MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
James 0. Browning, United States District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) the parties’ Stipulated Petition for Approval of the Settlement of Minors’ Claims, filed January 11, 2017 (Doc. 25)(“Petition”); and (ii) the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve Settlement, filed July 10, 2017 (Doc. 33)(“Motion”). The Court held a healing on July 31, 2017. The primary issue is how the Court should distribute the settlement funds from a wrongful death action amongst Plaintiff Federico Mares-Moreno, Plaintiff Genesis Alvarez, Plaintiff Simon Alvarez, Sr., and the decedent’s son, Jesus Alvarez. The Court con-eludes that it will deny the Petition and Motion, but that it will approve a settlement that distributes the funds in the following manner: $200,000.00 for Mares-Moreno; $500,000.00 for G. Alvarez; $75,000.00 for S. Alvarez; and $225,000.00 for J. Alvarez. The money allocated to G. Alvarez and J. Alvarez will be held in trust. J. Alvarez’ trust will distribute $500.00 per month to his grandfather, S. Alvarez, until J. Alvarez’ eighteenth birthday. After J. Alvarez’ eighteenth birthday, the trust will distribute $1000100 pér month to J. Alvarez. G. Alvarez’ trust will not have a monthly distribution.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from a car accident on Interstate 40. See Complaint for Wrongful Death and Personal Injury ¶ 9, at 3, filed May 17, 2016 (Doc. l)(“Complaint”). On May 5, 2016, Federico Mares-Moreno was driving east on 1-40 with three passengers in a 2007 GMC Yukon. See Complaint ¶ 9, at 3. His wife, Elvia Alvarez, sat in the vehicle’s backseat with their then four-year-old daughter, G. Alvarez. See Draft Transcript of Motion Hearing at 2:17-19 taken July 31, 2017)(“Tr.”)(Glasheen).1 G. Alvarez was not wearing a seatbelt. See Tr. at 34:2-3 (Oakey). E. Alvarez’ father, S. Alvarez., rode in the passenger side seat. See Tr. at 2:16-17 (Glasheen). The four of them were driving to Louisiana so that Mares-Moreno could begin a new job. See Tr. at 5:7-9.
Also driving east on 1-40 was Jasmail Singh in a 2012 Freightliner—a tractor trailer. See Complaint ¶ 9, at 3. At some point, while driving east, J. Singh “lost control of his vehicle,” “jerked the tractor-trailer to the left,” and, while attempting to regain control of the vehicle, collided [1228]*1228■with the GMC Yukon’s passenger side, causing it to-roll. Complaint ¶ 9, at 3. The collision ejected G. Alvarez from the vehicle, causing several, injuries, including: a collapsed lung; a brain bleed; an upper-right-arm fracture; a left-thigh fracture; a liver laceration; pelvis fractures; a back-compression fracture; ■ a hip fracture; and a broken skull bone. See Tr. at 33:25-35:10 (Mares-Moreno, Oakey). The collision killed E. Alvarez. See Complaint ¶ 11, at 3. Both Mares-Moreno and S. Alvarez also suffered injuries. See Tr. at 12:1—4 (Alvarez, Glasheen); Petition ¶ 9, at 2.
For her injuries, G. Alvarez underwent two surgeries for her leg and her right shoulder. See Tr. at 35:11-13 (Mares-Moreno, Oakey). Afterward, she used a walker to aid in her. mobility for a month, and sometimes still walks with a limp. See Tr. at 35:14-24. (Mares-Moreno; Oakey). G. Alvarez had physical therapy sessions, and, according to Mares-Moreno, she is “much better” now. Tr. at 35:25-36:15 (Mares-Moreno,' Oakey). G. Alvarez’ medical bills amount to $174,462.19, See Guardian Ad Litem Report at 5, filed July 27, 2017 (dated July 26, 2017)(Doc. 35)(“Re-port”). Although he believes that G. Alvarez is better now, Mares-Moreno thinks that G. Alvarez “might need some counseling, some therapy” from losing her mother. Tr. at 37:1-5 (Mares-Moreno). Mares-Moreno’s medical bills amount to $698.00 and S. Alvarez’ equaled $31,332.30. See Report at 5. Social Security provides Mares-Moreno $708.00 per month survivor benefits for G. Alvarez. See Tr. at 40:1-7 (Mares-Moreno, Oakey).
E. Alvarez had another child'who was not' in the accident—J. Alvarez—from a previous relationship. See Tr. at 18:19-22 (Allen, Alvarez); Tr. at 21:17-22 (Allen, Alvarez); Petition ¶ 11, at 3. J. Alvarez lives with Mares-Moreno, G. Alvarez, and his grandfather, S. Alvarez, in the same home, and Mares-Moreno has helped raise J. Alvarez, even though he is not Mares-Moreno’s biological son. See Tr. at 15:11-13, 20; 24:15-17 (Alvarez, Glasheen, Mares-Moreno). According to S. Alvarez, J. Alvarez’- biological father- has “never helped with anything” for J. Alvarez, and S. Alvarez'has not heard from J. Alvarez’ biological father since E. Alvarez died. Tr. at 19:1-5 (Allen, Alvarez). Following the accident, S. Alvarez was named kinship guardian to J. Alvarez. See Motion ¶ 2, at 2.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 17, 2016, Mares-Moreno, individually and as personal representative of E. Alvarez’ Estate, and as next friend of G. Alvarez, S. Alvarez, and Ivan Alvarez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit for wrongful death and personal injury against J. Singh, Sukhdev Singh, and Chahal Transport, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”). See Complaint at 1. S. Singh owned the tractor-trailer that collided with the GMC Yukon, and Chahal Transport employed J. Singh. See Complaint 1Hf4r5, at 2. I. Alvarez owned the GMC Yukon. See Tr. at 63:6-7 (Allen). The Plaintiffs allege that J. Singh negligently operated the tractor-trailer, resulting in the collision and committed negligence per se by violating several federal and New Mexico state laws. See Complaint ¶¶ 13-23, at 4-7. The Plaintiffs further allege that S. Singh and Chahal Transport negligently hired and supervised J. Singh, which resulted in the collision. See Complaint ¶¶ 24-30, at 7.
After the Plaintiffs filed suit, the Defendants’ insurer—Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (“Progressive”)—tendered its one million dollar policy limit to all Plaintiffs and any claimants who might have a claim arising from the accident. See Petition ¶ 10, at 2-3. The parties subsequently negotiated a one million dollar settlement. See Petition ¶ 13, at 1, 3. This [1229]*1229settlement, however, was “subject to the court’s approval,” because New Mexico requires a judge to approve settlements that bind minors. Petition ¶ 13, at 3. See Motion ¶ 7, at 3. The Court subsequently appointed Kathleen Oakey as Guardian Ad Litem to investigate the appropriate course for the children’s best interest. See Stipulated Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem, filed January 31, 2017 (dated January 21, 2017)(Doc. 27).
The Plaintiffs proposed the following initial settlement agreement and apportionment amount to Ms. Oakey:
[[Image here]]
See Report at 8 n.ll (“Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal”). Ms. Oakey raised concerns regarding the amount given to S. Alvarez and countered with the following proposal:
See Report at 8, n.ll (“Guardian Ad Litem Proposal”). According to Ms. Oakey, the Plaintiffs “agreed” to her proposal, “then subsequently changed their mind" and proposed the following:
See Report at 2. (“Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal”). The Plaintiffs also proposed to Ms. Oakey that they would set up a trust for both children that would distribute $750.00 per month to aid in raising and supporting them. See Report at '9.2 The $750.00 allocation would continue for both children until they turned eighteen. See Report at 9. S. Alvarez, as J. Alvarez’ guardian, would receive J. Alvarez’ allocation; Mares-Moreno, as G. Alvarez’ father, would receive G. Alvarez allocation. See Report at 9.
1. Motion to Approve Settlement.
On July 10,- 2017, the Plaintiffs motioned for the Court to approve the settlement. See Motion at 1. By this time,, however, the Plaintiffs had reverted to their original Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal:
[1230]*1230[[Image here]]
See Motion ¶ 5, at 2-3. In their Motion, the Plaintiffs expand on these figures, adding that this allocation results in the following pet recovery for each claimant—after sub-fracting projected attorney’s fees and medical costs from the allocated amount:
See Motion ¶5, at 2-3. According to the Plaintiffs, this apportionment considers all parties’ interests and covers G. Alvarez’ severe injuries and the loss of her mother; J. Alvarez’ loss of his mother; Mares-Moreno’s injuries, the loss of his wife, and financial support for G. Alvarez; and S. Alvarez’ injuries, the loss of his daughter, and financial support for J. Alvarez. See Motion ¶ 12, at 5.
In support of the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal, the Plaintiffs argue that, when approving a settlement involving minors, the Court “must determine if the settlement is fair and reasonable.” Motion ¶ 8, at 3 (citing Jones v. Nuclear Pharm., Inc., 741 F.2d 322, 324 (10th Cir. 1984)). They argue that the Court further must consider four factors in the fair-and-reasonable analysis:
(1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated; (2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the ultimate outcome of litigation in doubt; (3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation; and (4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable.
Motion ¶ 8, at 3-4 (citing Jones v. Nuclear Pharm., Inc., 741 F.2d at 324). The Plaintiffs aver that, after considering those factors, “the settlement agreement ... is fair and in the best interest of all parties involved,” and “no additional insurance is available and ... the Defendants do not have any recoverable assets if a judgment was obtained.” Motion ¶ 8, at 4.
Regarding the Guardian Ad Litem and her proposal, the Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Oakey can negotiate a compromise or settlement, but such a compromise or settlement is not binding “absen[t] judicial approval.” Motion ¶ 9, at 4 (citing Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978); Ruddock v. Ohis, 91 Cal.App.3d 271, 154 Cal.Rptr. 87 (1979); Wallace v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 194 Mass. 328, 80 N.E. 461 (1907)). The Plaintiffs add that Ms. Oakey does not have the authority “to pject the proposed settlement.” Motion ¶ 10, at 4. The Plaintiffs also aver that all parties that have the authority to reject the settlement agreement have agreed to the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal. See Motion ¶ 11, at 5. The Plaintiffs argue that, although Oakey has recommended a larger apportionment for .the children, the Court has ah independent duty to determine “whether the settlement and apportionment agreements represent the best interest of J. and G. Alvarez.” Motion ¶¶ 10,13, at 5-6 (citing Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande [1231]*1231Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶ 28, 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000, 1006 overruled on other grounds by Montoya v. ARAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971). The Plaintiffs conclude that the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal is “fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of Genesis and Jesus Alvarez.” Motion ¶ 13, at 6.
2. The Guardian Ad Litem Report.
On July 27, 2017, Ms. Oakey filed a Guardian Ad Litem Report. See Report at 1. Ms. Oakey wrote the Report based off of the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal, unaware that the Plaintiffs had reverted to the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal. See Tr. at 69:22-25 (Oakey). Accordingly, her Report is based off of the following:
See Report at 1-2. Ms. Oakey avers that the $300,000.00 settlement for J. Alvarez is “fair and reasonable under the circumstances,” but that G. Alvarez’ amount is “unreasonable,” and Ms. recommends that the Court should “not approve the settlement.” Report at 2. First, Ms. Oakey notes that the value “of each child’s claim here exceeds the amount each will receive in settlement,” but concludes that, “because Progressive is paying the liability policy limits available,” the settlement amount reached for J. Alvarez is “fair and reason-ablé ... under the circumstances.” Report at 7 (emphasis omitted). For G. Alvarez, however, Ms. Oakey argues that the séttlement is Unfair, unreasonable, and not in her best interest, because of G. Alvarez’ severe injuries, her “arguable future medical needs,” and losing her mother far outweigh the “injuries and claims of Mr. Mares Moreno and Mr. Alvarez.” Report at 7. Ms. Oakey, accordingly, officially proposes to the Court the Guardian Ad Litem Proposal:
See Report at 8 n.ll.
Ms. Oakey also argues that the $750.00 per month trust disbursements proposed by the Plaintiffs are inappropriate for both G. Alvarez and J. Alvarez. See Report at 9. Ms. Oakey recommends that the Court bar such a disbursement, because Mares-Moreno “is Genesis’ biological father, has an ongoing legal and moral obligation to provide!! ] for her and is capable of working.” Report at 9. She argues that a disbursement for J. Alvarez, however, is appropriate, because J. Alvarez’ grandparents “have voluntarily sought to raise him, are unemployed and have limited income,” but suggests that $500.00 per month would be more appropriate, because his grandparents “already receive $708.00 per month in social security survivor benefits.” Report at 9. Ms, Oakey concludes by recommending that the Court approve J. Alvarez’ settlement at $300,000.00, but not approve G. Alvarez’ settlement at $400,000.00. See Report at 9.
[1232]*12323. The Hearing.
The Court held a hearing on July 31, 2017. See Tr. at 1:1. The Court heard testimony from three witnesses: Mares-Moreno; S. Alvarez; and Joseph Tombs— a settlement planner. See Tr. at 44:13-14 (Tombs). Mares-Moreno and S. Alvarez testified generally about the accident, their injuries, their relationship to J. Alvarez and G. Alvarez, and how the two children had responded to the accident. See Tr, at 1:1—42:24.3
a. Tombs’ Testimony.
Mr. Tombs testified about setting up G. Alvarez’ and J. Alvarez’ trusts,, trust projections, and whether the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal, the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal, and the monthly trust allocations are fair and reasonable under the circumstances. See _Tr. at .46:16-47:1; id. at 49:2-7; id. at 60:8-24; id. at 51:15-24; id. at 52:21-53:1 (Tombs). First, Mr. Tombs testified that originally he had conceived drafting the settlement so that G. Alvarez and J. Alvarez would receive an annuity, but once “it became apparent that there could be some need for psychological counseling," he determined that a trust would be more appropriate. Tr. at 46:16-25; 47:1 (Tombs). Mr. Tombs forecasted that a trust would “beat rates of return” from an annuity, so the children would also benefit more from a trust. Tr. at 47:11-17 (Tombs). He also argued that a $750.00 payment per month for J. Alvarez is appropriate given that his grandfather and grandmother will raise him. See Tr. at 49:2-7 (Tombs). In contrast, he argued that, because Mares-Moreno “has a legal obligation to provide support for [G. Alvarez],” he had excluded the allocation language from G. Alvarez’ trust; instead, he included language “that the trustee, if they find it ... in Genesis!’] best interests!,] the money would be distributed.” Tr. at 49:7-11,14-15 (Tombs).
Mr. Tombs then forecasted the life of the trust assuming certain variables for J. Alvarez and G. Alvarez. See Tr. at 50:8; id. at 50:11; id. at 50:16-24; id. at 51:15-24; id. at 91:20-92:1; id. at 92:17 (Tombs). Based on J. Alvarez’ $300,000.00 amount from the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal, Mr. Tombs projects the following:
See Tr. at 50:8; id. at 50:11; id. at 50:16-24 . (Tombs). Based on J. Alvarez’ $200,000.00 from the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal, Mr. Tombs projects:
[1233]*1233[[Image here]]
See Tr. at 91:20-92:1; id. at 92:17 (Tombs). He also projects that, at $200,000.00, the trust would generate “close to [$]700 or [$]800” per month in interest. Tr. at 92:21-22 (Tombs). Based on ,G. Alvarez’ $400,000.00 from the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal, Mr. Tombs projects the following:
See Tr. at 51:15-24 (Tombs).
Mr. Tombs opined that the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal “could be reasonable” and that the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal would be reasonable. Tr. at 52:21-53:1 (Glasheen, Tombs). Mr. Tombs further testified that his fees for managing the trust were “75 basis points,” but that the total fee “is never more than 1.5 percent ... of the assets per year.” Tr. at 57:3-9 (Court, Tombs). He testified that this fee was a standard one for managing a minor trust, and that he had chosen the trust company, because “they have a very small minimum fee.” Tr. at 57:10-14 (Court, Tombs),
b. The Parties’ Arguments.
The Plaintiffs opened by asking that the Court approve the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal or to approve the Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal. See Tr. at 58:10-15 (Glasheen). Regarding the difference for G. Alvarez between the Guardian Ad Li-tem’s Proposal and the Plaintiffs’ two proposals, the Plaintiffs contended that the $38,000.00 medical bill subrogation lessened G. Alvarez’ expenses, and also averred that G. Alvarez’ injuries are not that severe any longer—“we’re talking about fractures, essentially a fractured leg and arm bone from which the child has made a very good recovery.” Tr. at 58:15-23 (Glasheen). They argued that G. Alvarez exhibits no signs “of permanent' impairment ... and [there is] certainly no evidence of any head injury.” Tr. at 58:23— 59:1 (Glasheen). They also noted that “we shouldn’t forget that Jesus lost his only parent,” and that 'every family member has lost a wife, a mother, or a daughter. Tr. at 59:2-6 (Glasheen); Moreover, they contended that G. Alvarez likely will “not remember her injuries” and argued that G. Alvarez receiving over half the money “is simply not reasonable.” Tr. at 59:9-15. They closed by emphasizing that “this is a close knit family who care about each other” and that “their plan for taking care of themselves .is well grounded.” Tr. at 59:16-21 (Glasheen).
The Court- noted that the Plaintiffs “were [in] agreement substantially, not fully but substantially” with. Ms. Oakey’s critique that;S. Alvarez “receiving 20 percent” was too much. Tr, at 60:15-18 (Court). The Plaintiffs agreed and ex[1234]*1234plained that part of the reasoning behind twenty percent to S. Alvarez “was so that he could help raise Jesus,” but that the monthly trust payments “accomplishes the clients’ goal.” Tr. at 60:22-61:4 (Glasheen). The Plaintiffs added that they also shifted the money from S. Alvarez to J. Avarez, instead of to G. Avarez, because “Jesus arguably suffered a greater loss there since he has no [biological] father.” Tr. at 61:15-17 (Glasheen). They conceded that G. Avarez had “significant orthop[]edic injuries,” but that they thought “giving Genesis an extra hundred thousand dollars in light” of the $38,000.00 medical subrogation and her “excellent recovery” was inappropriate. Tr. at 61:18-62:3 (Glasheen).
The Defendants asserted that they “wanted this case resolved to secure finality,” and they stressed that the one million dollar settlement would achieve finality given that the Plaintiffs had “agreed and accepted” that amount. Tr. at 62:16-20 (A-len). They also argued that I. Avarez, the vehicle’s owner, should be dismissed from the case, because he did not have a claim, and the Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed. See Tr. at 63:4-16 (Alen). Regarding the apportionment agreement, the Defendants stated that they did not take a position, but added that if this case was “simply a wrongful death claim,” J. Avarez could, at most, secure $250,000.00. Tr. 64:2-16 (A-len). The Defendants also noted that, under New Mexico law, the wrongful death claim subsumes the “loss of, consortium claims” and that the insurance policy does not cover emotional injury claims. Tr. 64:18-65:10; 69:7-12 (Alen).
