Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 14, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JOSUE GONZALO MANRIQUEZ- HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 22-9581 (Petition for Review) MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General,
Respondent. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Josue Gonzalo Manriquez-Hernandez petitions for review of a final order of
removal the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) issued. The Board upheld an
immigration judge’s denial of Manriquez-Hernandez’s application for withholding of
removal, cancellation of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), and of his request for voluntary departure. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 2
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we grant the petition in part as to the denial of cancellation and
remand to the Board for further proceedings. We otherwise deny the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings before the immigration judge
Manriquez-Hernandez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the
United States without admission or parole in July 2005, when he was nine years old.
In March 2015, the Department of Homeland Security served him a Notice to Appear
(NTA), charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a
noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole. He conceded
removability but applied for cancellation of removal of a nonpermanent resident
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and
CAT relief. He also sought voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b).
An immigration judge (IJ) held a hearing. At the outset, the IJ pretermitted
Manriquez-Hernandez’s cancellation application because he was a few months short
of the ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States required for
cancellation eligibility. The IJ therefore informed Manriquez-Hernandez that there
would be no questions about hardship to a qualifying relative if he were removed.
“[E]xceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative is another
eligibility requirement for cancellation. See § 1229b(b)(1)(D).1
1 The other requirements for cancellation eligibility are “good moral character,” § 1229b(b)(1)(B), and a showing that the applicant has not been convicted under certain enumerated provisions of the immigration laws, § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 2 Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 3
In support of his requests for withholding of removal and CAT relief,
Manriquez-Hernandez said he feared that his former caretakers would harm him if he
returns to Mexico. He explained that in 2004, when his mother was leaving Mexico
for the United States (his father had apparently done so in 2003), she arranged for
some friends to take care of Manriquez-Hernandez and his sister in the family’s
house. Manriquez-Hernandez alleged that the caretakers used drugs and alcohol in
the house and mistreated him and his sister. They told their uncle, who, with the help
of the police, was able to get the caretakers to leave the house. A week later,
Manriquez-Hernandez and his sister found the inside of their house destroyed and
threats to their lives painted on the walls. He and his sister did not tell anyone, but
until they left for the United States a few months later, they slept at their house only
occasionally and otherwise stayed away from it as much as possible. Since coming
to the United States, Manriquez-Hernandez has had no contact with the caretakers.
Manriquez-Hernandez also asserted a fear of harm if removed to Mexico based
on text messages his mother received in 2017. The messages threatened her family
and were accompanied by images of a decapitated man and other men holding guns.
According to Manriquez-Hernandez, when his mother told the sender of the messages
that she would call the police, the sender said that if she did so, “the organization will
take care of you and your family.” R., Vol. 1 at 202. Manriquez-Hernandez did not
know who sent the messages and was unsure if his mother was the intended recipient.
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Manriquez-Hernandez further testified that his parents divorced, which
resulted in family troubles that caused him to engage in conduct leading to multiple
arrests and tickets from 2010 to 2015. The IJ summarized that conduct as including
membership in the Southside Sureño 13 criminal street gang, breaking into cars to steal items, marijuana possession, alcohol possession and use, shooting a child with a BB gun in order to rob them, fleeing that incident, breaking into other cars and fleeing when the police arrive[d], stealing a vehicle, driving [that vehicle] while drunk and crashing that vehicle, and resisting arrest when the police officer sought to apprehend him. Id. at 100. Manriquez-Hernandez also admitted that just a month before the hearing
in 2019, he received a traffic citation for driving with a revoked license. He further
testified that he had gone through a lot of therapy and may have been diagnosed with
depression. He added that he had his own family now (a wife and two children) and
a job, and accordingly he had changed his ways and was trying to improve.
To link his fear of future harm to a protected ground, as required for statutory
withholding, Manriquez-Hernandez proposed four particular social groups (PSGs).
Three were defined by family relationships and the fourth comprised former members
of the Southside Sureño 13 gang. He also claimed fear of future persecution based
on his political opinion.
B. The IJ’s decision
The IJ denied withholding of removal for several independent reasons:
(1) none of Manriquez-Hernandez’s proposed PSGs were cognizable, and he
presented no evidence regarding his political opinion; (2) he did not claim past
persecution, and he did not establish it was more likely than not that he would be
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harmed in the future on account of his membership in any of his proposed PSGs; and
(3) he did not demonstrate that he could not safely relocate in Mexico.
