UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SAMUELMALDONADO, SSS Plaintiff, -against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER MIRANDA K. MALDONADO, 1:19-cv-7047 (ENV) Defendant. :
eee enn enn □□ ne ne eeeneeeeeees VITALIANO, D.J.
Plaintiff Samuel Maldonado filed this quite unusual pro se civil rights action on
December 12, 2019, naming his daughter as the only defendant. Plaintiffs request to proceed in
forma pauperis is granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the purposes of this Order, but the
action is dismissed.
Controlling Legal Principles
The Court is mindful that in reviewing a pro se complaint, a plaintiff's pleadings are held
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
USS. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, even after
Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Ifa liberal
reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the district
court must grant leave to amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000). Notwithstanding a self represented pleader’s right to solicitude, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action when it is satisfied that the
action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Regardless of
whether filed by a pro se plaintiff or not, a complaint must plead enough facts “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Although a plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, the pleading rules do demand “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In assessing plausibility,
all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, but this tenet is “inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Even more critical, a plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish
that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Pleading solicitude often affords
no cure for a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (inquiring into whether pro se plaintiff established subject matter jurisdiction);
see also Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 11 Civ. 5369, 2012 WL 1657362, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se
litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking.”). “[FJailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may
be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d
697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is
presented, or when plaintiffs and defendants have complete diversity of citizenship and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332. In order to invoke
federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Discussion
In this case, Maldonado alleges that his daughter conspired to violate his civil rights and
slandered and defamed him in connection with a New York criminal proceeding. His complaint,
it is presumed, invokes the provisions of the Civil Rights Acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section
1985 applies to conspiracies to interfere with an individual’s constitutional rights and may
include conspiracies by private actors. However, none of its three provisions applies in
plaintiff's case. Section 1985(1) addresses conspiracies to interfere with federal officers.
Section 1985(2) has two components. The first clause addresses conspiracies to obstruct justice
or to intimidate witnesses or jurors or other parties in federal court proceedings. The second
clause concerns conspiracies to obstruct “the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with
intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws....” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Section
1985(3) provides a remedy to redress conspiracies “for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Claims related to equal
protection of the laws under Section 1985(3) and the second clause of Section 1985(2) require
the plaintiff to show that the conspiracy was motivated by racial or otherwise class-based
animus. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-35, 103 S.Ct.
3352, 3359, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (Section 1985(3) requires “some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted)); Zemsky v. City of
New York, 821 F.2d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring racial, ethnic, or class-based animus for
the second part of Section 1985(2)). This pleading of the claim falls woefully short of satisfying plausibility. The provisions
related to federal officers and federal court proceedings clearly do not apply to plaintiff's case.
The remaining provisions refer to equal protection of the laws and require a showing of racial or
other class-based animus. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant conspired to violate his civil
rights as part of any racial or other discriminatory purpose. Thus, plaintiff's claims under
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SAMUELMALDONADO, SSS Plaintiff, -against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER MIRANDA K. MALDONADO, 1:19-cv-7047 (ENV) Defendant. :
eee enn enn □□ ne ne eeeneeeeeees VITALIANO, D.J.
Plaintiff Samuel Maldonado filed this quite unusual pro se civil rights action on
December 12, 2019, naming his daughter as the only defendant. Plaintiffs request to proceed in
forma pauperis is granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the purposes of this Order, but the
action is dismissed.
Controlling Legal Principles
The Court is mindful that in reviewing a pro se complaint, a plaintiff's pleadings are held
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
USS. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, even after
Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Ifa liberal
reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the district
court must grant leave to amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000). Notwithstanding a self represented pleader’s right to solicitude, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action when it is satisfied that the
action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Regardless of
whether filed by a pro se plaintiff or not, a complaint must plead enough facts “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Although a plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, the pleading rules do demand “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In assessing plausibility,
all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, but this tenet is “inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Even more critical, a plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish
that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Pleading solicitude often affords
no cure for a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Rene v. Citibank NA, 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (inquiring into whether pro se plaintiff established subject matter jurisdiction);
see also Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 11 Civ. 5369, 2012 WL 1657362, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se
litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking.”). “[FJailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may
be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d
697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is
presented, or when plaintiffs and defendants have complete diversity of citizenship and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332. In order to invoke
federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Discussion
In this case, Maldonado alleges that his daughter conspired to violate his civil rights and
slandered and defamed him in connection with a New York criminal proceeding. His complaint,
it is presumed, invokes the provisions of the Civil Rights Acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section
1985 applies to conspiracies to interfere with an individual’s constitutional rights and may
include conspiracies by private actors. However, none of its three provisions applies in
plaintiff's case. Section 1985(1) addresses conspiracies to interfere with federal officers.
Section 1985(2) has two components. The first clause addresses conspiracies to obstruct justice
or to intimidate witnesses or jurors or other parties in federal court proceedings. The second
clause concerns conspiracies to obstruct “the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with
intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws....” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Section
1985(3) provides a remedy to redress conspiracies “for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Claims related to equal
protection of the laws under Section 1985(3) and the second clause of Section 1985(2) require
the plaintiff to show that the conspiracy was motivated by racial or otherwise class-based
animus. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-35, 103 S.Ct.
3352, 3359, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (Section 1985(3) requires “some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted)); Zemsky v. City of
New York, 821 F.2d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring racial, ethnic, or class-based animus for
the second part of Section 1985(2)). This pleading of the claim falls woefully short of satisfying plausibility. The provisions
related to federal officers and federal court proceedings clearly do not apply to plaintiff's case.
The remaining provisions refer to equal protection of the laws and require a showing of racial or
other class-based animus. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant conspired to violate his civil
rights as part of any racial or other discriminatory purpose. Thus, plaintiff's claims under
Section 1985 are dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Indeed, his allegations not only fall short of plausibility, they make clear that amendment of this
claim is futile.
Maldonado also claims that defendant defamed and slandered him. These claims may be
actionable under state law, but they do not give rise to any federal question. The Court has
considered whether plaintiff could invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction in order to bring these state law claims and finds that both parties are domiciled in New York State. Although
plaintiff is currently detained in Florida, he states that he resides in New York City. For the
purpose of determining diversity of citizenship, prisoners are presumed to be domiciled in the
state of origin, not the state of incarceration. See Scott v. Sonnet, Sale & Kuehne, P.A., 989 F.
Supp. 542, 543 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Prisoners are presumed to retain the domicile they had at
the time of incarceration for diversity purposes, although they can attempt to show that they have
established domicile in the state of incarceration.”). While a prisoner can rebut this presumption
by showing that he intends to change his residence after incarceration, plaintiff has specifically
stated that he resides in New York. Thus, plaintiffs claims for slander and defamation are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
The Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i1)
and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Since the futility of
amendment is patent, leave for that purpose is denied.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal would not be
taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S. Ct. 917, 920, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to plaintiff, and to close this case.
So Ordered.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York February 14, 2020
s/ Eric N. Vitaliano ERICN. VITALIANO.——™” United States District Judge