Ms. Oakey began by stressing that she did not realize that the Plaintiffs had returned to the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal. See Tr. 69:22-25 (Oakey). She contended that, when reviewing the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal, her first concern, is that “there was no specific dollar amount earmarked for the wrongful death estate.” Tr. at 70:8-11 (Oakey). According to Ms. Oakey, the wrongful death estate calculation is important to determine “how -much should be given to Genesis” and to J. Avarez. Tr. at 70:24-25 (Oakey). She explained that she came to the Guardian Ad Litem Proposal by considering the wrongful death estate as a claimant, in addition to G. Avarez, J. Avarez, S. Avarez, and Mares-Moreno as individual claimants. See Tr. at 72:23-73:2 (Oakey). She clarified that she settled at Mares-Moreno’s $200,000.00 figure based off the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal, assuming that it was half of the wrongful death estate, to which Mares-Moreno is statutorily entitled. See Tr. at 73:23-74:7 (Oakey). She also argued that Mares-Moreno’s $200,000.00 was appropriate, because Mares-Moreno had a “small bodily injury claim ... a bystander liability claim ... [and] an individual loss of consortium claim assuming the Court is not subsuming” that claim into the wrongful death estate. Tr. at 73:7-19 (Oakey). She also contended that her only problem with the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal is that S. Avarez receives too much and G. Avarez too little. See Tr. at 75:4-8 (Oakey). Ms. Oakey stressed that S. Avarez suffered only “soft tissue injuries” and that his only continuing injury is a hurt shoulder. Tr. at 75:8-13 (Oakey). She contended, on the other hand, that G. A-varez “suffered horrific injuries.” Tr. at 75:17-18 (Oakey). She argued that, based on the injury differences, the discrepancy between S. Avarez’ recovery and G. Ava-rez’ recovery “raised concerns.” Tr. at 76:5-9 (Oakey). She also 'asserted that G. Avarez’ emotional injuries may be more acute, because “studies have shown that the most important person in a child’s life is the parent of the same sex.” Tr. ■ at 78:23-25 (Oakey). Ms. Oakey also stated she was “concerned that [G. Avarez] doesn’t speak,” and that “[s]he hasn’t received any counseling or therapy.” Tr. at 79:23; 80:5-6. (Oakey). She concluded that “I think the impact of this accident is much [1235]*1235greater on G. Alvarez than any other claimant.” Tr. at 81:13-15 (Oakey).
The Plaintiffs rejoined that Mares-Moreno has “a much bigger claim than is represented in the family apportionment,” but he “has given up his claim” in his children’s favor. Tr. at 84:19-22 (Glash-een). They argue that Mares-Moreno, accordingly, has “[gjiven up some of [his amount] ... to Simon [and] his father-in-law[,] because he knows that Simon is helping to raise Jesus.” Tr. at 84:22-25 (Glasheen). The Plaintiffs also argued that Ms. Oakey’s contention that G. Alvarez “won’t speak” is “purely speculation”; they add that G. Alvarez “is a shy kid,” but she “chats very comfortably around her family.” Tr. 85:7-9 (Glasheen). They also stressed that many of G Alvarez’ injuries are not “significant,” and there was “simply no evidence of any neurologic deficit or problems.” Tr. at 85:10-25 (Glasheen). Stressing that the Plaintiffs’ proposals are “a family compromise,” the Plaintiffs concluded that the “family is operating in the best interests of the children.” Tr. 86:2-13 (Glasheen).
Regarding the monthly trust allocation, Ms. Oakey argued that $500.00 per month would be more appropriate for J. Alvarez. See Tr. at 89:20-21 (Oakey). Ms. Oakey argued that, because the families were already receiving $708.00 per child per month from social security survivor benefits, roughly $1,200.00 per month for J. Alvarez was appropriate. See Tr. at 89:16-22 (Oakey). Mr. Tombs added that the Plaintiffs suggest the $750.00 per month trust allocation, because the Plaintiffs “were very familiar with ... the financial situation” and, accordingly, are in a better position to determine the right amount. Tr. at 90:21-25 (Tombs). The Plaintiffs also argued that the allocation is appropriate, because forcing the children to live “in abject poverty and then giving them a couple hundred thousand dollars when they turn 25 [is] not in the best interests of the child.” Tr. 91:8-11 (Glasheen). Ms. Oa-key rejoined that the plaintiffs will not live in “abject poverty” on the $1,200.00 per month allocation she proposed, and that J. Alvarez’ grandparents would be able to support J. Alvarez. See Tr. at 94:12-17 (Oakey). She conceded, however, that “the dollar amount difference between [$]500 and [$]750 is not substantial.” Tr. at 94:17-19 (Oakey). Regarding a monthly trust allocation for G. Alvarez, however, Ms. Oa-key averred that G. Alvarez should have no monthly distribution. See Tr. at 96:13-16 (Court, Oakey). The Plaintiffs countered that the monthly trust allocation “still provides that the trustee ... [will] make a judgment about whether it’s in the best interests of the children to make that payment.” Tr. 98: 10-13 (Glasheen). The Court queried whether it is a good idea to have a provision that affords G. Alvarez trust money in case she wants to attend private school. See Tr. at 100:24-101:6 (Court). Ms, Oakey argued that she would rather have “the vast majority of that money ... be available ... after they reach the age of majority.” Tr. at 101:7-14.
The Court concluded that it appears that all parties agree that the Plaintiffs’ Initial Proposal allocated too much to S. Alvarez. See Tr. at 105:10-11 (Court). Based on that agreement, the Court was inclined to take $125,000.00 from S. Alvarez and “move it toward the children.” Tr. at 105:17-19 (Court). Accordingly, it noted that it is inclined to order the settlement within the following range:
[1236]*1236[[Image here]]
See Tr. at 106:4-7 (Court). It also noted that it is inclined to order a $500.00 per month allocation from J. Alvarez’ trust and that G. Alvarez’ trust should not have a monthly payment, but that the Court would agree to a provision in G. Alvarez’ trust that Mares-Moreno “can apply for some expenses,” but with a cap imposed “so it doesn’t' totally drain” the trust’s principal. Tr. at 106:8-23 (Court).
LAW REGARDING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND ERIE
Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)(“Erie”), a federal district court sitting in diversity applies “state law with the objective of obtaining the result that would be reached in state court.” Butt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 477 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). Accord Mem. Hosp. v. Healthcare Realty Trust Inc., 509 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court has held that if a district court exercising diversity jurisdiction cannot find a Supreme Court of New Mexico “opinion that [governs] a particular area of substantive law ... [the district court] must ... predict how the Supreme Court of New Mexico would [rule].” Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 708 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1224-25 (D.N.M. 2010)(Browning, J.). “Just as a court engaging in statutory interpretation must always begin with the statute’s text, a court formulating an Erie prediction should look first to the words of the state supreme, court.” Peña v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103, 1132 (D.N.M. 2015)(Br.owning, J.).4 If the Court finds only an .opinion from the
[1237]*1237Court of Appeals of New Mexico, while “certainly [the Court] may and will consider the Court of Appeals’] decision in making its determination, the Court is not bound by the Court of Appeals’] decision in the same way that it would be bound by a Supreme Court decision.” Mosley v. Titus, 762 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1332 (D.N.M. 2010). (noting that where the only opinion on point is “from the Court of Appeals, [ ] the Court’s task, as a federal district court sitting in this district, is to predict what the Supreme Court of New Mexico .would do if the case were presented to it”)(citing Wade v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 667, 666 (10th Cir. 2007)(explaining that, “[w]here no controlling state decision exists, the federal court must attempt to predict what the state’s highest court would do,” and that, “[i]n doing so, it may seek guidance from decisions rendered by lower courts in the relevant state”)).5 The Court’ may also rely on decisions by the United States Court 'of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreting New Mexico law. See Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 27 F.Supp.3d at 1243 & n.30.6 Ultimately, “the Court’s task is to [1241]*1241predict what the state supreme court would do.” Wade v. EMGASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d at 666. Accord Mosley v. Titus, 762 F.Supp.2d at 1332 (citation omitted); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1188-89 (D.N.M., 2008)(Browning, J.)(quoting Wade v. EMGASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d at 665-66).
LAW REGARDING JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENTS INVOLVING MINORS
New Mexico does not have a statute or rule “governing settlements of claims on behalf of minors'.” Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶41, 127 N.M. 92, 977 P.2d 1012, 1020; Under New Mexico common law, however, “[a] trial court in an action involving minor children has a special obligation to see that they are properly represented, not only by their own representatives, but also by the court itself.” Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶30, 664 P.2d at 1006 overruled on other grounds by Montoya v. AKAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-066, ¶ 12, 838 P.2d at 974 (citations omitted).7 “In passing upon settlements dealing with claims or rights of minors, the court must determine whether the approval of a compromise would be in the best interests and welfare of the minor child.” Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶ 30, 664 P.2d at 1006 (citing United States v. Reilly, 385 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1967)). A'court is required to reject a settlement “[w]hen a settlement involving a minor is presented to a court for approval and the information before the court indicates that the settlement is not fair to the minor.” Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶ 42, 977 P.2d at 1020. “The court’s role in reviewing a settlement is to ‘represent’ the minor.” Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶45, 977 P.2d at 1020 (quoting Bonds v. Joplin’s Heirs, 1958-NMSC-096, ¶ 9, 64 N.M. 342, 328 P.2d 597, 599). The Court’s role is not to review the “adequacy of the performance of the minor’s attorney in reaching -the agreement. Rather, it is reviewing the fairness of the agreement itseif.” Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶ 45, 977 P.2d at 1020. “[T]he .fairness of the settlement should be determined as of the time the matter is presented to the court for decision.” Shelton v. Sloan 1999-NMCA-048, ¶ 45, 977 P.2d at 1020, “A party seeking to, repudiate a court approved settlement has the burden of proving the agreement was a product, of fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching of authority, or mutual mistake.” Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶ 28, 664 P.2d at 1006.
[1242]*1242LAW REGARDING GUARDIANS AD LITEM VIS-A-VIS SETTLEMENTS WITH MINORS
“[W]here one of the beneficiaries -is a minor, it is often the practice to seek court approval of any settlement and appointment of a guardian ad litem to advise the district court on the, appropriateness of the allocation of settlement amounts.” Spoon v. Mata, 2014-NMCA-115, ¶ 21, 338 P.3d 113, 119 (citing Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 1991-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 30-31, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40, 49). “When a guardian ad litem, is appointed ... it is very clear that' the guardian ad litem is an arm of the court.” Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶ 17, 331 P.3d 915, 920. “The general rule is that a next. friend or guardian ad litem acting for a minor may negotiate a compromise or settlement, but such compromise or settlement is not binding on the infant in the absence of judicial approval.” Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶28, 664 P.2d at 1006.
LAW REGARDING NEW MEXICO’S DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT OR NEGLECT STATUTE
“Recovery for wrongful death is provided for and carefully circumscribed by statute.” National Roofing, Inc, v. Alstate Steel, Inc., 2016-NMCA-020, ¶9, 366 P.3d 276, 280 (2015)(citing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-3 (“Wrongful . Death Statute”)). Pursuant to New Mexico’s Wrongful Death Statute:
The proceeds of any judgment obtained in any [wrongful death] action ... shall be distributed as follows:
A., if there is a surviving spouse and no child, then to the spouse;
B. if there is a surviving spouse and a child or grandchild, then one-half to the surviving spouse and the remaining one-half to the children and grandchildren, the grandchildren taking by right of representation;
C. if there is no husband or wife, but a child or grandchild, then to such child and grandchild by right of representation;
D. if the deceased is a minor, childless and unmarried, then to the father and mother who shall have an equal interest in the judgment, or if either of them is dead, then to the survivor;
E. If there is no father, mother, husband, wife, child or grandchild, then to a .surviving brother or sister if there are any; and
F. if there is no kindred as named in Subsections A through E of this section, then the proceeds of the judgment shall be disposed of in the manner authorized by law for the disposition of the personal property of deceased persons.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-3. If a wrongful death estate prevails in a wrongful death action, “the personal representative has a nondiscretionary duty to distribute the wrongful death proceeds in the ratio prescribed by the Wrongful Death Act.” Spencer v. Barber, 2013-NMSC-010, ¶ 22, 299 P.3d 388, 396 (2013).
ANALYSIS
In this case, the Court must determine how to divide one million dollars amongst a family. It further must resolve how the two children’s allocation will be disbursed until they reach the age of majority. The Court’s touchstone in this determination is fairness and the best interests of the children. See Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048, ¶42, 977 P.2d at 1020 (Concluding that the Court’s role is to “review[] the fairness of the agreement itself.”); Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, ¶30, 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000, 1006 (citing United States v. [1243]*1243Reilly, 385 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1967)(“In passing upon settlements dealing with claims or rights of minors, the court must determine whether the approval of a compromise would be in the best interests and welfare of the minor child.”)).8 In making its determination, the Court has considered the Plaintiffs’ proposals, their Motion, Ms. Oakey’s Report, her Guardian Ad Li-tem Proposal, and the testimony heard from Mares-Moreno, S. Alvarez, and Mr. Tombs. Based off of those considerations, the Court concludes the following settlement apportionment is fair and in the best interests of the children at the time it was presented to the Court:
The Court also concludes that a $500.00 per month allocation from J. Alvarez’ trust to S. Alvarez is appropriate until J. Alvarez’ eighteenth birthday. Finally, the Court concludes that a monthly allocation from G. Alvarez’ trust would be inappropriate, but her trust may have language that Mares-Moreno can apply to the trustee for expenses.9
In coming to this determination, the Court looks first to the appropriate apportionment for the children. As the Defendants noted at the hearing, if this action was purely a wrongful death action, J. Alvarez could, at most, receive $250,000.00. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-3(B); Spencer v. Barber, 2013-NMSC-010, ¶22, 299 P.3d at 396 (“[T]he personal representative has a nondiscretionary duty to distribute the wrongful death proceeds in the ratio prescribed by the Wrongful Death Act.”). The $250,000.00 amount is not necessarily a ceiling for J. Alvarez’ recovery, because a higher allocation could be in his best interest, but given that the. parties have generally agreed on the amounts for Mares-Moreno and SI Alvarez, allocating more to J. Alvarez than $250,000.00 would require taking money from G. Alvarez. The Court concludes that allocating more than [1244]*1244$250,000,00 to J. Alvarez would not be in G. Alvarez’ best interest.
