Marcus Linthecome v. Robert Luna

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 30, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-10390
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCUS LINTHECOME, Case No. 2:24-cv-10390-JGB-PD Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 FOR FAILURE TO STATE A ROBERT LUNA, et al., CLAIM 14 Defendants. 15 16 I. Pertinent Procedural History and Plaintiff’s Claims 17 18 On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff Marcus Linthecome (“Plaintiff”), an 19 inmate housed at the Twin Towers Correctional Facility, proceeding pro se 20 filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 21 named Defendants, 50 21 Doe Defendants, 5 Doe Clinicians, 20 Jail Liaisons, and 50 Doe inmates, along 22 with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”). [Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.] 23 The Complaint asserts that prison officials entered into a conspiracy with 24 other inmates, and that the officers are acquiescing as inmates are currently attempting to breach his cell with a rotary saw. [Dkt. No. 1 at 5.] 25 On December 12, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed 26 without prepayment of fling fees. [Dkt. No. 8.] The Court noted that 27 normally Plaintiff would not be eligible for IFP status because he has 28 1 previously filed at least three actions that were dismissed as frivolous, 2 malicious, or failed to state a claim.1 Linthecome v. Alfaro, No. 1:17-cv-00872, 3 2017 WL 11707551, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2017). [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff, 4 however, alleged that he should qualify for IFP status under the “imminent 5 danger” exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court noted that “while 6 Plaintiff’s allegations appeared somewhat rambling and conspiratorial, the 7 Court does ‘not make an overly detailed inquiry into whether the allegations 8 qualify for the exception’ [citing] Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 9 (9th Cir. 2007).” [Id.] 10 On January 28, 2025, the Court issued a screening order dismissing the 11 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b)(1) for failure to comply with 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failure to state claims under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 and directed Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint curing the 14 defects identified by the Court no later than February 28, 2025. [Dkt. No. 29.] Plaintiff failed to timely file a First Amended Complaint. On March 28, 15 2025, the Court issued a minute order granting Plaintiff an extension of time 16 to file a First Amended Complaint by no later than April 25, 2025. [Dkt. No. 17 70.]2 18

19 1 The Court takes judicial notice of its own files and records and notes that Plaintiff 20 has filed over 20 civil rights cases and seven habeas petitions in the Central District of California. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. 21 Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if 22 those proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.”). 23 2 Plaintiff filed a series of emergency Motions for Temporary Restraining Orders 24 (“TRO”) [“April 24 TRO,” Dkt. No. 86]; [“April 28 TRO,” Dkt. No. 89]; [“April 28 Motion for Service of SDT and TRO,” Dkt. No. 91], along with Motions to “File H.C. 25 (I.F.P.)” [“April 24 Motion,” Dkt. No. 87]; for a “Court order for phone access, out 26 of cell time, and showers” [“April 28 Motion,” Dkt. No. 92]; and for “Sheriff Luna to provide an order for the 24/7 lockdown” [“May 1 Motion,” Dkt. No. 97]. After filing 27 his Motions, Plaintiff filed a notice that he had been transferred to North Kern State 28 Prison (“NKSP”) and is no longer housed at the Los Angeles County Jail. [Dkt. No. 1 On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Motion for First Filing 2 Complaint,” along with a “Notice of Addendum to Complaint Tom Bane Act 3 52.1 CCP, USC 1983 Civil Rights Attached Complaint.” [Dkt. Nos. 94, 95.] 4 II. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint and Addendum 5 The First Amended Complaint is difficult to decipher; however, it 6 appears Plaintiff is alleging that his court filings are missing--docket numbers 7 one through seven, that warrants and holds issued against him by the San 8 Bernardino County Superior Court are incorrect and should be reissued, that 9 he is being housed in an unsafe unit and cell with audible sawing noise, and 10 that he is being harassed by rude deputies. [Dkt. No. 94 at 1-3.]3 11 Plaintiff also filed an Addendum to Complaint naming 52 Defendants 12 and alleging unsafe conditions and ongoing imminent danger. [Dkt. No. 95 at 13 1-2.] Plaintiff alleges that his court filings--docket numbers one through 14 seven--were stolen; that he has filed 160+ grievances and that the grievance 15 process is futile; and that inmates are using a rotary saw to cut his cell’s floor 16 and ceiling in order to try and kill him. [Id. at 3-7.] He alleges that deputies 17 have witnessed his cell’s ceiling and floors being sawed into but failed to 18 correct the unsafe conditions. [Id. at 7-13.] Plaintiff also alleges that he has 19 had no phone access, no showers, no time outside his cell, that his housing 20 needs are ignored, and that calls are all recorded. [Id. at 17-19.] He seeks 21 compensatory and punitive damages. [Id. at 26-27.] 22

