Mandeng v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 25, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3488
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JONATHAN CAMILLE MANDENG,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-3488 (JDB)

UBER COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Jonathan Camille Mandeng, a former driver for the rideshare company Uber, sued Uber in

D.C. Superior Court. After removing the action to this Court, Uber moves to compel arbitration

on the basis of an arbitration agreement Mandeng signed as part of his employment. For the

reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion.

Background

Mandeng filed this complaint pro se in D.C. Superior Court. See Compl. [ECF No. 1-3].

Though his allegations were not entirely clear, he seemed to allege Uber engages in widespread

mistreatment of its drivers and steals their wages. Id. As relief, he asked the court to “[u]nlock

[his] Uber App, review the treatment of drivers in general,” “put[] an end to all the abuses” drivers

suffer at the hands of Uber, and award him $150,000. Id. at 1.

Invoking diversity jurisdiction—more than $75,000 was in controversy between Uber, a

citizen of Delaware and California, and Mandeng, a citizen of D.C., see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)—

Uber removed the case to this Court, see Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1] at 2–3.

Soon thereafter, Uber moved to compel arbitration and to stay this Court’s proceedings in

the meantime. See Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration of Pl.’s Compl. & Stay Proceedings Pending

1 Arbitration [ECF No. 6] (“Mot.”). In support, Uber provided copies of agreements Mandeng

signed as a condition of his employment. See Decl. of Deborah Soh [ECF No. 6-2] (“Soh Decl.”)

¶¶ 5, 17–19; Portier Platform Access Agreement [ECF No. 6-9] (“PPAA”); Rasier Platform

Access Agreement [ECF No. 6-10] (“RPAA”). Each contains an arbitration provision alerting

Mandeng in capital and bolded lettering that, by assenting to the agreement, he was agreeing to

resolve disputes with Uber “THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION.” See

PPAA ¶ 13; RPAA ¶ 13. The arbitration provisions explain that they apply “to any legal dispute,

past, present or future, arising out of or related to [Mandeng’s] relationship with” Uber. PPAA

¶ 13.1(a); RPAA ¶ 13.1(a). Such disputes, the provisions make clear, include disputes about,

among other things, “compensation, minimum wage, expense reimbursement, overtime,” and

more. PPAA ¶ 13.1(c); RPAA ¶ 13.1(c). Where the arbitration provision applies, it requires “all

claims whether brought by” Mandeng or Uber “to be resolved only by an arbitrator . . . and not by

way of court or jury trial.” PPAA ¶ 13.1(b); RPAA ¶ 13.1(b). And it delegates to the arbitrator

not only the underlying merits of the claim but also questions about the scope of the arbitration

provision, providing that an arbitrator shall determine disputes “relating to the interpretation,

application, formation, scope, enforceability, waiver, applicability, revocability or validity of this

Arbitration Provision or any portion of this Arbitration Provision.” PPAA ¶ 13.1(b); RPAA

¶ 13.1(b).

Binding oneself to arbitration, the agreements explain, is “not a mandatory condition” of

contracting with Uber. PPAA ¶ 13.8(a); RPAA ¶ 13.8(a). So if Mandeng did not wish to forfeit

his right to come to court, he had 30 days after signing the agreements to email Uber indicating as

much. PPAA ¶ 13.8(a); RPAA ¶ 13.8(a). According to Uber’s records, he did not do so. Soh

Decl. ¶ 22.

2 Uber filed its motion to compel arbitration on December 23, 2024. See Mot. More than

four months then passed without word from Mandeng. On May 12, 2025, the Court instructed

Mandeng that, if he wished to oppose the motion, he had until June 2 to do so. See Min. Order,

May 12, 2025. Mandeng did not respond.

Analysis

“[A]rbitration agreements are simply contracts.” Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143,

148 (2024). The parties to arbitration agreements thus have wide discretion in fixing their terms

and, as a result, can opt to arbitrate disputes not only about “the merits” of a case but also gateway

questions like “whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits” and even “who should have the primary

power to decide” whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits. Id. at 148–49 (quoting First Options

of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)). Where an arbitration agreement delegates such

gateway questions in “clear and unmistakable” terms, a court’s only role is to determine “whether

a valid arbitration agreement exists”; it “may not decide an arbitrability question that the parties

have delegated to an arbitrator.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63,

69 (2019).

The agreements here delegate questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator in clear and

unmistakable terms. The agreements explain that an arbitrator shall resolve disputes “relating to

the interpretation, application, formation, scope, enforceability, waiver, applicability, revocability

or validity of this Arbitration Provision or any portion of this Arbitration Provision.” PPAA

¶ 13.1(b); RPAA ¶ 13.1(b). Nearly identical language has been held to provide clearly and

unmistakably for the arbitration of arbitrability. See, e.g., Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. AT&T

Inc., 6 F.4th 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration

agreement”); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (“enforceability,

3 revocability or validity of the Arbitration Provision or any portion of the Arbitration Provision”);

Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. [ECF No. 6-1] at 9–11 (collecting cases).

So the only remaining question for the Court is “whether a valid arbitration agreement

exists.” See Henry Schein, 586 U.S. at 69. It does, as Uber has provided uncontroverted evidence

of “an offer, an acceptance, and valuable consideration.” See Osvatics v. Lyft, Inc., 535 F. Supp.

3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Dixon v. Midland Mortg. Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D.D.C.

2010)). “It is well established that [Uber’s] method of obtaining drivers’ assent to its Terms of

Service—presenting the terms of the agreement and requiring users to click ‘I Agree’ before they

can access the service—constitutes a valid means of offer and acceptance.” Id. at 11 (cleaned up);

see Soh Decl. ¶¶ 8–11 (explaining Uber’s process); Ex. 2 [ECF No. 6-4] (displaying the “I Agree”

message). As for consideration, the arbitration provision is a two-way street: Mandeng exchanged

his agreement to arbitrate for Uber’s agreement to the same. See Shatteen v. Omni Hotels Mgmt.

Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Mutual agreements to arbitrate are independently

sufficient forms of consideration.” (cleaned up)). And Mandeng also came away from the

exchange with “access to [Uber’s] application as a driver.” Osvatics, 535 F. Supp. 3d at 11.

In sum, the Court has a very limited role in this case: to answer whether “the parties

subject[ed] some set of issues to an arbitrator for resolution,” and whether they “clearly and

unmistakably assign[ed] to an arbitrator the authority to decide whether disputes fit within that set

of issues.” Commc’ns Workers of Am., 6 F.4th at 1349. Having reached a plain affirmative

answer to both, the Court must leave to the arbitrator the question whether this “particular dispute

is arbitrable.” Id. And it must “stay the trial of the action until” the arbitration has run its course.

9 U.S.C. § 3; see Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 478 (2024) (“When a district court finds that a

4 lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the

[Federal Arbitration Act] compels the court to stay the proceeding.”).

Conclusion

For the above reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration and to

stay these proceedings pending arbitration. SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Dated: June 25, 2025