G, Alvarez sustained extensive injuries from the accident including an injury to her head. See Tr. at 33:25-35:10i(Mares-Moreno, Oakey). The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony that G: Alvarez has made a strong physical recovery, but injuries at young ages, even if seemingly mended, can have life-long effects. See Sherri L, Goldstrohm & Sharon Arffa, Preschool Children with Mild to Moderate Traumatic Brain Injury: An Exploration of Immediate and Posh-Acute Morbidity, 20 Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology 675, 684-85 (2005)(Determining that children without a mild or moderate brain injuries performed better in standardized testing). The Court’s conclusion is in accord with Ms. Oakey’s Report that $400,000.00 is unfair and unreasonable to G. Alvarez given G. Alvarez’ severe injuries, her “arguable future medical needs,” and loss of her mother. Report at 7. From a $400,000.00 allocation, Mr. Tombs projects that G. Alvarez would have around $245,000.00 to invest after medical and legal expenses. The Court determines that a higher amount is needed to align with G. Alvarez’ best interests.
The Court, however, adopts a $500,000.00 allocation for G. Alvarez instead of the $525,000.00 amount that'Ms. Oakey recommends. In coming to this conclusion, the Court balances J. Alvarez’ interests against G. Alvarez’. J. Alvarez lost his mother and has little, if any, contact with his biological father. See Tr. at 19:1-5 (Allen, Alvarez).’ There is a risk that, if J. Alvarez loses his grandparents, he will have no guaranteed support. In. allocating $500,000.00 and $225,000.00 to G. Alvarez and J. Alvarez respectively, the Court concludes that it is providing the appropriate amount to each child based on G. Alvarez’ injuries and J. Alvarez living situation. Both children will have money set aside for college, and, should Mr. Tombs’ projections materialize, both children -will have sums waiting for them on their twenty-fifth birthdays. See Tr. at 50:8; id. at 50:1; id. at 50:16-24; id. at 51:15-24 (Tombs).
For similar reasons, the Court concludes that a $500.00 per month allocation to S. Alvarez until J. Alvarez’ eighteenth birthday is appropriate. That allocation, coupled with the $708.00 per month social security distribution, will provide S. Alvarez a steady source of support income for J. Alvarez without draining the trust by S. Alvarez’ twenty-fifth birthday. Based on Mr. Tombs’ projections, a $750.00 per month allocation at $200,000.00 would leave J. Alvarez with almost no principal remaining by his twenty-fifth birthday. See Tr. at 91:20-92:1; id. at 92:17 (Tombs). One reason for this might be that a $750.00 per month distribution appropriates the trust’s entire projected monthly interest, sapping the trust’s growth potential. See Tr. at 92:21-22 Accordingly, a $500.00 distribution better aligns with J. Alvarez’ interests.10
After allocating $500,000.00 and $225,000.00 to G. Alvarez and J. Alvarez, the remaining $275,000.00 must be divided between Mares-Moreno and S. Alvarez. At all stages of settlement negotiations, all parties have agreed that $200,000.00 is a proper settlement amount for Mares-Moreno. See Report at 2, 8 n.ll. The Court sees no.reason to disrupt this agreement. Finally it determines that $75,000.00 is appropriate for S. Alvarez, because there appears to have been general agreement that S. Alvarez should receive less than the [1245]*1245other parties. Compare Plaintiffs’ Compromise Proposal (allocating S. Alvarez $100,000.00) with Guardian Ad Litem’s Proposal (allocating S. Alvarez $75,000.00). The Plaintiffs also represent that they allocated more to S. Alvarez in general so that he could better provide for J. Alvarez, but that the trust payments “accomplish[ ] the clients’ goal.” Tr. at 60:22-61:4 (Glasheen). The Court concludes the monthly distribution from J. Alvarez’ trust meets that concern and, accordingly, allocates $75,000.00 to S. Alvarez.
At this juncture, the Court cannot grant either the Petition or the Plaintiffs’ Motion, because the settlement’s terms currently differ from the Court’s determination contained within this Memorandum Opinion and Order. To resolve this matter, the appropriate course is for the parties to submit a new settlement agreement, in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, for the Court to approve.
IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the parties’ Stipulated Petition for Approval of the Settlement of Minors’ Claims, filed January 11, 2017 (Doc. 25), is denied;- and (ii) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Approve Settlement, filed July 10, 2017 (Doc. 33), is denied. The Parties have leave to file a Motion to Approve a Settlement pursuant to the terms described in' this- Memorandum Opinion and Order.