23 Moot. A claim is moot if the applicable “issues are no longer live, or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 24 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “If an inmate is seeking injunctive relief 25 with respect to conditions of confinement, the prisoner’s transfer to another prison renders the request for injunctive relief moot, unless there is some evidence of an 26 expectation of being transferred back.” See Prieser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 3 The Court previously sent Plaintiff the documents contained in docket numbers 1 28 through 7. [See Dkt. No. 60.] 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Standard of Review 3 The Court is required to screen pro se complaints and dismiss claims 4 that, among other things, are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon 5 which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 6 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). When a complaint 7 clearly does not state a claim upon which the court can grant relief, a court 8 may dismiss the case on its own, at the outset, without leave to amend. See 9 Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming district 10 court’s sua sponte dismissal of claim under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6)); Wong v. 11 Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court has authority under 12 Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss sua sponte for failure to state a claim). 13 In determining whether a complaint should be dismissed at screening, 14 the Court applies the same standard as that in a motion to dismiss pursuant 15 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 16 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Under that standard, “a complaint must contain 17 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” and viewed in the light most 18 favorable to the nonmoving party, “to state a claim to relief that is plausible 19 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 20 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it does require “more than an unadorned, the- 21 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. The Court does not, 22 however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 23 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 24 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) as amended on denial of reh’g, 275 25 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court 26 construes the First Amended Complaint liberally. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 27 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 28 1 To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 2 demonstrate that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, caused a 3 deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 4 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liability under § 1983 arises only upon a showing of 5 personal participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 6 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). There is no vicarious liability in § 1983 7 lawsuits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Hence, a government official – whether 8 subordinate or supervisor – may be held liable under § 1983 only when his or 9 her own actions have caused a constitutional deprivation. Id. Allegations 10 regarding § 1983 causation “must be individualized and focus on the duties 11 and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are 12 alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 13 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 14 B. Rule 8 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain a 16 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 17 relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 18 allegations, at a minimum, a complaint must allege factual allegations to 19 provide “fair notice” of both the particular claim being asserted and “the 20 grounds upon which [the particular claim] rests.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 21 555 & n.3 (citation and quotation marks omitted). If a plaintiff fails to clearly 22 and concisely set forth factual allegations sufficient to provide defendants 23 with notice of which defendant is being sued, on which theory, and what relief 24 is being sought against them, the pleading fails to comply with Rule 8. See, 25 e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint 26 must make clear “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 27 enough detail to guide discovery”); Exmundo v. Kane, 553 F. App’x 742, 743 28 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court dismissal of § 1983 claims where 1 plaintiff’s allegations “were unclear as to the timing and nature of [the 2 defendant’s] actions”). 3 Here, despite granting Plaintiff leave to amend, the FAC still does not 4 comply with Rule 8. 5 C. Failure to Protect Claim 6 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that his cell is being breached by inmates 7 who are cutting into his cell to try and kill him. [Dkt. Nos. 94 at 3; 95 at 7.] 8 He alleges that the inmates are using a rotary saw to cut the floor and ceiling 9 of his cell, and that the deputies are not getting him help to address the 10 unsafe cell. [Id.] Plaintiff was instructed in the prior dismissal Order that 11 such conclusory allegations in support of this claim fail to plausibly allege an 12 Eighth Amendment violation, and that he must provide specific facts 13 demonstrating that individual Defendants were personally aware of a specific 14 threat to his safety.4 [See Dkt. No. 29 at 7.] See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the 15 Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory 16 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient” 17 to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for relief.) 18 The FAC is unclear, and it is difficult to determine which of the 52 19 named individual Defendant(s) Plaintiff intends to sue and on what legal 20 theory. Plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts that provide a basis for any 21 cause of action and connect them to a specific individual Defendant(s) 22 involved. By failing to differentiate among Defendants or specify which 23 Defendant is the subject of Plaintiff's various allegations, the FAC violates 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) because it fails to provide Defendants 25 with fair notice of its alleged misconduct. 26 4 In 2013, Plaintiff alleged that the ceilings and floors in his cells at Los Angeles 27 County Jail and Twin Towers Correctional Facility were being cut by rotary saws 28 and that inmates were attempting to breach his cell in order to hurt him. See 1 Further, to the extent that Plaintiff sues Sheriff Luna, it is presumably 2 because he is responsible for the employees and the prisoners at the jails. 3 [Dkt. Nos. 94, 95.] Plaintiff cannot sue the Sheriff on this theory because 4 there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taylor, 880 5 F.2d at 1045. A supervisor may be held liable only if he or she was personally 6 involved in the constitutional deprivation. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676. A 7 supervisor may be liable based on his own acts or omissions, or his knowledge 8 of and acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, Starr 9 v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 982 (2012). 10 However, the FAC fails to allege any facts implicating Sheriff Luna for 11 personally violating Plaintiff’s civil rights or showing that Sheriff Luna had 12 actual knowledge of, and acquiesced in, any constitutional deprivations by his 13 subordinates. 14 D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Claim Regarding His 15 Grievances

16 Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure; 17 nor do they have a right to have their appeals handled in any particular 18 manner. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 19 “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific grievance 20 procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 21 denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004); see also McCoy v. Roe, 509 F. App’x 660, 660 22 (9th Cir. Feb.19, 2013) (affirming dismissal of claims arising from the 23 defendants’ response to a prisoner’s grievances) (citing Ramirez). A prison 24 grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and 25 actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under § 1983. 26 Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the 27 allegations regarding Defendants’ handling of Plaintiff's grievances fail to 28 state a cognizable § 1983 claim. | E. Leave to Amend the FAC Would Be Futile Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to amend his Complaint. The ; allegations in the FAC, however, still fail to state cognizable claims. 4 Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend 1s proper if it is > “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 6 amendment.” Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); see also, Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) 8 (a “district court’s discretion in denying amendment is particularly broad ? || when it has previously given leave to amend” (internal quotation marks 10 omitted)). Plaintiff has not met his initial burden to plead sufficient specific, | non-conclusory facts that plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Any 12 | amendment is therefore futile and leave to amend is unwarranted. 13 IV. Order 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court Dismisses Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint without leave to amend and orders that judgment be '° entered dismissing this action with prejudice. " IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 || Dated: June 30, 2025 20 21 HON JESUS B. BE L

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 || Presented by: 24 lecceas Menahoe_ 25 | HON. PATRICIA DONAHUE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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