Majersky v. City and County of Denver, Colorado

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-1200
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 21, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court GREGORY MAJERSKY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-1200 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-00479-LTB-RTG) CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, (D. Colo.) COLORADO; ASHLEY HINDS, Denver City Attorney’s Office; MAGISTRATE MICHELLE KLINE, Denver Municipal Court; JUDGE BETH FARAGHER, Municipal Court,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

Gregory Majersky, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Exercising jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 2

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Majersky initiated this action in state court in January 2025, asserting

constitutional claims against the City and County of Denver, Magistrate Judge

Michelle Kline, Judge Beth Faragher, and Denver City Attorney Ashley Hinds.

Majersky’s claims arose from Denver Municipal Court proceedings that resulted in

him pleading guilty to one count of disturbing the peace. 1 The defendants removed

the case to federal court. The district court ordered Majersky to file an amended

complaint that did not assert claims barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), and that did not sue defendants who were immune from suit.

Majersky filed his operative complaint in April 2025. He continued to

challenge his municipal court proceedings, alleging that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights throughout his criminal proceedings. Majersky contended that

the City of Denver’s police officers arrested him without probable cause, treated him

differently from his accuser, and failed to protect and enforce his rights. After his

arrest, he contended that City Attorney Hinds wrongfully pursued his prosecution,

and the judges wrongfully conducted proceedings against him based on an alleged

faulty arrest. Majersky requested that his conviction be overturned and that he be

awarded monetary damages for the violation of his constitutional rights. The

defendants moved to dismiss.

1 The details of Majersky’s underlying action can be found at Denver Municipal Case No. 23-GS-009736. 2 Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 3

A magistrate judge recommended that Majersky’s operative complaint be

dismissed. The magistrate judge noted that Majersky specifically requested that the

court vacate his state court conviction and that the claims were barred under Heck,

which prohibits a civil rights action where the plaintiff’s underlying conviction has

not been invalidated. The magistrate judge noted that Majersky could not succeed on

his malicious prosecution or his false arrest allegations, as the underlying conviction

remained valid. Next, the magistrate judge determined that the judges were entitled

to absolute judicial immunity, and the city attorney was entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity. Lastly, the magistrate judge determined that Majersky

insufficiently pled a municipal liability claim.

Majersky objected to the recommendation. He argued that Heck did not

preclude his claims because the warrant that led to his arrest was illegal and his

“detention was excessive because of the addition of the domestic violence tag for

mere email communications later ruled to be protected speech.” R. at 164. Majersky

also argued that the Tenth Amendment conflicted with Heck, judicial immunity, and

prosecutorial immunity. He then argued that the judges were not entitled to judicial

immunity because his arrest was illegal and he was not read his Miranda rights,

which defeated both judges’ jurisdiction over him. Majersky argued that City

Attorney Hinds was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity because she violated the

duties of her position and acted outside of her jurisdiction. Lastly, he argued that he

established municipal liability by citing to Denver’s municipal code and stating that

3 Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 4

the City and the other defendants acted against the United States and Colorado

Constitutions.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation over

Majersky’s objections and dismissed his operative complaint. It found that

Majersky’s objections lacked merit for the following reasons. First, Majersky’s

request to vacate his criminal conviction required treating the conviction as invalid,

which implicated Heck, and his criminal conviction had not been vacated. Second,

Magistrate Judge Kline and Judge Faragher were immune because their alleged

actions were all taken in their judicial capacities. Third, City Attorney Hinds was

entitled to prosecutorial immunity for her actions in prosecuting Majersky’s criminal

case. Lastly, it found that Majersky had not demonstrated municipal liability because

his allegations were insufficient to show that he suffered an injury caused by a policy

or custom of the City and County of Denver. The district court dismissed Majersky’s

claims against the judicial defendants and City Attorney Hinds with prejudice based

on absolute immunity. It dismissed the complaint and all claims against the City of

Denver without prejudice. Majersky timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Alvarado v.

KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complainant must allege facts that, if true, state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Est. of Burgaz, ex. rel. Zommer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,

30 F.4th 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2022). “In reviewing the motion to dismiss, we

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accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view the

allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

We construe Majersky’s pleadings liberally but do not serve as his advocate.

Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023).

ANALYSIS

Heck v. Humphrey

To recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, “a § 1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. So, a civil action is barred where

a successful judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction of

sentence. See Torres v. Madrid, 60 F.4th 596, 600 (10th Cir. 2023).

It is clear from Majersky’s complaint that he does not satisfy this prerequisite

with respect to the criminal conviction he sought to invalidate here. His claims

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. And that conviction has not been

vacated or called into question at all, outside of Majersky’s own allegations, which

are insufficient to surpass the Heck bar. Accordingly, the district court correctly

5 Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 6

determined that Majersky’s challenges and requests to invalidate his criminal

conviction were barred by Heck.

Majersky argues on appeal that the Tenth Amendment bars the application of

Heck to his case. We disagree. There is no Tenth Amendment exception to the Heck

doctrine, and Majersky’s action is exactly the type that falls within Heck’s purview. 2

We affirm the district court’s without-prejudice dismissals based on its Heck

analysis. 3 We now turn to the court’s with-prejudice dismissals, which were based

on judicial and prosecutorial immunity.

Judicial Immunity

A judge acting in his or her judicial capacity is immune from suit “unless the

judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Snell v. Tunnell,

920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990). Judicial immunity “is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in

the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11-12

2 Majersky makes the same Tenth Amendment argument with respect to the district court’s judicial and prosecutorial immunity determinations. As with Heck, there are no exceptions under the Tenth Amendment to the application of these doctrines, and we reject Majersky’s contentions to the contrary. 3 We need not address the district court’s analysis on Majersky’s attempt to bring a municipal liability claim, as the dismissal without prejudice under Heck is proper. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505–06 (2001) (discussing that a dismissal without prejudice “does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the lawsuit within the applicable limitations period”). 6 Appellate Case: 25-1200 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 01/21/2026 Page: 7

(citations omitted). To determine whether an act is judicial, the court must evaluate

whether the act is “a function normally performed by a judge,” and whether the

parties “dealt with the judge in his [or her] judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).

Those exceptions do not apply here. Majersky’s claims against Judges Kline

and Faragher stem from normal actions the judges took in their judicial capacities

while overseeing Majersky’s criminal proceedings. The district court correctly

determined that both judges were entitled to judicial immunity.

Prosecutorial Immunity

“It is well established that prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit under

section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial process,

such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.” Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although there is an exception to this immunity when the prosecutor acts in an

investigative or administrative function, see id. at 1490, that exception does not apply

here. The claims against City Attorney Hinds were entirely based on her decisions

and actions in prosecuting Majersky in his criminal case. The district court correctly

determined that City Attorney Hinds was entitled to prosecutorial immunity.

Majersky asserts that City Attorney Hinds is not subject to federal court

jurisdiction. He is incorrect. Majersky asserted federal claims against City Attorney

Hinds, and accordingly, his suit against her fell within federal jurisdiction, which the

defendants all acknowledged when they removed this action to the federal district

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court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which

the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . .

to the district court of the United States[.]”).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s decision. We grant Majersky’s in forma

pauperis motion.

Entered for the Court

Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge