Madsen v. Chrysler Corporation

261 F. Supp. 488
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 16, 1967
Docket65 C 1783
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 261 F. Supp. 488 (Madsen v. Chrysler Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Madsen v. Chrysler Corporation, 261 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1967).

Opinion

OPINION

WILL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, J. A. Madsen Motor Sales, Inc. and its stockholders, Madsen, Zwier-zycki, D’Ziak and Ashmore, bring this action, complaining of defendants’ decision to terminate the Chrysler, Plymouth and Imperial automobile franchises of Mad-sen Motor Sales in Wheaton, Illinois. A ninety-day notice of termination for cause was served on the plaintiff corporation on August 31, 1965. Prior to the termination of the ninety-day period, plaintiffs instituted this suit. While the franchises have been theoretically terminated as of November 29, 1965, plaintiffs have continued in the business of selling Chrysler, Plymouth and Imperial automobiles during the pendency of this action, under a separate agreement.

Plaintiffs seek damages and an injunction requiring Chrysler Corporation to maintain the original franchise relationship, basing their claim on several alternative theories. Initially, plaintiffs allege that Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation have conspired to restrain trade and, individually or in concert, have attempted to monopolize trade and commerce in the sale, service and financing of Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles in the Wheaton and Glen Ellyn, Illinois markets, by determining to open a factory-owned or controlled sales unit in that area, replacing Madsen Motor Sales’ Chrysler-Plymouth-Imperial (CPI) dealership in Wheaton and Glen Ellyn Motor Sales, an existing Plymouth dealership in Glen Ellyn operated by one William McKie. Plaintiffs contend that such action will restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by eliminating the competition now existing between Madsen and McKie and constitutes an attempt to monopolize the business of both Madsen and McKie in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

As an additional ground for the claimed § 1 violation, plaintiffs submit that the termination by Chrysler Corporation is in fact a concerted refusal to deal brought about by an agreement between Chrysler and McKie providing that upon termination of Madsen Motors’ franchise, McKie will be the operator of the new Chrysler-constructed CPI dealership planned to replace Madsen and Glen Ellyn, McKie’s present dealership. Plaintiffs also contend that the conduct outlined above constitutes a violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act, ch. 38 Ill.Rev.Stat. § 60-1 et seq.

Alternatively, plaintiffs allege that the termination of the Madsen Motors franchise gives rise to a cause of action under the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225, on account of defendants’ failure to act “in good faith” with respect to the decision to terminate. Finally, plaintiffs submit that, in any case, defendants had no grounds for termination for cause and, accordingly, the termination constitutes a *491 breach of their obligations under the contract.

■ As will appear more fully hereafter, defendants contend that the Madsen Motors franchise was terminated solely on account of the latter’s failure to perform its selling obligations under the franchise agreement. While there is no dispute as to Chrysler’s planned corporate-owned or controlled new dealership for the Wheaton-Glen Ellyn market, defendants take the position that this issue, and the selection of McKie as the proposed operator of the facility, is unrelated to the legality of the Madsen termination. The issues of injunctive relief and liability (on all counts of the complaint) have been tried to the court and the case is now ready for decision as to these issues.

J. A. Madsen Motor Sales initially acquired the Wheaton CPI franchise in 1953. The business was then operated as a partnership between plaintiffs Mad-sen and Zwierzycki. Thereafter, in 1958, the business was incorporated and two key employees, D’Ziak and Ashmore, acquired stock in the corporation. In 1957, after the enactment of the Dealers’ Day in Court Act, new franchise agreements — one covering Chrysler-Plymouth and one for Imperial — were entered into and, upon incorporation of the business in 1958, the latter agreements were replaced with new franchises, designating the corporation as franchisee.

The Chrysler-Plymouth and Imperial agreements are generally identical. Each provide for a continuing, indefinite term relationship, the dealer maintaining the right to terminate for any reason on 30 days’ notice and Chrysler reserving the right to terminate on 90 days’ notice in five specific instances. Aside from these specified causes, no general right of termination at will is reserved to the manufacturer. This distinguishes Chrysler Corporation franchise agreements from those of the other major automobile manufacturers. See Macaulay, Changing A Continuing Relationship Between A Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and The Legal System, 1965 Wis.Law Rev. 483, 564-65 (No. 3, Summer 1965). While § 2-309 (2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, in force both in Illinois and Michigan, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, c. 26, § 2-309(2); C.L. 1948, § 440.2309(2) [P.A.1962, No. 174], provides that contracts for indefinite terms are terminable at will, that section — if applicable to franchise agreements — is qualified by the words “unless otherwise agreed.” The introductory portion of the dealer agreement refers to the recitation of Chrysler’s right to terminate for specific causes in opposition to the dealer’s right to terminate at will and specifically points out that the franchise agreement may be terminated by Chrysler only in reliance on one of the specific enumerated causes.

On October 26, 1959, an additional dealer agreement relating to Valiant automobiles was executed by Chrysler and Madsen. Its terms are substantially identical to the Chrysler-Plymouth and Imperial agreements mentioned above. The primary ground for termination for cause stated in the agreements is the dealer’s failure to perform any of the undertakings and obligations stated in the operative sections of the agreement concerning sales of automobiles and parts, advertising, record keeping and the like.

The franchised dealer agrees that he will sell energetically in the non-exclusive sales area assigned him in the agreement and, since passage of the Dealers’ Day in Court' Act, specifically will sell whatever number of new Plymouth (or Chrysler or Imperial) automobiles is needed to fulfill his “Minimum Sales Responsibility” or “MSR”. The basis for calculating MSR is then set out in the agreement.

The starting point for the calculation of MSR is the “region” designated by Chrysler in which the dealer operates. In the case of Madsen Motors, this region, while referred to as “Chicago”, consists of a 108 county, 3 state area, including northwestern Indiana from Elkhart to the Illinois state line, the northern half of Illinois (north of Pe *492 oria) and the eastern half of Iowa (up to Des Moines). There are 227 dealer locations in the region, although not all dealers are CPI franchisees, some handling Plymouth only, others selling Chrysler and Imperial but not Plymouth or lacking the Imperial line. Each dealer is assigned a sales locality generally made up of one or more post office listings.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bray v. QFA ROYALTIES LLC
486 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Colorado, 2007)
Wootton Enterprises, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc.
134 F. Supp. 2d 698 (D. Maryland, 2001)
Heck Implement, Inc. v. Deere & Co.
926 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Missouri, 1996)
Associated Producers v. City of Independence, Mo.
648 F. Supp. 1255 (W.D. Missouri, 1986)
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake
631 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Illinois, 1986)
Kaiser v. Local No. 83
577 F.2d 642 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld
48 A.D.2d 428 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1975)
Varney v. Coleman Company, Inc.
385 F. Supp. 1337 (D. New Hampshire, 1974)
DeCantis v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc.
371 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Virginia, 1974)
Maywood Sportservice, Inc. v. Maywood Park Trotting Ass'n
302 N.E.2d 79 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1973)
Rea v. Ford Motor Company
355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1973)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld
72 Misc. 2d 392 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
261 F. Supp. 488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madsen-v-chrysler-corporation-ilnd-1967.