The IJ denied CAT relief because Manriquez-Hernandez provided no evidence
that the Mexican government or police had ever harmed him or that it was more
likely than not that he would be tortured in Mexico with the government’s consent or
acquiescence. The IJ noted that the one time Manriquez-Hernandez interacted with
the Mexican police, the police had helped his family.
The IJ also concluded Manriquez-Hernandez was not eligible for cancellation.
The IJ explained that although the NTA did not state the time and place to appear, a
notice of hearing served on Manriquez-Hernandez two days later provided that
information and therefore perfected the deficient NTA. That combination, the IJ
concluded, cut off Manriquez-Hernandez’s continuous presence in the United States
a few months short of the required ten years under the so-called “stop-time rule.”2
In the alternative, the IJ found that even if Manriquez-Hernandez was
statutorily eligible for cancellation, the IJ would deny cancellation as a matter of
discretion because Manriquez-Hernandez had not demonstrated he was “a most
deserving candidate to warrant [cancellation].” R., Vol. 1 at 102 n.1 (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the IJ found that
Manriquez-Hernandez’s “criminal history, his former gang membership, and his
2 “Under the statutory ‘stop-time rule,’ the period of continuous physical presence ends (A) when the alien is served with a notice to appear, or (B) when the alien has committed certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).” Estrada-Cardona v. Garland, 44 F.4th 1275, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2022). 5 Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 6
unwillingness to be truthful with this Court” about his criminal actions3 outweighed
the positive factors—letters Manriquez-Hernandez submitted from family, friends,
and others describing his good character; his lengthy residence in the United States;
and his many family ties here, including his marriage to a United States citizen with
two children. R., Vol. 1 at 102. For these same reasons, the IJ denied voluntary
departure as a matter of discretion.
C. The Board’s decision
The Board adopted and affirmed the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal and
CAT relief. Regarding withholding, the Board concurred with the IJ that
Manriquez-Hernandez “did not establish a clear probability of future persecution on
account of his political opinion or membership in a [PSG].” Id. at 3. The Board
separately concluded that intervening Board precedent regarding family-based PSGs
did “not affect or alter the [IJ’s] conclusions.” Id. at 3, n.2. The Board noted that
Manriquez-Hernandez had not challenged the IJ’s third basis for denying
withholding—that he did not meet his burden to show he could not safely relocate in
Mexico—and therefore concluded that he had waived the issue. The Board also
agreed with the IJ’s conclusion regarding CAT relief, adding that “it is purely
speculative that [Manriquez-Hernandez] will be targeted for harm when he returns to
Mexico.” Id.
3 Regarding Manriquez-Hernandez’s lack of candor to the court, the IJ found that he “lied on several occasions relating to his prior history with the gang and his criminal history.” R., Vol. 1 at 101. 6 Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 7
Turning to cancellation, the Board observed that since the IJ’s decision, the
Supreme Court had “held that an NTA sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule is a
single document containing all the information about an individual’s removal hearing
specified in . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).” R., Vol. 1 at 3 (discussing Niz-Chavez v.
Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021)). The Board therefore concluded that the deficient
NTA served on Manriquez-Hernandez “was not sufficient to stop the accrual of [his]
continuous physical presence.” Id. (citation omitted). But rather than grant his
motion for remand to the IJ for further factfinding regarding hardship, the Board
agreed with the IJ that even if Manriquez-Hernandez was eligible for cancellation, he
was not entitled to cancellation in the exercise of discretion because the negative
factors (his criminal history and former gang membership) outweighed the positive
ones (his lengthy residence in the United States and his many family ties here). And
like the IJ, the Board denied voluntary departure as a matter of discretion for the
same reasons.
II. DISCUSSION
The Board’s decision was a full explanatory opinion by a three-member panel.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6). Accordingly, the Board’s “opinion completely
super[s]edes the IJ decision for purposes of our review.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006). We therefore confine our review to the
Board’s opinion. We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo and its factual
findings for substantial evidence. Igiebor v. Barr, 981 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir.
2020).
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In his petition, Manriquez-Hernandez contends that the Board should have
remanded the case to the IJ for reconsideration of (1) withholding of removal based
on intervening precedent regarding family-based PSGs; (2) eligibility for CAT relief
based on a determination of willful blindness; (3) statutory eligibility for
cancellation, in particular whether he showed the exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship required for cancellation; and (4) the denial of voluntary departure. We
agree with his third and fourth contentions but reject the first two.
