two consecutive poor annual performance evaluations.
They appeal from a February 14, 2020 order dismissing their claims against the
District because the claims were barred by principles of collateral estoppel. We
affirm because essential elements of plaintiffs' claims were resolved against
plaintiffs in a prior federal action.
I.
Plaintiffs in this appeal are five former tenured teachers who were
employed by the District through the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years.1
In 2012, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Teacher Effectiveness and
Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act (TEACHNJ), N.J.S.A.
1 Rena Pierce settled with the District before the other five teachers filed their notice of appeal. Accordingly, plaintiffs Margaret Goode, Nicole Mann, Jessica Dequito, Theresa Atwater, and Jacqueline Ballinger are appellants.
A-0998-22 2 18A:6-117 to -129. TEACHNJ authorized school districts to develop their own
evaluation rubrics to assess teachers' performances on an annual basis. N.J.S.A.
18A:6-122. Under the statute, the rubrics had to include four rating categories:
ineffective, partially effective, effective, and highly effective. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
123(b)(1). Any teacher who received a partially effective rating followed by an
ineffective rating the next year, or who received a partially effective rating two
years in a row, could be brought up on tenure charges and might be subject to
termination. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-128; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.3.
In June 2013, the New Jersey Board of Education took over the operation
of the Camden City Board of Education. Thereafter, the State-appointed
Superintendent of Schools adopted a new rubric to evaluate District teachers. In
the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, each plaintiff was evaluated under
the new rubric and found to be partially effective. Plaintiffs were therefore
noticed that they were either being brought up on tenure charges or were being
placed on administrative leave due to their low evaluation scores. Rather than
contest the charges, four of the plaintiffs resigned and one plaintiff requested
and was placed on medical leave.
In June 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court in the District of
New Jersey asserting claims against the District and several individual
A-0998-22 3 defendants who were involved in their evaluation processes (the Federal
Action). Plaintiffs alleged that the District and its employees had used the new
rubric as a pretext to discriminate against teachers who were over forty years of
age.
Over the next several years, the parties engaged in motion practice and
plaintiffs amended their complaint several times. During that process, plaintiffs
dismissed certain claims and dismissed several individual defendants.
In their fourth and final amended complaint filed in the Federal Action,
plaintiffs alleged that the District and two individual defendants had violated the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34;
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, for
retaliating against activity protected by the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the CR Act), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2;
the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A.
34:19-1 to -14; and the New Jersey doctrine of fundamental fairness.
In May 2019, defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking to
dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims in the Federal Action. On November 22, 2019,
the federal court issued a written opinion and order granting defendants' motion
in part and denying it in part. The court dismissed plaintiffs' ADEA claims
A-0998-22 4 against the District with prejudice. The federal court also dismissed plaintiffs'
LAD and CEPA claims against the District without prejudice because it
determined that the District was an arm of the State and was not subject to suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.
Regarding the claims against one of the individual defendants, the federal
court determined that one of the plaintiffs, Pierce, had alleged facts that allowed
her claims to survive summary judgment. In contrast, the court found that the
claims by all other plaintiffs were subject to dismissal on summary judgment.
Specifically, the federal court found that the claims by plaintiffs Goode, Mann,
Dequito, Atwater, and Ballinger should be dismissed. The court dismissed the
LAD claims, finding that those plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate adverse
employment actions. In addition, the court dismissed plaintiff Goode's CEPA
claim, the only CEPA claim asserted in the Federal Action other than Pierce's
claim, because it found that she failed to demonstrate that she engaged in a
whistleblowing activity addressing a matter of public concern as required by the
CEPA. Two of the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but the federal court
denied that motion. Because the claims by Pierce were not dismissed, her claims
continued to be litigated in the Federal Action.
A-0998-22 5 In the meantime, in December 2019, plaintiffs sued the District in the Law
Division, reasserting the LAD and CEPA claims that had been dismissed without
prejudice in the Federal Action. The District moved to dismiss with prejudice
the claims asserted on behalf of all the plaintiffs except for Pierce. Concerning
Pierce's claims, the District moved to stay the Law Division action pending the
resolution of Pierce's claims in the Federal Action.
On February 14, 2020, the Law Division judge entered an order dismissing
the LAD and CEPA claims asserted on behalf of plaintiffs Goode, Mann,
Dequito, Atwater, and Ballinger. The court held that those claims were all
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court stayed Pierce's claims
pending the resolution of those claims in the Federal Action.
In October 2022, Pierce settled her remaining claims in the Federal
Action. Pierce and the District then agreed to the entry of a consent order
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0998-22
MARGARET GOODE, NICOLE MANN, JESSICA DEQUITO, THERESA ATWATER, and JACQUELINE BALLINGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
RENA PIERCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMDEN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Respondent. ____________________________
Submitted January 16, 2024 – Decided March 1, 2024
Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4986-19. Kober Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Peter M. Kober, on the briefs).
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys for respondent (Walter F. Kawalec, III, and Richard L. Goldstein, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs are former teachers who worked for the Camden City School
District (the District). They all resigned or requested to be placed on medical
leave after receiving two consecutive poor annual performance evaluations.
They appeal from a February 14, 2020 order dismissing their claims against the
District because the claims were barred by principles of collateral estoppel. We
affirm because essential elements of plaintiffs' claims were resolved against
plaintiffs in a prior federal action.
I.
Plaintiffs in this appeal are five former tenured teachers who were
employed by the District through the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years.1
In 2012, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Teacher Effectiveness and
Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act (TEACHNJ), N.J.S.A.
1 Rena Pierce settled with the District before the other five teachers filed their notice of appeal. Accordingly, plaintiffs Margaret Goode, Nicole Mann, Jessica Dequito, Theresa Atwater, and Jacqueline Ballinger are appellants.
A-0998-22 2 18A:6-117 to -129. TEACHNJ authorized school districts to develop their own
evaluation rubrics to assess teachers' performances on an annual basis. N.J.S.A.
18A:6-122. Under the statute, the rubrics had to include four rating categories:
ineffective, partially effective, effective, and highly effective. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
123(b)(1). Any teacher who received a partially effective rating followed by an
ineffective rating the next year, or who received a partially effective rating two
years in a row, could be brought up on tenure charges and might be subject to
termination. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-128; N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.3.
In June 2013, the New Jersey Board of Education took over the operation
of the Camden City Board of Education. Thereafter, the State-appointed
Superintendent of Schools adopted a new rubric to evaluate District teachers. In
the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, each plaintiff was evaluated under
the new rubric and found to be partially effective. Plaintiffs were therefore
noticed that they were either being brought up on tenure charges or were being
placed on administrative leave due to their low evaluation scores. Rather than
contest the charges, four of the plaintiffs resigned and one plaintiff requested
and was placed on medical leave.
In June 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court in the District of
New Jersey asserting claims against the District and several individual
A-0998-22 3 defendants who were involved in their evaluation processes (the Federal
Action). Plaintiffs alleged that the District and its employees had used the new
rubric as a pretext to discriminate against teachers who were over forty years of
age.
Over the next several years, the parties engaged in motion practice and
plaintiffs amended their complaint several times. During that process, plaintiffs
dismissed certain claims and dismissed several individual defendants.
In their fourth and final amended complaint filed in the Federal Action,
plaintiffs alleged that the District and two individual defendants had violated the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34;
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, for
retaliating against activity protected by the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the CR Act), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2;
the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A.
34:19-1 to -14; and the New Jersey doctrine of fundamental fairness.
In May 2019, defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking to
dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims in the Federal Action. On November 22, 2019,
the federal court issued a written opinion and order granting defendants' motion
in part and denying it in part. The court dismissed plaintiffs' ADEA claims
A-0998-22 4 against the District with prejudice. The federal court also dismissed plaintiffs'
LAD and CEPA claims against the District without prejudice because it
determined that the District was an arm of the State and was not subject to suit
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.
Regarding the claims against one of the individual defendants, the federal
court determined that one of the plaintiffs, Pierce, had alleged facts that allowed
her claims to survive summary judgment. In contrast, the court found that the
claims by all other plaintiffs were subject to dismissal on summary judgment.
Specifically, the federal court found that the claims by plaintiffs Goode, Mann,
Dequito, Atwater, and Ballinger should be dismissed. The court dismissed the
LAD claims, finding that those plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate adverse
employment actions. In addition, the court dismissed plaintiff Goode's CEPA
claim, the only CEPA claim asserted in the Federal Action other than Pierce's
claim, because it found that she failed to demonstrate that she engaged in a
whistleblowing activity addressing a matter of public concern as required by the
CEPA. Two of the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but the federal court
denied that motion. Because the claims by Pierce were not dismissed, her claims
continued to be litigated in the Federal Action.
A-0998-22 5 In the meantime, in December 2019, plaintiffs sued the District in the Law
Division, reasserting the LAD and CEPA claims that had been dismissed without
prejudice in the Federal Action. The District moved to dismiss with prejudice
the claims asserted on behalf of all the plaintiffs except for Pierce. Concerning
Pierce's claims, the District moved to stay the Law Division action pending the
resolution of Pierce's claims in the Federal Action.
On February 14, 2020, the Law Division judge entered an order dismissing
the LAD and CEPA claims asserted on behalf of plaintiffs Goode, Mann,
Dequito, Atwater, and Ballinger. The court held that those claims were all
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court stayed Pierce's claims
pending the resolution of those claims in the Federal Action.
In October 2022, Pierce settled her remaining claims in the Federal
Action. Pierce and the District then agreed to the entry of a consent order
dismissing Pierce's claims with prejudice in this state court action. Thereafter,
the five remaining plaintiffs filed this appeal from the February 14, 2020 order.
Those same plaintiffs also filed an appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, challenging the dismissal of their claims asserted
in the Federal Action.
A-0998-22 6 On January 10, 2024, while this appeal was pending, the Third Circuit
affirmed the federal district court's order granting summary judgment to
defendants and dismissing all the remaining claims in the Federal Action.
Goode v. Camden City Sch. Dist., No. 22-3044, 2024 WL 107887, at *1 (3d Cir.
Jan. 10, 2024).
II.
On this appeal, plaintiffs argue that the rulings by the federal court should
not bar their LAD and CEPA claims because when the Law Division made its
decision, the federal court's rulings were not final. That argument is no longer
viable because the Third Circuit has now affirmed the district court's rulings,
and those rulings are indisputably final. The district court's rulings on the LAD
and CEPA claims against the individual defendants eliminate an essential
element of plaintiffs' LAD and CEPA claims against the District. Consequently,
plaintiffs' LAD and CEPA claims against the District are barred by collateral
estoppel.
Whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law, which we review
de novo. Gannon v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., 414 N.J. Super. 507, 523-24 (App.
Div. 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 211 N.J. 454 (2012). Moreover, as this issue
arose on a motion to dismiss, we use a de novo standard of review. Baskin v.
A-0998-22 7 P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v.
Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108
(2019)); Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. County of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super.
286, 290 (App. Div. 2017); Rezem Fam. Assocs. v. Borough of Millstone, 423
N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).
Collateral estoppel, which is also referred to as issue preclusion, "bars
relitigation of any issue which was actually determined in a prior action,
generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or cause of
action." In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 214 N.J. 51, 66-67 (2013)
(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 114 (2011)).
"When the prior action is the subject of a prior federal court judgment, the
binding effect of that judgment, whether applying principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, is determined by the law of the jurisdiction that rendered it."
Id. at 67.
Here, a federal court rendered the rulings that the District seeks to enforce;
we, therefore, look to federal law, and specifically to the law as applied by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to determine the prior
judgment's preclusive effect. Ibid.; see also Gannon, 211 N.J. at 471. In the
A-0998-22 8 Third Circuit, collateral estoppel applies when the party asserting the doctrine
establishes that:
(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question.
[Bestwall LLC v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (In re Bestwall LLC), 47 F.4th 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2016)).]
There is no dispute that identical issues necessary to assert claims under
the LAD and the CEPA were decided in the Federal Action. To support their
claims under the LAD, plaintiffs must demonstrate adverse employment actions.
Ali v. Woodbridge Twp. Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2020). The
federal court, however, found that plaintiffs had not established adverse
employment actions related to their resignations or paid administrative leave
with the District. To support their CEPA claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate a
whistleblower activity on a matter of public concern. Fraternal Ord. of Police,
Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2016). The federal court
determined that Goode, who was the only plaintiff asserting a CEPA claim in
A-0998-22 9 both the Federal Action and this action, could not demonstrate that she had
engaged in a whistleblowing activity on a matter of public concern.
There is also now a final judgment on the merits of the LAD and CEPA
claims. When the District Court rendered its decision, its ruling likely
constituted a final judgment on the merits under federal law. See Free Speech
Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 541 (3d Cir. 2012).
Nevertheless, we need not dwell on that issue. The Third Circuit has now
affirmed the district court's rulings and they are, therefore, indisputably final.
Plaintiffs also cannot dispute that they were parties against whom the prior
adjudication was entered and that they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues in question. Indeed, plaintiffs were also plaintiffs in the Federal
Action. They had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether they could
establish adverse employment actions under the LAD and whistleblower activity
under the CEPA. Under well-established principles of collateral estoppel,
plaintiffs cannot now relitigate those same issues in another forum. The Law
Division, therefore, correctly dismissed the LAD and CEPA claims against the
District.
Affirmed.
A-0998-22 10