Scheinman v. Zalkind

112 F.2d 1017, 27 C.C.P.A. 1354, 46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 134
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1940
DocketNo. 4333
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 112 F.2d 1017 (Scheinman v. Zalkind) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scheinman v. Zalkind, 112 F.2d 1017, 27 C.C.P.A. 1354, 46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 134 (ccpa 1940).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Examiner of Interferences of the United States Patent Office awarded priority of invention defined by the single count of this interference to the senior party Zalkind and upon appeal to the Board of [1355]*1355Appeals his decision was affirmed. Scheinman has appealed here for a reversal of the board’s decision.

The interference is between an application of Zalkind, filed October 16,1933, and an application of Scheinman, filed September 18,1936.

The inventions of both parties relate to collapsible filing cabinets which are made substantially of fibrous board. Both parties provide metallic parts such as frames for holding the parts together and rollers and tracks for the purpose of permitting the drawers of the casings to slide in and out of their enclosures. Both parties were concerned with such receptacles or filing equipment, including transfer and storage files, as would be suitable for receiving and storing correspondence, papers and other articles which would be of the drawer and casing type and which could be supplied to the user in knocked-down or collapsed condition to be afterwards assembled and erected by the purchaser.

The count was claim 56 of the application of the senior party Zalkind. Appellant has divided the count into its component elements and for convenience in referring to certain clauses therein contained we reproduce it as it appears in appellant’s brief:

3. A collapsible cabinet comprising the combination of
(1) a drawer section.of a substantially fibrous board'structure foldable into a substantially flat arrangement;
(2) a casing section of a substantially fibrous board structure for enclosing said drawer section, and foldable into a substantially flat arrangement ;
(3) roller mechanism associated with one of said sections for slidably supporting said drawer within said casing when said’ sections are in assembled condition;
(4) reinforcing means secured to said one section for carrying said roller mechanism,
(4a) whereby said one section is foldable into said substantially flat arrangement with said roller mechanism and reinforcing means attached thereto,
(4b) with negligible additional thickness being required for said flat arrangement;
(5) and track mechanism for coacting with said roller mechanism mounted on the other of said sections, and adapted to strengthen said section,
(5a) whereby said other section is foldable into said substántially flat arrangement with said track mechanism mounted thereon.

Neither side took testimony and during the motion period appellant moved to dissolve the interference on the following grounds:

1. That he [Scheinman] is not entitled to make the count in issue.
2. The party Zalkind is not entitled to make the count in issue.
3. That if the count is construed so broadly as to read upon Scheinman, it is unpatentable over the prior art.
4. That there has been such informality in declaring the interference as will preclude the proper determination of the question of priority of invention.

[1356]*1356Ill this court; appellant raises two questions: 1. Zalkind is not entitled to make the count in issue; 2. informality in declaring the interference.

The Primary Examiner found against Scheinman on all his contentions and the Examiner of Interferences rendered a pro fonna decision in favor of Zalkind, the senior party.

The Board of Appeals decided the two questions which were presented to it for decision: 1. The right of Zalkind to make the count; 2. the allegation that the count was functional and misleading. On the first question the board said:

In connection with the first ground Scheinman urges that Zalkind cannot make the count because it recites that the drawer section and also the casing section are “foldable into substantially fiat arrangement” and because the last part of the count requires that “said other section is foldable into said substantially fiat arrangement-with said track mechanism mounted thereon.”
Scheinman states that the count is properly readable on his application No. 101,444 where the tracks lie within the wall body so that when the casing is collapsed the side, top and bottom wall will engage and the arrangement will be a flat one. He urges that in Zalkind the tracks will lie between the opposite walls when the drawer or casing section is collapsed and therefore the arrangement of the collapsed structure is not substantially flat.

Count 3 includes the following limitation—

a casing section of a substantially fibrous board structure for enclosing said drawer section and foldable into substantially flat arrangement.
In both the Scheinman and Zalkind constructions the walls of the casing are separated by a space equal to the thickness of the roller or the track section. In both applications the collapsed casing is referred to as being substantially flat. It is our view that this part of the count is fairly readable on the Zalkind construction as we regard it as being substantially flat when collapsed. We also regard the two whereby clauses in the count as being readable on the Zalkind application because we think it is proper to state that each section is foldable into substantially flat arrangement even though a roller or a track is mounted on the inside walls of the section and will separate the walls to some extent.

On the second question raised with reference to the count being functional and misleading, the board had the following to say:

The second ground of Scheinman’s motion to dissolve alleged that the count is .functional and misleading. Scheinman urges that the only difference defined over the prior art resides in the whereby clauses in it and that it is improper to define the invention in this manner. He urges that the structure whereby the results stated in the whereby clauses are achieved must be stated, and that if this structure is recited, it is proper to add the whereby clauses. The examiner held that the whereby clauses set forth structural limitations. It is no doubt tine that ordinarily a whereby clause is generally used to merely set forth the results achieved by the structure included. This is no doubt the preferable mode of drawing claims.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
112 F.2d 1017, 27 C.C.P.A. 1354, 46 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1940 CCPA LEXIS 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scheinman-v-zalkind-ccpa-1940.