A. Withholding
Manriquez-Hernandez argues that in light of the intervening precedent
regarding family-based PSGs, the Board should have remanded his case to the IJ for
reconsideration of whether he established a cognizable family-based PSG in support
of his withholding application. But Manriquez-Hernandez raises no challenge to an
independently dispositive ground the Board relied in denying withholding—his
failure to challenge the IJ’s dispositive determination that he did not establish he
could not safely relocate to another part of Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(3)(i)
(placing burden on withholding applicant who has not suffered past persecution to
demonstrate that it would not be reasonable to relocate within a country to avoid
future threats to his life or freedom on account of a protected ground). Because
Manriquez-Hernandez has not challenged that ground, he cannot prevail with respect
to the denial of withholding, and we need not consider his argument regarding his
proposed PSGs. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that because an unchallenged agency finding was “by itself, a sufficient
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basis for” denying relief, “success on appeal is foreclosed—regardless of the merit of
[petitioner’s] arguments relating to” a separate ground for the denial of relief).
B. CAT relief
Manriquez-Hernandez argues that the Board should have remanded the case to
the IJ because the IJ made no findings whether the Mexican government would
willfully turn a blind eye to any torture he might be subjected to in the future. We
reject this argument.
Evidence that public officials are willfully blind to activity constituting torture
can satisfy a CAT applicant’s burden of showing that they will acquiesce in his future
torture. See Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining
requirements for CAT relief, including that any torture would be “by a public
official, or at the instigation or with the acquiescence of such an official” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (“Willful blindness means that
the public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official
capacity was aware of a high probability of activity constituting torture and
deliberately avoided learning the truth[.]”). But in its CAT analysis, the Board
determined it was “purely speculative” that Manriquez-Hernandez would “be targeted
for harm when he returns to Mexico.” R., Vol. 1 at 3. Manriquez-Hernandez has not
challenged that determination, so he has waived review of it. See Krastev v. INS,
292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Issues not raised on appeal are deemed to be
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waived.”). And absent any likelihood that he would be tortured, there was no reason
for the Board to address willful blindness.4
C. Cancellation
Regarding cancellation, Manriquez-Hernandez argues that after concluding the
NTA was insufficient to cut off his continuous presence short of ten years, the Board
erred by exercising de novo review and determining that he did not merit cancellation
as a matter of discretion. He contends that because the IJ did not take testimony or
make predictive findings about hardship, the Board should have remanded the case to
the IJ for further factfinding regarding his statutory eligibility for cancellation, and
that by not doing so, it “necessarily exceeded its permissible scope of review and
conducted fact-finding contrary to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).” Pet’r’s Opening Br.
at 30.
In the alternative, Manriquez-Hernandez argues that even if the Board can
deny relief as a matter of discretion in the first instance, it erred by doing so here
because it made that discretionary decision without having any testimony or factual
findings about hardship and without any indication that it had considered his
documentary hardship evidence. He therefore concludes that the Board did not
4 We note that the IJ did find that there was “certainly not sufficient evidence that the government of Mexico would turn a blind eye, that is, acquiesce[,] to [Manriquez-Hernandez] being tortured by governmental or non-governmental actors,” R., Vol. 1 at 99–100.
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consider all the factors set out in its own case law regarding discretionary denials of
cancellation.5
As an initial matter, we must assess our jurisdiction to consider
Manriquez-Hernandez’s challenges to the Board’s denial of his application for
§ 1229b cancellation. See Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir.
