Home/Customs and Patent Appeals/Mantz v. Jackson

Mantz v. Jackson

140 F.2d 161, 31 C.C.P.A. 824, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 329, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 14
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 3, 1944
DocketNo. 4782
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 140 F.2d 161 (Mantz v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mantz v. Jackson, 140 F.2d 161, 31 C.C.P.A. 824, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 329, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 14 (ccpa 1944).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office in an interference proceeding involving a patent, No. 2,213,844, to Harold A. Mantz, granted September 3, 1940, on an application filed November 10, 1938, and an application of Wilbur F. Jackson filed February 7, 1941, for reissue of his patent No. 2,201,399, granted May 21, 1940, on an application filed January 7, 1938. Jackson, therefore, is the senior party.

As originally declared, the interference comprised five counts corresponding to five claims in the Mantz patent, which Jackson copied into his application for reissue. Mantz, in response to an order to show cause why judgment on the-record should not be entered against [826]*826him, moved to dissolve the interference as to counts 1, 2, and 5 on the ground that Jackson’s disclosure did not support them. The Primary Examiner granted the motion as to count 5 but denied it as to counts 1 and 2.

On final hearing, the Board of Interference Examiners reviewed the question as to Jackson’s right to make counts 1 and 2 and, holding that these counts were supported by Jackson’s disclosure, awarded priority to Jackson. Jackson’s record date being earlier than that of Mantz, judgment of priority was entered in favor of Jackson as to counts 1 to 4, inclusive.

The only issue before this court is with respect to Jackson’s right to make counts 1 and 2, although appellant has advanced another contention to which we shall refer hereinafter.

Counts 1 and 2 read as follows:

1. In a device of the character described, in combination, a control device having an electromagnet provided .with an armature connected to a controlling member and adapted when energized to hold said member in operating position and when deenergized to release said member for movement to a safety position, a shutoff cods:, reset means for resetting said armature to attracted position and said controlling member to operating position, and means for preventing, the resetting operation of said reset means except when said shutoff code is closed.
2. In a device of the class described, a shutoff valve, a reset stem mounted for reciprocatory movement, means adapted to be reset by reciprocatory movement of said stem and means cooperable with said stem and movable laterally thereof when the valve is closed to permit operation of said reset means, said last means being held against lateral movement to prevent operation of said reset means when said valve is open. [Italics not quoted.]

Broadly speaking, the invention of the counts relates to a safety device for controlling the flow of fuel to the burners of gas appliances and the like, for example, a gas water heater. The object is to provide a device including a thermoelectrically controlled valve responsive to the heat generated by a pilot burner (or .rather to the current generated by a thermocouple placed adjacent the pilot flame), a shut-off' cock, and means for resetting the thermoelectrically controlled valve when closed, as well as means for preventing the resetting of said valve except when the shut-off cock is closed. This arrangement prevents the flow of gas to the main burner of the gas appliance on which the device is used while the pilot burner is extinguished.

It is stated in appellant’s brief:

It is particularly important that no gas flow to the main burner until after the pilot burner has been lit. There are two obvious reasons for that. The flow of gas to the main burner is in considerable volume and would result in quickly filling the compartment enclosing that burner with a highly explosive gad-air mixture, causing a serious and often disastrous explosion when it is attempted to reignite the pilot burner. Secondly, if gas is supplied to the main burner at the same time it is supplied to the pilot burner, and the pilot burner is immediately lighted, the gas from the main burner will also be lighted with the risk of [827]*827serious Burning of tlie user’s hand or of setting the user’s clothing afire. Those things can happen and have happened, in using defective so-called safety devices of this general type and, profiting by experience, the requirements of the American Gas Association that devices of this type be safe in fact have become increasingly stringent.

The devices of both parties, as described in their respective patents, are quite complicated and comprise many parts. This makes it difficult to describe the devices so that the real crux of the controversy may be easily understood. We think, therefore, that it will promote clarity to reproduce here one of the drawings of each of the parties. [See pp. 828, 829.]

The questions here raised by appellant • (except one question appellant seeks to present which we will discuss later herein) are, judging from the decisions of the tribunals below, the same as those which were presented there. The board’s statement of appellant’s contentions would therefore seem to be sufficient for the most part for our purposes here, and we quote the following from the board’s decision:

Mantz contends that Jackson has no right to make count 1 for the reason that Jackson does not disclose an armature connected to the controlling member and, further, that Jackson does not disclose structure wherein the resetting means resets the armature to attracted position and said controlling member to operating position.
As to the first contention, it appears in the structure as disclosed by Jackson that the stem 46 may properly be read as the controlling member as set forth in this count. The armature 47 is mounted on this member and abuts against the shoulder thereon and at all times is maintained in this abutting relationship by the spring 48. It therefore appears that the armature is connected to the controlling member at least as much as that of Mantz who describes a loose connection between the armature 55 and stem 57. The mere statement of connection in the count is not deemed to require a rigid connection and, in fact, such rigid connection is not disclosed by either party.
As to the second ground, Mantz contends that the resetting means consisting of Jackson’s bell crank 41 and the actuating cam 43 does not reset Jackson’s controlling member to operating position but that instead the spring 48 is the actuating means which causes the armature to move to attracted position. It is to be noted, however, that the spring 48 cannot act to move the armature 47 and the controlling member 46 until the bell crank 41 is moved to reset position by the cam 43. Accordingly it is believed that Jackson fully discloses reset means for resetting the armature to attracted position and the controlling member to operative position.
With respect to count 2 Mantz contends that Jackson does not disclose reset means which moves laterally of the reset stem or that the means is held against lateral movement. In the device of Jackson it is deemed proper to refer to the member 46 of the reset stem. We further deem that the statement “lateral movement” can only be interpreted as movement in a direction generally perpendicular to the axis of the stem.

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140 F.2d 161, 31 C.C.P.A. 824, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 329, 1944 CCPA LEXIS 14, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mantz-v-jackson-ccpa-1944.