Malone v. Hastings

193 F. 1, 113 C.C.A. 329, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1040
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 6, 1912
DocketNo. 2,169
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 193 F. 1 (Malone v. Hastings) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Malone v. Hastings, 193 F. 1, 113 C.C.A. 329, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1040 (5th Cir. 1912).

Opinion

GRUBB, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The effect of the general demurrer is to assert that the petition does not set out a cause of action, because (1) it failed to aver facts which show that a warranty, express or implied, accompanied the sale; and (2) it claimed no damages other than those based on the possible value at maturity of a planted, but not matured, crop, and damages of this kind are too speculative and uncertain for allowance.

[ 1 ] 1. The contention of the defendants in error upon the first point is that the only obligation resting on the defendants, according to the averments of the petition, by virtue of the contract, was to furnish the plaintiff with a variety of seed known as white Bermuda onion seed, and as the petition averred that seed of that variety had been actually furnished, the defendants were not responsible for its quality, if it failed to produce the desired and anticipated results, and that there was no averment of a warranty, either express or implied, that the onion seed furnished would produce any specific yield in quantity or quality.

The infirmity of this contention lies in the mistaken assumption that the contract of sale required of the defendants only to furnish seed of a given variety, regardless of quality. We agree with defendants that there was no warranty as to the quantity or quality of onions to be produced from the seed sown. The petition avers that the seed “contracted for and to be sold and delivered bjr defendant to plaintiff tmder said contract should be pure, fresh, white Bermuda onion seed of the very best quality and grade.” This much by the express terms of the contract of sale the defendants were bound to supply. The defendants clearly breached the contract of sale if they supplied a substantially different article from that contracted for, and, if the damages claimed were due to such breach, the right of recovery would be complete. The petition avers as to the character of the seed actually supplied;

“That said seed so shipped and delivered to plaintiff by de/endants were pot pure, fresh, white Bermuda onion seed of the best grade and quality, nor were they of a reasonably good grade or quality of while Bermuda onion seed, but same wore very inferior seed, of impure quality, and a seed that, so far as the same did germinate at all, would produce only a very faulty and inferior onion, and an onion of very little value.”

[4]*4That this averment shows a noncompliance with the contract on defendants’ part is clear. We need not, therefore, enter upon the question of warranty.

We do not interpret the petition as attempting to assert a covenant by defendants to supply seed that would produce 30,000 pounds to the acre and a resulting breach, in that a less amount was produced. As we construe its averments, it asserts an agreement on defendants’ part to furnish seed of the best grade and quality, a breach by actually furnishing seed that was impure, inferior, and not even of reasonably good grade, with the result that plaintiff lost the difference between the value of a crop produced from seed of the best grade and quality, which is averred to have been about 30,000 pounds to the acre, and what the inferior seed furnished actually produced, which is averred to have been 165,000 pounds for the 25 acres.

[2] 2. The further contention of the defendants in error is that the only damages claimed, being based upon the value of an unmatured crop, are too speculative for allowance.

It is a general rule that speculative profits are too uncertain for legal computation. The rule does not prevent the recovery of profits, because they are profits, but only because of their uncertainty or remoteness. So it is only such profits as are speculative or remote that' cannot be recovered. Damages, based upon the value of unmatured crops, are analogous to profits lost, and are governed by the same rule. The inquiry in every case of- profits claimed as damages, therefore, includes the ascertainment of the issue whether the profits are reasonably certain, and not too remote for legal assessment; and this ’is as true of damages based on the prospective value of unmatured crops as it is of lost profits. That the damage resulting from the failure of a crop due to inferior seed is the nátural and direct, as distinguished from the remote, result of -a breach of contract to furnish good seed, in a case in which the parties to the contract contemplated at the time of the sale that the seed was to be used for the planting of a crop, is clear.

The more difficult question is whether damages based on the result of an unmatured crop are speculative. The test by which in each instance this question is to be ascertained is whether there are sufficient data to determine with reasonable certainty the probable value the crop yrould have had, if matured.

The recent case of Metzger v. Brincat, 154 Ala. 397, 45 South. 633, involved the right to recover the loss of profits due to the violation of a covenant in a lease not to let adjoining premises for occupancy in a business of a like character to -that conducted by the appellee tenant, who operated á fruit stand, and applies the test we have mentioned. The coprt said:

“The contract shows that the matter in the contemplation of the parties-was that the business of the appellee should not be injured by renting a portion of thé house to another party, and the evidence shows that the damages were ascertainable with reasonable certainty. * * * The case of Montgomery Co. Union Agr. Soc. v. Harwood, 120 Ind. 440, 26 N. E. 182, 10 L. R. A. 532, was for breach of a provision in a lease of a mere temporary privilege for a few days, and there were no data from which probable sales [5]*5could be estimated, and that character of business was contrasted with an esta 1)1 i shed business. This case, and others cited, are differentiated' from the one now under consideration, in that in the present case there is evidence that the particular locality where this fruit stand was located had for years been a favored place for such business, on account of being the corner where passengers from the railroad station passed; that this particular stand had been previously occupied by the party whom Brincat had bought out, and to whom the defendant had rented that part of the building between plaintiff' and said comer; that all fruit dealers in that locality had experienced a definite depreciation in business whenever a rival stand was placed between them and said corner; and it was also shown'that this particular business experienced a like depreciation from the time the rival stand was set up. The damage was consequently ascertainable with reasonable certainty, and was not speculative; and the contract had been made with a view to guard against that particular damage.”

The distinction drawn by the Alabama court between the case of Montgomery County v. Harwood, 126 Ind. 440, 26 N. E. 182, 10 L. R. A. 532, in which no data were present, and the case decided by it, in which sufficient data were present, clearly illustrates the proper rule.

In the case of Bell v. Reynolds & Lee, 78 Ala. 515, 56 Am. Rep. 52, the same court applied this test to the case of damages based on the value of an unmatured crop. The action was one for the price of fertilizer sold defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
193 F. 1, 113 C.C.A. 329, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1040, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/malone-v-hastings-ca5-1912.