2020). Generally, § 1252(a)(2) strips circuit courts of jurisdiction to review any
judgment regarding cancellation of removal except for constitutional claims and
questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); see also Galeano Romero,
968 F.3d at 1182 (recognizing that we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional
claims and questions of law, including those that arise in the circumstances specified
at § 1229b(b)(1)” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have interpreted the
statute as “denying jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of a decision
concerning cancellation of removal.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1181 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Among those discretionary aspects is the ultimate decision
whether to grant cancellation to an eligible applicant. See § 1229b(b)(1) (providing
that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal” if the applicant is statutorily
5 It is questionable whether Manriquez-Hernandez has argued a due process violation regarding the discretionary denial of cancellation. Compare Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 24 (asserting that the Board violated his due process rights by not remanding to the IJ for reconsideration of his eligibility for cancellation), and Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 12–16 (fleshing out a due process argument), with Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 32 (stating that he “is not presenting a formal due-process claim, despite the strength of his claim, because of the minimal rights noncitizens are entitled to”). We need not resolve whether he raised a constitutional claim because his legal-error argument has merit. 11 Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 12
eligible (emphasis added)); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (placing burden on applicant to
show eligibility for relief from removal “and that it should be granted in the exercise
of discretion”); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (“Because relief from
removal is always a matter of grace, even an eligible noncitizen must persuade the
immigration judge that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).6
We have jurisdiction to consider both of Manriquez-Hernandez’s arguments
because they raise questions of law. Specifically, his first argument raises the
question whether the Board exceed its permissible scope of review by making factual
findings in violation of § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). See Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 67
(2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen the [Board] engages in factfinding in contravention of . . .
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), it commits an error of law, which we have jurisdiction to
correct.”); cf. Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184 (“Obviously, the Board would lack
discretion to contravene statutory requirements.”). And his alternative argument
raises the question whether the Board deviated from its own precedent by not
considering, or showing that it had considered, his evidence of hardship as a positive
factor in the discretionary calculus. See Galeano Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184
6 We agree with Manriquez-Hernandez that his arguments are not directed at any finding regarding the degree of hardship any of his qualifying relatives would experience upon his removal. Indeed, neither the IJ nor the Board made any such findings or determinations. We therefore need not address the government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction over such an argument under Galeano-Romano and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020).
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(explaining that it is a question of law whether the Board “depart[s] from or ignore[s]
its precedent”). We therefore have jurisdiction to review both arguments.
We reject his first argument. If an IJ decides that denial of relief from removal
would be appropriate “regardless of eligibility, the judge need not address eligibility
at all.” Patel, 596 U.S. at 332. Thus, like the IJ, the Board was permitted to assume
statutory eligibility and proceed directly to the discretionary decision. And in
denying cancellation, the Board did not engage in any factfinding. It instead
assumed statutory eligibility for cancellation, which necessarily included the
assumption that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship would result to
Manriquez-Hernandez’s qualifying relatives if he is removed. Hence, the Board was
not required to remand to the IJ for further factfinding in order to deny cancellation
as a matter of discretion. We therefore conclude the Board acted within its
permissible scope of review and did not engage in factfinding prohibited by
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
Manriquez-Hernandez’s alternative argument stems from the fact that the IJ
and the Board relied on different tests in denying discretionary cancellation. The IJ
relied on In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (B.I.A. 1980), which does not include
hardship as a factor to be considered in a discretionary denial of voluntary departure.
The Board, on the other hand, relied on In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7 (B.I.A. 1998),
where the Board held that “evidence of hardship to the respondent and his family if
[removal] occurs” is among the “favorable considerations” that may be considered in
deciding a cancellation application. Id. at 11. But in conducting its de novo review
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under In re C-V-T-, the Board relied on the factual findings the IJ made in applying
In re Seda, which the Board held were “not clearly erroneous,” R., Vol. 1 at 4. In
doing so, Manriquez-Hernandez concludes, the Board focused only on factors
relevant to the In re Seda analysis and did not consider his hardship evidence, which
he expressly called to the Board’s attention in his brief on appeal.7
Under these circumstances, and coupled with the IJ’s express refusal to take
any testimony at the hearing regarding hardship, we conclude that the Board
committed reversible error. We simply cannot determine whether the Board factored
the documentary hardship evidence into its discretionary calculus. We do not suggest
that hearing testimony on hardship is required before the Board can deny cancellation
as a matter of discretion. But the IJ’s express refusal to take such testimony adds to
our inability to determine whether the IJ or the Board considered hardship when
denying cancellation as a matter of discretion.
In so concluding, we acknowledge the government’s argument that
In re C-V-T- does not require consideration of any particular factor in every case.
