Madson v. Fato

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 12, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-01482·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSHUA O. MADSON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1482 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND LUCY FATO; PETER ZAFFINO, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action, for which the filing fees have been paid, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e- 17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. He alleges that Defendants discriminated against him because of his race and religion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who identifies his race as Jewish and his religion as Islam, brings this action against Lucy Fato and Peter Zaffino, alleging that they discriminated against him while he was employed at Validus Research in Manhattan. Plaintiff makes the following assertions against Defendants: (1) Propagated A culture of Bullying And Harassment Based on Race-Religion In Chicago and New York Offices (2) Denied severance based on Race-Religion (3) Terminated Employment based on Race-Religion (4) Conspired with Domestic Special Interest Groups In My Attempted Assasination Based on Race-Religion. (ECF 1, at 5.)1 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages. DISCUSSION A. Claims under Title VII Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim, and all spelling, irregular capitalization, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original, unless noted otherwise. unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). Proper defendants Plaintiff cannot bring Title VII claims against Defendants Fato and Zaffino. Title VII only provides for the liability of an employer and other covered entities, such as an employment

agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The only proper defendant for an action under Title VII is a plaintiff’s employer or other entities covered by the statute. See Chibuzor v. Corwin, No. 20-CV-9643, 2020 WL 6905304, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2020); Mira v. Kingston, 218 F. Supp. 3d 229, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII. See Wrighten v. Glowski, 232 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]ndividual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII.”), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Ind. v. Ellerth,

Madson v. Fato, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

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