CROTHERS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Minnie Makedonsky appeals from a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Human Services’ decision denying her application for [187]*187Medicaid benefits. She argues the Department erred in deciding assets transferred to her daughters by her attorney-in-fact were available to her for purposes of determining her Medicaid eligibility. We hold a preponderance of evidence supports the Department’s findings that a presumption of undue influence regarding the transfers was not rebutted and that assets transferred to Makedonsky’s daughters by her attorney-in-fact were available to her for purposes of determining her Medicaid eligibility. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] Minnie Makedonsky entered a nursing home in Kidder County in August 2002, and the parties stipulated that at all times relevant to her claim for Medicaid benefits, she was mentally competent and capable of understanding her business affairs, but she had physical deficiencies requiring nursing home care. On August 22, 2002, after entering the nursing home, Minnie Makedonsky executed a durable power of attorney, appointing her daughter, JoAnn Makedonsky, as her attorney-in-fact. Between November 2002 and September 2005 JoAnn Makedonsky, as her mother’s attorney-in-fact, gifted more than $159,000 in assets to Minnie Makedonsky’s four daughters, JoAnn Makedonsky, Carol Schwindt, Rose Mack, and Donita Endrud. On September 8, 2005, Minnie Makedon-sky executed a “statement of intention to gift,” stating she had freely and voluntarily made those gifts to her daughters and she was not influenced by anyone, including JoAnn Makedonsky, in making those gifts.
[¶ 3] In February 2006, Minnie Make-donsky applied for Medicaid benefits with Kidder County Social Services. The county denied her application, concluding she had made disqualifying transfers of assets. Minnie Makedonsky appealed to the Department of Human Services.
[¶ 4] After an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) recommended affirming the county’s decision. The ALJ said JoAnn Makedonsky was a trustee for Minnie Makedonsky under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-08. The ALJ further said any transaction by which a trustee obtains any advantage from a beneficiary is presumed to be entered into without sufficient consideration and is a result of undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-16. The Department adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and found JoAnn Makedonsky had not rebutted the presumption of undue influence because Minnie Makedonsky had not testified at the administrative hearing to substantiate Minnie’s intent to gift her assets or to explain how she intended to pay for her nursing home costs. The Department concluded Minnie Makedon-sky’s testimony would have been the best evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence and JoAnn Makedonsky’s hearsay testimony about her mother’s intent was not credible. The Department was not convinced by Minnie Makedon-sky’s claim that, before she signed the statement of intention to gift, she had intended to gift her assets to her daughters. The Department recognized an applicant for Medicaid benefits must make a good-faith effort to pursue available legal actions to have assets made available for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. The Department determined Minnie Makedon-sky had a cause of action to have the gifted assets returned to her until she signed the statement of intention to gift on September 8, 2005, because under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-33.1(8), “a transfer is complete when the individual ... making the transfer has no lawful means of undoing the transfer or requiring a restoration of ownership.” It decided Minnie Makedonsky made a disqualifying transfer when she executed the [188]*188statement of intention to gift on September 8, 2005, which was within the thirty-six month look-back period of her February 2006 application for Medicaid benefits. Based on the value of the disqualifying transfer, the ALJ recommended that Minnie Makedonsky’s period of ineligibility for Medicaid benefits was from September 2, 2005, through July 15, 2008. The Department adopted the ALJ’s recommendation, and the district court affirmed the Department’s decision.
II
[¶ 5] “ ‘When a decision of an administrative agency is appealed from the district court to this Court, we review the decision of the agency.’ ” Martin v. Stutsman County Soc. Servs., 2005 ND 117, ¶ 8, 698 N.W.2d 278 (quoting Steen v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs., 1997 ND 52, ¶ 7, 562 N.W.2d 83). Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49, we review an administrative agency’s decision in the same manner as the district court, and we must affirm the agency’s decision unless:
“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of [N.D.C.C. eh. 28-32] have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8.The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.”
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.
[¶ 6] “Our review of an agency’s decision is limited; we will not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency,” and we will not reverse an agency’s decision unless its findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. J.P. v. Stark County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2007 ND 140, ¶ 9, 737 N.W.2d 627. In considering whether an agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we decide “only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.” Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.1979). “Questions of law are fully renewable.” Gustafson v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs., 2006 ND 75, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d 599.
Ill
[¶ 7] Minnie Makedonsky argues the Department erred in counting assets she gifted to her four daughters through her attorney-in-fact before the applicable look-back period. She asserts the gifts were effective on the date the transfers occurred and not in September 2005, when she signed the statement of intention to ratify the gifts because the ratification related back to the actual date of the transfers. She contends JoAnn Makedonsky was authorized to gift the assets under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-30-06, which allows an attorney-in-fact to make gifts if the attorney-in-fact has authority to perform any [189]*189act the principal may perform. She claims the Department erred in counting the assets gifted by JoAnn Makedonsky to the other three daughters because Minnie Makedonsky had a confidential relationship with only JoAnn Makedonsky and not with the other three daughters.
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CROTHERS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Minnie Makedonsky appeals from a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Human Services’ decision denying her application for [187]*187Medicaid benefits. She argues the Department erred in deciding assets transferred to her daughters by her attorney-in-fact were available to her for purposes of determining her Medicaid eligibility. We hold a preponderance of evidence supports the Department’s findings that a presumption of undue influence regarding the transfers was not rebutted and that assets transferred to Makedonsky’s daughters by her attorney-in-fact were available to her for purposes of determining her Medicaid eligibility. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] Minnie Makedonsky entered a nursing home in Kidder County in August 2002, and the parties stipulated that at all times relevant to her claim for Medicaid benefits, she was mentally competent and capable of understanding her business affairs, but she had physical deficiencies requiring nursing home care. On August 22, 2002, after entering the nursing home, Minnie Makedonsky executed a durable power of attorney, appointing her daughter, JoAnn Makedonsky, as her attorney-in-fact. Between November 2002 and September 2005 JoAnn Makedonsky, as her mother’s attorney-in-fact, gifted more than $159,000 in assets to Minnie Makedonsky’s four daughters, JoAnn Makedonsky, Carol Schwindt, Rose Mack, and Donita Endrud. On September 8, 2005, Minnie Makedon-sky executed a “statement of intention to gift,” stating she had freely and voluntarily made those gifts to her daughters and she was not influenced by anyone, including JoAnn Makedonsky, in making those gifts.
[¶ 3] In February 2006, Minnie Make-donsky applied for Medicaid benefits with Kidder County Social Services. The county denied her application, concluding she had made disqualifying transfers of assets. Minnie Makedonsky appealed to the Department of Human Services.
[¶ 4] After an administrative hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) recommended affirming the county’s decision. The ALJ said JoAnn Makedonsky was a trustee for Minnie Makedonsky under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-08. The ALJ further said any transaction by which a trustee obtains any advantage from a beneficiary is presumed to be entered into without sufficient consideration and is a result of undue influence under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-16. The Department adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and found JoAnn Makedonsky had not rebutted the presumption of undue influence because Minnie Makedonsky had not testified at the administrative hearing to substantiate Minnie’s intent to gift her assets or to explain how she intended to pay for her nursing home costs. The Department concluded Minnie Makedon-sky’s testimony would have been the best evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence and JoAnn Makedonsky’s hearsay testimony about her mother’s intent was not credible. The Department was not convinced by Minnie Makedon-sky’s claim that, before she signed the statement of intention to gift, she had intended to gift her assets to her daughters. The Department recognized an applicant for Medicaid benefits must make a good-faith effort to pursue available legal actions to have assets made available for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. The Department determined Minnie Makedon-sky had a cause of action to have the gifted assets returned to her until she signed the statement of intention to gift on September 8, 2005, because under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-33.1(8), “a transfer is complete when the individual ... making the transfer has no lawful means of undoing the transfer or requiring a restoration of ownership.” It decided Minnie Makedonsky made a disqualifying transfer when she executed the [188]*188statement of intention to gift on September 8, 2005, which was within the thirty-six month look-back period of her February 2006 application for Medicaid benefits. Based on the value of the disqualifying transfer, the ALJ recommended that Minnie Makedonsky’s period of ineligibility for Medicaid benefits was from September 2, 2005, through July 15, 2008. The Department adopted the ALJ’s recommendation, and the district court affirmed the Department’s decision.
II
[¶ 5] “ ‘When a decision of an administrative agency is appealed from the district court to this Court, we review the decision of the agency.’ ” Martin v. Stutsman County Soc. Servs., 2005 ND 117, ¶ 8, 698 N.W.2d 278 (quoting Steen v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs., 1997 ND 52, ¶ 7, 562 N.W.2d 83). Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-49, we review an administrative agency’s decision in the same manner as the district court, and we must affirm the agency’s decision unless:
“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of [N.D.C.C. eh. 28-32] have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8.The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.”
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.
[¶ 6] “Our review of an agency’s decision is limited; we will not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency,” and we will not reverse an agency’s decision unless its findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. J.P. v. Stark County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2007 ND 140, ¶ 9, 737 N.W.2d 627. In considering whether an agency’s findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we decide “only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were proved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.” Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.1979). “Questions of law are fully renewable.” Gustafson v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs., 2006 ND 75, ¶ 6, 712 N.W.2d 599.
Ill
[¶ 7] Minnie Makedonsky argues the Department erred in counting assets she gifted to her four daughters through her attorney-in-fact before the applicable look-back period. She asserts the gifts were effective on the date the transfers occurred and not in September 2005, when she signed the statement of intention to ratify the gifts because the ratification related back to the actual date of the transfers. She contends JoAnn Makedonsky was authorized to gift the assets under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-30-06, which allows an attorney-in-fact to make gifts if the attorney-in-fact has authority to perform any [189]*189act the principal may perform. She claims the Department erred in counting the assets gifted by JoAnn Makedonsky to the other three daughters because Minnie Makedonsky had a confidential relationship with only JoAnn Makedonsky and not with the other three daughters. She argues the evidence establishes the presumption of undue influence was successfully rebutted and the assets were not available to her for purposes of her Medicaid eligibility.
[11S] The Department counters that a Medicaid applicant must take affirmative steps showing an asset cannot be made available and that the date Minnie Make-donsky signed the statement of intention to gift, September 8, 2005, was the date she relinquished her legal right to sue for the return of assets gifted by her attorney-in-fact. The Department argues that evidence supports its findings that Minnie Makedonsky made a disqualifying transfer when she signed the statement of intention to gift and that she did not rebut the presumption of undue influence that arose when her attorney-in-fact gained an advantage from her. The Department contends the assets were available to Minnie Make-donsky for purposes of her Medicaid eligibility.
[¶ 9] In Estate of Pladson v. Traill County Soc. Servs., 2005 ND 213, ¶¶ 10-11, 707 N.W.2d 473, we outlined the legal framework for assessing an applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits:
“Generally, a person without sufficient assets to meet the cost of necessary medical care and services is eligible for Medicaid benefits. Schmidt v. Ward County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2001 ND 169, ¶ 9, 634 N.W.2d 506. The Medicaid program is intended to be a payor of last resort, and available resources must be exhausted before Medicaid will pay for an individual’s care. Wahl v. Morton County Soc. Servs., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 18, 574 N.W.2d 859. An applicant for Medicaid benefits must prove eligibility. Roberts [v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs.], 2005 ND 50, ¶ 7, 692 N.W.2d 922. Under the Department’s rules for determining Medicaid eligibility, a one-person unit is eligible for Medicaid benefits if the total value of that person’s assets does not exceed $3,000. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-26(l)(a); Linser v. Office of Attorney General, 2003 ND 195, ¶ 7, 672 N.W.2d 643. An ‘asset’ is defined as ‘any kind of property or property interest, whether real, personal, or mixed, whether liquid or illiquid, and whether or not presently vested with possessory rights.’ N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-01(2). Although certain assets are exempt or excluded from consideration, see N.D. Admin. Code §§ 75-02-02.1-27 and 75-02-02.1-28, other assets that are ‘actually available’ must be considered in determining the applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-25(1); Estate of Gross v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Servs., 2004 ND 190, ¶ 8, 687 N.W.2d 460. Assets are ‘actually available’ under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-25(1) when the assets are at the disposal of the applicant, recipient, or responsible relative who has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and that person has the legal ability to make the sum available for support, maintenance, or medical care.” Estate of Gross, at ¶ 8.
“Determining whether an asset is ‘actually available’ for purposes of Medicaid eligibility is largely a fact-specific inquiry depending on the circumstances of each case. Linser, 2003 ND 195, ¶ 11, 672 N.W.2d 643. The ‘actually available’ requirement must be interpreted reasonably, and the focus is on the applicant’s actual and practical ability to [190]*190make an asset available as a matter of fact, not legal fiction. Opp v. Ward County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2002 ND 45, ¶ 11, 640 N.W.2d 704.”
[¶ 10] An asset need not be in hand to be “actually available,” and an applicant may be required to initiate appropriate legal action to make the asset available. Linser v. Office of Attorney Gen., 2003 ND 195, ¶ 11, 672 N.W.2d 643; Opp v. Ward County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2002 ND 45, ¶ 11, 640 N.W.2d 704; Schmidt v. Ward County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2001 ND 169, ¶¶ 13-14, 634 N.W.2d 506; Post v. Cass County Soc. Servs. Bd., 556 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (N.D.1996). If an applicant has a colorable legal action to obtain assets through reasonable legal means, the assets are available and the burden is on the applicant to show a legal action would be unsuccessful. Linser, at ¶ 11; Opp, at ¶¶ 22-23; Post, at 665.
[¶ 11] Minnie Makedonsky’s claim involves whether the transfers by her attorney-in-faet to her daughters were gifts. A valid gift requires an intention by the donor to then and there give the property to the donee, coupled with an actual or constructive delivery of the property to the donee and acceptance of the property by the donee. Bellon v. Bellon, 244 N.W.2d 227, 228 (N.D.1976); In re Paulson’s Estate, 219 N.W.2d 132, 134 (N.D.1974); In re Kaspari’s Estate, 71 N.W.2d 558, 567 (N.D.1955); Zeman v. Mikolasek, 75 N.D. 41, 53, 25 N.W.2d 272, 279 (1946). The pivotal issue in this case involves whether Minnie Makedonsky intended to gift her property when the transfers were made.
[¶ 12] JoAnn Makedonsky, as Minnie Makedonsky’s attorney-in-fact, had a relation of personal confidence with Minnie Makedonsky, and JoAnn Makedonsky is deemed a trustee under N.D.C.C. § 59-01-08, the statute in effect when these transactions occurred. See 2007 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 549, § 27 (repealing N.D.C.C. ch. 59-01 and adopting Uniform Trust Code). Although JoAnn Makedon-sky had authority to gift Minnie Makedon-sky’s property under N.D.C.C. § 30.1-30-06, that authority must be construed together with other statutes regarding obligations of an attorney-in-fact and trustee. See In re Estate of Elken, 2007 ND 107, ¶ 7, 735 N.W.2d 842 (statutes construed as a whole and harmonized to give meaning to related provisions). All transactions between a trustee and a beneficiary, including gifts, are presumed to be without sufficient consideration and under undue influence. N.D.C.C. § 59-01-16. See 2007 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 549, § 27 (repealing N.D.C.C. ch. 59-01 and adopting Uniform Trust Code).
[¶ 13] Minnie Makedonsky had the burden of rebutting the presumption that the gifts were made without sufficient consideration and under undue influence. See Estate of Zins, 420 N.W.2d 729, 731 (N.D.1988). Although Minnie Makedon-sky asserts some of the gifts were to daughters other than the attorney-in-fact, the Department claims, “[t]ransfers to close family members are and always must be suspect, for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the likelihood of collusion resulting in a subsequent redistribution of the assets to the Attorney-in-Fact.” According to JoAnn Makedonsky, the daughters “plan[ned] to divide [equally] anything, any assets that are still available at the time of Minnie’s passing.” The Department decided JoAnn Makedonsky had not rebutted the presumption of undue influence because Minnie Makedonsky had not testified at the administrative hearing to substantiate Minnie Makedon-sky’s intent to gift her assets or explain how she intended to pay for her nursing home costs. The Department acknowledged that JoAnn Makedonsky testified [191]*191she called her mother each time a transfer was made and Minnie Makedonsky would ask if she had transferred the property yet. The Department decided, however, Minnie Makedonsky’s testimony would have been the best evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence and JoAnn Makedonsky’s hearsay testimony about her mother’s intent was not credible. The Department rejected Minnie Makedon-sky’s assertion that, before she signed the statement of intention to gift, she had intended to gift her assets to her daughters. The Department concluded Minnie Make-donsky had not carried her burden of establishing eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
[¶ 14] This record contains credible evidence supporting the Department’s findings that Minnie Makedonsky did not intend to gift her assets to her daughters when those transfers were made, including the Department’s reliance on Minnie Mak-edonsky’s failure to testify at the administrative hearing, which the Department found raised questions about JoAnn Make-donsky’s credibility, and the testimony about the daughters’ “plan” to divide the assets equally after Minnie’s death. In assessing credibility, the Department was entitled to draw an adverse inference from Minnie Makedonsky’s failure to testify at the administrative hearing. See Seco, Inc. v. Carney Rig & Trucking Co., 166 N.W.2d 397, 402-03 (N.D.1969); Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694, 709 (N.D.1964); Scherbenske v. Maier, 71 N.W.2d 770, 775 (N.D.1955). The parties also stipulated that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Minnie Makedonsky was mentally competent and capable of understanding her business affairs, but that she had physical deficiencies requiring nursing home care. Although Minnie Makedonsky may have had the capacity to make these gifts when they were made, her attorney-in-fact made these transfers, which implicated the presumption of undue influence and factual issues about her intent. There is evidence supporting the Department’s credibility and factual determinations regarding the transfers and Minnie Make-donsky’s intent, and we do not reweigh that evidence.
[¶ 15] We also reject Minnie Makedon-sky’s claim that her ratification of the gifts in September 2005 was retroactive to the actual date of the transfers under Matter of Mehus’ Estate, 278 N.W.2d 625, 630 (N.D.1979) and Askew v. Joachim Mem’l Home, 234 N.W.2d 226, 237 (N.D.1975). A principal’s valid ratification can relate back to the date an agent transferred the principal’s property. See Mehus, at 630; Askew, at 237. Here, however, the Department found Minnie Makedonsky lacked intent when the transfers were made and the gifts were revocable until she executed the statement of intention to gift. This case is about Medicaid eligibility under the Department’s regulations, and those regulations provide that “[a] [disqualifying] transfer is complete when the individual ... has no lawful means of undoing the transfer or requiring a restoration of ownership.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-33.1(8). We conclude the Department’s Medicaid regulations control the date of a disqualifying transfer for purposes of Minnie Makedonsky’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
[¶ 16] “Recognizing the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, our standard of review in cases such as this does not allow us to make independent findings of fact or to substitute our judgment for that of the agency fact finder.” Linser, 2003 ND 195, ¶ 11, 672 N.W.2d 643 (citing Wagner v. Sheridan County Soc. Servs. Bd., 518 N.W.2d 724, 729 (N.D.1994)). Evidence in this record supports the Department’s findings that Minnie Makedonsky did not intend to gift her assets, that the presumption of undue influence was not [192]*192rebutted, and that Minnie Makedonsky failed to establish her eligibility for Medicaid benefits. A reasoning mind could reasonably conclude, as the Department did, that Minnie Makedonsky did not intend to gift her assets, that the presumption of undue influence was not rebutted, and that Minnie Makedonsky’s assets were actually available to her until she executed the statement of intention to gift on September 8, 2005. Under the Department’s Medicaid regulations, her action constitutes a disqualifying transfer within the look-back period and disqualifies her from receiving Medicaid benefits.
IV
[¶ 17] We affirm the judgment affirming the Department’s decision.
[¶ 18] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and DALE V. SANDSTROM, J., concur.