See 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11 (“[T]here is no inflexible standard for determining who
7 Manriquez-Hernandez informed the Board that his wife has “a long history of serious mental health issues stemming from sexual abuse as a child, including: Depression, Anxiety, and PTSD. She also suffer[s] from Rheumatoid Arthritis.” R., Vol. 1 at 43–44. He added that “his family will suffer financially in his absence, not [to] mention the emotional consequences of [his] children growing up fatherless.” Id. at 44. And he pointed to country-conditions evidence showing “prevalent violence” in Mexico, and “a lower standard of education and healthcare in Mexico that prevent[s] him from taking his family with him to Mexico, as well as [an] almost [] non-existent mental healthcare system for [his] wife.” Id. 14 Appellate Case: 22-9581 Document: 010111015812 Date Filed: 03/14/2024 Page: 15
should be granted discretionary relief, and each case must be judged on its own
merits.”). But it does require the agency to “balance the adverse factors . . . with the
social and humane considerations presented in [a noncitizen’s] behalf” in
determining whether to grant cancellation as a matter of discretion. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Manriquez-Hernandez presented hardship evidence, so it
was incumbent on the Board to consider it or explain why it would not consider it.
The Board “is not required to discuss every piece of evidence when it renders a
decision,” Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 648 (10th Cir. 1995), or “to write an
exegesis on every contention,” Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000
(10th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). But it must “consider the issues
raised,” and its decision must “set[] out terms sufficient to enable us as a reviewing
court to see that the Board has heard, considered, and decided.” Becerra-Jimenez,
829 F.2d at 1000 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are unable to determine
whether the Board did so in this case.
The government’s remaining arguments do not persuade us otherwise. The
government asks us to apply the presumption of regularity because “the Board
acknowledged the applicable law and standard of review and considered the
appropriate factors.” Resp. Br. at 44. “The presumption of regularity supports the
official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” Nat’l
Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, neither of the immigration cases the government cites in
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support of its argument, Khakhn v. Holder, 371 F. App’x 933 (10th Cir. 2010), and
Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004), applied the presumption of
regularity to salvage the Board’s deficient substantive analysis.8 We conclude that
applying the presumption in this case would be improper.
The government points out that Manriquez-Hernandez filed documentary
evidence of hardship and drew the Board’s attention to that evidence, and suggests
that both the IJ and the Board considered that evidence because they considered the
entire record. But this makes it all the more surprising that neither the IJ nor the
Board said anything about the hardship evidence in their discretionary denials of
cancellation, and we are unwilling to assume that the Board considered the hardship
evidence in deciding to deny cancellation as a matter of discretion.
Finally, the government argues that Manriquez-Hernandez “testified about
why he should be granted ‘any discretionary relief,’” Resp. Br. at 48 (quoting
R., Vol. 1 at 204), and he could have discussed the positive equities in connection
with his application for voluntary departure. The testimony referred to, however,
was Manriquez-Hernandez’s response to his attorney’s question: “‘[G]iven your
juvenile history, why should the Court consider any discretionary relief for you?’”
8 In Khakhn, we applied the presumption of regularity to a prior administrative decision and a deportation warrant an immigration officer relied on in later proceedings. See 371 F. App’x at 936. And in Yuk, we employed the presumption of regularity in concluding that the Board’s summary affirmance procedure does not violate due process or administrative law principles given that the IJ’s decision provides a reasoned explanation courts can review. See 355 F.3d at 1232.
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R., Vol. 1 at 204. He replied that he was trying to change and now had a family.
And when his attorney asked if he would accept voluntary departure, he simply said,
“Yeah.” Id. at 205. In view of the IJ’s directive that there would be no testimony
about hardship, it is unsurprising that Manriquez-Hernandez’s answers did not refer
to hardship.
D. Voluntary departure
Like cancellation decisions, § 1252(a)(2) divests us of jurisdiction to review
the denial of voluntary departure under § 1229c except for constitutional claims and
questions of law. See Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.
2016). Manriquez-Hernandez challenges the discretionary denial of voluntary
departure based on the same arguments he raises regarding the denial of cancellation.
We have concluded that those arguments present questions of law regarding
consideration of the hardship evidence. We therefore have jurisdiction to consider
those arguments as they relate to the denial of voluntary departure. Because the
Board’s discretionary denial of voluntary departure rested on the same analysis as its
discretionary denial of cancellation, the Board is instructed to revisit the
discretionary denial of voluntary departure in light of our decision, if necessary.
Cf. In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 554 (omitting hardship from non-exclusive list of
voluntary-departure considerations).
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III. CONCLUSION
We grant the petition for review in part, deny it in part, and remand to the
Board for further proceedings consistent with our disposition.
Entered for the Court
Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge